Filed 6/22/26 In re S.B. CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re S.B., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
MADERA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF F090502
SOCIAL SERVICES/CHILD WELFARE
SERVICES, (Super. Ct. No. MJP019221)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
OPINION
v.
D.B.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Madera County. Timothy A.
Kams, Judge.
Sarah Vaona, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Regina A. Garza, County Counsel, and Christopher B. Dorian, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
D.B. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional order adjudging her
now 12-year-old son, S.B., a dependent of the court and removing him from her physical
custody pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 361.
Mother contends there was insufficient evidence to support (1) the juvenile court’s
jurisdictional finding that S.B. was described by section 300, subdivision (c) (serious
emotional damage) and (2) the court’s finding that there were no reasonable means to
protect S.B. without removal underlying its removal order.
Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Original Petition Filed and Dependency Proceedings Initiated with S.B. Remaining in
Mother’s Custody
S.B. is the middle child of five siblings, who, at the time the underlying
dependency proceedings were initiated, all resided with mother in Madera County. S.B.
and his siblings had a range of special needs, with one of his siblings having complex
medical needs.2 The family had an extensive child welfare history, made up of numerous
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
2 As we explain the body of this opinion, taking jurisdiction over a child under
section 300, subdivision (c) requires a finding, as relevant here, that “[t]he child is
suffering serious emotional damage, or is at substantial risk of suffering serious
emotional damage, evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward
aggressive behavior toward self or others.”
There does not appear to be a dispute that the evidence supports the finding that
S.B. suffered from “serious emotional damage” as defined by the statute; the only
jurisdictional issue raised by mother is whether there was sufficient evidence of “nexus”
between her conduct and the risk of harm. As such, we try to avoid, where possible,
going into too great of detail regarding aspects of S.B.’s mental and emotional struggles,
including his diagnoses, medication he takes, and the numerous examples of extreme
behavior included in the record, in the interest of protecting his privacy.
Additionally, we reference S.B.’s sibling’s medical needs briefly throughout the
opinion to the extent they are relevant to the basis of the underlying dependency case and
2.
referrals as well as the provision of services, both in Madera County and San Diego
County. San Diego is where the family previously resided, and where S.B.’s presumed
father, J.B. (father), lived primarily during the proceedings.3
The dependency case underlying the present appeal was originally initiated in
November 2024, when the Madera County Department of Social Services/Child Welfare
Services (department) filed a petition on behalf of all five children based on allegations
made by then 10-year-old S.B. that father had used excessive discipline on him.4 The
petition also alleged that the parents had failed to provide S.B. with adequate
medical/behavioral treatment to address his oppositional and aggressive behaviors. The
petition listed five occasions over the prior two months, on which mother called law
enforcement due to S.B.’s dangerous behavior, including trying to jump into oncoming
traffic, getting into physical altercations with his siblings and mother, and vandalizing the
home.
S.B. and his siblings remained in mother’s care at the time the petition was filed.
S.B. Detained from Mother
Following the filing of the original petition, two incidents led the department to
detain S.B. from mother. First, in December 2024, mother called law enforcement for
assistance because S.B. was refusing to get into mother’s vehicle. When law
enforcement arrived, S.B. was thrashing while being held by mother and one of his
mother’s ability to provide care for S.B. We purposefully only touch on the extent of
these needs to protect that child’s privacy.
3 Father is not a party to this appeal, his participation in the underlying proceedings
was limited, and to our knowledge, he has not appealed separately.
4 While the department’s initial investigation and focus were on these allegations,
S.B. later recanted them, and, as we explain the body of the opinion, the focus moved
from possible abuse and/or neglect of S.B. to the parents’ inability to care for S.B.’s
mental and emotional health needs.
3.
siblings and had a bloody nose. One of the sheriff’s deputies who responded was able to
talk to S.B. and calm him down.
Mother and S.B. gave conflicting accounts of what had happened. In mother’s
account, S.B. “lost it” for no reason because she took his phone. He hit her with his shoe,
kicked his sibling, and fled the home on foot. Mother followed him in her vehicle and
was able to get him to get into the vehicle, but he later tried to jump out while the vehicle
was moving. Mother eventually had to call law enforcement for assistance. S.B.’s
sibling’s account was consistent with mother’s.
