Filed 8/24/26 In re Romeo M. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re ROMEO M., a Person B347717
Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law. (Los Angeles County
_____________________________
Super. Ct. No.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY 25CCJP01368A)
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
KATHERINE M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Nancy Ramirez, Judge. Affirmed.
Janelle B. Price, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Alik S. Ourfalian, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
******
Katherine M. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s
findings and orders asserting dependency jurisdiction over her
12-year-old son and removing the child from mother’s custody.
Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting that
assertion as well as the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
court’s finding that removal was warranted. Because these
challenges lack merit, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
A. The family
Mother and Luis G. (father) are the parents of Romeo M.,
who was born in December 2013. Mother and father separated
before Romeo was born and have since resided apart.
B. Conduct giving rise to jurisdiction
On April 26, 2025, Romeo ran from his bedroom screaming
for help. Maternal grandmother and maternal grandfather
entered the room and found mother lying on the floor, foaming at
the mouth and nose, and with her eyes rolled back. The maternal
grandfather initiated cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), and
the maternal grandmother called 911. Paramedics responded
and reported that mother was experiencing a drug overdose.
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Mother was transported to the hospital, where she refused to
provide a urine sample; however, a blood test returned positive
results for amphetamines, opiates, and fentanyl. Mother’s
discharge paperwork indicated that she was diagnosed with
“[f]entanyl use disorder, severe; [m]ethamphetamine use;
[s]eizure-like activity.”
This was not the first incident in which mother overdosed
in Romeo’s presence. In October 2023, while Romeo was at a
pumpkin patch, mother went to her car. When Romeo returned
to the car, he found mother unresponsive. Believing she might be
dead, he attempted to rouse her by slapping her face, then sought
assistance from a security guard, who summoned emergency
personnel. The security guard observed aluminum foil containing
a substance in the vehicle and reported that mother appeared to
be under the influence of a narcotic.
Mother engages in erratic nighttime behavior. She will, at
times, walk around the house in the middle of the night
ostensibly to clean, although other family members report that no
cleaning is actually accomplished. On other occasions, she
prepares food late at night. Her sleep patterns are similarly
irregular; she may go several consecutive days without sleeping,
followed by periods of excessive sleep. Additionally, mother
sometimes comes home late from work and takes Romeo out—
either to the park or to eat—returning after midnight, even on
school nights. On May 1, 2025, shortly after a social worker
visited regarding the April 26, 2025 incident, mother left the
home, did not return that night, briefly reappeared the following
morning, and then again departed until approximately 11:00 p.m.
that evening. Teachers at Romeo’s school reported that he
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appeared sluggish and lethargic, and was consistently very tired;
he also had 39 tardies and eight unexcused absences.
C. The Department’s initial investigation
Mother denied any drug use, specifically fentanyl,
amphetamines, or methamphetamine, and stated that she had
only taken tramadol. Mother initially reported that the only
substance she had ever used was marijuana, with her last use
occurring in 2019, but later amended that statement to indicate
her last use was in 2017.
Mother offered various reasons for the two overdose
incidents. As to the April 2025 incident, she alternatively
reported that (1) she had ingested approximately seven to 10
tramadol pills, although she had no prescription and would not
disclose where she got them; (2) she had been prescribed Norco,
but did not make good on her promise to provide the prescription
paperwork; and (3) a “man” at a “friend’s” party that she
attended the night before must have placed a drug in the tumbler
from which she was drinking. As to the pumpkin patch incident,
mother indicated that she was in significant pain and went to her
car for relief. She stated that after returning to the car, she
“couldn’t wake back up,” describing herself as very tired and
“knocked out like a bear.” When the social worker raised
concerns about leaving her nine-year-old child unattended at that
pumpkin patch, mother responded that Romeo was old enough
and that she could see him from the car (ostensibly, before she
passed out). Mother denied using any drugs on that date, stating
instead that she took one to two tramadol pills, which she
believed caused her to fall asleep.
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On June 12, 2025, mother enrolled in a 28-day residential
substance abuse treatment program, but she left the program
prematurely following a disagreement with staff.
During the Department’s investigation, mother was
required to participate in weekly drug testing. She did not
appear for testing on nine different dates.
Romeo denied that mother used drugs or took any pills,
explaining that he had never seen her do so. He spoke warmly of
mother, describing her as “nice” and “fun.”
