Filed 10/6/26 In re R.L. CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re R.L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, F089769
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 0080623-2)
v.
R.L., OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Fresno County. James Kelley,
Judge.
William Safford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Ivan P. Marrs and Justin
Pedroso, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
In 1994, after being found unfit for the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, appellant
R.L. was convicted in adult court of murder (Pen. Code, § 187), kidnapping to commit
robbery (id., § 209, subd. (b)), carjacking (id., § 215, subd. (a)), and robbery (id., §§ 211,
212.5, subd. (b)). In addition, the jury found true a special circumstance alleging that the
murder occurred during the commission of a robbery. R.L. was 17 years old at the time
of the offenses. The trial court sentenced him to a prison term of life without the
possibility of parole, plus a determinate term of 14 years.
In 2014, R.L. filed a petition for recall and resentencing based on his age at the
time of the commitment offense.1 (See Pen. Code, § 1170, former subd. (d)(2)(A)(i),
now subd. (d)(1)(A).) The petition remained pending in the trial court for nearly nine
years.
In 2017, Assembly Bill No. 2590 (2015−2016 Reg. Sess.) was enacted, amending
Penal Code section 1170 to make recall of a petitioner’s sentence mandatory where the
court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, the statements alleged in the petition
true. (Stats. 2016, ch. 696, § 1.)
In 2023, the parties agreed that Penal Code section 1170 required the court to
recall R.L.’s sentence. The parties also agreed that recall of R.L.’s sentence entitled him
1 Penal Code section 1170, former subdivision (d)(2)(A)(i), now subdivision (d)(1)(A)
provides: “When a defendant who was under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of
the offense for which the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for life without the
possibility of parole has been incarcerated for at least 15 years, the defendant may submit to the
sentencing court a petition for recall and resentencing.”
2.
to a new transfer hearing.2 (See In re E.P. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 409, 416.) Following a
transfer hearing,3 the court found that R.L. was not amenable to the care, treatment, and
training programs of juvenile court and granted the prosecutor’s transfer petition. The
court stayed sentencing during the pendency of the instant appeal.
R.L. raises multiple claims on appeal. First, he contends the juvenile court
misapplied the law in making its amenability determination, misinterpreting key criteria
and ignoring substantial evidence showing that he was amenable to rehabilitation.
Second, the juvenile court’s reliance on the probation officers’ reports and addendums at
the transfer hearing violated his constitutional rights. According to R.L., the probation
department failed to prepare a “neutral, unbiased, and thorough report on [his] behavioral
patterns and social history.” (Boldface omitted.) Third, he submits the court failed to
consider evidence that he was a victim of human trafficking because he had been coerced
into joining a criminal street gang as a juvenile. We affirm.
2 When R.L. was originally tried, his age and the nature of his offense triggered a statutory
presumption that he was “not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court
law.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, former § 707, subd. (c); Stats. 1979, ch. 1177, § 2, p. 4601.) This
“presumption of unfitness” could only be rebutted if the minor established by a preponderance of
the evidence that he was a suitable candidate for treatment under the juvenile justice system.
(People v. Superior Court (Rodrigo O.) (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1303; Welf. & Inst. Code,
former § 707, subd. (c).) The enactment of Proposition 57 eliminated any rebuttable
presumption of unfitness under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707. (People v. Superior
Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 314.) Further, Assembly Bill No. 2361 (2021–2022 Reg.
Sess.) amended Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 by “raising the standard of proof to
clear and convincing evidence on the issue of whether a juvenile should be transferred.” (In re
Miguel R. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 152, 156 (Miguel R.); see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.770(a).)
3 The parties below referred to the transfer hearing as a “reverse transfer hearing,”
reflecting the procedural posture of the case. We refer to the hearing below as simply a “transfer
hearing,” which is consistent with the governing statute.
3.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Underlying Conviction
The following statement of facts are recited from R.L.’s direct appeal in People v.
Jaime Lopez (Dec. 31, 1998, F024557 & F025403) (nonpub. opn.):
“On the evening of September 13, 1994, Jose Juan Herrera went to
Olsen Park in Coalinga with [Adam Refugio] Loya, [Luis Antonio]
Sanchez, [Jaime] Lopez, and [Francisco] Nava[, Jr]. The group met several
other youths there, including [R.L.], Juan Carlos Ruiz, Armando Contreras,
Raul Jiminez, and Contreras’s cousin “Mike.” While they were in the park,
the youths drank beer and smoked marijuana. At least one of the marijuana
cigarettes smoked was laced with methamphetamine.
“Herrera testified that while he was sitting in the park with the other
individuals, he heard someone talk about getting a car and going to the fair
in Tulare. Both Ruiz and Contreras recalled that Loya was the person who
first mentioned doing a carjacking. Contreras also recalled Loya saying:
“Let’s go jack some f----ing [W]hite boys.” Jiminez also heard Loya talk
about wanting to get even with some “white guys” who had confronted him
a few days earlier and Ruiz heard Loya talk about wanting to rob White
people.
“Herrera testified that during the time he was in the park, he saw
[R.L.] waving a gun around, which he described as a .25-caliber
semiautomatic pistol. Ruiz testified that at some point while he was in the
park, he saw Loya go to a trash can and retrieve a .25-caliber semiautomatic
pistol. Contreras claimed he did not see anyone with a firearm while he
was in the park. Jiminez recalled Mike talking about the nine[-]millimeter
pistol he had in Los Angeles, but did not recall any other discussion about
weapons while he was in Olsen Park.
