Filed 7/31/26 In re S.A. CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re S.A., A Person Coming Under B349998, B351012
the Juvenile Court Law.
_________________________________ (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21CCJP00254)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
BRIANNA S.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Mary E. Kelly, Judge. Affirmed.
Jesse Frederic Rodriguez, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Sally Son, Deputy County Counsel,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In January 2024, the Department of Children and Family
Services (DCFS) filed a Welfare and Institutions Code 1 section 300
petition on behalf of then-four-month-old S.A. The petition alleged
that the history of domestic violence between S.A.’s parents,
Brianna S. (Mother) and Jared A. (Father), placed S.A. at serious
risk of harm. The petition further alleged that Father’s physical
abuse of S.A.’s half sibling, M.S.—Mother’s child from a prior
relationship—posed a risk to S.A. Finally, the petition alleged that
S.A.’s other sibling, V.S., was “a current dependent of the juvenile
court due to . . . [the parents’] domestic violence.”
The juvenile court sustained the petition and placed S.A.
with a foster caregiver who expressed interest in adopting the
child. The court denied family reunification services to Father, 2
but granted services and monitored visits to Mother. DCFS
reported that, although inconsistent, Mother’s visits with S.A.
were meaningful. DCFS further reported that Mother and S.A.
appeared to share an emotional bond. But after Mother failed to
make sufficient progress on her case plan, the court terminated
her services and set a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing.
On the morning of the hearing, Mother filed a section 388 petition
seeking the return of S.A. to her custody or the reinstatement
of her reunification services. The court denied the petition, and
at the rescheduled section 366.26 hearing, the court terminated
Mother’s parental rights to free S.A. for adoption.
1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2 Father is not a party to this appeal, and we therefore
discuss his involvement in the dependency proceedings only to
the extent relevant to Mother’s claims.
2
On appeal, Mother contends the court erred by (1) denying
her section 388 petition, and (2) relying on irrelevant considerations
to reject her argument at the section 366.26 hearing that the
parental-benefit exception (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) barred
termination of her parental rights.
We conclude the court acted within its discretion in denying
Mother’s section 388 petition: The record supports the court’s
findings that Mother’s circumstances were “changing,” rather than
changed, and that Mother had failed to establish that granting
the petition would be in S.A.’s best interests. We further conclude
the court did not rely on irrelevant considerations in analyzing the
parental-benefit exception and acted within its discretion in finding
that Mother had failed to prove the third requisite element of the
exception—namely, that terminating parental rights would be
detrimental to S.A. (See In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 631
(Caden C.), citing § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
We summarize only the factual and procedural history
relevant to our resolution of this appeal.
A. The Family’s Prior Contacts With DCFS
In January 2021, DCFS filed a section 300 petition on behalf
of S.A.’s then-three-year-old half sibling, M.S., after a medical
examination revealed she had sustained numerous injuries
consistent with nonaccidental trauma. M.S.’s injuries included
“significant orbital swelling and bruising, numerous bruises to
[her] torso, bruising to [her] right and left cheeks, healing abrasions
to [her] left ear . . . , bruising to [her] mons pubis, and patterned
markings consistent with inflicted bite marks to [her] left lateral
buttocks and left upper arm.” The petition further alleged that the
3
history of domestic violence between Mother and Father placed
M.S. at risk. The juvenile court sustained the petition and
exercised dependency jurisdiction over M.S. In parallel criminal
proceedings, Father pleaded no contest to felony child abuse of
M.S. (Pen. Code, § 273d, subd. (a)), and Mother pleaded no contest
to misdemeanor child abuse (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (b)). The
juvenile court eventually terminated jurisdiction with an order
awarding M.S.’s father, L.S., sole legal and physical custody of the
child.
In November 2021, DCFS filed a section 300 petition on
behalf of S.A.’s other sibling, V.S.—then an infant—based on the
parents’ abuse of M.S. and their history of domestic violence. The
juvenile court declared V.S. a dependent, removed him from the
custody of Father and Mother, and ordered family reunification
services for Mother. In June 2023, the court terminated Mother’s
reunification services. V.S.’s dependency case remained pending
when Mother gave birth to S.A. in September 2023. Ultimately,
the court terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to V.S.
in December 2024.
