Filed 9/3/26 In re R.T. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re R.T., Jr., a Person Coming B350230
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
(Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 21CCJP01860)
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
R.T.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Juan M. Valles, Judge Pro Tempore. Affirmed.
Jamie A. Moran, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Navid Nakhjavani, Principal
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The juvenile court assumed dependency jurisdiction over
R.T., Jr. (Minor) in October 2024 after finding his mother, L.C.
(Mother), suffered from mental health and substance abuse
issues. Minor’s father, R.T. (Father), with whom Minor did not
reside, asked the court to place Minor with him. The juvenile
court declined to do so, finding this would be detrimental to
Minor, and ordered Minor removed from both parents. We
affirmed that disposition order in a prior appeal. (In re R.T.
(Mar. 6, 2026, B343695) [nonpub. opn.] (In re R.T. I).) At a more
recent six-month review hearing, the juvenile court ordered
Minor returned to Mother’s custody and impliedly found that
return to Father would be detrimental. We consider whether
substantial evidence supports this continued finding of
detriment.
I. BACKGROUND1
A. The Dependency Investigation and Petition
Minor was born in September 2015. Minor was living with
Mother in October 2024 when police responded to an incident at
the home and observed Mother “acting in a bizarre and
aggressive man[ner].” Mother was involuntarily hospitalized
under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150 and Minor was
taken into protective custody.2 Minor told a social worker with
1
In reciting the pertinent background facts, we draw on our
prior opinion in In re R.T. I. On our own motion, we also take
judicial notice of the record in the prior appeal. (Evid. Code,
§§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).)
2
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
2
the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family
Services (the Department) that he did not know Father.
The Department filed a dependency petition in October
2024 alleging Mother’s mental and emotional problems placed
Minor at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm.3
The petition indicated Father’s whereabouts were unknown. The
petition was subsequently amended to add an allegation that
Minor was also at risk of harm from Mother’s history of
substance abuse.
Later in October, the juvenile court ordered Minor released
to Mother on the condition that a maternal great uncle, M.C.,
reside with Mother and Minor. The juvenile court later added a
condition that Mother “not drive [Minor] anywhere.”
Mother told a Department social worker that she and
Father were in a relationship beginning in 2013, Father was
present for Minor’s birth in 2015, but “the relationship . . . was
not good due to domestic violence.” She lived in Texas with
Minor and Father until 2018, when she took Minor and “fle[d]”
3
This was not the first time Minor had come to the
Department’s attention. In 2021, the juvenile court assumed
dependency jurisdiction based on findings that Mother’s
substance abuse and mental and emotional problems put Minor
at substantial risk of serious physical harm. The juvenile court
denied family reunification services to Father in that case “due to
his being an alleged father and whereabouts unknown.”
Dependency jurisdiction was terminated in June 2022. The
following year, the juvenile court dismissed a petition alleging
Mother was driving with Minor “under the influence of an
unknown substance” when she struck another car and left the
scene.
3
from Father. Mother reported she had no contact with Father
after she left.
Father said he dated Mother for about three years and was
present for Minor’s birth. According to Father, he lived with and
cared for Minor from Minor’s birth in September 2015 until
Mother took Minor to California in April 2016. Father denied
there was any domestic violence, and he said their relationship
fell apart when Mother “started using drugs.” He said he had
only sporadic contact with Minor after Mother left because
Mother provided incorrect contact information.
Father provided the Department a mailing address in
Arkansas but said he was living in Texas “per terms of his
probation.” The Department reported Father was incarcerated
from March 2024 to August 2024, on charges including domestic
violence, and he would be on probation until 2026.
The juvenile court determined Father is Minor’s presumed
father in October 2024. A Department social worker spoke with
Father “to assess for possible release” of Minor. Father said he
was “working on getting a copy of the terms of his probation to
the Department.” He suggested he was on probation for
“tampering with physical evidence.” When the social worker
asked Father for his address in Texas to have local child welfare
workers assess his home, Father declined to provide one. Father
said that if Minor were released to him, he would meet him in
Arkansas, which is where Father’s wife lived. Father planned to
move to Arkansas to recover from an upcoming heart surgery.
Although Father previously indicated Minor would need to stay
with him in Texas because he was not allowed to leave the state,
Father said he had “r[u]n his plan to move to Arkansas by his
probation officer, and his probation officer ‘was cool with it.’” The
4
social worker called Father’s probation officer, who “stated he
[was] not authorized to release any information other than
stating [Father] is on his case load and confirming he is on
probation.”
B. Adjudication and Disposition
Mother pled no contest to the amended dependency petition
at an October 2024 jurisdiction hearing. The juvenile court heard
testimony on the disposition it should order.