II. Procedural Background
On May 9, 2025, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (the Department) filed a petition
asking the juvenile court to exercise dependency jurisdiction over
Romeo on the grounds that (1) mother has a “history of
substance abuse including marijuana, and is a current abuser of
opiates, amphetamine, methamphetamine, [f]entanyl, and
nonprescription medication [t]ramadol” and has been “under the
influence” of those same substances “while [Romeo] was in [ ]
mother’s care and supervision,” which “endangers” his “physical
health and safety” and “places [him] at risk of serious physical
harm, damage, and danger”; (2) “mother . . . has mental and
emotional problems, including a diagnosis of [d]epression,
[b]ipolar [d]isorder, and [s]evere [f]entanyl [u]se [d]isorder,”
which “renders [ ] mother unable to provide regular care and
supervision of [Romeo]” and “places [him] at risk of serious
physical harm, damage and danger”; and (3) mother’s conduct at
home on April 26, 2025, and previously at the pumpkin patch in
October 2023, when she “was using opiates, amphetamine,
methamphetamine, [f]entanyl, and non-prescription medication
[t]ramadol while [Romeo] was in [her] care” “endangers” his
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“physical health and safety” and “places [him] at risk of serious
physical harm, damage and danger.” The Department alleged
that this conduct rendered jurisdiction appropriate under
subdivision (b) of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300.1
On July 15, 2025, the juvenile court held a combined
jurisdictional and dispositional hearing. The court sustained
these allegations, and exerted dependency jurisdiction over
Romeo. At disposition, the juvenile court removed Romeo from
mother’s custody, and placed him with father under a family
maintenance plan. The court ordered monitored visitation for
mother and set a section 364 review hearing.
Mother filed a timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Assertion of Dependency Jurisdiction
Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting all three counts of the sustained dependency petition
under section 300, subdivision (b)(1). We review the juvenile
court’s finding of jurisdiction for substantial evidence. (In re I.J.
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773 (I.J.).) In so doing, we review the
record in the light most favorable to the court’s findings, drawing
all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support those
findings. (Ibid.)
Section 300, subdivision (b) authorizes the exertion of
dependency jurisdiction where a child “has suffered, or there is a
substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm
or illness, as a result of” a parent’s “inability . . . to provide
regular care for the child due to the parent’s . . . substance
abuse.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(D); see also id., subd. (b)(1)(A)
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
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[jurisdiction authorized due to parent’s “failure or inability . . . to
adequately supervise or protect the child”]). As pertinent here,
this requires the Department to prove “(1) substance abuse (2)
makes a parent . . . unable to provide regular care for a child and
(3) this inability . . . creates a substantial risk” “the child” may
“suffer serious physical harm or illness.” (In re N.R. (2023) 15
Cal.5th 520, 558 (N.R.).) That risk of harm to the child must
exist at the time of the jurisdictional hearing. (In re M.M. (2015)
240 Cal.App.4th 703, 719.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s assertion
of jurisdiction on the two substance abuse-related grounds.
There is sufficient evidence of substance use: The toxicology
screen of mother’s blood after the April 26, 2025 incident
indicated that she had ingested amphetamines, opiates, and
fentanyl; the security guard who came to Romeo’s aid at the
pumpkin patch had seen some aluminum foil consistent with the
use of narcotics; and mother’s ever-changing stories as to the
events leading up to these incidents raises the reasonable
inference that mother is lying to conceal her drug use. Because
mother’s use of these substances is “excessive,” it constitutes
“substance abuse.” (N.R., supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 555, italics
added.) There is also sufficient evidence that mother’s substance
abuse renders her “unable to provide regular care” and “results in
. . . a substantial risk of” serious physical harm or illness to a
child: On two occasions, her drug use left Romeo unsupervised
and, indeed, the only person able to get emergency aid to help
mother. Although a security guard was nearby at the pumpkin
patch and the maternal grandparents were nearby in April 2025,
those fortuities do not eliminate the risk posed by leaving a nine
or 11-year-old unsupervised. (E.g., In re Yolanda L. (2017) 7
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Cal.App.5th 987, 993 [“The juvenile court need not wait until a
child is seriously injured to assume jurisdiction if there is
evidence that the child is at risk of future harm from the parent’s
. . . conduct”].) What is more, mother’s erratic conduct in the
years in between reasonably supports the inference that she has
continued to use drugs and thus continued to place Romeo at risk
throughout that period. Mother’s steadfast denial of any and all
drug use only elevates the risk. (In re Esmeralda B. (1992) 11
Cal.App.4th 1036, 1044 [“denial is a factor often relevant to
determining whether persons are likely to modify their behavior
in the future without court supervision”].)
Mother responds with two categories of arguments.
