Filed 11/5/26 In re R.R. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re R.R., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
E088727
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, (Super.Ct.No. DPIN2400157)
Plaintiff and Respondent, OPINION
v.
R.R. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Natalie Keller,
Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Conditionally reversed.
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Christine E. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal for Defendant and
Appellant R.R.
Donna P. Chirco, under appointment by the Court of Appeal for Defendant and
Appellant D.R.
Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Jamila T. Purnell and Julie Jarvi, Deputy County
Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of D.B. (Mother) and R.R.
(Father—father to their son, R.R. (Minor)). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (b)(1).)1
Mother contends: (1) her juvenile court attorney rendered ineffective assistance during
the disposition hearing by not arguing that the Riverside County Department of Public
Social Services (the Department) failed to prove its claim that reunification services
should be bypassed; and (2) the juvenile court erred in not stating on the record its
reasons for finding the parent-child bond exception inapplicable. Father asserts the
Department failed to complete its inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978
(ICWA).2 (§ 224, subd. (b) & 224.2, subd. (b)(1).) The Department concedes Father’s
contention is correct. Mother and Father join in one another’s contentions. We
conditionally reverse.
1 All subsequent statutory references will be to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2 “[B]ecause ICWA uses the term ‘Indian,’ we do the same for consistency, even
though we recognize that other terms, such as ‘Native American’ or ‘indigenous,’ are
preferred by many.” (In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 739, fn. 1.)
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FACTS
A. DETENTION
Mother is intellectually disabled and suffers from bipolar disorder and depression.
Father suffers from “significant mental health problems,” including bipolar disorder I,
post traumatic stress disorder, and unspecified personally disorder. Adult Protective
Services was involved with Mother and Father (the Parents) due to issues of domestic
violence. While Mother was pregnant, the Parents took parenting classes through the
Refuge Pregnancy Center. Minor was born in May 2024.
During a medical appointment in late June 2024, Minor “appeared to be starving
and [was] frantic.” Minor had “poor weight gain” and no growth of his head
circumference “which indicates no brain growth.” After lab tests showed no
abnormalities, a pediatrician determined Minor was “not getting enough calories.”
Nurses discovered the Parents were making errors in feeding Minor. For example, the
Parents did not wake Minor to feed him, fed him while he laid flat on a bed, and did not
burp him, which led to Minor vomiting his formula.
While Minor stayed in the hospital, nurses tried to teach the Parents how to feed
Minor. The hospital social worker opined that it was unsafe to place Minor in the
Parents’ care because the Parents “are not able to follow through with what is being
taught to them by the nursing staff.” Minor’s pediatrician also expressed concern about
the Parents’ ability to provide Minor with the needed care. While staying in the hospital,
Minor did “really well and has gained weight.” In July 2024, the Department detained
Minor.
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B. JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction hearing was set for August 27, 2024. On that day, the Department
requested a continuance “to complete the psychological evaluations for Mother and
Father.” The juvenile court granted the continuance and suggested the Department give
the Parents extra assistance in enrolling in services or “any kind of specialized referrals.”
The juvenile court encouraged the Parents to engage in services offered by the
Department.
Two psychologists examined Mother. During the exam by Kenneth Garett, Ph.D.
(Garett), Mother “showed notable delays” which caused Garett to test Mother’s cognitive
abilities. Garett determined that Mother’s “cognitive impairments seemed to be in the
low borderline to upper developmentally disabled range, clearly the type of scores which
would make it difficult for her to function independently and to be employable.” Garett
concluded that Mother, by herself, “would be unable to properly care for an infant child”
“due to both her intellectual impairment as well as her psychological difficulties based on
her bipolarity.”
Jamye Jesser, Psy.D. (Jesser), concluded that Mother “showed intellectual
functioning in the below average range.” Jesser opined that Mother’s “problems are
because she has intellectual and emotional impairments which preclude her from
functioning in a parental role.” Jesser concluded, “I have evaluated both [Mother] and
[Father], and have concerns about their ability to handle an infant. I do believe in their
desire to raise their baby, however, feel that parenting classes, domestic violence classes,
and individual and couple’s therapy need to occur for a significant amount of time before
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reunification with their child can be considered. The baby’s failure to thrive confirms the
nature of my doubts.”
For the continued jurisdiction hearing on October 2, 2024, the Department
asserted the Parents should be denied reunification services because they suffer from
mental disabilities that render them “incapable of utilizing those services.” (§ 361.5,
subd. (b)(2).) That hearing was again continued.