S.B. reported he, mother, and his sibling got into a physical altercation stemming
from mother blaming him for something he did not do, holding him down, and instructing
his sibling to get his phone from his backpack. S.B. hit his mother with a shoe in self-
defense, and mother caused his bloody nose by elbowing him. He denied jumping out of
a moving vehicle and explained that mother had bought him food and subsequently threw
it out the window, and he got out of the car while it was parked to get it. The deputy
observed a burger on the ground consistent with S.B.’s statement. The deputy stated in
her report that she was “ ‘unable to determine what truly occurred with this incident’ ”
because mother had previously been “ ‘untruthful and inconsistent with her statements to
law enforcement numerous times.’ ” Mother requested law enforcement place a section
5150 hold on S.B., but they declined because they did not feel he met the criteria.5
A few days later, mother was transporting S.B. to seek mental health help, and
they stopped at a gas station on the way. She and S.B. began arguing because he did not
want to go, and he left the area on foot. A security guard assisted mother in searching for
S.B., eventually found him hiding in the bushes, and contacted law enforcement. Upon
5 Section 5150 authorizes law enforcement and other designated authorities, to place
up to a 72-hour hold, upon probable cause, on individuals who “as a result of a mental
health disorder, is a danger to others, or to themselves, or gravely disabled.”
4.
law enforcement’s arrival, mother explained to them that S.B. had gotten violent with her
and his siblings earlier that day. She stated that S.B. scratched himself and told mother
he would tell the police she did it. While they were driving S.B. was moving around the
vehicle and attempting to distract her from driving. The deputy who responded to the
scene placed S.B. on a section 5150 hold for being a danger to himself and others.
S.B. was subsequently hospitalized for mental health treatment for 14 days. Upon
his release, he was detained from mother and placed in foster care, as his behaviors had
resulted in physical injuries and put himself and others at further risk.
A child and family team meeting was conducted on January 2, 2025, during which
mother denied ever hitting S.B. She admitted that S.B.’s sibling had intervened and been
kicked in the stomach while attempting to restrain S.B. She stated that S.B. would
become aggressive with his siblings when he was being antagonized and when his
electronics were taken away. Mother explained that S.B. had been receiving counseling
services as well as in-home services prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. His behaviors had
steadily worsened since the services had stopped due to the pandemic, but she had not
attempted to reestablish services until around November 2024. S.B. had since been
attending weekly counseling sessions, and mother had recently scheduled in-home
services because S.B.’s behaviors had continued to worsen.
Following the meeting, the department filed a first amended original dependency
petition on behalf of S.B. asserting he came within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction under
section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1). The department sought an order of continued
detention of S.B. from mother. The department reported that the parents had “utilized
law enforcement to assist them … and have demonstrated that they are unable to control
[S.B.’s] behavior … without other agency intervention.” The department stated that
though mother reported S.B. had grown more volatile, she had only obtained services for
S.B. recently, and the delay had “resulted in other children in the home being at risk of
5.
physical harm,” adding that mother had utilized the help of S.B.’s sibling, which resulted
in her being injured.
On January 6, 2025, a detention hearing was conducted, S.B. was ordered to
remain detained, and the matter was set for a contested jurisdiction hearing on
January 24, 2025.
Second Amended Original Petition Filed, Juvenile Dependency Jurisdiction Taken
Over S.B., and S.B. Returned to Mother’s Home; Family Maintenance Recommended
Disposition
On January 24, 2025, the parties informed the juvenile court they had “reached an
agreement.” In accordance with the agreement, the department dismissed the
jurisdictional allegations as to S.B.’s siblings made in the original petition and filed a
second amended original petition (SAP) as to S.B. in open court. County counsel
informed the court that the department planned to exercise its discretion to return S.B.
home on an extended visit pending disposition and planned to recommend family
maintenance services for disposition.
The SAP alleged that S.B. came within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction under
section 300, subdivision (c). Specifically, it alleged that S.B. was suffering or at
substantial risk of suffering serious emotional damage and had “no parent or guardian
capable of providing appropriate care.” The supporting facts alleged were that S.B. had
been diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, oppositional defiant disorder,
“and potential other undiagnosed conditions,” and exhibited symptoms such as “a history
of untoward aggressive behavior toward others, depression, anxiety, suicidal ideation and
violent outbursts.” The petition alleged the parents were incapable of providing adequate
behavioral health services for S.B. as evidenced by law enforcement intervention
including but not limited to incidents from September 2024 and October 2024, and the
recent incident from December 2024, which resulted in a section 5150 hold.