Father testified he was present when Minor was born and
Minor remained in his custody for “about five, six months.”
Father lost contact with Minor for “a couple months” when
Mother took him to California, but he then had video chats with
Minor (who was still less than one year old) “almost . . . every
other day.” Father testified he would “ask [Minor] about his day,
how he was doing, ask him how he was doing in school,
sometimes play games, talk to each other, tell him how much [he]
miss[ed] him.” Father visited Minor in person “every day” over a
“two or three week[ ]” period in 2021 when Mother and Minor
stayed with a friend in Texas.
Father testified he would sometimes call Minor and receive
no answer, or Minor’s phone number would change. Father was
also incarcerated at times. When Father lost contact with Minor,
he would reach out by phone and email, he would contact
Mother’s relatives, and he sometimes “sen[t] the police to check
the state of [Minor].” Father denied engaging in domestic
violence with Mother, but he acknowledged a domestic violence
5
arrest involving a different partner in 2021. Children were
present during that domestic violence episode.
The juvenile court postponed the conclusion of the
disposition hearing to a future date. In the meantime, the
Department submitted a report expressing concern that, contrary
to the conditions of the juvenile court’s release of Minor to
Mother, M.C. (the great uncle) was not living with them and
Mother was driving with Minor. The Department also reported
Father failed to provide the terms of his probation as requested.
Minor was detained from Mother in late November 2024.
The juvenile court initially ordered the Department to assess
Father for placement, but it modified its order after the
Department argued Father failed to respond to the Department’s
requests for information regarding his criminal history and
probation status in Texas. The court ordered that “[i]f [Father]
does present any further documents regarding his criminal
matters in Texas, the Department should vet those and address
that in [a report] . . . . But the Department has made several
attempts to assess, and the outcome has been consistently
negative.” The court also ordered the Department to consider
Minor’s paternal grandmother for placement.
In early December 2024, the Department reported Minor
was not adjusting well to foster care. When social workers picked
him up from school to transport him to his new placement, he
demanded to be returned to Mother and made “both suicidal and
homicidal statements.” Minor also suffered “uncontrollable
outbursts” at school and exhibited behaviors “harmful . . . to self
and [others].”
The Department also received reports that Mother was
encouraging Minor to “‘act up.’” Minor told a social worker he
6
wanted to return to Mother’s care and “became somewhat
hysterical” when the social worker asked how he felt about
staying with Father or his paternal grandmother. Minor said “he
does not know his [paternal grandmother].” When a social
worker spoke with the paternal grandmother, she said she had
not seen Minor since he was three or four years old but she was
“more than willing to take [Father] and [Minor] in.” Minor was
amenable to living with Father temporarily, “but he d[id] not
want to live out of state away from [Mother].”
The Department reported it had “still not received a copy of
[Father’s] terms of probation,” though “the delay could be due to
[Father’s] probation being transferred to the state of Arkansas.”
Father indicated he expected to move to Arkansas “by the end of
the month,” and he would need to do so “the day his probation is
transferred.” Because Minor’s paternal grandmother lived in
Texas, Father could not “agree long-term to living with [her] as a
condition of having [Minor] in his care.” Father was “open to
having the Department assess the home he share[d] in
[Arkansas] with his new wife when he g[ot] there so that [Minor]
c[ould] be placed in his care; however, he [was] not there yet and
asked if there [wa]s any[ way] the case could be continued
indefinitely until he move[d].”
The day before the reconvened disposition hearing, the
Department reported it “received a call from [F]ather’s probation
officer,” who provided a copy of the terms of probation and stated
Father was “currently in compliance.” The probation officer
confirmed probation was “being transferred to the state of
Arkansas” but was “unable to confirm the status of the transfer.”
The probation officer stated Father was on probation for
7
“tampering with evidence, assault on a family member, and
assault ‘reck breath,’ which means he ‘choked someone out.’”
At the resumed disposition hearing in December 2024,
Father asked the juvenile court to place Minor with him
pursuant to section 361.2, a statute that provides a child should
be placed with a parent with whom the child did not reside when
the events giving rise to dependency proceedings began—unless
this would be detrimental to the child.
