Filed 7/15/26 In re R.M. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re R.M., et al., Persons Coming B345917
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
(Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 24CCJP00844A-C)
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
ORDER MODIFYING
Plaintiff and Respondent, OPINION
v. [NO CHANGE IN
JUDGMENT]
C.H.,
Objector and Appellant.
It is ordered that the caption page of the opinion filed on
July 2, 2026, is modified as follows:
Delete “Defendant and Appellant” in the caption and
replace it with “Objector and Appellant”
Delete “Caree Harper, in pro. per., for Defendant and
Appellant” and replace it with “C.H., in pro. per., for Objector and
Appellant.”
There is no change in judgment.
____________________________________________________________
BAKER, Acting P. J. MOOR, J. KIM, J.
2
Filed 7/2/26 In re R.M. CA2/5 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re R.M., et al., Persons Coming B345917
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
(Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 24CCJP00844A-C)
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
C.H.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Tara Newman, Judge. Affirmed.
Caree Harper, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant
County Counsel, and Aileen Wong, Principal Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Former foster parent C.H. appeals from the juvenile court’s
denial of her petition for a change of the court’s order that had
removed Roy. M. (Roy), Ri. M. (Ri), and Rob. M. (Rob)
(collectively, Minors) from her care.1 We are primarily asked to
decide whether the juvenile court reversibly erred by declining to
admit most of C.H.’s documentary evidence, excluding most of
her proposed witnesses, and denying continuances of the hearing.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Dependency Jurisdiction
Twice in January 2024, father R.M. (Father) repeatedly hit
mother M.M. (Mother), who was pregnant, while in the presence
of Roy and Ri. Also in January 2024, Father drove Roy and Ri in
1
Because C.H. is not a party in the underlying dependency
case, her access to the juvenile court case file is limited by the
California Rules of Court. The juvenile court granted C.H. access
to certain redacted portions of the clerk’s transcript and the
reporter’s transcript from the hearings on February 13, 2025, and
March 4, 2025. C.H. later sent a letter to the juvenile court
asserting that portions of the record were missing. The juvenile
court declined to allow her access to any other documents.
C.H. subsequently moved to augment the record on appeal.
This court granted her motion as to certain documents filed in
the juvenile court, denied it as to other documents, and deferred
the decision on additional exhibits to this panel. We grant the
motion as to Proposed Augmented Exhibit 15 and pages one
through five of Proposed Augmented Exhibit 16 to C.H.’s October
28, 2025, “supplement” to her motion to augment the record (i.e.,
C.H.’s post-judgment request for special transcript and C.H.’s
proposed exhibit list filed in the juvenile court), but deny the
request as to Proposed Augmented Exhibit 17 because it is
irrelevant to the disposition of this appeal.
2
a car without properly securing them in safety seats; Mother was
also in the car. Minors were removed from Father and Mother in
July 2024. The juvenile court ultimately sustained a five-count
dependency petition based on these events.
B. Minors are Placed with C.H. and Later Removed from
Her Care
Minors were placed with C.H. after being removed from
their parents. In September and November 2024, however, the
Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services
(the Department) learned of allegations that Minors were being
abused and neglected by C.H. After investigation, the allegations
were partially substantiated.
On November 8, 2024, C.H. was given a 14-day notice that
Minors would be removed from her care and taken to a new
placement because C.H. was struggling with managing all three
Minors, especially Ri. According to Department social worker
Aura Walker (Walker), C.H. agreed to the notice but she did not
sign it. The Department initially agreed to allow C.H. to
maintain custody of the children through the Thanksgiving
holiday.
The Department changed course on November 19, 2024,
however, after C.H.’s babysitter told the Department that C.H.
would scream insults and obscenities at Ri close to his face,
would often yell at Minors (including in public), and was
especially mean and rude to Ri. A Department social worker
interviewed Ri and Roy the same day at school. Both disclosed
C.H. yelled at them. Ri also reported C.H. would carry him to his
room in a way that hurt his body. A teacher at the school
reported that Ri and Roy would often say they were not fed
3
enough, that C.H. would scream at Ri in front of others, and that
C.H. would sometimes drive to Ri and Roy’s school without car
seats and yell at them to get out without getting out of the car
herself. When Department social workers attempted to speak to
C.H. the same day, she refused to let them into her home and put
her attorney on the phone.