“The group of youths left Olsen Park and began walking to Herrera’s
house. During the walk, Herrera heard Loya and [R.L.] continue to talk
about going to the Tulare fair. He also heard some conversation about
carjacking someone. Ruiz stated that before they left the park, he heard
Herrera say he had a gun at his house. Ruiz recall[ed] that as he walked to
Herrera’s house, Mike talked about doing something so they could go to the
Tulare fair.
“Herrera testified that when he arrived at his house, he got an M-1
rifle from a back room and gave it to Loya. Contreras also saw Loya with
4.
an M-1 rifle while he was at Herrera’s home, but Jiminez claimed he saw
no guns while he was there. Ruiz stated that at Herrera’s house, Loya tried
to convince everyone to go along with the plan to obtain a car and go to the
Tulare fair. He first saw Loya offer Mike the pistol which he was carrying
in the waistband of his pants, and then the M-1. Ruiz, Contreras, Jiminez,
and Mike said they did not want to go. Herrera, [R.L.], Loya, Sanchez, []
Lopez and Nava then left and walked to the intersection of Polk Avenue
and Thompson Street. Herrera testified that when they arrived, Loya and
[R.L.] told everyone where to stand and said once they stopped a car,
everyone should get in.
“At approximately 10 p.m. on the evening of September 13th,
Charlene Richardson was approaching the intersection of Polk and
Thompson when she saw a group of boys standing by the stop sign.
Although she did not see any guns as she drove up to the stop sign, the
actions of the individuals scared her and she called the Coalinga Police
Department when she got home.
“Herrera testified that after they arrived at the intersection, [] Lopez
first tried to stop a car, but was unsuccessful. Sanchez asked Nava and
Herrera to try, but they both refused. Then a small pickup truck approached
the intersection and Loya and [R.L.] waved it down. The truck was driven
by Manuel Toste. Toste was a college student who was on his way home to
the trailer park where he lived with Darrell Crosswy. Toste had been with
Crosswy at a friend’s home earlier in the evening, but left between 10 and
10:30 p.m. to return home.
“When Toste stopped his truck, Loya and [R.L.] approached the
driver’s side. Loya asked the driver the time and then said to [R.L.], “This
one?” When [R.L.] said yes, Loya pointed the .25-caliber pistol at Toste
and [R.L.] pointed the M-1 at him. Loya got in[to] the truck on the driver’s
side, followed by [R.L.], [] Lopez, Sanchez, Herrera, and Nava climbed
into the bed of the truck. Herrera testified [R.L.] then began driving the
truck and Loya handed the pistol to Sanchez through the sliding back
window of the truck and told him to hold it on Toste. As they were driving,
Herrera heard Loya ask Toste for his watch, and he heard Toste say that if
they drove him to the bank, he could get more money to give them.
“Herrera testified that after [R.L.] drove for a while, he stopped the
truck by the side of the road and he heard someone inside the truck say:
“Get out.” Toste got out of the passenger side of the truck and began
running toward the back of the truck. He had run approximately 75 to
90 feet, when Sanchez said: “Stop, freeze.” Loya got out of the truck and
said the same thing. Toste stopped running, faced the truck, and put his
5.
hands in the air. Herrera testified that he, [] Lopez, and Nava, said: “No,
let him go.” Loya took the pistol from Sanchez, walked up to Toste, and
pointed it at him. While Loya was pointing the pistol at Toste, Herrera
heard [R.L.] say “matalo,” which means “kill him,” two or three times.
Herrera testified he never heard [R.L.] say “dejalo.”4 [R.L.] pointed the M-
1 at Toste, then walked up to Loya, took the pistol from him and pointed it
at Toste’s face. When [R.L.] pointed the gun at Toste, Herrera heard Toste
say, “Don’t you believe in God?” [R.L.] did not answer and shot Toste in
the head from a distance of approximately one to two feet.
“After [R.L.] shot Toste, Sanchez got into the driver’s seat of the
truck and backed it up to where Loya and [R.L.] were standing. As the
truck passed Toste lying on the ground, Herrera could hear him breathing.
Herrera testified he heard Nava say, “Shoot him again.” Herrera admitted
he said the same thing, but only did so because he knew Toste was dying
and wanted him put out of his misery. [] Lopez then took the .25-caliber
pistol, got out of the truck and walked to where Toste was lying. Herrera
saw [] Lopez point the gun at Toste and cock it once or twice, but did not
hear the gun fire. [] Lopez returned to the truck and said the gun did not
work. They then drove off with Sanchez at the wheel.
“Sanchez stopped the truck at a convenience store in Avenal to buy
gas. As they were driving away from the store, Herrera testified he heard
[R.L.], Sanchez, [] Lopez and Nava, who were seated in the front of the
truck, discussing that they wanted to do the same thing in Tulare. Herrera
said he wanted to be dropped off, and Sanchez said, “No, everyone is
going.” The truck’s engine began to overheat and when they stopped to put
water in the radiator, Herrera got out of the truck and said he was leaving.
[] Lopez, Nava, and Sanchez got out with him. Someone told Herrera to
take the M-1, so he got it from Loya and threw it into a canal near the road.
[] Lopez took the clip from the rifle. The M-1 was recovered from a ditch
on October 17, 1994.
“Herrera, [] Lopez, Sanchez, and Nava walked about five or six
miles to a convenience store.[5] While they were walking the four youths
agreed on a story to tell if they were caught. They agreed to claim they had
been in Huron partying with some girls. At the convenience store, Herrera
saw [] Lopez hide the clip from the M-1 in a grassy area near the store.
This clip was recovered in the area described by Herrera on October 18,
4 It was stipulated that “dejalo” means “let him go” or “leave him alone,” in Spanish.
5 Although not recited in this court’s opinion, Loya stated that he and R.L. stayed behind.
They put water into Toste’s truck and continued to the Tulare County Fair.