B. Section 300 Petition and Proceedings
In November 2023, DCFS received a report from an
anonymous caller concerning incidents of domestic violence between
Mother and Father. The caller reported that the parents ignored
a restraining order prohibiting Father from “go[ing] near . . .
[M]other,” and that “[M]other regularly [went] with . . . [S.A.]
to visit [Father].” The caller further reported that the parents
“argue[d] and curse[d] at each other constantly in front of the child,”
and that on October 29, 2023, “[Father] pushed . . . [M]other aside
so that he could take the child out of the car instead of her.” When
a social worker met with Mother to discuss the allegations, Mother
4
said she had “gone to . . . [F]ather’s home to drop off the belongings
he had in her house, and upon her not allowing him to see [S.A.], he
became angry and tried to break her driver’s side window.”
Less than a month later, in December 2023, DCFS received
a referral alleging that S.A. was at risk of general neglect. In the
course of investigating that referral, the assigned social worker
learned of several additional incidents of domestic violence between
the parents: In January 2023, Mother repeatedly struck Father’s
face with her hands and fists, and Father pushed Mother’s face
down onto a bed and used his knee to physically restrain her. In
August 2023, while Mother was pregnant with S.A., Father struck
Mother “four times in the mouth causing a laceration and swelling
to [Mother’s] upper lip.” In November 2023, Father came to
Mother’s home and “broke her door down.” And in December 2023,
“[M]other got into a fight with another woman after having found
her naked in [Father’s] bed.” According to a confidential informant,
“[M]other had [S.A.] in her vehicle when she engaged the other
woman in a fight[,] and [M]other’s vehicle windshield was
reportedly broken” during the altercation.
Notwithstanding these incidents, Mother told the
investigating social worker that she and Father “separated back
in 2021 and ha[d] not been together since” then. In addition, she
told the social worker that “[S.A.] [was] not [Father’s] biological
son” and identified another individual with the same surname as
Father as S.A.’s biological parent. DCFS suspected Mother was
not being truthful, and a subsequent DNA test confirmed Father’s
paternity with 99.9 percent accuracy.
On January 29, 2024, DCFS filed the section 300 petition
giving rise to this appeal. The petition alleged, in pertinent part,
that the parents’ history of domestic violence and the prior physical
abuse of M.S. posed a serious risk of harm to S.A. (See § 300,
5
subd. (j).) At the January 30 initial hearing on the petition,
the court detained S.A. from both parents. In addition, the court
granted Mother’s request for a temporary restraining order against
Father.
At the May 15, 2024 adjudication hearing on the petition, the
court sustained the allegations against Mother and Father. 3 The
court ordered Mother to participate in a case plan consisting of four
random, on-demand drug tests, individual counseling to address
anger management and case issues, a domestic violence support
group, and monitored visits with S.A. three times per week. The
court did not offer Father any family reunification services and
ordered that he have no visitation with S.A. The court then set the
next hearing—the six-month status review—for November 13, 2024.
The court later continued that hearing to December 17, 2024.
In July 2024, DCFS filed a “walk-on” request seeking an
order requiring Mother to participate in a full drug and alcohol
program and weekly drug tests. In support, DCFS reported that
Mother had missed several of her on-demand tests. At the July 31
hearing on the request, Mother argued she had missed her tests
due to “misunderstanding[s]” and her work schedule. But minor’s
counsel—who joined in DCFS’s request—countered that, “[i]n
[S.A.’s] sibling’s case, . . . there were statements that Mother used
[substances] daily,” and that Mother had “used similar arguments
in order to evade . . . having to drug test or do a drug program.”
3 The petition asserted eight counts under section 300 against
the parents, all arising from essentially the same allegations:
two counts pursuant to subdivision (a) of that section, three
counts pursuant to subdivision (b), and three counts pursuant
to subdivision (j). The court sustained the counts alleged under
subdivision (j) and dismissed the remaining counts.
6
The juvenile court ordered Mother to participate in a full drug
treatment program, as well as weekly on-demand drug testing.
