Filed 11/4/26 In re Ra.A. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re Ra.A. et al., Persons Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
E088035
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, (Super.Ct.No. DPRI2600052)
Plaintiff and Appellant, OPINION
v.
R.A.,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Malvina Ovanezova,
Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Jamila T. Purnell, Assistant County Counsel and
Catherine E Rupp, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Patricia K. Saucier, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Respondent.
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INTRODUCTION
Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) challenges the
juvenile court’s order providing R.A. (father) with reunification services. DPSS seeks to
correct the court’s disposition order to reflect that father should receive enhancement
services instead, since his children, Ra.A. and A.A. (the children), remain in the care of
their mother, E.E. (mother). We reverse the disposition order as to father and remand for
a new disposition hearing.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 10, 2026, DPSS filed a section 300 petition on behalf the children.
Ra.A. was six years old at the time, and A.A. was one month old. The petition alleged
they came under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to
protect) and (g) (no provisions for support). Specifically, the petition alleged that, on
February 4, 2026, mother and father (the parents) had a domestic violence incident in the
presence of the children, where mother sustained injuries. Additionally, the parents had
an unreported history of domestic violence, father had a criminal history which included
active charges for inflicting corporal injury on a spouse, willful child cruelty, and
attempting to dissuade a witness/victim, and he was currently incarcerated.
The social worker filed a detention report and stated that DPSS received a referral
alleging emotional abuse on February 4, 2026. The police responded to the family home,
where the parents were arguing; father punched mother in the stomach and leg and
1 All further statutory references will be to the Welfare and Institutions Code
unless otherwise indicated.
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grabbed her by the face. The children were present and saw father hitting mother. An
unknown person called the police, and the parents fled with A.A. and left Ra.A. at the
house. The police located them and arrested father.
The social worker interviewed father, who said the children were his biological
children, and that he, mother, and the children lived with the paternal great-grandparents.
Father denied any criminal history or domestic violence with mother. The social worker
also interviewed mother, who said there had been domestic violence and emotional abuse
with father during the eight years of their relationship. As to the current incident, she
said father went through her social media, noticed that a male liked one of her posts,
started questioning her about him, and then hit her all over her legs, arms, and face.
Mother also disclosed that father constantly threatened to kill her and the maternal family
if she attempted to leave him. She indicated that she ended the relationship with father
and said she and the children would not be returning home. Mother said she had been
granted an emergency protective order and planned to file for a permanent restraining
order, and for sole legal and physical custody of the children.
The court held a detention hearing on February 11, 2026. DPSS recommended the
court detain the children from father but allow them to remain with mother. The court
followed the recommendation and ordered the children detained from father only. The
court granted a temporary restraining order that day.
Jurisdiction/Disposition
On February 27, 2026, the social worker filed a jurisdiction/disposition report,
recommending that the court sustain the petition, declare the children dependents, remove
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them from father’s custody but order that they remain in mother’s custody, and order
family maintenance services for mother and family reunification services for father. The
social worker reported that, on February 11, 2026, the court found father to be the
children’s presumed father. He remained incarcerated and had a criminal court hearing
scheduled for March 19, 2026.
The social worker further reported that mother and the children had relocated, and
mother was willing to enforce the restraining order to keep her and the children safe. She
desired to be provided with family maintenance services, and the social worker opined
there were no safety concerns to warrant the children being removed from her care.
The court held a jurisdiction/disposition hearing on March 4, 2026, and county
counsel submitted on the petition, detention report, and jurisdiction/disposition report, but
also noted there were amended recommendations submitted that morning.2 County
counsel asked the court to sustain the petition and offer mother family maintenance
services. As a result, father was not entitled to reunification services, pursuant to section
16507, subdivision (b); however, DPSS would submit to him receiving “nonstatutory
services.” Mother objected to the allegations against her but submitted on the
recommendation for family maintenance services and asked the court to grant a
permanent restraining order against father. Father also objected to the allegations and
2 The record on appeal contains no amended recommendations. We note that
father’s appellate counsel requested to augment the record with the amended
recommendations allegedly submitted to the court on March 4, 2026. However, the clerk
of the court confirmed that “amended recommendations were mentioned, however they
were not filed” with the court.