6.
1994. All four of the youths then got a ride from someone in a van, back to
Coalinga, where they went to Herrera’s house. Herrera testified that prior
to the carjacking there had been no discussion about what they would do
with the driver. He believed they were just going to let him go. After he
was arrested, Herrera spoke with Loya while they were both in juvenile
hall. Loya told Herrera he just could not pull the trigger when he had the
gun pointed at Toste.
“Officer John Adams of the California Highway Patrol (CHP) was
on duty on the evening of September 13, 1994. At approximately
12:10 a.m. on September 14th, he and his partner, Officer Art Rosas, had
made a traffic stop on Kansas Avenue in Kings County, when Adams saw a
pickup truck approach them at an excessive speed. Adams and Rosas gave
chase, and the pickup truck reached speeds of approximately 100 miles per
hour as it tried to elude them. During the pursuit, Adams saw there were
two people in the truck and saw the passenger throw several objects out the
window. Adams identified the driver as [R.L.] and the passenger as Loya.
The pickup truck went out of control as it attempted to make a turn and
came to a stop. When Adams and Rosas arrived at the scene, the truck was
empty.
“Officers of the Tulare Police Department responded to a call for
assistance from Adams and Rosas and began a search of the area where the
pickup truck spun out of control. After approximately 15 minutes of
searching, [R.L.] and Loya were discovered hiding in a shed nearby. When
they were apprehended, neither [R.L.] nor Loya was wearing shoes.
Officer Rosas conducted a field sobriety test of [R.L.] and, although he
could smell alcohol on his breath, concluded [R.L.] was not under the
influence.
“[R.L.] and Loya were arrested for traffic violations and transported
to the CHP office in Hanford. At that office Rosas separately interviewed
both individuals after advising them of their Miranda6 rights. [R.L.]
waived his Miranda rights and stated he had been at Olsen Park in Coalinga
drinking beer when he saw a truck stop and the occupants run away. [R.L.]
got in it and drove away, intending to go to the Tulare fair. He stated he
did not stop when he saw the CHP officers because he knew the truck was
stolen. Loya also waived his Miranda rights and told essentially the same
story as [R.L]. Loya admitted that while the officers were chasing the
6 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
7.
truck, he threw an ATM card, eyeglasses, and other items out of the truck.
Loya told Rosas he knew the truck was not his.
“On the morning of September 14, 1994, Toste’s body was found.
Near Toste’s body, the police found one spent .25-caliber casing and three
live rounds. An autopsy revealed that Toste died of a single gunshot wound
to the head. The muzzle of the gun that killed Toste was between six and
thirty inches from his head when the shot was fired. Although Toste may
have continued breathing for a short period, he died within a few minutes of
being shot. Analysis of the shells recovered at the scene of Toste’s murder
revealed that all four rounds were designed for use in a semiautomatic
pistol, and that they had all been ejected from such a weapon. Additionally,
the live rounds recovered at the scene were consistent with the bullet
removed from Toste’s head.” (People v. Jaime Lopez, supra, F024557 &
F025403, pp. 6–11, fn. omitted.)
The Juvenile Transfer Hearing
On June 1, 2023, the court vacated R.L.’s sentence. The prosecutor objected to
the transfer of R.L.’s case back to the juvenile court, and the court scheduled a transfer
hearing.
The juvenile court held a hearing on the prosecutor’s petition to transfer R.L.’s
case to adult court April 28–30, 2025. The parties submitted extensive briefing and
documentary evidence. The court also heard testimony from probation officers,
correctional and reentry-program personnel, social workers, and psychological experts.
The evidence adduced at the hearing is summarized below.
The Probation Officer’s Reports
The 1994 Fitness Report
Deputy Probation Officer Jenny Rios authored R.L.’s original fitness report. The
report described R.L.’s family circumstances and his educational and behavioral history.
R.L.’s biological father was a seasonal field worker. His mother abandoned the
family in 1984 and has not been heard from since. The family was supported by food
stamps.
8.
R.L. originally attended Coalinga High School. His former school principal
described him as defiant and disruptive, with little respect for authority. R.L. represented
his gang affiliation through his attitude, clothing, and the individuals with whom he
associated. He was suspended from school on several occasions.
In 1994, R.L. transferred to Cambridge Continuation High School, which he was
attending when he committed the instant offenses. The school principal reported that
R.L.’s attendance and grades were poor and described R.L. as disruptive, defiant, and
giving the appearance of being a gang member.
R.L.’s sister stated that when R.L. was five years old, he was in an accident in
which he suffered serious injuries. R.L. had to wear a colostomy bag and diapers into his
late adolescence. His classmates teased him incessantly about wearing diapers, causing
him to lash out frequently.
R.L. was 17 years and one month old when he committed the instant offenses.
Before then, he had suffered juvenile adjudications for the following offenses:
• In December 1989, R.L. was placed on informal probation and sentenced to
community service for petty theft.
• In January 1994, he was given “PPT intake services”7 for petty theft, disturbing
the peace, and vandalism.
• At the time of his conviction for the instant offenses, R.L. had a disposition
pending for a felony weapons charge in Kings County. The court surmised
that this case may have been dismissed given R.L.’s sentence in the instant
matter.
Rios opined that “all reasonable attempts ha[d] been made on behalf of [R.L.] to
facilitate his rehabilitation and reformation[,]” but R.L. had “failed to take advantage of
the services that were offered to him at the local level.” Rios explained that R.L. had
7 The report did not explain what PPT intake services include.
9.
been on formal and informal probation and had been offered PPT services but failed to
avail himself of those services.