In advance of the scheduled December 17 hearing, DCFS
reported that Mother “appeared to be doing well with keeping
employment and being resourceful,” but that she had failed to
comply with her case plan: Mother had not enrolled in a drug
treatment program or individual counseling, had tested positive
for marijuana twice, and had missed all but one of her domestic
violence program sessions. In addition, although Mother was
“patient,” “nurturing,” and “affection[ate]” when she participated
in visits with S.A., she had missed over 20 scheduled visits between
October and December 2024. And DCFS reported that S.A.’s
caregiver no longer was willing to monitor Mother’s visits with
S.A. because Mother had “episodes where she be[came] irate and
be[gan] to argue for no reason.” (Italics omitted.)
DCFS further reported that S.A. was thriving in his foster
placement: “[S.A.] has been in the care of [the caregiver] since he
was [four] months [old,] and she has demonstrated genuinely caring
for him, as she has ensured . . . his needs are promptly met while
continuing to provide him with a safe and supportive home.” “[S.A.]
appears very bonded with [the caregiver] and her husband, as he
gets excited when he sees them, after returning back home from
visits. [The caregiver] reported [S.A.]’s first word was ‘papa’ to
her husband.” Finally, the caregiver “indicated being committed
to providing [S.A.] with permanency through adoption” in the
event reunification efforts failed. Based on its reports, DCFS
recommended that the juvenile court terminate Mother’s family
reunification services. 4
4 “Because [S.A.] was under three years old at the time of his
detention, [Mother was] entitled to only six months of reunification
7
At the December 2024 review hearing, the court terminated
services, citing Mother’s “lackluster participation in visits and . . .
programs” and her failure to “take[ ] responsibility” for her actions.
The court further noted that “Mother ha[d] the opportunity to file a
[section] 388 [petition] if [she] cho[se] to engage in [her] programs.”
The court then set a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing
for April 15, 2025. The court later continued that hearing to
August 18, 2025.
C. Section 388 Petition and Proceedings
On August 18, 2025—the date of the scheduled section 366.26
hearing—Mother filed a section 388 petition requesting that the
court return S.A. to her care or, alternatively, reinstate her family
reunification services and order liberalized visits with S.A. In
support of her requests, Mother attested that she had completed an
additional parenting course and had reenrolled in domestic violence
and anger management courses. She further attested that, before
DCFS filed the petition on behalf of S.A., she had participated in
two years of individual counseling and had completed parenting
classes, a domestic violence course, and an anger management
course. Finally, Mother attested that she “ha[d] great quality
weekly visits with [S.A.], and [that she and S.A.] share an
undeniably strong bond.”
Mother provided progress letters and certificates of
completion evidencing her participation in these programs. And
reports DCFS had filed with the court between March and August
2025 confirmed Mother’s characterization of her visits with S.A.
DCFS reported, for example, that Mother made efforts to find
services.” (In re Andrew M. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 803, 810, fn. 2;
see §§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(B), 366.21, subd. (e)(3).)
8
engaging experiences for S.A., such as a Dr. Seuss birthday
celebration hosted at a local library. DCFS further reported
that S.A. greeted Mother as “mama,” that S.A. “displayed joy
and excitement in . . . [M]other’s presence,” and that the assigned
social worker “ha[d] observed a positive relationship between . . .
[M]other and [S.A.]”
To permit DCFS time to respond, the court set the hearing
on Mother’s petition for October 6, 2025 and continued the
section 366.26 hearing to that same date. The court later continued
both hearings to October 21.
In its report filed in response to Mother’s petition, DCFS
agreed that “[M]other and [S.A.] share a meaningful emotional
bond” and that Mother “ha[d] been partially compliant with
her case plan.” DCFS nonetheless asked the court to deny the
section 388 petition because “[F]ather continue[d] to pose a serious
and ongoing threat, as evidenced by repeated domestic violence
incidents,” including an alleged arson attack by Father at Mother’s
apartment. DCFS further reported that Mother’s visitation with
S.A. had been inconsistent, due in part to the instability created by
Mother’s continued contact with Father.
In preparation for the October 21, 2025 hearing, DCFS also
filed supplemental section 366.26 permanency planning reports.
In those reports, DCFS continued to recommend that the court
terminate Mother’s parental rights to permit S.A.’s caregiver
to adopt him. DCFS reported that S.A. had been diagnosed with
an “expressive speech delay,” and that he “display[ed] tantrums,
irritability, and resistance to physical contact, particularly after
visits with . . . [M]other and during transitions in his routine.”