The juvenile court found placement with Father would be
detrimental to Minor. The juvenile court reasoned “there is a
long history of documented and reported domestic violence” and
“while Father reports that he has been compliant with the terms
of his Texas probation or parole, there’s no evidence before the
court to suggest he’s mitigated this underlying risk.” The
juvenile court also emphasized “placement of [Minor]
with . . . [F]ather would be harmful to the child’s emotional well-
being . . . . Though the court [was] removing [Minor] from
Mother’s custody . . . [it could not] ignore the very close bond that
these two share.” The juvenile court observed that “Mother and
[Minor were] clutching onto one another, and Mother [was] in
tears.” Minor was “having a very difficult time emotionally and
psychologically being simply detained from his Mother,” and the
juvenile court “believe[d] that removing [Minor] from the
Southern California area away from his mother would be
extremely harmful to [his] emotional well-being.” The juvenile
court concluded that, “[w]hatever the source of Father’s inability
to establish a relationship with [Minor], the fact remains that
there are serious unresolved concerns regarding domestic
8
violence and the harm the child would face if removed from
California and placed in the care of . . . Father in Texas.”4
Father’s case plan included individual counseling and an
order to comply with the terms of his probation. He was granted
monitored visitation in California and monitored phone and
virtual visits.
Father appealed the disposition order, and this Court
affirmed in In re R.T. I. We held that substantial evidence
supported the juvenile court’s finding that the Department made
reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal.
We further held that Father’s challenge to the juvenile court’s
decision not to place Minor with him as a non-custodial parent
under section 361.2 lacked merit for several reasons. Among
other things, the statute only applies to parents who, unlike
Father, had not had a removal order entered against them.
Moreover, as we shall discuss, the juvenile court returned Minor
to Mother’s care at a subsequent review hearing, so it did not
make sense to analyze Father’s right to have Minor placed with
him under a statute addressing placement when a child is
removed from a custodial parent. In any case, we held, the
detriment finding was adequately supported by evidence that
Father had a recent history of domestic violence, by evidence that
the emotional strain Minor suffered out of Mother’s custody was
likely to be exacerbated by placement in another state, and by the
4
The juvenile court found Father’s testimony concerning his
relationship to Minor “on the whole not credible. The statements
he provided were inconsistent with evidence already before the
court. Some of the timelines he provided [we]re simply not
plausible in light of the child’s age . . . .”
9
juvenile court’s finding that Father’s testimony concerning his
relationship with Minor was not credible.
C. The Six-Month Review Hearing
The juvenile court called the matter for a six-month review
hearing in June 2025 but determined Father did not receive
proper notice and continued the hearing to the following month.
The court also ordered, among other things, the Department to
“report back on Father’s engagement with the case plan and the
Department, as well as including any information on Father’s
visitation with [Minor].”
In July 2025, the Department filed a report indicating it
attempted to reach Father by phone a couple days earlier but his
voicemail was full. Father did not respond to text messages
requesting he call the Department. The juvenile court again
continued the six-month review hearing when Minor was not
present. The court remarked, however, that it “would have found
that the Department ha[d] failed to provide Father with
reasonable services.” The Department’s records indicated it had
not made “any attempts to communicate with . . . [F]ather until
very recently,” which was “wholly unacceptable.” The juvenile
court ordered the Department “to explain in clear detail why
Father was not contacted between the end of last year at
disposition, through the first setting of this [six-month review
hearing].”
In a subsequent report, the Department explained it had
failed to maintain contact with Father after disposition because
of other “issues requir[ing] urgent attention,” including Minor’s
behavioral challenges and Mother’s resistance to services. In
“managing the immediate crisis,” a Department social worker
10
“did not realize until it was raised by the court that she had not
made contact with [Father].” The Department later documented
additional efforts to reach Father by mail, phone, and text
message.
The juvenile court held the six-month review hearing in
September 2025. The Department asked the court to order Minor
returned to Mother with family maintenance services and to
order enhancement services for Father.
Father’s attorney argued he did not receive reasonable
services following the disposition hearing. She also remarked
that although she did “not have a specific direction from [her]
client” regarding the Department’s recommendation, Father’s
“previous request at the disposition . . . hearing was release given
that he was a non-offending and previously a non-custodial
parent.” Father’s attorney further emphasized Father “ha[d] an
appeal pending, and he [wa]s not waiving any appealable issues.”
When the juvenile court asked the Department’s attorney
to “address the issue of reasonable services as to Father,” the
attorney acknowledged “a lack of contact and reasonable services
to . . . Father since the disposition” hearing. The court found the
Department failed to provide Father with reasonable services
from December 2024 through July 2025. The juvenile court
ordered “an administrative review of this matter,” with a report
to be filed no later than October 15, 2025. The court remarked it
“ha[d] never seen such an apparent and glaring lack of servicing,”
with “absolutely no efforts to communicate with . . . [F]ather” in
the months following the disposition order.
The juvenile court retained jurisdiction over Minor, but
ordered him released to Mother—conditioned upon her continued
compliance with her case plan. The juvenile court explained that,
11
“had Father been provided services and [had] Father . . . engaged
in those services, Father may have been eligible for return
today.” However, Father was “in the same place he was eight
months ago.” Although this was “not his fault” and “squarely the
Department’s responsibility,” “[t]he only remedy for
Father . . . [wa]s for the court to extend family enhancement
services to him as [Minor] [was] returned to the care of Mother.”
