Filed 8/12/26 In re R.M. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
B347837
In re R.M., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. LB0107A)
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
R.M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Sabina A. Helton, Judge. Affirmed.
Kristen Owen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Chelsea Zaragoza,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
In 2023, the People filed a juvenile wardship petition
alleging R.M. participated in a drive-by shooting and murder
when he was 17 years old. The People moved to transfer R.M.
from the juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction
pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 707,
subdivision (a)(1).1 The juvenile court determined R.M. was not
amenable to rehabilitation while under the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction. On appeal, R.M. contends the People failed to carry
their burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that he
was not amenable. He further contends the court erred in
reaching its conclusion in the absence of comprehensive expert
testimony on amenability, and by considering rehabilitative
attempts made in connection with the current offense when
assessing the success of any prior juvenile court attempts at
rehabilitation. We affirm.
SECTION 707
“Section 707 sets forth the procedures for transferring a
minor from juvenile court to criminal court. It provides that
whenever a minor aged 16 years or older is alleged to have
committed a felony, the prosecutor may move ‘to transfer the
minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction.’
(§ 707, subd. (a)(1).) The prosecution bears the burden of proving
that the minor should be transferred. (Cal. Rules of Court,
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare
and Institutions Code.
2
rule 5.770(a).)” (In re Miguel R. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 152, 164
(Miguel R.).)
Section 707, subdivision (a)(3), provides: “In order to find
that the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal
jurisdiction, the court shall find by clear and convincing evidence
that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court. In making its decision, the
court shall consider the criteria specified in subparagraphs (A) to
(E), inclusive. If the court orders a transfer of jurisdiction, the
court shall recite the basis for its decision in an order entered
upon the minutes, which shall include the reasons supporting the
court’s finding that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation
while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” The
requirement that the court recite the basis for its decision “means
the court should ‘explicitly “articulate its evaluative process” by
detailing “how it weighed the evidence” and by “identify[ing] the
specific facts which persuaded the court” to reach its decision’
whether to transfer minor to a court of criminal jurisdiction.” (In
re S.S. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1277, 1294 (S.S.).)
The relevant criteria are: 1) “[t]he degree of criminal
sophistication exhibited by the minor” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(i));
2) “[w]hether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the
expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction” (id.,
subd. (a)(3)(B)(i)); 3) “[t]he minor’s previous delinquent history”
(id., subd. (a)(3)(C)(i)); 4) “[s]uccess of previous attempts by the
juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor” (id., subd. (a)(3)(D)(i));
and 5) “[t]he circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in
the petition to have been committed by the minor” (id.,
subd. (a)(3)(E)(i)). These criteria “are based on the premise that
the minor did, in fact, commit the offense.” (People v. Superior
3
Court (Jones) (1998) 18 Cal.4th 667, 682 (Jones).) The court must
also consider enumerated factors relevant to each criterion.
(§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii), (B)(ii), (C)(ii), (D)(ii), (E)(ii).)
“[T]he court has the discretion to conclude that one or more
of the five factors predominate so as to determine the result, even
though some or all of the other factors might point to a different
result.” (In re E.P. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 409, 417; accord,
Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 167 [“the statute does not
require that any . . . criteria be afforded any greater weight than
any other”].) “[T]he ultimate finding that the juvenile court must
make under section 707(a)(3) concerns a global assessment of the
minor’s suitability to rehabilitation within the juvenile court
system . . . .” (Miguel R., at p. 167.)
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Underlying Offense
In the afternoon of January 21, 2023, a minor, Khalil S.,
was shot and killed during a drive-by shooting at Silverado Park
in Long Beach, where he was playing basketball. Gunfire struck
another victim in the abdomen and a third victim in the thigh.
Both survived. Khalil S.’s younger brother was also on the
basketball court at the time of the shooting but was not injured.
A few weeks before the shooting, R.M. arranged to buy a
gun from a co-minor.
Approximately an hour before the shooting, R.M. began a
live broadcast on his Instagram account while he and two co-
minors were outside an apartment complex associated with the
Bricc Boys gang. R.M. was associated with the Black Bandits
gang, which is a rival of the Bricc Boys. Someone commented on
the broadcast: “ ‘The toast is out I repeat,’ ” “ ‘Playing basketball
thinking shit sweet,’ ” and “ ‘They hoopin on the west.’ ” “Toast”
4
is a term rival gangs use to refer to the West Coast Rollin 80s,
which claim the west side of Long Beach and specifically
Silverado Park.
R.M., who was driving his mother’s car, took an indirect
route to get from the apartment complex to Silverado Park. He
then drove past the park, returned with the passenger side facing
the park, and slowed down. A co-minor in the front passenger
seat fired 17 rounds.
After the shooting, R.M. drove to the apartment building
where he and his family lived.2 Surveillance video from the
mailroom showed R.M. and a co-minor changing clothes, and
R.M. making gang signs.
Surveillance video also captured R.M. and co-minors
walking from his apartment building towards the location where
a shooting at an inhabited dwelling took place shortly after. A
witness description of the clothes worn by individuals running
away from that location matched clothes worn by R.M. and co-
minors.
The evening of the shooting, an Instagram user messaged
R.M.: “ ‘Pick yo man up off the ground. You can’t get him back.’ ”
R.M. replied with a laughing emoji. The same user also shared a
photo of Khalil S. The day after the shooting, R.M. sent
Instagram messages stating that he was trying to sell his gun.
2 Before the shooting, R.M. exchanged Instagram messages
with a co-minor, in which R.M. agreed to pick the co-minor up,
but stated he had to bring the car home before 2:00 p.m. The
shooting at Silverado Park took place at approximately 1:50 p.m.