The caregiver “note[d] that [S.A.] appear[ed] calm and regulated
once he return[ed] home.” DCFS further reported that the
caregiver had enrolled S.A. in early intervention services and
9
weekly therapy to address behavioral challenges. Finally, DCFS
also reported—somewhat inconsistently—that S.A. “show[ed] no
signs of distress upon separation [from Mother],” and that “[t]he
observed attachment between . . . [M]other and [S.A.] remain[ed]
secondary rather than primary, given [S.A.]’s age and the extended
duration of his placement in out-of-home care.”
At the October 21 hearing, the court denied Mother’s
section 388 petition. It found that Mother had stated “changing,”
rather than changed, circumstances. And although the court
expressed “concern[ ] that [DCFS] seem[ed] . . . to be blaming . . .
[M]other for . . . [F]ather’s violation of the restraining orders,” the
court further found that Mother had failed to show it was in S.A.’s
best interests to reinstate reunification services.
The court then continued the section 366.26 permanency
planning hearing to December 2025 to permit the parties time to
analyze whether the parental-benefit exception under Caden C.,
supra, applied in Mother’s case. The court explained, in pertinent
part: “The child refers to [Mother] as ‘mama’ and there does
appear to be, by all accounts, the emotional bond. So the real issue
for the court is the third prong [of the exception],”—i.e., whether
terminating parental rights would be detrimental to S.A.
D. Section 366.26 Permanency Proceedings
In preparation for the scheduled December 8, 2025
section 366.26 hearing, DCFS filed two additional reports. The
reports noted, in pertinent part, that S.A.’s caregiver had been
“responsive, patient, and attuned” to the child’s needs, which “ha[d]
allowed [S.A.] to form a secure attachment and to participate in
therapy and early intervention services” to address his “identified
developmental delays.” The reports also described an October 2025
visit between Mother and S.A. Although Mother was “attentive”
10
and “affectionate,” S.A. “demonstrated frequent behavioral
dysregulation throughout the visit. He threw toys, a microphone,
and bottles, resisted physical contact at times, and engaged
in tantrum-like behaviors, such as squealing, flopping to the
ground, and running away.” DCFS asserted that S.A.’s “behavior
suggest[ed] ongoing challenges with emotional regulation and
impulse control during visits.” The reports concluded with a
renewed recommendation that the court terminate parental
rights to free S.A. for adoption by his caregiver.
At the section 366.26 hearing, Mother argued that the
parental-benefit exception applied to bar termination of her
parental rights. She urged that the high quality of her visits with
S.A.—only six of which she had missed over the preceding six
months—demonstrated that terminating parental rights would be
detrimental to S.A. Minor’s counsel, in contrast, joined in DCFS’s
recommendation, arguing that Mother’s prior conviction for child
abuse and the “on and off” nature of Mother’s relationship with
Father counseled in favor of terminating parental rights.
At the conclusion of the parties’ arguments, the court found
Mother had failed to establish that the parental-benefit exception
applied, explaining:
“This is a difficult case for the court because I do believe in
some respects Mother is being tagged, so to speak, with Father’s
misconduct here. The incident where her home was set on fire
was so egregious, and I don’t think that’s something that . . .
Mother invited. However, I am persuaded by [minor’s counsel’s]
argument . . . regarding the fact that these parents seem to—there’s
a period of time where they don’t engage, and then Mother does
engage with . . . Father.
“Mother’s visits, she does have a strong bond and [DCFS]
recognizes it’s a strong emotional bond. But it appears, on
11
balance, to the court, in weighing this . . . that this two-year-old
is specifically adoptable by clear and convincing evidence[.] . . . I do
believe . . . Mother has met the first prong [of the parental-benefit
exception, i.e., by demonstrating regular visitation with the child].
“It is true that Mother is not—this is a special needs
child who is receiving occupational therapy and speech therapy,
and there’s no indication that . . . [M]other’s participated in those
services. . . . [A]nd it is specifically for the reason that there has
been serious domestic violence that the parents have engaged in . . .
but it is for that reason, and given the circumstances regarding the
other two children, and in this instance, although I am cognizant
of the fact that we are beyond reunification and I have to accept
as true . . . and look at the parents with the fact that they have not
completed their case plan, and that is not to be held against them
unless it would impact an ongoing relationship with the child.