The following day, the juvenile court issued an order
authorizing the Department to immediately move all three
Minors to a new placement, which the Department did.
C. C.H. Files Petitions to Change the Court’s Orders
Later in November 2024, C.H. filed a Welfare and
Institutions Code section 388 changed circumstances petition
requesting the court change its earlier order removing Minors
from her care.2 C.H. argued circumstances had changed because:
Mother told C.H. she wanted Minors placed with C.H.; C.H.’s
father, a special education teacher, was moving in with her to
provide individualized support to Ri; a wraparound therapist
stated she was pressured by a social worker to accuse C.H. of
being uncooperative; and Roy asked C.H. to fight for him. C.H.
principally asked the court to order Minors to be immediately
replaced in her home and to “investigate” the conduct of social
worker Berta Cardenas (Cardenas).
The following month, C.H. submitted another section 388
petition accompanied by her own declaration. That declaration
identified several developments that C.H. believed warranted
returning Minors to her care, some of which were cited in her
2
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
4
earlier petition. C.H.’s declaration also addressed her earlier
refusal to meet with the social worker on the day of the social
worker’s school visit and asserted she had been in the emergency
room earlier that day and was sick. C.H. also submitted a
declaration signed by Mother requesting Minors be placed in
C.H.’s care.
D. The Department’s Pre-Hearing Filings
In January 2025, the Department filed an interim review
report and response to C.H.’s requests for section 388 relief. The
Department’s submission detailed ongoing concerns with C.H. as
a caregiver and her inability to provide for Minors’ emotional
needs.
According to the Department, C.H. was not empathetic
toward Ri’s emotional needs and early in the placement stated
she would not transport Ri to any more appointments due to his
behavior.3 C.H. suggested separating Ri from his siblings until
his behavior improved. C.H. was also verbally aggressive with
social workers and service providers and failed to promptly
respond to urgent calls and emails from the Regional Center
regarding services for one of the children. C.H. labeled Ri a
“‘predator’” or a “‘problem’” and resisted the Department’s
attempts to coach her to reframe her thinking and realize Ri was
traumatized from prior experiences.
According to the Department’s reporting, Ri’s behaviors
improved approximately three weeks after Minors were placed in
3
The Department’s report asserted C.H. at one point
expected Ri to Uber alone or with a social worker to sexual abuse
therapy, an hour away.
5
a new home. Within a month of being placed with new
caregivers, Roy and Ri started saying they feel safe, they love
their current caregivers, and they want to be adopted by them.
A Department social worker spoke to Roy and Ri in
January 2025.4 They reported they did not want to return to
C.H.’s care and would rather stay in their current placement.
When asked why, Ri said C.H. used to yell in his face a lot; Roy
similarly stated C.H. yelled at “‘us’” a lot and was mean. Roy and
Ri were both making progress and were enjoying school. The
mental health teams working with Roy and Ri reported they
continued to thrive and make progress in meeting their
respective mental health goals, and that their caregivers were
involved, engaged, and open to feedback and suggested
interventions.
The Department interviewed Mother in January 2025. She
reported she did not want Minors returned to C.H. While Mother
acknowledged previously signing a declaration for C.H., she said
she thought she was doing the right thing, but she had since felt
slightly harassed by C.H., who kept tracking her down.
In February 2025, the Department submitted a last minute
information report. The report revealed Mother’s partner told a
social worker that C.H. paid Mother $100 to sign an affidavit
stating Mother would prefer to have Minors live with C.H. The
partner also stated C.H. invited Mother to live with C.H. and
Minors as long as Father was not included. The last minute
information report also indicated there was a placement hold on
C.H.’s home due to an ongoing investigation.
4
Rob was too young to provide a statement.
6
E. The Section 388 Petition Hearing
The court ultimately held an evidentiary hearing on C.H.’s
section 388 petition, which stretched over two days in early 2025.5
On the first day, Mother’s counsel reported he had been unable to
reach Mother, who was not present. He asked for a brief
continuance so he could seek direction from Mother and so she
could appear. The juvenile court overruled the objection, stating
Mother had been provided with proper notice. C.H. did not
object.