R.M. returned the car to his family’s apartment building at
2:01 p.m.
5
However, R.M. later wanted to get the gun back from the co-
minor who was holding it.
Law enforcement determined the cartridge casings
retrieved from the street near Silverado Park and from the
location of the inhabited dwelling shooting were fired by the same
gun. A firearm slide and barrel located in R.M.’s room created
markings that matched the cartridge casings.
Juvenile Court Proceedings
In March 2023, the People filed a juvenile wardship
petition under section 602, charging R.M., who was then 17 years
old, with one count of murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and
three counts of attempted murder (id., §§ 664, 187, subd. (a)).3
A detention report filed with the juvenile court stated that
R.M. admitted street gang involvement. The report
recommended that R.M. be detained in juvenile hall. The
juvenile court found that the People had made a prima facie
showing under section 602 and that it was necessary for R.M. to
be detained.
Also in March 2023, the People filed a motion to transfer
R.M. from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction
pursuant to section 707, subdivision (a)(1).
In May 2023, the People filed a report by Deputy Probation
Officer Havan Ngo. The report discussed the circumstances of
the crime and R.M.’s family background. R.M.’s mother denied
that he was a gang member. She stated that he had lost his best
friend and two family members at a young age. R.M. also had
difficulties with bullying at school, which required him to
transfer high schools twice. He had 365 unverified absences at
3 R.M. was not charged with any crime in connection with
the second shooting.
6
his current school and was failing multiple classes. The
probation officer observed that R.M. had a single parent family,
but his home life was not unstable. However, his mother’s work
schedule prevented her from providing consistent supervision.
The report also addressed the amenability criteria under
section 707, subdivision (a)(3). It concluded that the previous
delinquent history and success of prior attempts by juvenile court
to rehabilitate the minor factors were inapplicable and the
remaining criteria supported transfer to a criminal court. The
probation officer stated that R.M.’s “overall behavior in the
juvenile hall setting has been challenging and remains so at this
time.” She concluded that R.M. could not be effectively
rehabilitated at the juvenile court level and recommended that
the matter be considered for transfer to a court of criminal
jurisdiction.
In January 2025, R.M. filed an opposition and the People
filed a supplemental transfer motion.
R.M.’s Conduct While In Custody
After R.M. was detained, Instagram accounts posted videos
of him throwing gang signs in juvenile hall.
Between May 2023 and May 2025, 17 detention observation
reports and three informations to the court were filed concerning
R.M.’s conduct in juvenile hall. The reports consistently stated
that R.M. failed to follow instructions. There were multiple
instances in which R.M. insulted and/or threatened staff, used
gang language or gang signs, or went out of bounds.4 R.M. also
4 The insults and threats to staff included comments such as:
“ ‘Shut up bitch you are annoying you are a weird ass bitch’ ”;
“ ‘You dumb bitch, you don’t know what you talkin’ about, we can
7
engaged in “horse play” that led to fighting and more serious
physical altercations with other youths. Staff deployed pepper
spray to break up two altercations in which he was involved.
R.M. appeared to be under the influence of a substance on a few
occasions.
Various reports stated that R.M. negatively influenced
other youths. A detention observation report dated July 2023
stated that R.M. “encourages other youths to participate in
negative behavior.” A report dated October 2023 stated that his
behavior “negatively affect[ed] . . . the tone of the unit.” An
information for the court from the same month stated that R.M.
“gang talked with peers,” “refused to go to his room during shift
exchange,” and swore at staff. R.M. displayed this behavior “with
a group of others,” which “puts all probationers, minors and staff
members at risk.” In June 2024, a detention observation report
stated that R.M. “is sophisticated and adversely impacts and
influences the younger youth that are in his housing unit to
condone negative behavior.” Finally, a report from April 2025
stated that R.M. “began to rile up the group of youths/young
adults during shower time,” which caused a delay in
programming.
Although multiple detention observation reports contained
positive case notes, most were either mixed or predominantly
negative, including reports filed after the transfer hearing began.
Only the final report filed with the court was entirely positive.
be wherever we want, fuck you bitch’ ”; “ ‘Shut the fuck up, I will
knock you out stupid, there is nothing here to do’ ”; and, around
four months before the juvenile court’s ruling, when it was time
for youths to return to their rooms for the night, “ ‘ “No I will not
go down because you are a tramp . . . shut the fuck up.” ’ ”
8
While prior reports typically covered observation periods of
approximately one month, the final report covered only a four-
day period that coincided with the end of the presentation of
evidence at the transfer hearing.
Reports filed between May 2023 and February 2025 stated
that R.M. was offered and actively participated in rehabilitative
programming.
R.M. began individual therapy in or around October 2023.
As of March 2024, he had participated in 30 sessions. Reports
filed between May 2024 and January 2025 stated that R.M.
continued to participate in individual therapy each week or as
needed.
R.M. completed high school in October 2024. At the time of
the transfer hearing, he was enrolled in college courses.
Transfer Hearing
The transfer hearing took place over 10 days between
February and May 2025. The juvenile court heard testimony
from nine witnesses concerning the circumstances of the
underlying offense, as described above; R.M.’s amenability to
rehabilitation under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction; and the
impact of the crime on Khalil S.’s family.
i. Probation officer
Ngo was a juvenile investigator for 30 years. When
preparing her report, Ngo reviewed police reports and detention
observation reports. At the time of the transfer hearing, Ngo still
believed that R.M. was not amenable to rehabilitation while
under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
Ngo opined that R.M. was not amenable under the criminal
sophistication criterion because the crime involved a gun and was
a gang-related drive-by shooting. The decision to move from the
9
apartment complex to Silverado Park, to take a longer route, and
to drive around the park to position the passenger side of the car
towards the basketball courts was evidence of planning that
showed criminal sophistication. Changing clothes was also
evidence of sophistication “[i]n avoiding detention and
identification.” Ngo testified that R.M.’s involvement in a second
shooting and his attempt to sell the gun the following day also
exhibited sophistication.