With respect to the commitment offense, Rios observed that R.L. acted with
criminal sophistication, explaining that the crime was planned and that R.L. used a
firearm in its commission.
Rios recommended that R.L. be committed to the adult criminal justice system,
given his “extremely violent and dangerous behavior.” Rios explained that the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction would expire when R.L. turned 25 years old, and that would not
provide sufficient time to ensure a reasonable probability of rehabilitation.
The 2023 Transfer Report Addendum
Deputy Probation Officer Beatrice Sanchez submitted a transfer report addendum
dated August 10, 2023. Sanchez opined that the “recommendations from the Fitness
Report of the Probation Officer dated September 29, 1994, still appear appropriate” and
recommended transfer to adult court.
The 2025 Transfer Report Addendum
On January 10, 2025, Deputy Probation Officer Suzanne Rossi submitted an
addendum report and recommendation for the 2025 transfer hearing. Rossi’s findings
and conclusions were consistent with those set forth in the 1994 fitness report and the
2023 transfer report addendum.
Rossi found that R.L. had acted with a high degree of criminal sophistication in
committing the instant offenses. She specifically cited the premeditated nature of the
offenses and R.L.’s participation with five other suspects in planning and committing the
crimes. Rossi opined that R.L. “was mature enough, had the intellectual capacity to
understand the wrongfulness of his actions, and was in sound physical, mental and
emotional health.”
With respect to rehabilitation, Rossi noted that available juvenile rehabilitation
programs involved commitment to a secure youth treatment facility. She further
10.
concluded that R.L.’s age of 47 years would limit his remaining period of juvenile court
confinement to a maximum of two years from the date of his commitment, which would
not be “enough time to affect rehabilitation.”
According to Rossi, the remaining Welfare and Institutions Code section 7078
factors—including R.L.’s previous delinquent history, the success of prior attempts to
rehabilitate him, and the circumstances and gravity of the offense—supported transfer to
adult criminal court.
The Prosecution’s Witnesses
Kayatana Davis
Kayatana Davis, an assistant deputy chief for the Fresno County Probation
Department (the Department) at the Juvenile Justice Campus, had worked for the
Department for more than 27 years. She had over five years of experience working with
juvenile offenders.
Davis was assigned to Secure Track, also known as the Secure Youth Treatment
Facility. Secure Track permits youths who have committed section 707, subdivision (b)
offenses and were previously housed at other facilities to remain locally. Residents of the
program can remain in Secure Track until they are 25 years old.
Secure Track offers programming including cognitive behavioral intervention, life
skills training, restorative justice, sex offender or maladaptive behavior treatment, anger
management or anger regression replacement therapy, high school classes, and college
classes. The programs are provided in person at the Juvenile Justice Campus, although
college classes are offered virtually.
Davis explained that Secure Track cannot house a 47-year-old person or permit
them to participate in its programming. The program is designed for those between ages
16 and 25 and housing a 47-year-old there would present safety concerns. Secure Track
8 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
11.
programs are also not available at the Fresno County jail, and the program lacks the
ability to transport individuals to the facility for programming.
Davis acknowledged that while Secure Track does not offer programs designed to
meet the rehabilitative needs of individuals over age 25, similar services are available
through community-based services in Fresno County.
Astrid Apodaca
Officer Astrid Apodaca, assistant deputy chief of the Fresno County Juvenile
Court Services Unit, supervised the juvenile court unit for approximately five years and
worked for the Department for more than 25 years. Apodaca handled many of the
administrative responsibilities of the juvenile court and reviewed juvenile probation
recommendations.
Apodaca testified that probation has never recommended committing a person
over age 25 to Secure Track. She explained that this was attributable to the individual
circumstances of the former minor rather than an inability of probation to accommodate
such an individual. However, Apodaca acknowledged that section 208.5 prohibits a
person over age 25 from being in a juvenile facility.
Apodaca reviewed the 2023 and 2025 transfer report addendums concerning R.L.
If R.L. were to remain within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, Apodaca anticipated
that probation would recommend placing him on probation for one day and then
terminating probation. She explained that R.L. had already served his maximum
commitment term and had exceeded the jurisdictional age of 25. The Department would
no longer contact R.L. thereafter.
Apodaca was unaware of any juvenile programs in which a person whose
probation had been terminated could participate.
Apodaca further explained that a person over age 25 is automatically considered
mature, and mature adults are no longer moldable through juvenile programming. She
12.
acknowledged that R.L. could theoretically be referred to community-based services, but
she did not know what those services entail.
The Defense’s Witnesses
Suzanne Rossi
Suzanne Rossi, employed as a probation officer with the Department, authored the
2025 transfer report addendum.
Rossi’s report addressed each of section 707’s five criteria and relied primarily on
the 1994 fitness report, the circumstances of the commitment offense, and R.L.’s conduct
during the offense. Rossi opined that the section 707 criteria favor transfer to adult court.
She identified R.L.’s criminal sophistication and his age as significant considerations,
explaining that the juvenile probation system was not designed to assist individuals over
age 25.
Rossi further testified that although R.L. could not be rehabilitated within juvenile
court jurisdiction because the available juvenile programs were not designed for someone
his age, he could be rehabilitated in the adult court system.
On cross-examination, Rossi acknowledged that information concerning R.L.’s
childhood trauma, substance abuse, bullying, foster care placement, and other aspects of
R.L.’s history could have been relevant to the statutory criteria. However, that
information was either omitted from her report entirely, or addressed only in connection
with some of the statutory criteria. Rossi also acknowledged that she made no effort to
determine R.L.’s rehabilitative needs.