C.H. attempted to introduce a number of exhibits and to
present testimony from a series of witnesses. The juvenile court
declined to admit most of C.H.’s proffered exhibits, concluding
they were not relevant to the dispute. The court stated it would
not consider any exhibits pertaining to events that occurred prior
to the removal of Minors from C.H.’s care. It ultimately admitted
only one proffered exhibit: a parenting certificate.6
5
During the hearing, the juvenile court said the November
petition was no longer operative and the hearing was formally on
C.H.’s later-filed December 2024 petition. The court also denied
C.H.’s request to be deemed Minors’ presumed or de facto parent
and that determination is uncontested in this appeal.
6
We have augmented the record with C.H.’s proposed
exhibit list, which identifies most of the exhibits that the court
excluded at the hearing, but C.H. has not arranged for
transmission of many of these exhibits to this court. Most of the
exhibits identified on the list appear to be filings from the
dependency matter, communications with the Department, and
communications between C.H. and others involved in caring for
Minors, all of which predate Minors’ removal from C.H.’s care on
November 20, 2024. The remaining exhibits are described as an
expert report, an undated article discussing preschool expulsions,
7
The court also sustained Minors’ relevance objections to
twelve of C.H.’s proposed witnesses, including social worker
Cardenas, wraparound therapist Raquel Sanchez, and expert
Bobby Cagle (Cagle), who was represented to be a prior director
of the Department. After the court asked C.H. who two of the
proposed witnesses were, C.H. represented one was former
babysitter Andrea Weatherby (Weatherby) and C.H. withdrew
her request to call the other witness. The court ruled it would
allow testimony only from C.H., Weatherby, social worker
Walker, and supervising social worker Allen Kuan (Kuan).
During C.H.’s testimony, she described the circumstances
under which Minors were initially placed in her home, explaining
she was given about two hours’ notice before the placement.
After hearing some of C.H.’s testimony,7 the court said everything
that happened before the removal was in the reports, and C.H.’s
testimony regarding earlier events was repetitive. The court
asked C.H. to focus on whether anything had changed since then.
When asked what changed since Minors’ removal, C.H. said
her father, a retired teacher who has 60 graduate units of special
needs instruction, moved to California and was prepared to
provide Ri with round-the-clock, one-on-one counseling in C.H.’s
home. Though he had been available to C.H. over the phone
during the Minors’ earlier placement, he was not available for
video calls until October and he had not been available in person.
and a letter from another foster parent who spent time with C.H.
and Minors voicing her support for returning Minors to C.H.’s
care.
7
There were a number of sustained relevance objections
during her testimony.
8
C.H.’s brother also moved nearby, and her sister was planning to
move as well. When asked how her parenting style would be
different if Minors were returned to her care, C.H. said she would
adjust her physical posture when talking to Minors, including by
stepping back so no one would think she was getting in someone’s
face. She also said she would try to redirect Minors from certain
behaviors rather than just taking away tablets.
C.H. said she had taken a parenting class and learned
different options for reacting to different situations. C.H. said if
Minors were returned to her, she would deal with their trauma
by being less shocked and having a more tempered response.
C.H. admitted there were times her cooperation with the
Department broke down and said she could learn and do better.
C.H. also expressed her love for Minors and conceded there were
things she could have handled better.
There was a multi-day break in the proceedings after the
first day of testimony, and the Department filed a last minute
information report in the interim. The report advised Ri had
been replaced into a different foster home, while Roy and Rob
remained in the home in which the three had been placed
following their removal from C.H. According to the report, Ri’s
behavior had progressively worsened since the last hearing,
possibly due to Mother’s sporadic visits, his psychiatrist’s
decision to take him off medication, or a visit by law enforcement
responding to an anonymous report the children were not being
properly supervised. This worsening behavior included an
incident in which Ri lunged at one of the caregivers while she
was lying in bed, grabbed her neck, and threatened to kill her. Ri
also screamed at his caregivers that evening until 9 p.m., during
which time Roy was physically distressed. Ri was placed with
9
different caregivers who were willing to let Ri continue attending
the same school as Roy and willing to help maintain the sibling
bond.
When the section 388 hearing reconvened, C.H.
represented herself (she had been represented by counsel
previously). At the outset of the proceedings, C.H. informed the
court she had been hit by a car the day before, but she did not ask
to continue the hearing.