At the time of the hearing, R.M. was 19 years old, which
meant the juvenile court had five years and nine months of
remaining jurisdiction over him. Ngo testified that R.M. could
not be rehabilitated before the expiration of the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction based on the serious and violent nature of the crimes
and R.M.’s “long history with poor conduct, unacceptable conduct”
while at juvenile hall. Ngo testified that detention observation
reports showed that R.M. was “disrespectful to staff, disrespectful
to the rules,” was involved in a physical altercation requiring the
highest level of intervention, and possessed contraband drugs,
among other negative conduct. R.M.’s statement, recorded in a
May 2024 detention observation report, that he did not care
about school, following his conditions of probation, or being
transferred to county jail, indicated to Ngo that R.M. “ha[d] no
plans of cooperating with staff in juvenile hall; that he will
continue to be disruptive and dangerous to his unit,” and that
R.M. “has no respect for the court’s receipt of all of his [detention
observation reports], [or the] potential consequences of the
motion of transfer to adult court.” R.M. had been receiving
services during the time this conduct occurred, including mental
health sessions, but his behavior remained “overwhelmingly
10
negative” and his periods of cooperation were “far and few in
between [sic].”
Ngo did not believe R.M. was eligible to be sent to a secured
youth treatment facility (SYTF) based on the nature of his
crimes. She did not consider the possibility of a SYTF
commitment when preparing her report. When asked at the
hearing to factor the SYTF option into her opinion, she testified
that she still believed R.M. was not amenable to remain in the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction and that he warranted the higher
level of supervision that a court of criminal jurisdiction could
provide.
With respect to the prior delinquent history criterion, Ngo
testified that R.M. had no prior formal charges or petitions filed
against him. However, Ngo agreed that a minor purchasing a
firearm, making arrangements to sell a firearm, and gang
entrenchment were delinquent behavior. She opined that this
behavior made him not amenable to remain in juvenile court
jurisdiction.
Ngo stated in her report that there had been no prior
attempts to rehabilitate R.M. but agreed that he had been
detained in juvenile hall since 2023 and had received
rehabilitative services during that time. Ngo testified that R.M.
had not benefitted from the services he received because they
depend on the individual’s “acceptance and commitment to the
plans for treatment.” R.M.’s behavior remained “consistently
negative, poor conduct, noncompliant, violent at times,” which
indicated that the services “ha[d] not worked for him.”
Finally, Ngo testified that the offense was serious and R.M.
was a primary contributor to Khalil S.’s death. R.M.’s presence
in rival gang territory at the time of the shooting indicated to her
11
that he was in a violent mental state, planned the crime, and
understood the risks.
During cross-examination, Ngo testified that, since a
change in the relevant law in 2021, she had never recommended
that a minor remain under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. It
was her belief that the juvenile court cannot rehabilitate a minor
charged with murder or attempted murder.
ii. Forensic psychologist
Dr. Nancy Kaser-Boyd, a forensic psychologist, prepared an
evaluation of R.M. for the defense. She interviewed R.M. and
reviewed educational records, probation reports, behavioral
observations from juvenile hall, and the police report.
Kaser-Boyd testified that R.M. was raised by a single
mother and he helped care for his younger brother. His
grandmother helped look after R.M. and his brother until she
developed dementia, shortly before the shooting occurred. R.M.’s
father was a regional center client and not an active parent.
When R.M. was 12 years old, his best friend died in a car
accident. When R.M. was 15 years old, an uncle and father figure
died suddenly.
R.M.’s mother left for work early in the morning, so R.M.
was responsible for getting his brother ready for school. Kaser-
Boyd believed that, during the COVID-19 pandemic, there was
not “enough structure to keep [R.M.] involved in school.” This
was “when his behavior started to deteriorate.”
To Kaser-Boyd’s knowledge, R.M. did not receive
counseling or therapy for the losses he suffered before he was
detained. He received therapeutic services in juvenile hall. His
treating therapist described him as interested and motivated for
treatment.
12
Kaser-Boyd’s evaluation involved the administration of the
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, adolescent version.
The purpose was to determine whether R.M. was open to self-
disclosing and whether he has antisocial personality disorder,
which leads to delinquency and criminality. R.M. did not have an
elevated score for antisocial personality disorder and scored
comparable to the American standard of normal children, which
indicated that he was “motivated” and “willing to disclose.” He
had a slightly elevated score for depression. Kaser-Boyd testified
that R.M. may have received negative detention observation
reports because he was not “engaged.”
Kaser-Boyd did not discuss the underlying facts of the
crime with R.M. but reviewed the police report. Kaser-Boyd
opined that R.M.’s use of his mother’s car and his failure to cover
the license plates suggested a lack of criminal sophistication.
With respect to whether R.M. could be rehabilitated prior
to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, Kaser-Boyd
testified that R.M. did not have antisocial personality disorder or
a predisposition toward delinquency, which “means that there is
nothing about his character that couldn’t be changed.” He had
completed high school, was taking college courses, and had been
going to therapy consistently. Although it had “taken a while,”
he had “started to benefit from the programs that are available”
at juvenile hall and “started to show motivation to be educated
and to be insightful about himself.”