6.
The parents submitted on the issue of jurisdiction, and the juvenile court sustained
the allegation in the SAP and set the matter for disposition.
S.B. was subsequently returned to mother’s custody, and in its initial disposition
report, dated February 11, 2025, the department recommended that S.B. be adjudged a
dependent and mother be ordered to participate in family maintenance services. S.B. was
receiving in-home behavioral health services and was medication compliant. He was
observed to be adjusting well to new medications, his services, and returning home with
mother. Additionally, mother was participating in parenting classes.
Mother set the matter for a contested disposition hearing to be held on March 27,
2025; she wanted the case to be dismissed outright or be granted “informal services”
without the juvenile court adjudging S.B. a dependent child.6
In the meantime, S.B. continued to participate in services including therapy, in-
home behavioral health services, and medication management. Mother completed her
parenting program, but there were concerns with mother’s ability to participate with S.B.
in the in-home services as she was distracted by the other children in the home. The
department opined monitoring under court supervision remained appropriate ahead of the
contested disposition hearing.
Disposition Hearing Continued, Subsequent Petition Filed, and S.B. Detained from
Mother Second Time
The contested disposition hearing was continued on March 27, 2025, and May 1,
2025, at the juvenile court’s suggestion, and ultimately set for July 10, 2025. The
6 See section 360, subdivision (b) (“If the court finds that the child is a person
described by [s]ection 300, it may without adjudicating the child a dependent child of the
court, order that services be provided to keep the family together and place the child and
the child’s parent or guardian under the supervision of the social worker for a time period
consistent with [s]ection 301.”).
7.
juvenile court wanted to give more time for circumstances to improve with hope that the
matter could be dismissed.
During this time, however, S.B.’s behavior began to escalate, despite his continued
participation in services, resulting in his being placed on multiple section 5150 holds
following mother’s calls to law enforcement due to his engaging in destructive behavior,
including toward his home, mother’s vehicle, and a deputy’s patrol vehicle; leaving the
home alone and being found on the side of the road by a concerned stranger; threatening
and kicking a sheriff’s deputy; impulsive and aggressive behaviors; and being otherwise
combative with law enforcement.7 Mother referred herself to behavioral health, took a
mental health assessment, and met the criteria for services. She signed a release so the
department could track her progress. Mother also began seeking an alternative living
arrangement for her child with medical needs so she could focus more attention on her
other children. As of late May 2025, the department maintained its position that family
maintenance services was the most appropriate disposition.
Following an incident on June 5, 2025, however, the department changed its
position regarding S.B. remaining in mother’s home. On June 5, mother called law
enforcement and reported that S.B. was throwing rocks at windows and breaking doors at
the family’s home. Upon law enforcement’s response to the residence, mother reported
that S.B. had run away after she told him they would be coming. She explained that
earlier that day, the social worker had made a visit, and the topic of out-of-home
7 On one occasion in April 2025, there was conflict in the family arising from S.B.’s
siblings’ perceptions that S.B. was taking too much of mother’s time and attention, and
the siblings acting out including being physically assaultive to mother and S.B., and
eventually running away from their home into the woods until they were apprehended by
law enforcement. One of S.B.’s siblings was placed on a section 5150 hold as he
reported not feeling safe returning home, and mother elected to press charges as to S.B.’s
other sibling, and she was transported to juvenile hall. The department reported that the
sibling who was transported to juvenile hall was later placed in father’s care following a
hearing with juvenile probation.
8.
placement came up. S. B. got upset and began acting out. Mother estimated that S.B.
caused approximately $230 in property damage to doors in the home. While law
enforcement was present, S.B. returned home and did not respond to the sheriff’s
deputy’s attempts to speak with him. Law enforcement decided to place a section 300
hold on S.B. due to the destructive and runaway behavior and the “high volume of calls”
the sheriff’s department had received concerning S.B., totaling approximately 50 calls for
service in the past three months. It was deemed to be unsafe for S.B. to remain in the
home and that the parents had failed to provide adequate supervision and protection
despite receiving extensive services, and he was taken into protective custody.