First, she raises several arguments aimed at undermining
the weight of the Department’s evidence—namely, that (1) the
positive “screens” for narcotics after the April 2025 incident do
not definitively establish that she had drugs in her body; (2) the
positive screen for drugs after the April 2025 incident is
consistent with her explanation that she ingested tramadol,
which is an opiate; (3) the positive screen after the April 2025
incident is the only medical confirmation of her drug use; (4) no
one actually saw her ingest drugs or found any drug
paraphernalia in her home; (5) her seizure-like symptoms during
the April 2025 incident could have been caused by a neurological
disorder instead of drug use; and (6) the juvenile court could not
compel her to test for drugs prior to the assertion of jurisdiction
(so her failure to test for drugs means nothing). These arguments
effectively ask us to weigh the evidence differently than the
juvenile court, which is beyond our purview under substantial
evidence review. (In re Brianna S. (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 303,
316.) The arguments themselves also lack merit. A positive drug
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screen supports a finding of drug use; mother’s admission that
she ingested tramadol does not explain the fentanyl or
amphetamine in her blood; circumstantial evidence of drug use,
including mother’s erratic behavior and the foil reported during
the pumpkin patch, constitutes viable evidence; the seizure-like
symptoms mother exhibited in April 2025 are also consistent
with a drug overdose; and the evidence supporting jurisdiction is
substantial without any consideration of mother’s failure to drug
test.
Second, mother contends that there is insufficient evidence
that her substance abuse places Romeo at risk of harm. We
disagree. To be sure, Romeo has thus far avoided harm on the
two specific occasions when mother incapacitated herself through
drug use. But, as explained above, actual harm to a child is not a
prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction and mother’s drug use
and her steadfast denial of such use create a risk of harm.
Mother counters that her overdoses have only left her
“temporarily unable” to care for Romeo, and that Romeo was old
enough in 2023 and 2025 (at ages 9 and 11) to fetch emergency
help from other adults when mother was in the throes of her
overdoses. That Romeo was able to find other adults to help—
rather than be victimized or harmed by them because he was left
unsupervised—is a fortuity that does not eliminate the risk posed
by mother’s conduct.
* * *
Because the two substance abuse-based grounds for
dependency jurisdiction are supported by substantial evidence,
we need not consider whether that jurisdiction is also supported
by the mental health allegation. (I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p.
773.)
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II. Removal from Mother
Mother next argues that there was insufficient evidence to
support the juvenile court’s order removing Romeo from her
custody.
Once a juvenile court exerts dependency jurisdiction over a
child, the court may remove the child from their parent if it finds,
by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) “[t]here is or would be a
substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or
physical or emotional well-being of the [child] if the [child] were
returned home,” and (2) “there are no reasonable means” short of
removal “by which the [child’s] physical health can be protected.”
(§ 361, subd. (c)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.695(c)(1).) In light
of the clear and convincing standard, our task is to ascertain
whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s
finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that removal was
appropriate. (In re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 155.)
Substantial evidence also supports the juvenile court’s
removal of Romeo from mother’s custody. The substantial
evidence that supports the juvenile court’s exercise of dependency
jurisdiction also, on the facts of this case, supports the finding by
clear and convincing evidence that Romeo faces a substantial
danger of harm if left in mother’s custody. (See In re Rocco
M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 826 [“[s]ince the evidence warranted
a finding of substantial risk of serious physical injury, it also
appears to have supported a finding under section 361 . . . of a
substantial danger to the [child’s] physical health”].)
Mother counters with two arguments, neither of which is
persuasive. First, she argues that removal is unnecessary
because she has a support system—namely, the maternal
grandparents—in place to protect Romeo. We disagree. The
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record indicates that the maternal grandparents had concerns
about mother’s unusual nocturnal behavior, including her habit
of taking Romeo out late at night, but failed to intervene.
Further, mother’s drug overdoses occurred either in the
grandparents’ home or while she was living with them. In short,
the record does not support a finding that they mitigate the risk
that mother’s substance abuse poses to Romeo. Second, mother
asserts that the Department did not examine other “reasonable
means” of avoiding removal (as required by section 361,
subdivision (c)) because it did not assess the feasibility of having
father move in with mother to care for Romeo. This alternative
was not reasonable, as father demonstrated a significant lack of
awareness regarding mother’s substance abuse and, even after he
learned, did not express any concern for Romeo remaining in her
care, thereby reflecting a lack of protective capacity. The
Department was not required to pursue placement with a parent
who, at the time, demonstrated neither awareness of the
precipitating risk nor an ability to recognize the danger it posed.
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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and the
disposition orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT
We concur:
_________________________, J.
BAKER
_________________________, J.
MOOR
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