Kuan testified re-placing Minors with C.H. was not in their
best interests, in part because she yelled at Roy and Ri and
because she was verbally aggressive with social workers and
service providers. Social worker Walker testified she initially
thought C.H. was doing a good job with Minors and she gave C.H.
the benefit of the doubt for as long as she could because this was
a complex case. Walker testified, however, that every person
involved in the case encountered issues with C.H. and with
communication, including service providers for Minors. There
were also issues with Ri from the beginning of the case, which
were becoming unmanageable.8 Weatherby ultimately did not
testify.9
8
The court sustained objections to many of C.H.’s questions
for Kuan and Walker on relevance and other grounds.
9
There was some confusion on the second day of the hearing
regarding whether Weatherby was permitted to testify. Toward
the beginning of the hearing, the court stated C.H. represented
she was not going to call Weatherby as a witness. C.H. corrected
the court, saying she intended to call Weatherby. The court then
said, “those are the only witnesses that are allowed from your
witness list. Mr. Kuan, yourself, Ms. Weatherby[,] and Ms.
Walker.” Later in the hearing, after Kuan’s testimony was
10
The juvenile court took the matter under submission at the
conclusion of the hearing and subsequently issued a written
ruling, which we quote in full: “The [section 388 petition] is
denied because the former caregiver [C.H.] has not demonstrated
changed circumstances. While [C.H.] steadfastly and
convincingly expresses her love for the three children who were
placed with her from July 2024 to November 2024, the children
were removed on an expedited basis on November 20, 2024. The
expedited removal was ordered because [C.H] was not able to
provide for the safety and specific emotional and physical needs
of the children nor was she making use of resources available to
assist the children, and was not making the children consistently
available to [the Department]. After a full 388 hearing, including
hours of witness testimony, [C.H.] has not shown a change in
circumstances, she has not shown insight into the issues that led
to the expedited removal of the [M]inors, nor has she made a
showing that it is in the [M]inors’ best interests to grant the 388
petition. For these reasons the 388 petition is denied.”
completed, the court stated it was 3:30 p.m., it was not going to
continue the matter another day, and Walker was the last
witness. The court and C.H. then discussed again whether
Weatherby was permitted to testify. The court represented C.H.
had said Weatherby would not testify. C.H. replied that she did
not. The court replied that C.H.’s former counsel made that
representation, but C.H. said she believed the representation was
regarding a different witness and began to articulate a request.
The court then interrupted C.H. and said she had requested an
hour for Walker, the court would grant her 30 minutes. C.H.
replied, “Okay.” Walker was the last witness called. After
Walker’s testimony, the court heard argument from counsel and
said it needed to bring the proceedings to a close.
11
II. DISCUSSION
C.H. has not demonstrated reversible error. Even if we
assume the juvenile court erred in excluding some of C.H.’s
evidence or witnesses, the record does not reveal an adequate
offer of proof was made in many respects (Evid. Code, § 354,
subd. (a)) and there is no reasonable probability (insofar as we
can discern without an adequate offer of proof) the excluded
evidence would have established C.H.’s requested relief—namely
the return of Minors to her care—was in their best interests.
C.H.’s remaining arguments are forfeited either because they are
inadequately presented or because they were not raised in the
juvenile court.
A. Standing
“Any parent or other person having an interest in a child
who is a dependent child of the juvenile court . . . may, upon
grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, petition the
court . . . for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any order of
court previously made . . . .” (§ 388, subd. (a)(1).) An order
denying a section 388 petition is an appealable postjudgment
order. (In re K.C. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 231, 236; § 395, subd. (a)(1).)
In determining who can appeal from a dependency order,
“we are required to ‘liberally construe the issue of standing and
resolve doubts in favor of the right to appeal.’ [Citations.]” (In re
C.P. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 17, 26.) “In juvenile dependency
proceedings, as in civil actions generally (see Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 902), only a party aggrieved by the judgment has standing to
appeal.” (In re Lauren P. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 763, 768; K.C.,
supra, 52 Cal.4th at 236.)
12
The Department, joined by Minors, argues C.H. lacks
standing to appeal the denial of her section 388 petition because
she is a former foster parent and, as such, has no legally
cognizable interest in the placement of Minors.10 (§ 361.3, subd.
