Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

In re R.R. CA4/2

Filed 11/5/26 In re R.R. CA4/2
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 11/5/26 In re R.R. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ord ered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re R.R., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
E088727
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, (Super.Ct.No. DPIN2400157)

Plaintiff and Respondent, OPINION

v.

R.R. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Natalie Keller,

Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Conditionally reversed.

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Christine E. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal for Defendant and

Appellant R.R.

Donna P. Chirco, under appointment by the Court of Appeal for Defendant and

Appellant D.R.

Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Jamila T. Purnell and Julie Jarvi, Deputy County

Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.

The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of D.B. (Mother) and R.R.

(Father—father to their son, R.R. (Minor)). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (b)(1).)1

Mother contends: (1) her juvenile court attorney rendered ineffective assistance during

the disposition hearing by not arguing that the Riverside County Department of Public

Social Services (the Department) failed to prove its claim that reunification services

should be bypassed; and (2) the juvenile court erred in not stating on the record its

reasons for finding the parent-child bond exception inapplicable. Father asserts the

Department failed to complete its inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978

(ICWA).2 (§ 224, subd. (b) & 224.2, subd. (b)(1).) The Department concedes Father’s

contention is correct. Mother and Father join in one another’s contentions. We

conditionally reverse.

1 All subsequent statutory references will be to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2 “[B]ecause ICWA uses the term ‘Indian,’ we do the same for consistency, even
though we recognize that other terms, such as ‘Native American’ or ‘indigenous,’ are
preferred by many.” (In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 739, fn. 1.)

2
FACTS

A. DETENTION

Mother is intellectually disabled and suffers from bipolar disorder and depression.

Father suffers from “significant mental health problems,” including bipolar disorder I,

post traumatic stress disorder, and unspecified personally disorder. Adult Protective

Services was involved with Mother and Father (the Parents) due to issues of domestic

violence. While Mother was pregnant, the Parents took parenting classes through the

Refuge Pregnancy Center. Minor was born in May 2024.

During a medical appointment in late June 2024, Minor “appeared to be starving

and [was] frantic.” Minor had “poor weight gain” and no growth of his head

circumference “which indicates no brain growth.” After lab tests showed no

abnormalities, a pediatrician determined Minor was “not getting enough calories.”

Nurses discovered the Parents were making errors in feeding Minor. For example, the

Parents did not wake Minor to feed him, fed him while he laid flat on a bed, and did not

burp him, which led to Minor vomiting his formula.

While Minor stayed in the hospital, nurses tried to teach the Parents how to feed

Minor. The hospital social worker opined that it was unsafe to place Minor in the

Parents’ care because the Parents “are not able to follow through with what is being

taught to them by the nursing staff.” Minor’s pediatrician also expressed concern about

the Parents’ ability to provide Minor with the needed care. While staying in the hospital,

Minor did “really well and has gained weight.” In July 2024, the Department detained

Minor.

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B. JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction hearing was set for August 27, 2024. On that day, the Department

requested a continuance “to complete the psychological evaluations for Mother and

Father.” The juvenile court granted the continuance and suggested the Department give

the Parents extra assistance in enrolling in services or “any kind of specialized referrals.”

The juvenile court encouraged the Parents to engage in services offered by the

Department.

Two psychologists examined Mother. During the exam by Kenneth Garett, Ph.D.

(Garett), Mother “showed notable delays” which caused Garett to test Mother’s cognitive

abilities. Garett determined that Mother’s “cognitive impairments seemed to be in the

low borderline to upper developmentally disabled range, clearly the type of scores which

would make it difficult for her to function independently and to be employable.” Garett

concluded that Mother, by herself, “would be unable to properly care for an infant child”

“due to both her intellectual impairment as well as her psychological difficulties based on

her bipolarity.”

Jamye Jesser, Psy.D. (Jesser), concluded that Mother “showed intellectual

functioning in the below average range.” Jesser opined that Mother’s “problems are

because she has intellectual and emotional impairments which preclude her from

functioning in a parental role.” Jesser concluded, “I have evaluated both [Mother] and

[Father], and have concerns about their ability to handle an infant. I do believe in their

desire to raise their baby, however, feel that parenting classes, domestic violence classes,

and individual and couple’s therapy need to occur for a significant amount of time before

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reunification with their child can be considered. The baby’s failure to thrive confirms the

nature of my doubts.”