Kaser-Boyd testified that the previous delinquent history
and previous attempts at rehabilitation criteria were inapplicable
because he had no prior history with the juvenile court system.
Finally, Kaser-Boyd agreed that the crime was grave.
However, she testified that “another six years, assuming that
13
SYTF offers good programs, will be very helpful to him.” She
concluded that R.M. was amenable to rehabilitation in the
juvenile court system.
During cross-examination, Kaser-Boyd testified that she
interviewed R.M. once in January 2024 for “about four hours.”
Kaser-Boyd agreed that she would probably be able to make a
more comprehensive analysis of criminal sophistication if she
questioned R.M. about the crime, but did not do so for ethical
reasons.
Kaser-Boyd testified that R.M. and his mother both denied
that he was a gang member. She was unaware that R.M. had
admitted gang membership in the detention report. Kaser-Boyd
was also unaware that R.M. livestreamed his presence in rival
gang territory on Instagram, or that R.M. learned via Instagram
that a rival gang was playing basketball at Silverado Park. She
agreed that this showed “some level of contemplating, planning,
or executing a plan to drive across the city to find rival gang
members.” She also agreed that passing by the basketball court
once without stopping “shows a level of scouting for unsuspecting
targets” and some level of criminal sophistication. Kaser-Boyd
believed it did “not necessarily” show sophistication as to R.M., as
opposed to others in the car, though “[i]t could.”
When Kaser-Boyd interviewed R.M. in January 2024, the
last detention observation report she received “said his behavior
was improving,” although she agreed it “now sounds like it wasn’t
very accurate.” She acknowledged that “the rehabilitation hasn’t
taken total effect yet because he still has these outbursts.”
Kaser-Boyd was “not totally aware” of the programming at
the County’s SYTF “because it’s still in development.” She
assumed SYTF staff “are responsible professionals that are going
14
to make interventions that are empirically based.” She believed
R.M. needed “programming regarding gang membership”;
programming to address whether “he ha[s] an issue with women,”
which could involve “anger management”; and “vocational
training and education.”
iii. SYTF
Kurtis Miller, a supervising deputy probation officer,
testified concerning SYTF programming. He had worked at the
Barry J. Nidorf SYTF since it opened in July 2023.5
The SYTF offers educational programs “first and foremost,”
including high school and college courses. A work unit was also
in “its infant stages,” in which youths complete work projects
around the facility and earn a wage. There are various anti-
recidivism programs, including mentorship programs, classes on
financial literacy and anger management, and a criminal gangs
anonymous class. It also offers a drug treatment program, a
dialectical behavior therapy program, sports programs, and arts
and music programs.
Much of the SYTF programming is also available at
juvenile hall, but high populations and behavior issues at
juvenile hall make “programming difficult at times.” Miller
testified: “[T]here is something to be said with young men that
come and they have a determinate sentence and they kind of
know the plan[,] whereas in [juvenile hall], they’re still pre-
5 Miller testified that there are three probation-run SYTFs in
Los Angeles County. In addition to the Barry J. Nidforf facility,
Campus Kilpatrick is a “step-down facility,” which has less
intensive supervision than at Barry J. Nidorf, and allows young
men to transition to community-based supervision. The third
facility, the Dorothy Kirby Center, is for young women.
15
adjudicated and things are hanging in the balance. . . . When
they get to SYTF, they know at least, okay, I have a four-year
baseline, I have this, I have a treatment plan, and here it is. . . .
[B]ut it’s still a 50/50 of whether they’re going to comply with it
or not.”
Programming offered at the SYTF is “not required” but
“encouraged.” Miller believed all of the SYTF programs are well
suited for someone doing a commitment for murder. He
explained that “about 60 percent of our young people are there for
murder or attempted murder or some violent crime.” However,
amenability “is going to depend upon their interest and their
level of commitment.”
Staff who are not therapists run the dialectical behavior
therapy offered at the SYTF. Other programming is “by and
large” dependent on community-based organizations. Miller
believed the rehabilitative services offered at the SYTF “should
be evidence based,” and “that’s the goal, absolutely.” He could
not say “for sure” whether they were.
According to Miller, staffing is a serious issue at the Barry
J. Nidorf facility. The bulk of the staff is not permanent but
pulled from field offices for 60 day rotations, which results in
safety issues. Miller also opined that the population is too high
“for the purposes of the effectiveness of this program.” Gang-
related incidents are prevalent.
iv. The murder victim’s family
Khalil S. was 17 when he was killed. He was in the process
of enlisting in the Navy. He aspired to attend college and provide
for his family. He was not involved in any criminal gang. Khalil
S.’s death devastated his parents and siblings. His younger
16
brother, also a victim of the shooting, had “shut[ ]down” and
remained “really hard to engage with.”
Juvenile Court’s Ruling
In July 2025, the juvenile court ruled on the transfer
motion. The court stated that it had reviewed the motion for
transfer and opposition, the probation report, and considered the
testimony from “multiple days of hearing with numerous
witnesses.” The court concluded that the prior delinquent history
criterion supported a finding that R.M. was amenable to
rehabilitation while under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, but
the remaining criteria did not. The court stated that it weighed
the criteria as a whole and made a “global assessment” and
concluded that the People had shown by clear and convincing
evidence that R.M. was not amenable to rehabilitation while
under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
R.M. timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
“We review the juvenile court’s ruling on a transfer motion
for abuse of discretion.” (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at
p. 165.) To grant a transfer, the juvenile court was required to
find by clear and convincing evidence that R.M. was not
amenable to rehabilitation while under the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction. (§ 707, subd. (a)(3).) “When reviewing a finding that
a fact has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the
question before the appellate court is whether the record as a
whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact
finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.