(a).) The Department does not dispute, however, that the
juvenile court allowed C.H. to file a petition under section 388
seeking a change of the juvenile court’s order. Because it does
not ultimately affect our disposition of the appeal, we shall
assume C.H. has standing to pursue this appeal and we
accordingly deny the motion to dismiss it.
B. Reversal for Evidentiary Error Is Unwarranted
Because There Was No Adequate Offer of Proof and
Because C.H. Has Not Demonstrated Any Error Was
Prejudicial
C.H. challenges the juvenile court’s exclusion of her
proffered evidence including: (1) evidence of events that occurred
prior to Minors’ removal from her home; (2) testimony from C.H.’s
father, which she says would have demonstrated changed
circumstances; (3) evidence that Minors’ removal from C.H.’s care
resulted from fraudulent statements by the Department; and (4)
the testimony and report of expert Cagle.11 She further contends
10
After the Department and Minors filed their respective
respondents’ briefs, the Department also filed a motion to dismiss
the appeal on standing grounds, in which Minors joined. We
deferred the motions to this panel.
11
C.H. does not, however, challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the juvenile court’s ruling based on the state
of the evidence admitted at the hearing.
13
the court’s evidentiary rulings violated her due process rights.
These contentions fail for want of a showing of prejudicial error.
1. The record lacks offers of proof and does not
include all of C.H.’s proffered exhibits
“A judgment shall not be reversed by reason of erroneous
exclusion of evidence unless a miscarriage of justice is shown and
it appears of record that ‘[t]he substance, purpose, and relevance
of the excluded evidence was made known to the court by the
questions asked, an offer of proof, or by any other
means . . .’ (Evid. Code, § 354, subd. (a).)” (In re Mark C. (1992)
7 Cal.App.4th 433, 443-444.) So far as the appellate record
reveals, C.H. made no offers of proof regarding the witnesses and
documents the juvenile court excluded other than Weatherby
and, possibly, Cagle.12 C.H.’s “[f]ailure to make an adequate offer
of proof precludes consideration of the alleged error on appeal.”13
(Id. at 444.)
12
The court initially ruled it would allow Weatherby to
testify, though Weatherby ultimately did not (when the court
declined to extend the hearing for a third day). Insofar as C.H.
maintains she made an offer of proof as to her proffered expert
Cagle because Cagle’s report was before the juvenile court, we
address the significance of Cagle’s testimony (and Weatherby’s)
post. C.H.’s arguments regarding certain other documentary
exhibits also fail for the independent reason that she has not
arranged for transmission of all of those exhibits to this court.
13
C.H.’s opening brief references a February 2025 pre-
hearing status conference at which she claims the juvenile court
excluded key evidence and witnesses. But the record contains
neither a transcript of the conference nor any minute order
14
2. On the appellate record provided, any
evidentiary error was harmless
There is no basis for reversal on the record as it stands
because C.H. has not demonstrated prejudicial error. A
petitioner under section 388 “‘has the burden of showing by a
preponderance of the evidence (1) that there is new evidence or a
change of circumstances and (2) that the proposed modification
would be in the best interests of the child.’ [Citation.]” (In re
J.M. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 833, 845.) In determining whether a
section 388 petitioner has made the requisite showing, the
memorializing it, and it is C.H.’s burden to provide an adequate
record.
C.H. suggests a special transcript request involving the
February 2025 hearing was approved but the transcript of the
hearing was not produced. The record does contain a request for
special transcript and order C.H. submitted prior to the
commencement of the evidentiary hearing, which represented she
was requesting the transcript of a trial setting dated February
11, 2025, for a “[w]rit.” At C.H.’s request, this court augmented
the record with Requests for Special Transcript that C.H.
submitted in March 2025, which represented they were being
made for purposes of a writ. Those requests did not ask for the
preparation of a transcript from a pre-hearing status conference
in February 2025.
C.H. did send a letter to the juvenile court asserting that
portions of the appellate record were missing, but that letter does
not identify a pre-hearing status conference in February 2025 as
missing. Moreover, and in any case, the juvenile court did not
issue a final ruling on the objections to C.H.’s proposed witnesses
or exhibits until the first day of the hearing on her section 388
petition, and an offer of proof should have been made at that
time—but was not.