Erin Parker
Erin Parker, a subject matter expert on prison and equal employment opportunity
cases, consulted on Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) matters,
including gangs, inmate populations, programming, rule violations, classifications, and
CDCR policies and procedures.
13.
Parker had worked for nearly 27 years in CDCR as a correctional officer, parole
agent, and acting chief of internal affairs. She previously supervised parolees who had
served sentences for murder, manslaughter, robbery, and other offenses requiring
minimum supervision. The court qualified Parker as an expert concerning CDCR subject
matter.
Parker prepared a report concerning R.L. based on his C-file, which documented
his conduct during incarceration, his history, and an interview with him. R.L. was
initially classified as a low-profile Norteño gang member, but he renounced his gang
affiliation while incarcerated. Initially housed at Salinas Valley State Prison, R.L. was
labeled a “rat” after testifying against his codefendants. R.L. told Parker that he was
assaulted twice while incarcerated.
In April 1999, R.L. was placed in administrative segregation after assaulting
another inmate. He remained in segregated housing for 15 months before being
transferred to California Correctional Institution in Tehachapi, a level four prison, where
he was assaulted again.
Parker identified a turning point in R.L.’s incarceration, when another inmate
began ministering to him and encouraged him to read the Bible. After R.L. was
transferred to High Desert State Prison, another level four prison, he was placed in
administrative segregation. During this period, R.L. began telling others that he no
longer drank, used drugs, or participated in gangs, and he formally renounced his gang
affiliation.
R.L. was eventually transferred to Mule Creek State Prison, a level three facility
that offered greater access to programming. There, he participated in self-help
programming, substance abuse treatment, victim impact, anger management courses, and
other programs. He also completed his general equivalency diploma and took college
courses.
14.
In 2017, after demonstrating positive institutional behavior—including an absence
of rule violations, disciplinary issues, and assaults—R.L. was reclassified and transferred
to a level two prison, the lowest classification available to him given his sentence. In
2024, he received a score of one on his criminal-risk assessment, the lowest score
possible given his circumstances.
Parker opined that R.L. was amenable to rehabilitation based upon his
participation in rehabilitation programming and being free of rule violations for 25 years.
Parker could not, however, determine whether R.L. would be amenable to rehabilitation
specifically under juvenile court jurisdiction because she was unfamiliar with the
programs available through the juvenile court.
The prosecutor questioned Parker about R.L.’s prior denials of parole. R.L.
received a five-year denial at his first parole board hearing in 2019 and a three-year
denial at his 2024 hearing.9 At the 2024 hearing, the parole board expressed concern
about R.L.’s lack of candor when discussing violence associated with prior rule violations
and his reliance on the religious aspects of his rehabilitation. The parole board also
expressed concern about his ability to accept responsibility and learn from self-help
programming.
Jaime Leyva
Jaime Leyva was the program director of Circles of Support and Accountability
(CoSA), an adult reentry program that assists individuals with reintegration after
incarceration. CoSA works with individuals 18 months before release, assesses their
needs, and provides social support, training, and individual wellness programs after
release.
9 “A juvenile offender whose controlling offense carries a term of 25 years to life or
greater is ‘eligible for release on parole by the board during his or her 25th year of incarceration
at a youth offender parole hearing, unless previously released or entitled to an earlier parole
consideration hearing pursuant to other statutory provisions.’ ” (People v. Franklin (2016)
63 Cal.4th 261, 277, quoting Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (b)(3).)
15.
Leyva testified that CoSA could provide R.L. classes, pay his rent for a couple of
months after his release, and provide a support network if he were placed on probation.
CoSA would also be able to pick R.L. up and transport him to his probation officer and
housing.
Kimberly Gragston
Kimberly Gragston worked for ReEvolution and the Ahimsa Collective.
ReEvolution is a nonprofit organization that provides support to current and formerly
incarcerated individuals. ReEvolution provides direct case management, housing
referrals, employment support, therapy, substance abuse treatment, counseling, resume
writing assistance, and transportation services. The Ahimsa Collective is also nonprofit,
and they provide restorative justice processes throughout California.
After speaking with Gragston about both organizations, R.L. appeared open and
able to participate in the programs. Gragston clarified, however, that these programs are
not court ordered or otherwise compulsory, a participant could discontinue their
participation at any time.
Juliana Cottrell
Juliana Cottrell, a forensic social worker and former probation officer, worked on
juvenile transfer and reverse transfer cases and provided evaluations of section 707
criteria. The court qualified Cottrell as an expert witness regarding forensic social work
and as a probation officer.
Cottrell evaluated R.L.’s involvement with the juvenile justice system and his
subsequent rehabilitation. She reviewed his C-file, parole transcripts, juvenile probation
records, medical records, discovery, and met with R.L. six times. Cottrell identified
several sources of childhood trauma, including an accident that left R.L. permanently
disabled, his mother’s abandonment, abuse and neglect, substance abuse, bullying, and
childhood hunger.
16.
R.L. was hit by a drunk driver as a child, and his resulting injuries required him to
wear diapers into his teenage years. His disability and the need to wear diapers became a
source of insecurity and bullying, contributing to a low sense of self-worth and trauma.
In addition to being harassed for his disability, R.L.’s peers made fun of his clothes,
which were ill-fitting donated items.
R.L.’s father drove R.L. and his siblings while intoxicated on multiple occasions
throughout their childhood. On one of those occasions, R.L.’s father flipped his vehicle.
Rather than calling for emergency services, R.L. contacted a family friend for assistance,
who drove the family home. R.L.’s father never took R.L. or his siblings to the hospital.
When he was just eight years old, R.L. began drinking alcohol. His father would
give him beer and they would drink together. By the time R.L. was 13 or 14 years old, he
was drinking to the point of intoxication and blacking out.