In conducting its review, the court must view the record in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give
17
appropriate deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated
the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and
drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.”
(Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011–1012.)
We review R.M.’s legal arguments de novo. (Miguel R.,
supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.)
II. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
A. Expert opinion on amenability
R.M. contends that the People were required to present
expert testimony on R.M.’s amenability to rehabilitation under
juvenile court jurisdiction. Although R.M. concedes that Ngo was
an expert witness, he asserts her testimony “was based solely on
the crime and his participation,” that she was “ignorant of the
rehabilitative services offered at SYTF,” and “did not even
consider SYTF or rehabilitation as an option” when preparing her
report. He contends her testimony was therefore insufficient to
support the juvenile court’s conclusion, and the absence of any
other expert opinion that he was not amenable to rehabilitation
compels the conclusion that the juvenile court erred in granting
the transfer motion. We disagree.
Section 707, subdivision (a)(1), requires a probation officer
to provide a report addressing “the behavioral patterns and social
history of the minor.” “Following submission and consideration of
the report, and of any other relevant evidence that the petitioner
or the minor may wish to submit, the juvenile court shall decide
whether the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal
jurisdiction.” (Id., subd. (a)(3), italics added.) The statute does
not require the People to submit expert testimony concerning a
minor’s overall amenability to rehabilitation or any specific
criterion.
18
R.M. relies on S.S., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th 1277, in which
the appellate court stated that, “[g]iven the Legislature’s
refocusing on minors’ amenability to rehabilitation, expert
testimony will likely be necessary for a complete analysis.” (Id.
at p. 1286.) In S.S., “the only evidence introduced [at the
transfer hearing] in addition to the probation report and the
psychological evaluation was an autopsy report introduced by the
petitioner.” (Id. at p. 1283.) Neither the probation report nor the
psychologist’s evaluation expressed an opinion as to the minor’s
amenability to rehabilitation. (Id. at pp. 1282–1283.)
The law imposing a clear and convincing evidence standard
on the juvenile court’s amenability determination took effect after
the transfer hearing but while the minor’s appeal was pending.
(S.S., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 1284.) The parties agreed that
the standard applied retroactively (id. at pp. 1281, 1288), and “by
urging remand for a new transfer hearing, implicitly agree[d] a
more favorable result for minor [was] reasonably probable.” (Id.
at p. 1289.) The appellate court concluded there was a
reasonable probability the juvenile court would not have ordered
the minor’s transfer under the current law. (Id. at p. 1291.) It
noted that the psychologist who assessed the minor did not
express an opinion about whether the former minor was
amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court. (Id. at p. 1283.) The court noted that “proper
analysis of this criterion generally requires ‘expert testimony
concerning the programs available, the duration of any of the
programs, or whether attendance would rehabilitate [the minor]
before termination of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.’ ” (Id. at
p. 1291.) The prosecution in S.S. “presented no evidence to
demonstrate what minor’s rehabilitative needs were” or “why
19
they could not be met within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.”
(Ibid.)
S.S. is distinguishable. Here, the juvenile court expressly
applied the clear and convincing evidence standard. Further, in
S.S., there was no evidence directly addressing the former
minor’s overall amenability to rehabilitation or any relevant
criteria. Ngo and Kaser-Boyd both testified concerning these
issues. Although neither was familiar with the programming
available at a SYTF, Miller filled this evidentiary gap. S.S. does
not hold that a court abuses its discretion in concluding that a
minor is not amenable to rehabilitation under the court’s
jurisdiction unless it has heard testimony from a single expert
witness addressing all considerations relevant to amenability.
J.N. v. Superior Court (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 706, is also
distinguishable. In J.N., the probation officer’s report concluded,
“without any analysis,” that the minor was “ ‘unsuitable to be
dealt with under the Juvenile Court law.’ ” (Id. at p. 721.) The
juvenile court found that the possibility of rehabilitation criterion
did not support amenability because the former minor would
remain in the juvenile court system for only three more years (id.
at p. 721), even though the former minor “had done ‘pretty well’
in custody” (id. at p. 714). This was an abuse of discretion. (Id.
at p. 722.) The appellate court observed that “the prosecution did
not present any expert testimony concerning the programs
available, the duration of any of the programs, or whether
attendance would rehabilitate [the former minor] before
termination of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.” (Id. at p. 722.)
The court concluded that “[t]he probation officer’s opinion in his
report was not substantial evidence because the opinion lacked
support by substantial evidence. [Citation.] There was no
20
evidence as to the efforts necessary to rehabilitate [the former
minor] and no evidence as to why available programs were
unlikely to result in rehabilitation in the time allotted. This lack
of evidence rendered any opinion based on the report without
evidentiary value.” (Ibid.)
Here, there was testimony concerning the programming
that could assist in R.M.’s rehabilitation, the available
programming at the SYTF, and testimony to support a finding
that the services available at the SYTF were unlikely to result in
rehabilitation in the time allotted.
In sum, although the “testimony of experts that the minor
can be treated by those facilities is entitled to great weight in the
court’s ultimate determination,” “[t]he decision rests in the sound
discretion of the juvenile court.” (Jimmy H. v. Superior Court
(1970) 3 Cal.3d 709, 714–715; see also In re O.F. (2026) 119
Cal.App.5th 133, 164 (O.F.) [recognizing that juvenile court does
not abuse its discretion by disagreeing with expert and relying on
other evidence].) The evidence presented here permitted the
juvenile court to make an informed determination of whether
R.M. was amenable to rehabilitation. We reject R.M.’s contention
that the absence of comprehensive testimony from the People’s
expert concerning R.M.’s overall amenability, or amenability with
respect to any specific criterion, compels reversal.