On June 9, 2025, the department filed a subsequent petition pursuant to section
342.8 The petition alleged that S.B. was suffering or at substantial risk of suffering
serious emotional damage and had “no parent or guardian capable of providing
appropriate care” under section 300, subdivision (c). Supporting facts included S.B.’s
diagnoses and symptoms already set forth in the SAP, and additionally that “The family
has received extensive services aimed both at addressing [S.B.]’s behaviors and
equipping the parents with skills to manage those behaviors and [S.B.]’s violent outbursts
in the home, but based on recent events the [d]epartment submits that the parents … have
been incapable of providing appropriate care for the child, who continues to act out in
ways which can potentially cause harm to himself and others.” The petition stated that
S.B. was placed on four section 5150 holds in April and May 2025 and referenced the
June 5, 2025 incident.
8 Section 342 provides in pertinent part that “[i]n any case in which a minor has
been found to be a person described by [s]ection 300 and the petitioner alleges new facts
or circumstances, other than those under which the original petition was sustained,
sufficient to state that the minor is a person described in [s]ection 300, the petitioner shall
file a subsequent petition.” (Id., subd. (a).) “Unless otherwise provided by law, all
procedures and hearings required for an original petition are applicable to a subsequent
petition filed under this section.” (Id., subd. (b).)
9.
At the detention hearing on the subsequent petition conducted on June 16, 2025,
the juvenile court made temporary detention orders, and the matter was set for a
combined detention and adjudication hearing.
Juvenile Court Sustains Subsequent Petition and Sets Matter for Disposition on the
SAP and Subsequent Petition; Updated Recommended Disposition is Removal and
Family Reunification Services
The contested detention and adjudication hearing on the subsequent petition
commenced on July 10, 2025, and concluded on July 31, 2025. The social worker
testified that S.B. did not exhibit extreme behaviors while in out-of-home placement,
either when he was briefly removed in January, and since he had been removed in June.
Since the most recent removal, visits had been going well between mother and S.B.
Mother testified that she had sought various treatments for S.B. prior to
department intervention, including ADHD treatment, therapy services, psychiatric
services, medication management, and in-home behavioral services. She learned that he
had oppositional defiant disorder only in the past year when he started showing more
defiant behaviors. Medication had improved his behavior, and he no longer showed
violence toward others. She had previously set up a safety plan with the assistance of in-
home behavioral services, which included limiting S.B.’s screen time and using
techniques to deescalate him, such as coregulation, redirection, or giving him space. If he
did not deescalate, she was to call the sheriff’s department or the behavioral health crisis
line for backup support. S.B. had consistently used the “taking space” method since
March 2025.
Mother explained that on June 5, 2025, the day S.B. most recently got removed,
S.B. had begun acting out after the social worker’s visit, and she told him if he did not
deescalate, she would call the sheriff’s department and behavioral health in accordance
with the safety plan. When she was on the phone seeking assistance, S.B. calmly walked
off, stating he did not want to go to foster care, be placed on a section 5150 hold, or
10.
interact with the sheriff’s deputies in any way. He went to an RV on the property, which
is a common behavior, and when he returned to the house, the deputies placed a
section 300 hold on him even though he was calm. Mother testified the since S.B. had
been in placement, he had been very depressed and withdrawn.
As for safety plans that she could arrange at the time of the hearing that were not
previously available, mother testified that the behavioral health crisis intervention line
had recently staffed a full-time behavioral health employee to be the first responder in the
instance of a mental health crisis. Mother testified this was an improvement over the
previous policy where the sheriff’s department was the first responder to intervention line
calls. Mother was also in the process of seeking a placement for her child with complex
medical needs, who required a one-on-one nurse “at all times.”
Following the testimony, mother’s attorney argued the evidence was insufficient to
show the department made reasonable efforts to prevent removal nor that S.B. came
within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (c) because mother
was not in denial of nor failing to seek treatment for S.B.’s mental health treatment.
County counsel argued he “could cite the entire record of these proceedings dating
back to …when the initial petition was filed as a perpetuating attempt by the [d]epartment
not to remove [S.B.].” He further argued that mother was “in denial about her ability to
help [S.B.] to the extent he needs to be helped right now,” adding “this is not a criticism
of [mother]’s dedication.” He went on to say that “Everything has been tried except for
an extended period of [S.B.] being removed from that home and provided care outside of
the home.”