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asked the court to provide him “with family reunification per the report or …
nonstatutory services.”
The court noted father had a criminal protective order that he needed to comply
with, and it granted the permanent restraining order, to expire in March 2028, but said it
would permit visitation for father when his criminal protective order was modified to
allow it. The court then found true the allegations under section 300, subdivision (b), but
struck the allegation under section (g) since father was no longer in custody. The court
ordered physical custody of the children to be retained by mother and ordered that she be
provided with family maintenance services. It ordered the children to be removed from
father’s custody, pursuant to section 361, subdivision (c), and stated it believed it was
appropriate to grant him reunification services “to provide him with the tools that he
needs to have contact with his kids.” The court adopted the remaining recommendations.
County counsel objected to the court’s order for reunification services, reiterating that
father was not entitled to them.
DISCUSSION
The Court Improperly Ordered Reunification Services for Father
DPSS argues the court did not have the statutory authority to order reunification
services for father since the children were ordered to remain in mother’s custody. DPSS
contends the court should have offered him enhancement services instead. Father states
that the court adopted the recommended findings contained in DPSS’s report and ordered
reunification services, and he simply asks this court to affirm the disposition order. We
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agree with DPSS and therefore reverse the order for reunification services and remand
with directions for the court to conduct a new disposition hearing as to father.
Section 16501, subdivision (h) provides: ““As used in this chapter, family
reunification services are activities designed to provide time-limited foster care services
to prevent or remedy neglect, abuse, or exploitation, when the child cannot safely remain
at home, and needs temporary foster care, while services are provided to reunite the
family.”” (Italics added; In re A.L. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 138, 145 (A.L.).)
Section 16507, subdivision (b) provides that “[f]amily reunification services shall
only be provided when a child has been placed in out-of-home care or is in the care of a
previously noncustodial parent under the supervision of the juvenile court.” (Italics
added.)
As these statutes make clear, “when a child … is not removed from [his/her]
custodial parent(s) in the context of the dependency proceeding, no ‘reunification’
services are called for. Instead, as stated in section 362, the court in that situation is
vested with discretion to make ‘any and all reasonable orders to the parents or guardians
of the child who is the subject of any proceedings under this chapter as the court deems
necessary and proper to carry out the provisions of this section.’” (A.L., supra, 188
Cal.App.4th at p. 145.)
Here, because the children remained with mother, a custodial parent, father was
not entitled to reunification services. (§ 16507, subd. (b); In re Destiny D. (2017) 15
Cal.App.5th 197, 212 (Destiny D.) [when child remains placed with one of two custodial
parents, parent not retaining custody is not entitled to reunification services]; A.L., supra,
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188 Cal.App.4th at p. 145 [no reunification services are called for when a child is not
removed from her custodial parent]; see also In re C.S. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 631, 636
(C.S.).) In other words, “[b]ecause parental custody of [the children] was not disrupted
by the dispositional order, and [they were] not placed in foster care, there is no current
need to ‘reunify’ this family. Instead, the goal of this dependency proceeding is simply
to ‘eliminate[e] the conditions or factors requiring court supervision.’” (A.L., supra, 188
Cal.App.4th at p. 140; § 364, subd. (b).) Thus, the court erred in ordering reunification
services for father.
DPSS requests that we remand the matter to conduct a new disposition hearing
and instruct the juvenile court to offer father “the services to which he is
entitled — namely enhancement services.” Enhancement services are “child welfare
services offered to the parent not retaining custody, designed to enhance the child’s
relationship with that parent.” (Earl L. v. Superior Court (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1490,
1497, fn. 1.) We note that father is not actually entitled to enhancement services, since
“[a]n order for enhancement services is subject to the court’s discretion.” (C.S., supra,
80 Cal.App.5th at p. 637, see § 362, subd. (a); Destiny D., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at pp.
212-213.) Therefore, we will reverse the court’s disposition order as to father and
remand the matter for the court to exercise its discretion on whether or not to offer him
enhancement services.
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DISPOSITION
The disposition order as to father is reversed, and the matter is remanded with
directions to conduct a new disposition hearing and exercise its discretion on whether or
not to offer him enhancement services. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
FIELDS
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
P. J.
MENETREZ
J.
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