Prior to the continued hearing in November 2024, Mother participated in domestic
violence classes. Mother requested to start individual counseling, and the Department
was trying to assist her with the referral. At the hearing, Mother’s attorney argued in
favor of reunification services, asserting that Mother might need extra time, but she could
complete services and reunify with Minor. Father asked the juvenile court, “[I]s there
any way I can prove my ability to care for this child?” The juvenile court said it would
continue the disposition hearing, so Father would “have a little bit of time and room to
work on those issues.” Mother continued to take domestic violence classes and work
with a specialist who “teaches about child development.”
C. DISPOSITION
The disposition hearing took place in February 2025. At the start of the hearing,
Mother’s attorney argued, “We are asking the Court to not follow the recommendation
and order reunification services for this young new mother.· This is her first child, who
obviously she loves very much.· But she has also demonstrated some initiative in getting
involved in counseling.· Very early on in the case, they did seek out services of the
Refuge Pregnancy Center in Indio where they are supported by a parent mentor, taking
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classes there as well that are offered there.· She has, documented in the current report,
has engaged in services.· She’s participating in domestic violence classes and SafeCare.
Importantly, visitation has been consistent, very positive, very engaging with the child.·
The mother, with the support of the Department, the Court, and those that she’s engaged
with already, can be a mother, can have an opportunity to raise this child. [¶] I
understand what the evaluations have put forth, but this is a new mother, as I said, a
young mother who needs to learn and is making every effort to do that to become a good
mother.· And, as the Court knows, with some support, I think she can achieve that. [¶]
So on behalf of mother, we're asking for the opportunity to reunify with her child.”
The juvenile court denied reunification services for the Parents “due to the mental
disabilities and other limitations of the [P]arents.”
D. REQUEST TO CHANGE A COURT ORDER
In June 2025, Mother requested the juvenile court return Minor to the Parents’
care on a plan of family maintenance. Mother asserted she had good visits with Minor
and completed a class in health, safety, and parent-infant interaction. Department social
workers met with the Parents. During the meeting, one of the social workers asked
Mother what Mother learned from the classes she had taken. Mother could not say what
topics were discussed, what she learned, or what information was taught in the classes.
The Department opposed Mother’s request for family maintenance due to Mother being
unable to describe anything she learned in her reunification classes. The juvenile court
denied Mother’s request based upon a failure to prove changed circumstances.
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E. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
In June 2026, the juvenile court held a hearing regarding terminating the Parents’
parental rights. The Parents again requested the juvenile court place Minor in their care
on a plan of family maintenance based upon the new evidence that Mother had obtained
employment. The juvenile court denied the request finding that it did not “rise[] to the
level of a change of circumstance and what would be in [Minor’s] best interest.” The
Parents then argued in favor of the juvenile court finding the parent-child bond exception
applies and not terminating the Parents’ rights. Shortly thereafter the juvenile court twice
held discussions off the record. When the juvenile court resumed on the record
discussions, it did not expressly discuss the parent-child bond exception, and the
attorneys did not mention it again. The court terminated the Parents’ parental rights
DISCUSSION
A. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL (Mother’s Appeal)
Mother contends her juvenile court counsel (Counsel) was ineffective because, at
the disposition hearing, Counsel failed to argue that the evidence did not support a
finding that services could be bypassed due to Mother suffering from a mental disability
that renders her incapable of utilizing those services (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(2)). The
Department asserts Mother’s contention is untimely because we cannot review alleged
errors that occurred at the disposition hearing in an appeal from the termination of
parental rights. We agree with the Department.
A parent may seek appellate review of a disposition order. (In re Meranda P.
(1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1150.) If a parent does not seek appellate review of the
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disposition order, then that order “is final and binding and may not be attacked on an
appeal from a later appealable order.” (Ibid.) This forfeiture rule includes claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id. at p. 1151.) Accordingly, Mother forfeited her
claim of ineffective assistance by not seeking appellate review following entry of the
disposition order.3
B. PARENT-CHILD BOND EXCEPTION (Mother’s Appeal)
Mother contends the juvenile court erred by not stating on the record its reasons
for finding the parent-child bond exception inapplicable.