On at least two occasions, R.L. and his siblings had been removed from his
father’s custody for neglect.10 While reunification proceedings were pending, the
children were placed into foster care. Their father’s behavior periodically improved, but
after they were reunified with him, his behavior regressed and their living conditions
deteriorated.
R.L. joined a gang when he was 14 years old. He was recruited by Temo, an older
gang member, who told R.L.’s peers to tell him to come to an afterschool event. Temo
gave a speech about everything the gang could provide, including power and protection.
R.L. decided to join the gang and was jumped in shortly thereafter.
According to R.L., the gang introduced him to methamphetamine, marijuana, and
cocaine. He began using methamphetamine daily, or as it was made available to him.
10 The specific circumstances underlying the siblings’ removal from their father’s home are
not specified within the record.
17.
Cottrell believed R.L. has the capacity to mature and grow if given rehabilitative
services. Cottrell opined that R.L. would be amenable to rehabilitation within two
years—the time remaining under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. R.L. also appeared
open to participating in adult rehabilitation services. Cottrell opined that juvenile
probation could supervise R.L.’s participation in those services.
Dr. Rahn Minagawa
Dr. Rahn Minagawa, a clinical and forensic psychologist and educator, worked as
a consultant on cases involving traumatic brain injuries and complex post-traumatic stress
disorder. The court qualified Dr. Minagawa as an expert in clinical and forensic
psychology, substance abuse, gang-involved youth, and developmental aspects of trauma.
Dr. Minagawa interviewed R.L. as part of his transfer evaluation report.
Dr. Minagawa identified R.L.’s childhood accident and resulting disability, his mother’s
abandonment, and his father’s abuse as critical events in R.L.’s life that disrupted his
social and physical development. According to Dr. Minagawa, R.L.’s maternal
abandonment caused him to seek safety and support on his own and from his gang. R.L.
likely had untreated trauma from these experiences. Dr. Minagawa further opined that
R.L.’s experiences shaped his world view and contributed to his violent behavior.
Dr. Minagawa administered three tests to R.L.: (1) the Millon Clinical Multiaxial
Inventory, fourth edition (MCMI-IV); (2) the Adverse Childhood Experience
Questionnaire; and (3) the Wechsler Children Intelligence Scale. The MCMI-IV is a test
administered to identify psychological conditions in patients, testing for things such as
substance abuse disorders, depression, anxiety, and personality characteristics. R.L.’s
MCMI-IV test results revealed that he suffers from general anxiety and past drug use.
The Adverse Childhood Experiences Questionnaire is a 10-question survey used to
identify risk areas for individuals based on their responses. R.L.’s questionnaire showed
he has seven out of 10 adverse childhood experiences. Dr. Minagawa explained that
scores of six or above are associated with a lifespan reduced by about 20 years.
18.
The Wechsler Children Intelligence Scale evaluates intellectual functioning and
helps clinicians understand a patient’s ability to understand the information provided to
them. R.L. scored a 97, which puts him within the average range for IQ. The test did not
detect any intellectual impairments that would prohibit him from participating in
programming.
Regarding R.L.’s transfer criteria, Dr. Minagawa opined that R.L. can be
rehabilitated within two years and would remain within the juvenile court system if he
were not transferred. However, Dr. Minagawa also stated that R.L. may not benefit from
programming designed for individuals between the ages of 12 and 25.
With respect to the section 707 criteria, Dr. Minagawa found evidence that R.L.
acted with criminal sophistication due to planning, using a weapon, and acting in concert
with others. Dr. Minagawa nonetheless concluded that R.L. should remain under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court under this criterion. Dr. Minagawa’s report explained
that R.L.’s brain had not yet fully matured at the time of the offense, he had been under
peer influence, and he had a history of trauma, impacting his mental and emotional
health.
As to the second criterion, Dr. Minagawa found R.L. demonstrated potential for
growth and maturity due to his accomplishments in custody, lack of violent offenses in
the last 25 years, and renouncing his gang.
Dr. Minagawa also found that the third criterion supported a finding of
amenability. Dr. Minagawa explained that the abuse and trauma R.L. suffered were
linked to his history of delinquency, and that R.L.’s prior criminal acts were influenced
by peer pressure.
For criterion four, Dr. Minagawa stated the circumstances and gravity of the
offense were grave and R.L.’s involvement was high. He ultimately found, however, that
this criterion did not favor transfer, explaining that R.L.’s judgment and reasoning were
19.
impaired by his adolescent brain and citing the tremendous changes that R.L. made since
his incarceration.11
Comprehensive Risk Assessment Report
The Board of Parole Hearings prepared a comprehensive risk assessment report
for R.L.’s parole suitability hearing, during which R.L. was interviewed.12 R.L.
explained that he was expelled from his former high school for carrying a gun,
vandalism, and truancy. He recalled trying to stab someone when he was 15 years old
and shooting a gun at a rival gang when he was 16 years old.
R.L. received three rule violations during his incarceration. His last rule violation
was for battery on an inmate, received in 1999. During the incident, R.L. used a razor
blade to attack another inmate. R.L. stated that the incident was gang related. His prior
rule violations were for being out of bounds and disobeying an order, both received in
1996.
Despite this history, the comprehensive risk assessment report, authored by Doctor
of Psychology Angelinja Enos, classified R.L. as “[l]ow risk,” citing his sobriety,
renunciation of his gang affiliation, self-awareness, and positive programming.