The juvenile court set a further hearing for March 2026.
II. DISCUSSION
Emphasizing the Department’s failure to maintain contact
with Father between disposition and the six-month review
hearing, Father contends the Department did not carry its
burden to show that returning Minor to Father’s care would be
detrimental to Minor.5 Father’s position is that a detriment
finding made at a six-month review hearing cannot stand unless
it is supported by fresh evidence collected after disposition. We
hold to the contrary on the facts here and conclude the record
supports the juvenile court’s detriment finding and placement
decision.
5
The issue on appeal is not the Department’s acknowledged
failure to provide Father with reasonable services, for which the
juvenile court already ordered the only available remedy—i.e.,
additional services. (In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962,
975 [“The remedy for a failure to provide reasonable reunification
services is an order for the continued provision of services,” not
“to return the child to the parent in spite of a finding of a
substantial risk of detriment”]; Michael G. v. Superior Court
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 609, 625.)
12
The statute pertinent to the issue presented provides that
“after considering the admissible and relevant evidence” at the
six-month review hearing, the juvenile court “shall order the
return of the child to the physical custody of their parent or legal
guardian unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the return of the child to their parent or legal
guardian would create a substantial risk of detriment to the
safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.
The social worker shall have the burden of establishing that
detriment.” (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(1); see also § 366.21, subd. (e)(2)
[“Regardless of whether the child is returned to a parent or legal
guardian, the court shall specify the factual basis for its
conclusion that the return would be detrimental or would not be
detrimental”].) “In making its determination, the court shall
review and consider the social worker’s report and
recommendations . . . and shall consider the efforts or progress,
or both, demonstrated by the parent . . . and the extent to which
they availed themselves of services provided . . . .” (§ 366.21,
subd. (e)(1).) Our review of the court’s determination is for
substantial evidence. (Robert L. v. Superior Court (1996) 45
Cal.App.4th 619, 625; In re E.D. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 960,
966.)
As the juvenile court candidly acknowledged, it did not
have current information regarding Father’s progress in his case
plan or his circumstances more generally on the date of the six-
month review hearing because the Department failed to maintain
contact with him. Nevertheless, we are unconvinced, as Father
argues, that the Department could not satisfy its burden without
evidence post-dating the disposition hearing because the pre-
disposition evidence was still relevant and adequate. To ignore
13
this evidence at the six-month review hearing would contravene
settled law explaining the past is “predictive of the future” and “‘a
parent’s future potential is undoubtedly revealed in the parent’s
past behavior with the child.’ [Citation.]” (In re Jasmon O.
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 424; see also In re Cole C. (2009) 174
Cal.App.4th 900, 917 [in deciding whether to remove a child from
a parent’s custody at disposition, “the court may consider the
parent’s past conduct as well as present circumstances”]; In re
Troy D. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 889, 900 [“While jurisdiction must
be asserted on the basis of conditions which exist at the time of
the jurisdictional hearing, the court is not required to disregard
the [parent’s] prior conduct”].) It would also risk conflating the
issue of reasonable services (which the trial court rightly found
were not provided) and the risk of detriment to a removed child.
Father’s recent history of domestic violence plus the
emotional strain on Minor caused by separation from Mother
combine to provide substantial evidence for the juvenile court’s
conclusion that releasing Minor to Father, who lives out of state
and with whom Minor does not have a longstanding relationship,
would be detrimental.6 (In re A.C. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 38, 43-
45 [affirming detriment finding at disposition where the non-
custodial parent lived out of state, the child did not have a strong
6
Father’s suggestion that the juvenile court did not make
the required detriment finding also lacks merit. The juvenile
court clearly stated the factual basis for its implied detriment
finding at the September 2025 hearing, which is all that section
366.21, subdivision (e)(2) requires. Specifically, the juvenile court
lamented “Father may have been eligible for return today” but for
the Department’s failure to provide reasonable services, which
left Father “in the same place he was eight months [earlier].”
14
relationship with that parent, and the child had strong local
attachments].) Although there likely would come a time when
evidence compiled prior to the disposition hearing would be too
stale to suffice, it was reasonable for the juvenile court to infer (at
the same time it appropriately made a no reasonable services
finding and extended the time to provide services) that the
relevant circumstances did not meaningfully change between
disposition and the six-month review hearing. (In re R.T. (2017)
3 Cal.5th 622, 633 [in undertaking substantial evidence review, a
reviewing court draws “‘all reasonable inferences from the
evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency
court’” and “‘review[s] the record in the light most favorable to
the court’s determinations’”].)
15
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, J.
We concur:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
MOOR, J.
16