For the continued jurisdiction hearing on October 2, 2024, the Department

asserted the Parents should be denied reunification services because they suffer from

mental disabilities that render them “incapable of utilizing those services.” (§ 361.5,

subd. (b)(2).) That hearing was again continued.

Prior to the continued hearing in November 2024, Mother participated in domestic

violence classes. Mother requested to start individual counseling, and the Department

was trying to assist her with the referral. At the hearing, Mother’s attorney argued in

favor of reunification services, asserting that Mother might need extra time, but she could

complete services and reunify with Minor. Father asked the juvenile court, “[I]s there

any way I can prove my ability to care for this child?” The juvenile court said it would

continue the disposition hearing, so Father would “have a little bit of time and room to

work on those issues.” Mother continued to take domestic violence classes and work

with a specialist who “teaches about child development.”

C. DISPOSITION

The disposition hearing took place in February 2025. At the start of the hearing,

Mother’s attorney argued, “We are asking the Court to not follow the recommendation

and order reunification services for this young new mother.· This is her first child, who

obviously she loves very much.· But she has also demonstrated some initiative in getting

involved in counseling.· Very early on in the case, they did seek out services of the

Refuge Pregnancy Center in Indio where they are supported by a parent mentor, taking

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classes there as well that are offered there.· She has, documented in the current report,

has engaged in services.· She’s participating in domestic violence classes and SafeCare.

Importantly, visitation has been consistent, very positive, very engaging with the child.·

The mother, with the support of the Department, the Court, and those that she’s engaged

with already, can be a mother, can have an opportunity to raise this child. [¶] I

understand what the evaluations have put forth, but this is a new mother, as I said, a

young mother who needs to learn and is making every effort to do that to become a good

mother.· And, as the Court knows, with some support, I think she can achieve that. [¶]

So on behalf of mother, we're asking for the opportunity to reunify with her child.”

The juvenile court denied reunification services for the Parents “due to the mental

disabilities and other limitations of the [P]arents.”

D. REQUEST TO CHANGE A COURT ORDER

In June 2025, Mother requested the juvenile court return Minor to the Parents’

care on a plan of family maintenance. Mother asserted she had good visits with Minor

and completed a class in health, safety, and parent-infant interaction. Department social

workers met with the Parents. During the meeting, one of the social workers asked

Mother what Mother learned from the classes she had taken. Mother could not say what

topics were discussed, what she learned, or what information was taught in the classes.

The Department opposed Mother’s request for family maintenance due to Mother being

unable to describe anything she learned in her reunification classes. The juvenile court

denied Mother’s request based upon a failure to prove changed circumstances.

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E. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

In June 2026, the juvenile court held a hearing regarding terminating the Parents’

parental rights. The Parents again requested the juvenile court place Minor in their care

on a plan of family maintenance based upon the new evidence that Mother had obtained

employment. The juvenile court denied the request finding that it did not “rise[] to the

level of a change of circumstance and what would be in [Minor’s] best interest.” The

Parents then argued in favor of the juvenile court finding the parent-child bond exception

applies and not terminating the Parents’ rights. Shortly thereafter the juvenile court twice

held discussions off the record. When the juvenile court resumed on the record

discussions, it did not expressly discuss the parent-child bond exception, and the

attorneys did not mention it again. The court terminated the Parents’ parental rights

DISCUSSION

A. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL (Mother’s Appeal)

Mother contends her juvenile court counsel (Counsel) was ineffective because, at

the disposition hearing, Counsel failed to argue that the evidence did not support a

finding that services could be bypassed due to Mother suffering from a mental disability

that renders her incapable of utilizing those services (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(2)). The

Department asserts Mother’s contention is untimely because we cannot review alleged

errors that occurred at the disposition hearing in an appeal from the termination of

parental rights. We agree with the Department.

A parent may seek appellate review of a disposition order. (In re Meranda P.

(1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1150.) If a parent does not seek appellate review of the

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disposition order, then that order “is final and binding and may not be attacked on an

appeal from a later appealable order.” (Ibid.) This forfeiture rule includes claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id. at p. 1151.) Accordingly, Mother forfeited her

claim of ineffective assistance by not seeking appellate review following entry of the

disposition order.3

B. PARENT-CHILD BOND EXCEPTION (Mother’s Appeal)

Mother contends the juvenile court erred by not stating on the record its reasons

for finding the parent-child bond exception inapplicable.