B. Degree of criminal sophistication
R.M. next contends that the underlying crime lacked
sophistication and the juvenile court engaged in “pure
speculation” in concluding that aspects of the crime demonstrated
planning. We find no abuse of discretion.
21
i. Relevant factors
When assessing a minor’s criminal sophistication, “the
juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including,
but not limited to, the minor’s age, maturity, intellectual
capacity, and physical, mental, and emotional health at the time
of the alleged offense; the minor’s impetuosity or failure to
appreciate risks and consequences of criminal behavior; the effect
of familial, adult, or peer pressure on the minor’s actions; the
effect of the minor’s family and community environment; the
existence of childhood trauma; the minor’s involvement in the
child welfare or foster care system; and the status of the minor as
a victim of human trafficking, sexual abuse, or sexual battery on
the minor’s criminal sophistication.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii).)
This criterion “requires a juvenile court . . . to consider the
whole picture, that is, all the evidence that might bear on the
minor’s criminal sophistication, including any criminal
sophistication manifested in the present crime.” (Jones, supra,
18 Cal.4th at pp. 683–684.)
ii. Juvenile court’s reasoning
The juvenile court found “there was some level of both
planning and search for rival gang members.” R.M. bought a gun
approximately one month before the shooting took place and tried
to sell it a few days after. “[T]he crime was not a spontaneous act
such as where a youth runs into a . . . rival gang member in some
public place and a shooting and a murder occur. This was a case
where [R.M.] and his co-minors seem to be actively searching for
rival members and driving to different places looking for them.
And the crime was planned timewise, as [R.M.] needed to get the
car home by 2:00 p.m.” R.M. and his co-minors were present in
the vicinity of a second shooting where the casings matched the
22
casings of the gun used in the Silverado Park shooting. However,
that the shooting was in broad daylight and R.M.’s use of his
mother’s car without covering the plates undercut sophistication.
R.M. was 17 years old at the time of the crime and of
average intelligence. There was no evidence of family gang
history or of peer pressure, although R.M. was with three co-
minors. He had a loving mother with a good job and had a
normal and happy childhood. R.M. experienced the loss of a
friend and uncle, and his grandmother had dementia. The court
observed that “there are certainly youth in [its] court that have
suffered far more trauma and loss compounded by issues of
neglect, abuse, serious mental health challenges and/or poverty”
and that R.M. was “not in this category.” The juvenile court
concluded that the criminal sophistication factor weighed against
amenability.
iii. Analysis
R.M. does not dispute that the juvenile court considered the
relevant factors. The court’s acknowledgment that some aspects
of the crime were unsophisticated did not preclude it from finding
that this criterion weighed in favor of transfer. (See Jones,
supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 683–684 [insufficient evidence supported
juvenile court determination that minors lacked criminal
sophistication, even though their plan to rob a store “was
uncomplicated and ineptly executed”]; Kevin P. v. Superior Court
(2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173, 194 (Kevin P.) [Jones “effectively
concluded not only that ineptitude in one’s criminal activities
does not preclude a finding of criminal sophistication, but also
that such ineptitude does not even constitute substantial
evidence of a lack of criminal sophistication”].) R.M.’s arguments
23
to the contrary amount to a request for this court to reweigh the
evidence, which we cannot do.
There was substantial evidence to support the court’s
conclusion. Notably, Kaser-Boyd agreed that aspects of the crime
discussed by the juvenile court were indicative of “planning” and
“scouting for unsuspecting targets.” (In re J.S. (2024) 105
Cal.App.5th 205, 214 [substantial evidence supported finding of
criminal sophistication where “crimes were not spontaneous or
impulsive but were indicative of deliberation”].) A reasonable
trier of fact could attribute this planning to R.M., who was the
driver.6
C. Rehabilitation prior to expiration of juvenile
court jurisdiction
R.M. contends this criterion required an expert opinion and
that Ngo’s testimony was insufficient because she was unfamiliar
with SYTF programming. He further argues that the court
abused its discretion by failing to consider evidence suggesting
that he had grown and matured and had further potential to do
so. We disagree.
6 In his reply brief, R.M. contends the juvenile court erred
because it “failed to consider this criterion through the lens of
amenability.” (See S.S., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 1288
[“analysis of the five criteria set forth in the statute should be
focused through the lens of amenability to rehabilitation”].) We
reject this argument. The juvenile court stated that “[i]n
evaluating [the section 707 criteria] through the lens of
amenability, [it] reviewed many cases, including In re S.S. and
Kevin P. v. Superior Court and In re Miguel.” The court was
clearly aware of and applied the relevant law. R.M. advances the
same claim with respect to the second criterion. That argument
fails for the same reason.
24
i. Relevant factors
When assessing whether a minor can be rehabilitated
before the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, “the
juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including,
but not limited to, the minor’s potential to grow and mature.”
(§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(B)(ii).) “[T]he focus of the second criterion is
whether there is enough time to rehabilitate the minor while the
minor is still eligible to remain under juvenile court jurisdiction.”
(Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.)
ii. Juvenile court’s reasoning
The juvenile court recognized that R.M. had over five years
of juvenile court jurisdiction remaining. Although the court had
warned R.M. of the importance of the detention observation
reports before the transfer hearing, the reports remained
“overwhelming[ly] negative, although in fairness, there is a
sprinkling of positive notes. The negative entries lasted until
even after the transfer hearing started. . . . [R.M.’s] language
towards staff is both terrible and threatening. . . . He’s been in
physical altercations in the hall that required the use of pepper
spray or pepper spray warning[s], which is the highest level of
control used in juvenile hall. He has instances of using gang talk.