15
juvenile court may consider the entire factual and procedural
history of the case including “factors such as the seriousness of
the reason leading to the child’s removal, the reason the problem
was not resolved, the passage of time since the child’s removal,
the relative strength of the bonds with the child, the nature of the
change of circumstance, and the reason the change was not made
sooner.” (In re Mickel O. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 586, 616.)
Errors in juvenile dependency cases, including alleged violations
of due process, are examined for harmlessness, and reversal is
only warranted “if the reviewing court finds it reasonably
probable the result would have been more favorable to the
appealing party but for the error.” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31
Cal.4th 45, 60; see also In re L.J. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 741, 754.)
Here, the juvenile court found C.H. did not demonstrate
either a change of circumstance or that her proposed modification
was in Minors’ best interests. We see no basis to conclude it is
reasonably probable that any of the excluded evidence would
have changed the juvenile court’s best interests determination.
The only evidence C.H. identifies as relevant to the topic of
Minors’ best interests was evidence that her father would provide
in-home special education assistance to Ri and Cagle’s expert
opinion.14 As to the former, C.H. herself testified that her father
would live in the home and provide one-on-one services to Ri.
That evidence was thus before the court. As to the latter, again,
there was no offer of proof about Cagle’s testimony. Even looking
14
Based on the offer of proof made at trial, the testimony of
Weatherby would have addressed an incident that occurred prior
to Minors’ removal from her home, not whether the proposed
modification would be in Minors’ best interests.
16
to his report as a substitute for such an offer, he was somewhat
critical of the Department’s actions in this case but he did not
opine the court should reconsider its prior order and once again
place Minors with C.H. Instead, the most he was able to
recommend was that the court consider C.H. “fictive kin” and
allow her to have regularly scheduled visits with them. That,
obviously, does not establish a reasonable probability of a
different result had Cagle been permitted to so testify.
C.H. additionally argues the juvenile court committed
reversible error by failing to consider Minors’ sibling bond and
the quality of C.H.’s placement after Ri was placed in a different
home, away from Roy and Rob. While there is a legislative
preference for keeping siblings together, the relevant statute
recognizes siblings may be separated where “it has been
determined that placement together is contrary to the safety or
well-being of any sibling.” (§ 16002, subd. (a)(1).) That the
juvenile court denied C.H.’s petition after Ri had been moved to a
different placement does not establish that the juvenile court did
not, in fact, consider Minors’ sibling bond in ruling on C.H.’s
petition.15 Without an express indication to the contrary (and
15
C.H.’s opening brief includes passing references to Ri’s
removal from his subsequent placement as the “biggest changed
circumstance of all” that the Department “buried it as though
they had a bias against [C.H.] . . . .” In her reply brief and at oral
argument, however, C.H. argued Ri’s removal was a changed
circumstance that itself warranted granting her petition.
Because C.H. did not develop this argument in her opening brief,
it is waived. (E.g., Old East Davis Neighborhood Assn. v. City of
Davis (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 895, 915.)
17
there is none), we presume the juvenile court knew and followed
the law. (In re Julian R. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 487, 499.)
C. C.H.’s Remaining Assignments of Error Lack Merit
“An appellant must provide an argument and legal
authority to support his contentions. This burden requires more
than a mere assertion that the judgment is wrong. ‘Issues do not
have a life of their own: If they are not raised or supported by
argument or citation to authority, [they are] . . . waived.’
[Citation.] It is not our place to construct theories or arguments
to undermine the judgment and defeat the presumption of
correctness.” (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149
Cal.App.4th 836, 852.) “When an appellant fails to raise a point,
or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and
citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.” (Badie v.
Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785.)
C.H.’s appellate brief contains a number of assertions that
are unsupported by citations to authority or by reasoned
argument, such as her complaint that there was not a bonding
study below and her assertion that the Department circumvented
a September 2024 order. These unsupported assertions are
forfeited.
C.H. also contends the juvenile court reversibly erred by
refusing to grant two continuances to Mother and C.H. These
contentions fail because C.H. did not join Mother’s request for a
continuance (nor did she object to the court’s denial of Mother’s
counsel’s request to continue the hearing) and did not request
herself a continuance of the March hearing—she instead said
only that she had been injured the day before. (In re Anthony P.
18
(1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 635, 641; In re Cheryl E. (1984) 161
Cal.App.3d 587, 603.)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, Acting P. J.
We concur:
MOOR, J.
KIM (D.), J.
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