By the time a dependency case reaches a hearing to consider terminating parental

rights, the statutory preference is for terminating parental rights and placing the child for

adoption. (§ 366.26, subds. (b)(1) & (c)(1).) However, if the juvenile court determines

that terminating parental rights would be detrimental to the child because the child would

benefit from continuing the parent-child relationship, then the juvenile court need not

terminate the parent’s rights. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) “If the court finds that

termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child ..., it shall state its reasons

in writing or on the record.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(D).) There is not a corresponding

requirement for the juvenile court to state its reasons when it finds the parent-child bond

exception does not apply. (In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1156.) Accordingly,

3 On September 9, 2026, Father filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus based on
ineffective assistance of counsel. Father’s petition, considered with this appeal, is
resolved by separate order (In re R.R., case No. E089256).

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we conclude the juvenile court did not err in failing to state, on the record, its reasons for

not applying the parent-child bond exception.

Mother asserts that the juvenile court was required to state, on the record, its

analysis under In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.). In Caden C., the

Supreme Court discussed the termination of parental rights and the parent-child bond

exception. (Id. at p. 631.) The high court explained the factors juvenile courts should

consider when determining whether the parent-child bond exception applies. (Id. at pp.

631-633.) The high court also explained things the juvenile court should not consider.

For example, “When it weighs whether termination would be detrimental, the court is not

comparing the parent’s attributes as custodial caregiver relative to those of any potential

adoptive parent(s). … Accordingly, courts should not look to whether the parent can

provide a home for the child; the question is just whether losing the relationship with the

parent would harm the child to an extent not outweighed, on balance, by the security of a

new, adoptive home.” (Id. at p. 634.)

Caden C. was issued on May 27, 2021. Mother cites to cases from 2021 to assert

that a juvenile court’s Caden C. analysis must be stated on the record: In re J.D. (2021)

70 Cal.App.5th 833 (J.D.), issued on September 29, 2021; and In re L.A.-O. (2021) 73

Cal.App.5th 197, issued on December 27, 2021.

Those two cases needed a Caden C. analysis to be expressly stated on the record

because there was no other way for the appellate courts to know if the juvenile courts had

included the newly announced improper factors in their analyses. (J.D., supra, 70

Cal.App.5th at p. 854; In re L.A.-O, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 211-212.) For example,

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in J.D., the appellate court wrote, “But we conclude that the juvenile court’s ruling

cannot be affirmed on this record, because we cannot be certain the juvenile court did not

consider factors disapproved of in Caden C.” (J.D., at p. 854.)

By contrast, because Caden C. has been the law for five years, we assume the

juvenile court conducted a proper Caden C. analysis unless the appellant affirmatively

demonstrates otherwise. (People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 666; Sonoma Land

Trust v. Thompson (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 978, 984.) Thus, the lack of an express Caden

C. analysis on the record is no longer the basis for a reversal.

Mother cites two more cases in her argument: In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th

1218, 1229-1230, and In re M.V. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1155, 1185-1186, in which the

juvenile courts explained their analyses and the appellants affirmatively demonstrated the

juvenile courts considered factors violative of Caden C. Mother’s reliance on these cases

is misplaced as they do not support her assertion that a Caden C. analysis must be stated

on the record.

C. ICWA (Father’s Appeal)

Father contends the Department erred in its duty to inquiry about Indian ancestry

because it failed to ask known relatives about any possible Indian ancestry. (§ 224.2,

subd. (b)(1).) The Department concedes Father is correct. The Department’s reports

reflects that it only questioned the Parents regarding Indian ancestry and did not attempt

to question any of the Parents’ relatives despite the Department knowing of the Parents’

relatives. For example, Father told the Department he was in contact with his parents, his

brother, and his uncle, but there is no record of the Department trying to ask the relatives

10
about possible Indian ancestry. We will conditionally reverse so the Department may

complete its ICWA inquiry.

DISPOSITION

The order terminating parental rights is conditionally reversed. The case is

remanded to the juvenile court so it and the Department may comply with their

obligations to inquire into Minor’s possible Indian heritage. (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(1).)

Thereafter, if the juvenile court determines that there is no reason to know whether Minor

is an Indian child (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(b)), then the

juvenile court shall reinstate the order terminating parental rights. If the juvenile court

concludes there is reason to know Minor is an Indian child (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(1)), then

the juvenile court shall proceed in compliance with the relevant federal and California

laws. (25 U.S.C. § 1912, subd. (a) & § 224.2, subd. (i)(1).)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS.

MILLER
J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ
P. J.

CODRINGTON
J.

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