He’s been found with contraband, including THC infused candy, a
prerolled joint, and a book of matches. [¶] He has refused to
follow direction. He’s been suspected to be under the influence at
times with red eyes and slurry speech. He’s gone out of bounds.”
The juvenile court explained that it “take[s] the time to try
and parse [detention observation reports] out” and find trends of
improving behavior. It found no positive trends in R.M.’s reports.
Instead, there was a trend of R.M. influencing others toward
negative behavior in reports between July 2023 and April 2025.
25
The court found it notable that R.M. was “still threatening staff,
requiring redirection, engaging in aggressive behavior and going
out of bounds,” even after the parties announced they were ready
for the transfer hearing. The court recognized “there is some
truth” to the argument that “juvenile hall is not a place for
rehabilitation,” but noted that “other youth are turning in good
reports, and if not good, reports that are far more positive than
[R.M.’s].”
The court found that Ngo’s and Kaser-Boyd’s opinions were
flawed in certain respects. Ngo “seemed to overemphasize the
nature of the crime and to not give SYTF serious consideration.”
Kaser-Boyd’s amenability opinion was also “undercut by a
number of things.” First, Kaser-Boyd opined that R.M. “was a
marginal or fringe participant in the gang,” even though his
conduct before and after the shooting and in juvenile hall
contradicted this characterization. R.M. admitted to being a
gang member, which Kaser-Boyd did not know. A gang expert
testified that it is unusual for murder to be a member’s first
criminal activity, which suggested that R.M. was not new to gang
participation. Second, although Kaser-Boyd testified that R.M.
had taken steps to improve his maturity and impulse control and
had good insight, those claims were “belied by the negative
[detention observation reports].” Third, Kaser-Boyd “did not
have a full picture of [R.M.’s] behavior in juvenile hall.” Finally,
Kaser-Boyd appeared to have “very little knowledge of any actual
programs offered at SYTF” and “had no information on
community stepdown program[s],” which “undercut” her opinion
of whether he could be rehabilitated under juvenile court
jurisdiction.
26
The juvenile court noted that the SYTF program is still
evolving. It is “50/50 if youth will participate in services or
comply, and there is a high level of gang activity in SYTF, and
. . . success depends on the youth’s interest in rehabilitation and
level of commitment. Based on [R.M.’s] behavior, [the court was]
not seeing this level of commitment from [R.M.]” The court found
that R.M.’s completion of high school, enrollment in college
courses, and participation in therapy was “commendable,” but
“his overall behavior has not changed much in his time of
detention.” The court had “serious concerns whether there is
enough time left to rehabilitate [R.M.] before the expiration of
juvenile jurisdiction” and concluded that he was not amenable to
rehabilitation based on this factor.
iii. Analysis
R.M.’s argument that the People were required to call an
expert witness who could address all factors relevant to this
criterion is essentially the same argument he advanced with
respect to the overall amenability analysis. We reject it for the
same reasons.
Substantial evidence supported the court’s conclusion that
this criterion weighed in favor of transfer. The juvenile court
accepted Kaser-Boyd’s opinion that R.M. did not have a
personality disorder that would limit his capacity for
rehabilitation. However, it concluded that Kaser-Boyd’s opinion
was based on an incomplete understanding of the circumstances
of the crime and unsubstantiated view of R.M.’s progress in
juvenile hall. Kaser-Boyd essentially admitted as much in her
testimony.
We agree that five years is “not an insignificant amount of
time.” (O.F., supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 163.) However, Ngo
27
and Miller testified that an individual’s level of commitment
determines whether he or she will benefit from rehabilitative
programming. At the time of the transfer hearing, R.M. had
received therapy and rehabilitative services for approximately
two years. Although Miller believed that youths often respond to
services better at the SYTF, he testified that the SYTF offers
much of the same programming as juvenile hall and also has
population issues. A reasonable trier of fact could conclude from
R.M.’s ongoing misconduct in juvenile hall there was clear and
convincing evidence that he had not demonstrated a commitment
to rehabilitation, which called into doubt whether he would
commit to rehabilitation at the SYTF.
R.M. argues that the court “myopically” relied on negative
reports of his behavior in juvenile hall to the exclusion of positive
reports. This amounts to another request for this court to
reweigh the evidence. Although R.M. claims there was
“increasing improvement in [his] behavior in the more recent
[detention observation reports],” a trier of fact could reasonably
disagree. One of the more recent reports the juvenile court relied
on in its ruling stated that R.M. fought with another youth,
“rile[d] up” other youths during shower time, and failed to follow
staff orders to move away from the door to another unit. As the
court observed, this report was part of a two-year trend of R.M.
encouraging negative behavior in other youths while in juvenile
hall. The detention observation reports therefore support both
that R.M. was not committed to his own rehabilitation and that
he might impede other youths’ rehabilitation if he received a
SYTF commitment. That the final report was positive did not
require the court to conclude that R.M. was amenable to
rehabilitation under this criterion, particularly in the absence of
28
a clear trend of improving behavior. Indeed, the final report was
dated only four days after the previous, largely negative report.
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by
concluding that it was doubtful that R.M. could be rehabilitated
while under the court’s jurisdiction.