Other Evidence Submitted by Trial Counsel
Trial counsel submitted evidence demonstrating that during his incarceration, R.L.
made efforts toward rehabilitation, including participating in drug and alcohol
11 Dr. Minagawa’s report also referenced a clinical evaluation authored by Sharon
Shumsky with the California Youth Authority (now the Division of Juvenile Justice), dated
December 19, 1995, to determine whether R.L. was amenable to their treatment. According to
Dr. Minagawa, the report concluded R.L.’s “ ‘criminal behavior is not so firmly established that
there is little likelihood that it can be changed by a commitment to [the Division of Juvenile
Justice]’ and that there ‘is a reasonable possibility that [R.L.]’s likelihood to commit criminal
behavior can be significantly reduced or eliminated with the confinement time and jurisdiction
time available.’ ” However, Shumsky’s report, which was also referenced by Parker, was not
made part of the record.
12 We do not recite all findings noted in the report as they are duplicative of other evidence
adduced at R.L.’s transfer hearing.
20.
rehabilitation programs and taking classes on violence prevention, domestic violence, and
victim awareness. In addition, R.L. completed his general equivalency diploma and
enrolled in college courses. R.L. pursued his Associate of Arts degree in English through
Merced College and a degree in Theology through The Urban Ministry Institute.
Trial counsel asserted that while R.L. had disciplinary issues during his first three
years of incarceration, including a write-up for violent conduct in 1999, R.L. had not
incurred a rule violation in 25 years. R.L. worked as a Peer Support Specialist in April
2025 and also received numerous certificates of recognition and laudatory chronos while
incarcerated.
The Court’s Ruling on the Transfer Petition
The juvenile court observed that R.L. “had a very rough start in life,” beginning
with a traumatic injury that dramatically changed his life and including his parents’
physical and emotional abandonment of him as a child. However, the court ultimately
determined that the prosecutor’s transfer petition should be granted for the reasons listed
below.
Degree of Criminal Sophistication
The court concluded that R.L. was the “ringleader” of the crime. He planned the
carjacking, selected Toste out of other possible victims, and directed his codefendant to
kill Toste. When his codefendant refused, R.L. murdered Toste to prevent him from
being an eyewitness to the carjacking. R.L. also discussed a cover story following the
murder.13 Accordingly, the court found that R.L. had acted with a high degree of
criminal sophistication.
13 Our prior opinion states that Herrera, Lopez, Sanchez, and Nava crafted a cover story as
they were walking to a convenience store and Loya and R.L. stayed behind with Toste’s vehicle.
(People v. Jaime Lopez, supra, F024557 & F025403, p. 10.) We were unable to find facts in the
record supporting the trial court’s conclusion that R.L. also participated in crafting a cover story.
Out of an abundance of caution, we have therefore omitted this finding from our evaluation of
the sufficiency of the evidence.
21.
Potential for Rehabilitation Before Age 25
Considering R.L.’s history, the court concluded that the evidence demonstrated he
could be rehabilitated before expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. On one hand,
R.L. had been denied parole twice. On the other hand, R.L. demonstrated efforts to
rehabilitate, documented by numerous laudatory chronos and educational endeavors. The
court further observed there were sparse rehabilitation services available for a 47-year-
old former minor through juvenile probation.
Previous Delinquent History
With respect to R.L.’s history of delinquency, the court found that this was a
neutral factor. Dr. Minagawa stated that R.L.’s gang involvement and history of
substance abuse should be considered as part of his delinquent history. The court further
observed there was evidence of prior crimes by R.L., one of which was a weapons charge
that appeared to have been dismissed considering his life sentence in the instant matter.
R.L. also had a prior adjudication for trespass and petty theft, which was reduced from
attempted burglary. Thus, there was evidence demonstrating that R.L.’s offenses were of
an increasingly serious nature.
Success of Previous Rehabilitation Attempts
The court observed that the minimal attempts to rehabilitate R.L., including
ordering him to complete community service and imposing a stay-away order, were
unsuccessful. However, the court clarified those services were not designed for
rehabilitation.
Circumstances and Gravity of the Offense
Finally, as to the circumstances and gravity of the offense, the court concluded
that the instant offense was worse than a typical murder case, describing the murder as
“particularly cold-blooded,” “heartless,” and “heinous.” R.L. shot and killed an unarmed
man, despite Toste’s compliance.
22.
The court surmised that Toste must have been in “abject terror” during the final
moments of his life, not knowing what would happen to him and completely powerless
against the six perpetrators. Toste asked R.L. whether he believed in God, which was
tantamount to begging for his life.
Following the murder, R.L. made plans with Loya to attend the Tulare County
Fair. R.L. discussed repeating the crime in Tulare.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the court concluded that R.L. was not amenable to
rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and granted the
prosecutor’s transfer petition.
DISCUSSION
I. THE JUVENILE COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE SECTION 707 CRITERIA,
AND SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS ITS FINDING THAT R.L. IS NOT
AMENABLE TO REHABILITATION.
R.L. challenges the court’s order transferring his case to adult court. He asserts
the court misapplied the law governing the section 707 transfer criteria, and that there is
insufficient evidence supporting the juvenile court’s finding that R.L. was not amenable
to rehabilitation by the clear and convincing evidence standard. We reject both claims.
A. Relevant law
Section 707 requires the juvenile court to make an “ultimate finding ‘that the
minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court.’ ” (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 164, quoting § 707, subd. (a)(3); see
Miguel R., at p. 167.) The court must consider all five enumerated criteria and state its
reasons for finding the minor to be unamenable to rehabilitation while under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court. (§ 707, subd. (a)(3).) These criterion include: (i) the
degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor; (ii) whether the minor can be
rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction; (iii) the minor’s
23.
previous delinquent history; (iv) the success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to
rehabilitate the minor; and (v) the circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the
petition to have been committed by the minor. The statute also provides a nonexhaustive
list of factors relevant to consideration of each criterion of section 707. (§ 707,
subd. (a)(3)(A)−(E).)