“In this case, Mother has post[-]case plan done services, but
I found that they did not warrant continued services in the case
under [section] 388, and given the fact that the serious conditions
under which the other children were—what happened to the
other children in placement with these parents, the court, even
though . . . Mother, you know, there is no evidence since . . . Father
has been incarcerated that . . . Mother is engaged with . . . Father.
The lack of—the lackluster participation in case plans up until . . .
Mother filed a [section] 388 [petition], which was denied, does
impact on what would happen with this child were this child to be
returned in a—even in a monitored visit setting, which would have
to be the court’s order for the visits.
“So given those circumstances, I don’t believe that Mother
can [demonstrate] that even though there is a strong emotional
attachment that it’s beneficial to the child or that the child would
suffer detriment if parental rights were terminated. I make that
12
finding under preponderance of the evidence, . . . and so I don’t
believe that . . . Mother has carried the preponderance standard
on the last two prongs [of the parental-benefit exception] for the
reasons stated by [minor’s counsel] and [DCFS].”
The court then terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental
rights to S.A.
Mother timely appealed the denial of her section 388 petition
and the order terminating parental rights. We consolidated the
appeals for purposes of briefing and decision.
DISCUSSION
A. The Court Acted Within Its Discretion In Denying
Mother’s Section 388 Petition
“Section 388 accords a parent the right to petition the
juvenile court for modification of any of its orders based upon
changed circumstances or new evidence.” (In re Alayah J. (2017)
9 Cal.App.5th 469, 478, fn. omitted.) “The [parent] has the burden
of showing by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that there is new
evidence or a change of circumstances and (2) that the proposed
modification would be in the best interests of the child.” (In re
Mickel O. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 586, 615 (Mickel O.), italics
omitted.)
With respect to the first prong, “the [parent] must show
changed, not changing, circumstances. [Citation.] The change of
circumstances or new evidence ‘must be of such significant nature
that it requires a setting aside or modification of the challenged
prior order.’ ” (Mickel O., supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 615, italics
omitted.) As to the second prong, the best interests of the child, the
court may consider factors such as “the seriousness of the reason for
the dependency and the reason the problem was not overcome; the
relative strength of the parent-child and child-caretaker bonds and
13
the length of time the child has been in the system; and the nature
of the change in circumstances, the ease by which the change could
be achieved, and the reason the change was not made sooner.” (In
re Aaliyah R. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 437, 446–447.) And where,
as here, “reunification services have been terminated, the parents’
interest in the care, custody, and companionship of the child are
no longer of overriding concern. [Citation.] The focus then shifts
to the child’s need for permanency and stability, and there is a
rebuttable presumption that continued foster care is in the child’s
best interests.” (Id. at p. 448.)
“In considering whether the [parent] has made the requisite
showing, the juvenile court may consider the entire factual and
procedural history of the case.” (Mickel O., supra, 197 Cal.App.4th
at p. 616.) “We review the juvenile court’s denial of a section 388
petition for an abuse of discretion.” (Ibid.)
Here, we cannot conclude the court abused its discretion in
denying Mother’s section 388 petition seeking the return of S.A.
to her custody or reinstatement of her reunification services. The
record supports the court’s finding that, at the time of the hearing,
Mother’s circumstances were “changing,” rather than changed:
Mother had enrolled in, but not yet completed, additional domestic
violence and anger management programs. And she continued to
display some inconsistency in attending visits with S.A.
The record likewise supports the court’s finding that granting
Mother’s petition was not in S.A.’s best interests. In arguing to the
contrary, Mother focuses on the high quality of her visits with S.A.
and the strength of her emotional bond with the child. But she
ignores that several other factors counsel against her position:
The reasons for the dependency proceeding—physical abuse of
S.A.’s half sibling and the parents’ domestic violence—were serious,
S.A. had lived with his foster caregiver since infancy, S.A. shared a
14
strong bond with the caregiver and her husband, and S.A.’s
diagnosed developmental delay heightened his need for stability.
We therefore conclude Mother fails to demonstrate the court
abused its discretion in denying her section 388 petition.