Minor’s counsel argued that mother “has been stretched every which way in every
direction and she’s been dealt a hand that’s difficult for anyone to have to deal with,” but
that what the county counsel said was “correct.” Minor’s counsel added that the incidents
where S.B. leaves the home put him in particular danger, as the family lived near
11.
mountain roads and wildlife. He further argued that mother’s “safety plan was lacking”
as the sheriff’s department’s “answer seems to be cookie-cutted into a 5150,” which had
not helped. Counsel added that he hoped circumstances could change, including services
becoming available for S.B.’s special needs sibling, mother adopting a different safety
plan such as reaching out to others rather than law enforcement, and S.B. taking initiative
to figure out ways to deescalate himself. However, counsel did not believe at the present
that mother had the capability to protect S.B.
In ruling, the juvenile court noted it had considered the reports and testimony
presented. The court found that the department had made reasonable and “substantial”
efforts and services to prevent removal. The court noted that it was glad county counsel
did not “argue or make it his complete argument that, look what’s happened since [S.B.]
was removed, things are hunky-dory…. It is information that is informative, but it’s not
the basis of the [c]ourt’s ruling.” The court went on to say that the “record is replete with
instances of [S.B.] being destructive and the potential danger not only to himself but to
others in the home—run aways from home. And despite all the extensive services
provided by the [d]epartment, [S.B.] is still in a position of potential danger, I guess,
largely of his own doing, but in a position where the parents, frankly, have failed to
provide enough so that there’s protection for [S.B.], and perhaps, the other children in the
home, but largely to [S.B.].” Finally, the court noted that it did not “fault [m]other for
wanting to oversee supervision and … call the shots.” The court continued, “That’s not
necessarily appropriate here and maybe not the best scenario here. She cares for her
children, obviously. She has her hands full … but in spite of her efforts, the [d]epartment
has met their burden, which is slight, frankly, preponderance, and, therefore, the
allegation is sustained.” The court again continued disposition on the SAP and set it to
coincide with disposition on the subsequent petition.
12.
On August 27, 2025, the department filed an addendum report detailing a number
of positive supervised visits between mother, S.B., and some of his siblings. The
department was recommending S.B. remain in out-of-home care and the family
participate in reunification services. Though S.B. wished to return home, and the family
had been having positive visits, the social worker believed the focus of the case should be
progressing visitation to overnight visits to assess for mother’s ability to care for S.B.
without instances of self-harming statements and behaviors.
Disposition Hearing Conducted, and S.B. Declared a Dependent and Removed from
Mother’s Custody with Reunification Services
A contested disposition hearing on both the SAP and the subsequent petition was
conducted on September 2, 2025. Mother called the social worker for cross-examination.
The social worker testified that S.B.’s behaviors appeared to be improving, and the family
had a three-hour unsupervised visit the previous weekend. S.B. continued not to have
instances of extreme behavior or section 5150 holds while in out-of-home placement. He
was also engaging more in his therapy. The social worker opined that “time and space”
had helped S.B. Overall, mother’s circumstances had also been stable.
When mother’s attorney questioned the social worker about whether the family
reunification case plan would include any additional services to what the family had
already participated in, the social worker responded that there was not “a specific service
… for this kind of case.” Rather, he explained, “The best reality testing kind of comes
with progressive visits when we believe it to be appropriate…. And we have had a
sequence of good visits without issues, so we’ll continue to reduce what support and what
monitoring is being provided, and … gradually work towards … [S.B.] going home and
that being it. But there’s not like a regular class or a specific service that we have
available or accessible.” The department was recommending to expand visits.
13.
The social worker further explained that there were moments when S.B. was in
placement that he would get upset, but when given “time and space” he was able to
“bounce right back” with no further issues beyond “a brief moment of him being upset.”
Because the more extreme behaviors only took place when S.B. was at home, the
department felt it was most appropriate to gradually continue to reduce support and
monitoring of visits. However, the social worker felt that “with the risk as significant as
multiple contacts with law enforcement and multiple holds being placed, whether the 300
holds, 5150 holds, whatever, the [d]epartment is taking a more protective side, leaning on
progressing visits rather than just returning him home today.”
Mother testified the visits had been going very well. S.B. had had limited access
to his siblings and was not engaging in antagonizing behaviors or allowing the actions of
his siblings to cause conflict. Mother had noticed a lot of improvement in his behavior
since being removed. He was able to deescalate and practice coping skills. She
attributed the improvement to medication stabilization and being motivated to return
home. She learned a lot from her parenting class and her own therapy, including making
an effort to listen to and understand S.B.’s perspective, aiming for a more healthy balance
when deciding what he is allowed to do such as playing video games, and encouraging
his gifts and interests.