D. Success of previous attempts at rehabilitation
R.M. contends the juvenile court erred in considering the
success of rehabilitation services R.M. received in connection with
the present offense under this criterion. We conclude the court’s
consideration of this evidence was not improper.
i. Relevant factors
When evaluating the success of previous attempts by the
juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor, “the juvenile court shall
give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to,
the adequacy of the services previously provided to address the
minor’s needs.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(D)(ii).)
ii. Juvenile court’s reasoning
The juvenile court found that because R.M. had no prior
history with the juvenile justice system, he had not been provided
services through probation and the courts before this case.
However, it noted that he had received services while at juvenile
hall. “Although there are notes and a letter from DMH,
Department of Mental Health, that he participates and is open to
services, the [detention observation reports] remain[ed] terrible
as described previously.” Similarly, despite completing high
school and enrolling in college courses, his detention observation
reports remained poor. The court concluded R.M. was not
amenable under this criterion.
29
iii. Analysis
In D.C. v. Superior Court (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 441 (D.C.),
the Court of Appeal considered whether the juvenile court
properly considered the former minor’s school records and
conduct post-dating the underlying offense in connection with the
previous delinquent history criterion. Because the court analyzed
the statute’s use of the word “previous,” its analysis is also
instructive with respect to the success of previous attempts at
rehabilitation criterion.
The D.C. court found that “[t]he statutory language is
ambiguous as to whether ‘previous’ refers to the time before the
alleged offense or before the transfer decision.” (D.C., supra, 71
Cal.App.5th at p. 452.) Although other criteria expressly concern
the alleged offense (e.g., § 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii), (E)(i)), “the five
criteria focus on different areas; that two refer to factors existing
at the time of the alleged offense does not mean the rest should
also. To the contrary, the statute’s express reference to the time
of the alleged offense in two instances suggests that where such a
reference is omitted—such as in the previous delinquent history
criterion—there should be no such limitation.” (D.C., at p. 452.)
The court noted that the legislative history was “silent as to
the Legislature’s intent with respect to the meaning of
‘previous,’ ” but “indicates a general intent that juvenile courts
have broad discretion to consider all relevant evidence in making
the transfer decision.” (D.C., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 454.)
“Most significantly, the factors for the five criteria added by the
[2015] amendment were expressly made nonexclusive: for each
criterion, the statute provides that ‘the juvenile court may give
weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to,’ the
identified factors.” (Id. at p. 455.) It concluded that “the
30
legislative history of the section 707 criteria indicates an
overarching intent to grant judges broad discretion to consider all
evidence relevant to this inherently case-by-case determination.
Narrowly construing the statutory language to prohibit the
juvenile court from considering relevant information would be
contrary to this legislative intent.” (Ibid.) Accordingly, the
juvenile court did not err in considering evidence of conduct that
occurred after the alleged offense. (Id. at p. 456.)
We likewise conclude that the juvenile court properly
considered the success of rehabilitation efforts that occurred
before the transfer hearing but after the underlying offense. A
trier of fact could reasonably conclude that R.M.’s response to
rehabilitative services he received in juvenile hall before the
hearing was relevant to the court’s amenability analysis, even if
services provided at the SYTF may have a greater impact than
services provided at juvenile hall.
E. Circumstances and gravity of the alleged
offenses
Although R.M. does not dispute that the crime was serious,
he contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by concluding
that he was actively involved in the commission of the shooting.
We again disagree.
i. Relevant factors
When evaluating the circumstances and gravity of the
offense, “the juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant
factor, including, but not limited to, the actual behavior of the
person, the mental state of the person, the person’s degree of
involvement in the crime, the level of harm actually caused by
31
the person, and the person’s mental and emotional development.”
(§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(E)(ii).)
“[T]he allegation that a minor committed a serious offense,
including murder, does not ‘automatically require a finding of
unfitness.’ [Citations.] Rather, in evaluating this criterion, a
juvenile court may rely on evidence that, ‘while not justifying or
excusing the crime, tends to lessen its magnitude’ . . . .” (Kevin
P., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 189.)
ii. Juvenile court’s reasoning
The juvenile court observed that murder is an indisputably
grave crime and “[s]hooting into a park in broad daylight where
all kinds of people are enjoying a day at the park is reckless and
inherently dangerous and serious.” The crime was also gang-
related and “not an impetuous act, but a planned act.”
The court recognized it could consider evidence that “might
tend to lessen [the crime’s] magnitude in some ways.” R.M. was
the driver, not the shooter. “However, this is not the type of case
where someone is asked to drive a friend to the store and that
person has no idea that the friend is planning to commit a
robbery, or even if that person has knowledge that the friend is
going to commit a robbery, has no idea the friend is carrying a
gun.” Rather, the court viewed R.M. “as just as culpable and just
as much of an active participant in the shooting” because he
procured the car and a gun and was the last person who could
“make the decision to turn around or not go through with it.”
There was no evidence that R.M. was forced to participate. The
court found “[h]is degree of participation is high” and “[h]e had to
have known of the grave consequences of his actions.” The court
also concluded there was “nothing out of the ordinary for his
mental or emotional development.” The court also observed that
32
there was extensive evidence of the impact of the crime on Khalil
S.’s family.
iii. Analysis
R.M. argues that the circumstances of the crime could
support the finding that he was pressured to participate, which
would mitigate the gravity of the offense. This amounts to yet
another request for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we
decline to accept. There was substantial evidence that R.M.
played an active role in the events leading to the shooting and in
the shooting itself. Moreover, the record does not suggest that
the court improperly relied on this criterion to the exclusion of
any other. Rather, the court stated that it weighed the criteria as
a whole and made a “global assessment” of amenability.
33
DISPOSITION
The order of the juvenile court is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, Acting P. J.
We concur:
HANASONO, J.
ASHWORTH, J.*
* Retired Judge of the El Dorado Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
34