B. Mother Fails To Demonstrate the Court Erred By
Refusing To Apply the Parental-Benefit Exception
The parental-benefit exception set forth in section 366.26,
subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) is “an exception to the presumptive rule of
terminating parental rights after reunification efforts have failed,
in order to free a child for adoption.” (See In re Eli B. (2022)
73 Cal.App.5th 1061, 1067.) “It applies where ‘[t]he court finds
a compelling reason for determining that termination would
be detrimental to the child due to one or more of the following
circumstances: [¶] (i) The parents have maintained regular
visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit
from continuing the relationship.’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 631, quoting § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) The parent therefore
must prove: “(1) regular visitation and contact, (2) a relationship,
the continuation of which would benefit the child such that (3) the
termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.”
(Caden C., supra, at p. 631.) “[A] parent must prove all three
components of the . . . exception,” and a “failure of proof on any one
of them is fatal.” (In re Katherine J. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303,
322, fn. 10, italics omitted.)
The juvenile court here found that Mother failed to establish
the second and third elements of the parental-benefit exception.
We focus our analysis on Mother’s challenge to the court’s finding
on the third element, which we review for abuse of discretion.
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) “In determining whether
terminating parental rights would be detrimental to the child, the
juvenile court must assess ‘how the child would be affected by losing
15
the parental relationship—in effect, what life would be like for
the child in an adoptive home without the parent in the child’s
life.’ [Citation.]” (Andrew M., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 818.)
“A ‘ “showing [that] the child would derive some benefit from
continuing a relationship maintained during periods of visitation” ’
is not a sufficient ground to depart from the statutory preference
for adoption. [Citation.] It is only ‘[w]hen the relationship with a
parent is so important to the child that the security and stability of
a new home wouldn’t outweigh its loss, [that] termination would be
“detrimental to the child due to” the child’s beneficial relationship
with a parent. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “In Caden C., our
Supreme Court provided examples of potential harms from the
loss of a parental relationship based on the facts of that case:
‘the effects might include emotional instability and preoccupation
leading to acting out, difficulties in school, insomnia, anxiety, or
depression.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
The court acted within its discretion in finding the absence of
such detriment here. At the time of the section 366.26 hearing, S.A.
was two years old and had lived with his foster caregivers—with
whom he shared a strong bond and who appropriately attended to
his special needs—since he was an infant. And throughout his life,
S.A.’s only interactions with Mother were during weekly monitored
visits. (See Andrew M., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 820 [“parents
must prove some type of harm beyond the fact that their loving
visits would cease”].)
Mother argues that evidence that S.A. sometimes engaged
in “tantrums when separating from [M]other at the end of visits”
demonstrates that “S.A. will be harmed and experience detriment
if [the] relationship with [M]other is severed.” But the record
contains evidence that S.A. also “engaged in tantrum-like
behaviors” and “demonstrated frequent behavioral dysregulation”
16
at other times—including in the middle of a visit with Mother. In
addition, S.A.’s caregiver reported that S.A. would “appear[ ] calm
and regulated once he return[ed] home.” We therefore are not
convinced that evidence of S.A.’s dysregulated behavior at the end
of visits with Mother compels a finding of detriment.
Nor are we persuaded by Mother’s argument that the court
considered irrelevant factors in analyzing detriment. Mother urges
the court “improperly pointed out that [she] had not participated
in [S.A.’s] special needs services,” and “improperly considered
whether it would be detrimental to return S.A. to [Mother].” (See
Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634 [“Nothing that happens at
the section 366.26 hearing allows the child to return to live with the
parent. [Citation.] Accordingly, courts should not look to whether
the parent can provide a home for the child; the question is just
whether losing the relationship with the parent would harm
the child to an extent not outweighed, on balance, by the security
of a new, adoptive home”].) But a parent’s “lack of meaningful
engagement . . . with [a child’s] medical condition” is relevant in
assessing the quality of the parental relationship and whether
“detriment [will] flow from terminating” that relationship.
(Andrew M., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 819.) And the court
stated expressly in making its section 366.26 findings that it was
“cognizant of the fact that [the case was] beyond reunification.”
We therefore conclude Mother fails to demonstrate the court abused
its discretion in finding the absence of detriment for purposes of the
parental-benefit exception.
Accordingly, we affirm.
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DISPOSITION
The orders Mother challenges on appeal are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:
BENDIX, J.
M. KIM, J.
18