Mother further explained that one of S.B.’s siblings, with whom he has had
conflict, had moved out of the home, which mother believed was best for both S.B. and
the sibling. The family planned to move back to San Diego, where they had family
support, better schooling options, and better support for her medically vulnerable child.
Her medically vulnerable child had been in the hospital for the past couple of weeks, and
mother was still waiting on alternate housing for her. Mother testified S.B. would be safe
if returned to her care, and it would be in his best interest.
14.
Following the testimony, mother’s attorney argued that the department has not met
its burden to prove that return would be detrimental to S.B. and requested return of S.B.
on family maintenance services.
County counsel argued that given the history of the case, gradual return was
appropriate to give the department more time to ensure mother’s home was safe for S.B.
Minor’s counsel stated that S.B. wanted to return home and added that she felt
extended visits transitioning to return home appeared to be appropriate.
In ruling, the juvenile court noted it considered the evidence and that it was
pleased S.B. was doing “substantially better in placement,” adding that “[f]acts speak for
themselves.” The court went on to say that mother “characterize[d] [department]
intervention as a failure on her part, which is not the [c]ourt’s characterization. The
[c]ourt does realize that intervention is necessary. In fact, the [c]ourt is satisfied that
returning [S.B.] today to his parent’s home would be detrimental to [S.B.] The [c]ourt is
satisfied that graduated return is appropriate, essentially in the works, based on [county
counsel’s] representation.”
The court adjudged S.B. a dependent child and ordered him removed from
mother’s physical custody and mother to participate in family reunification services. The
objectives of mother’s case plan, included: “[s]how your ability to provide adequate care
for your child’s special needs”; “[s]how your ability to understand your child …’s
feelings and give emotional support”; “[c]onsistently, appropriately and adequately parent
your child”; and “[s]how your ability to supervise, guide, and correct your child … at
home, school, and in the community.” S.B. was to continue participating in therapy and
medication management with mother’s assistance and encouragement.
The juvenile court set an interim review hearing and a six-month review hearing,
noting “we can always expedite things if … substantial progress is made and [S.B.] is
doing great.”
15.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
“ ‘In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
jurisdictional findings and disposition, we determine if substantial evidence, contradicted
or uncontradicted, supports them. “In making this determination, we draw all reasonable
inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court;
we review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we
note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.” ’ ” (In re I.J.
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) When reviewing the court’s dispositional findings, we bear
in mind the clear and convincing standard of proof. (See Conservatorship of O.B. (2020)
9 Cal.5th 989, 1011.)
II. Jurisdictional Findings
As a threshold matter, we note that mother does not appear to be challenging the
jurisdictional findings made on January 24, 2025, when the juvenile court sustained the
SAP. To the extent mother is only challenging the findings made on July 31, 2025, at the
adjudication hearing on the subsequent petition, she has not established whether reversing
these findings would have a practical effect on the proceedings. It appears to us that if
the court’s true finding on the allegations set forth in the subsequent petition were
reversed, the court would still retain jurisdiction over S.B. based on the sustained findings
in the SAP. (See In re A.B. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1364 [“no effective relief
would be provided to [the] mother by reversing jurisdiction under the original petition
because jurisdiction was established independently under the subsequent petition”].) The
department, however, has not asserted that mother’s contentions are moot. In an
abundance of caution, we consider her arguments on their merits and conclude she has
not established the findings were not supported by substantial evidence.
16.
Section 300, subdivision (c) provides that dependency jurisdiction may be taken
over a child where: “The child is suffering serious emotional damage, or is at substantial
risk of suffering serious emotional damage, evidenced by severe anxiety, depression,
withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior toward self or others, [(1)] as a result of the
conduct of the parent or guardian or [(2)] who has no parent or guardian capable of
providing appropriate care.”9
In other words, the two situations described by section 300, subdivision (c) are:
“ ‘(1) when parental action or inaction causes the emotional harm, i.e., when parental
fault can be shown; and (2) when the child is suffering serious emotional damage due to
no parental fault or neglect, but the parent or parents are unable themselves to provide
adequate mental health treatment.’ ” (In re Shelley J. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 322, 329.)