By the time a dependency case reaches a hearing to consider terminating parental
rights, the statutory preference is for terminating parental rights and placing the child for
adoption. (§ 366.26, subds. (b)(1) & (c)(1).) However, if the juvenile court determines
that terminating parental rights would be detrimental to the child because the child would
benefit from continuing the parent-child relationship, then the juvenile court need not
terminate the parent’s rights. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) “If the court finds that
termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child ..., it shall state its reasons
in writing or on the record.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(D).) There is not a corresponding
requirement for the juvenile court to state its reasons when it finds the parent-child bond
exception does not apply. (In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1156.) Accordingly,
3 On September 9, 2026, Father filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus based on
ineffective assistance of counsel. Father’s petition, considered with this appeal, is
resolved by separate order (In re R.R., case No. E089256).
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we conclude the juvenile court did not err in failing to state, on the record, its reasons for
not applying the parent-child bond exception.
Mother asserts that the juvenile court was required to state, on the record, its
analysis under In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.). In Caden C., the
Supreme Court discussed the termination of parental rights and the parent-child bond
exception. (Id. at p. 631.) The high court explained the factors juvenile courts should
consider when determining whether the parent-child bond exception applies. (Id. at pp.
631-633.) The high court also explained things the juvenile court should not consider.
For example, “When it weighs whether termination would be detrimental, the court is not
comparing the parent’s attributes as custodial caregiver relative to those of any potential
adoptive parent(s). … Accordingly, courts should not look to whether the parent can
provide a home for the child; the question is just whether losing the relationship with the
parent would harm the child to an extent not outweighed, on balance, by the security of a
new, adoptive home.” (Id. at p. 634.)
Caden C. was issued on May 27, 2021. Mother cites to cases from 2021 to assert
that a juvenile court’s Caden C. analysis must be stated on the record: In re J.D. (2021)
70 Cal.App.5th 833 (J.D.), issued on September 29, 2021; and In re L.A.-O. (2021) 73
Cal.App.5th 197, issued on December 27, 2021.
Those two cases needed a Caden C. analysis to be expressly stated on the record
because there was no other way for the appellate courts to know if the juvenile courts had
included the newly announced improper factors in their analyses. (J.D., supra, 70
Cal.App.5th at p. 854; In re L.A.-O, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 211-212.) For example,
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in J.D., the appellate court wrote, “But we conclude that the juvenile court’s ruling
cannot be affirmed on this record, because we cannot be certain the juvenile court did not
consider factors disapproved of in Caden C.” (J.D., at p. 854.)
By contrast, because Caden C. has been the law for five years, we assume the
juvenile court conducted a proper Caden C. analysis unless the appellant affirmatively
demonstrates otherwise. (People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 666; Sonoma Land
Trust v. Thompson (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 978, 984.) Thus, the lack of an express Caden
C. analysis on the record is no longer the basis for a reversal.
Mother cites two more cases in her argument: In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th
1218, 1229-1230, and In re M.V. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1155, 1185-1186, in which the
juvenile courts explained their analyses and the appellants affirmatively demonstrated the
juvenile courts considered factors violative of Caden C. Mother’s reliance on these cases
is misplaced as they do not support her assertion that a Caden C. analysis must be stated
on the record.
C. ICWA (Father’s Appeal)
Father contends the Department erred in its duty to inquiry about Indian ancestry
because it failed to ask known relatives about any possible Indian ancestry. (§ 224.2,
subd. (b)(1).) The Department concedes Father is correct. The Department’s reports
reflects that it only questioned the Parents regarding Indian ancestry and did not attempt
to question any of the Parents’ relatives despite the Department knowing of the Parents’
relatives. For example, Father told the Department he was in contact with his parents, his
brother, and his uncle, but there is no record of the Department trying to ask the relatives
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about possible Indian ancestry. We will conditionally reverse so the Department may
complete its ICWA inquiry.
DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is conditionally reversed. The case is
remanded to the juvenile court so it and the Department may comply with their
obligations to inquire into Minor’s possible Indian heritage. (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(1).)
Thereafter, if the juvenile court determines that there is no reason to know whether Minor
is an Indian child (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(b)), then the
juvenile court shall reinstate the order terminating parental rights. If the juvenile court
concludes there is reason to know Minor is an Indian child (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(1)), then
the juvenile court shall proceed in compliance with the relevant federal and California
laws. (25 U.S.C. § 1912, subd. (a) & § 224.2, subd. (i)(1).)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS.
MILLER
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
P. J.
CODRINGTON
J.
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