In her briefing, mother appears to conflate the two types of ways a child comes
within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (c). She contends
that section 300, subdivision (c) “requires a nexus between the action or inaction of the
parent and the defined substantial risk of harm to the minor,” suggesting that even in the
second type of cases, the department was required to show that mother’s actions or
inactions caused S.B.’s emotional suffering. She goes on to argue the evidence does not
establish she was the cause of S.B.’s suffering or continued suffering; rather, she obtained
services for S.B. and was cooperative with the department. Mother’s argument is
misplaced.10
9 Additionally, and not relevant to the facts of this case, “[a] child shall not be found
to be a person described by this subdivision if the willful failure of the parent or guardian
to provide adequate mental health treatment is based on a sincerely held religious belief
and if a less intrusive judicial intervention is available.” (§ 300, subd. (c).)
10 We note mother starts her opening brief by asserting that section 300,
subdivision (c) reads: “ ‘The child is suffering, or is at substantial risk of suffering,
serious emotional damage … because the child has no parent or guardian capable of
providing appropriate care.’ (Sec. 300, subd. (c), emphasis added.)” This, however, is a
misquote and not what section 300, subdivision (c) actually states; as is evident from our
17.
Here, the SAP and the subsequent petition clearly alleged the second category of
section 300, subdivision (c) cases—that mother was not capable of providing appropriate
care to address S.B.’s emotional suffering, not that her actions or inactions were the cause
of it. The question for the juvenile court was simply whether mother was capable of
providing appropriate care for S.B. (See In re K.S., supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 337,
fn. 4.) Contrary to mother’s assertions, the juvenile court was not required to find any
abuse or neglect on mother’s part. (See In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 631–633
[thorough review of the legislative history demonstrates that children who have
conditions, including mental illness, or conditions causing unmanageable behaviors can
come within the juvenile court’s dependency jurisdiction even when the condition is not
caused by the parents’ behavior].)
The juvenile court’s finding that S.B. came within its jurisdiction under
section 300, subdivision (c) was supported by ample substantial evidence. We first note
the parties appear to agree, as do we, that S.B.’s symptoms met the definition of “serious
emotional damage” as defined by section 300, subdivision (c), so we focus our discussion
reproduction of the subdivision in the body of this opinion, the causational word
“because” does not appear.
Mother’s position may come from a reliance on the Judicial Council form juvenile
dependency petition (Form JV-122). As the Court of Appeal observed in In re K.S.
(2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 327: “[Form JV-122] provides two options for subdivision (c)
jurisdiction—that the child suffers or is at risk of suffering serious emotional damage
either (1) ‘as a result of the conduct of the parent or guardian,’ or (2) ‘because the child
has no parent or guardian capable of providing appropriate care.’ ” (Id. at p. 337, fn. 4.)
The K.S. court went on to explain, that even though the social worker had checked
the “second ‘because’ box,” “the statute does not require that the emotional damage
result from the parent’s inability to provide appropriate care, only that the parent is not
capable of providing care for the emotional damage.” (Ibid.)
In its analysis, the K.S. court “disregard[ed] the causal language in the form
petition and determine[d] whether the record support[ed] the proper criterion under the
statute: whether [the] mother is capable of providing appropriate care for [the child].”
(Ibid.) We do the same here.
18.
on whether the evidence supported the court’s finding that mother was unable to
appropriately treat S.B.’s conditions.
On this point, the evidence was overwhelming. While S.B. was in mother’s care,
his emotional distress and aggressive behaviors reached a level that caused mother to
request law enforcement assistance on what by some accounts appeared to be more than a
weekly basis. He was placed on multiple section 5150 holds, representing multiple times
while S.B. was in mother’s care that law enforcement determined that he was a danger to
himself or others. Additionally, on a couple of occasions, S.B.’s runaway behavior put
him in danger that caused third parties to seek law enforcement assistance.
We acknowledge that according to mother, requesting law enforcement assistance
was recommended by one of S.B.’s service providers as part of a safety plan for
occasions when S.B. was unable to deescalate, and recognize that in some instances, this
may be necessary when someone is experiencing an acute mental health crisis. But this
should be used in rare cases and not as a routine part of long-term mental health or
behavioral treatment; the frequency with which mother had to resort to this was not
appropriate or sustainable. While the record supports reasonable inferences that mother’s
numerous calls for law enforcement assistance were rational responses to S.B. having
legitimate mental health crises requiring professional intervention, the record also
supports equally reasonable inferences that they represented what had become an
entrenched pattern of overreliance on the practice that unnecessarily exposed S.B. to law
enforcement contact. In the latter scenario, S.B.’s regular contact with law enforcement
resulted in heightened risk to his health and safety, like being placed in repeated
situations where he was engaging in combativeness toward deputies, and the toll of being
placed on potentially unnecessary section 5150 holds. Regardless, both scenarios are
manifestations of mother’s inability to provide proper care for S.B.’s behavioral and
emotional needs. At best, even if mother’s calls for law enforcement were warranted,
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S.B. repeatedly being treated by section 5150 holds, which are intended for short-term
stabilization not long-term care, demonstrates that his regular treatment was not effective
and likely needed adjustments.
Further, it is uncontroverted that while S.B. was in out-of-home placement, he
consistently did not exhibit extreme behaviors that required law enforcement assistance
or the placement of section 5150 holds. According to the social worker, S.B. would get
upset in placement, but instances were brief and did not escalate to extreme behavior
requiring external agency intervention.
We are sensitive to the fact that the record shows that S.B. might act out while at
home for a complex variety of reasons, that may include his diagnoses; medication
adjustment issues; negative dynamics with his siblings; and mother’s competing
responsibilities of having to navigate caring for multiple children with their own unique
needs, including one that requires around-the-clock medical care. Similarly, S.B. not
displaying extreme behaviors out of the home is likely due to equally complex and varied
reasons that could include having, as the social worker put it, “time and space” from his
family dynamics and desiring to be back home.
In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, however, the
juvenile court could readily conclude that the care mother was providing to S.B., which
we recognize included cooperating with his receiving numerous types of services, was
not adequate to support his emotional needs. As such, the finding that he came within the
court’s jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (c) was supported by substantial
evidence.
III. Dispositional Findings
A dependent child shall not be taken from the physical custody of his or her
custodial parents unless, as relevant here, the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that: “[(1) t]he minor is suffering severe emotional damage, as indicated by
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extreme anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior toward
themselves or others, and [(2)] there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s
emotional health may be protected without removing the minor from the physical custody
of their parent.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(3).) The court must also determine whether the child
welfare department made “reasonable efforts … to prevent or to eliminate the need for
removal of the minor from their home.” (§ 361, subd. (e).)
Mother argues only that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile
court’s finding there were no reasonable alternatives to removal and does not address
whether the evidence supported the court’s detriment finding. To that end, she contends
that S.B. could be safely returned to her custody with protective measures in place as
evidenced by the plan to gradually return S.B. home.
We disagree with mother’s interpretation of the evidence presented at the
disposition hearing and the juvenile court’s findings. This is not a typical removal case
where a child is detained at the outset of a case, the disposition hearing is conducted in a
timely manner, and the parties and court must engage in a hypothetical analysis of
whether reasonable alternatives to removal exist and how they might work in reality. The
dependency proceedings in the present case had been going on for nearly a year before
disposition, during which alternatives to removal were tested and had failed. The
department and court tried initially keeping S.B. in mother’s home, detaining him due to
escalation in behaviors causing risk of physical injury to himself, returning him to the
home soon after with extensive services in place, putting off disposition far beyond the
statutory limit, and continuing to work with the family before law enforcement finally
placed a section 300 hold on him leading to his second removal in part due to the number
of calls for service they had received.
At the time of the disposition hearing, S.B. had been stable for about two months,
and according to the social worker, the gradual transition from out-of-home care back to
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mother’s care appeared to be working well based upon S.B.’s particularized needs not for
specific services but for “time and space.” We recognize the evidence of the positive
steps mother had taken to ensure the home was a safer and healthier place for S.B. to
return to, such as making alternative arrangements for S.B.’s siblings and looking into
better school options for him. However, because the department had already tried
returning S.B. to the home with services during a short period of out-of-home stability,
and this resulted in his displaying more extreme behaviors, law enforcement intervention,
and section 5150 holds upon his return, the juvenile court could have reasonably inferred
that full-time return was not reasonable when compared with the department’s plan to
continue gradually reducing supervision.
The juvenile court’s finding that at the time of the disposition hearing there were
no reasonable alternatives to removal was supported by substantial evidence.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders are
affirmed.
DESANTOS, J.
WE CONCUR:
PEÑA, Acting P. J.
HARRELL, J.
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