Although criteria two, three, and four look to whether and how the minor has
changed—his potential for rehabilitation while under juvenile court jurisdiction, his
history of delinquency, and his response to prior interventions—criteria one and five are
defined by reference to the minor’s conduct and circumstances at the time of the offense
itself. (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii) [directing the court to weigh the minor’s characteristics
“at the time of the alleged offense”]; id., subd. (a)(3)(E)(i) [criterion five turns on the
“circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition”].) Because no single
criterion controls the ultimate finding, evidence of a minor’s subsequent growth under
criteria two through four does not reduce the weight properly assigned to the offense-
specific circumstances addressed by criteria one and five. (Miguel R., supra,
100 Cal.App.5th at pp. 166−167.)
In stating its ruling on a transfer petition, the juvenile court must, as to each
criterion, identify the specific factors on which it relied and state how it weighed the
evidence. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.770(c).)
Due to the unique procedural posture of the case at bench, the transfer petition
here was considered when R.L. was 47 years old. When conducting a transfer hearing
under these circumstances, “ ‘the juvenile court shall, to the extent possible, treat the
matter as though the prosecutor had originally filed a juvenile petition in juvenile court
and had then moved to transfer [the former minor’s] cause to a court of criminal
jurisdiction. [Citation.] If, after conducting the juvenile transfer hearing, the court
determines that it would have transferred [the former minor] to a court of criminal
jurisdiction because he is “not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile
24.
court law,” then [the former’s minor’s] convictions and sentence are to be reinstated.
[Citation.] On the other hand, if the juvenile court finds that it would not have transferred
[the former minor] to a court of criminal jurisdiction, then it shall treat [the former
minor’s] convictions as juvenile adjudications and impose an appropriate “disposition”
within its discretion.’ ” (People v. Superior Court (Lara), supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 310.)
B. Standard of Review
“We review the juvenile court’s ruling on a transfer motion for abuse of discretion.
[Citation.] ‘The abuse of discretion standard is not a unified standard; the deference it
calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling under review. The trial
court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are
reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary
and capricious.’ [Citation.] The juvenile court’s findings with respect to each of
section 707’s five criteria are findings of fact reviewed for substantial evidence.”
(Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) “Likewise, we review for substantial
evidence the juvenile court’s ultimate finding ‘that the minor is not amenable to
rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.’ [Citation.] Because the
juvenile court must make that finding by clear and convincing evidence, we ‘determine
whether the record, viewed as a whole, contains substantial evidence from which a
reasonable trier of fact could have made the finding of high probability demanded by’ the
clear and convincing evidence standard.” (Ibid.)
“In conducting substantial evidence review, we draw all reasonable inferences in
support of the court’s findings, not against them. [Citation.] We consequently are
concerned only with whether ‘ “ ‘the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s
findings.’ ” ’ [Citation.] When evidence reasonably justifies the trier of fact’s findings,
‘ “the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be
reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.” ’ ”
(Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 169.)
25.
C. Analysis
1. Degree of Criminal Sophistication
The first criterion requires consideration of “[t]he degree of criminal sophistication
exhibited by the minor.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(i).) When evaluating this criterion, “the
juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the
minor’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, and physical, mental, and emotional health at
the time of the alleged offense; the minor’s impetuosity or failure to appreciate risks and
consequences of criminal behavior; the effect of familial, adult, or peer pressure on the
minor’s actions; the effect of the minor’s family and community environment; the
existence of childhood trauma; the minor’s involvement in the child welfare or foster care
system; and the status of the minor as a victim of human trafficking, sexual abuse, or
sexual battery on the minor’s criminal sophistication.” (Id., subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii).)
Here, the evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that R.L. exhibited a
substantial degree of criminal sophistication, despite his age, trauma, and peer influences,
including his gang affiliation. As the juvenile court observed, the circumstances of this
offense went beyond those of an ordinary murder.
R.L. participated in discussions concerning obtaining a vehicle, accompanied the
group while firearms were obtained, helped position the group to stop Toste’s vehicle,
drove the stolen truck, removed Toste from the vehicle, and ultimately, took the firearm
from Loya, shooting Toste at close range. Afterward, R.L. fled the scene with his
companions and continued with Loya during the subsequent high-speed police pursuit.
Even assuming Loya initially proposed the carjacking and exerted pressure over
the other participants, R.L. was not merely a passive participant. His conduct during the
offense demonstrates substantial independent participation in the offense, independent of
peer influence. Further, R,L.’s subsequent disposal of evidence while fleeing from law
enforcement further supports the conclusion that he appreciated the wrongful nature of
his conduct and the consequences of being apprehended.
26.
At the same time, section 707 requires the court to consider circumstances bearing
on the developmental and environmental context in which that conduct occurred. (§ 707,
subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii).) R.L. was 17 years and one month old at the time of the offense. He
had experienced significant childhood adversity, including an accident that caused
prolonged physical consequences, requiring him to wear a colostomy bag and diapers
into his adolescence and resulting in harassment by his peers. His mother abandoned the
family, he spent periods in foster care, developed a substance addiction at an early age,
and grew up in poverty. The evidence also reflects longstanding difficulties at school and
gang involvement. These circumstances bear directly on R.L.’s maturity, emotional
development, susceptibility to peer pressure, and ability to appreciate risks and
consequences.
The circumstances surrounding the offense likewise provide evidence of peer
influence. The crime was committed by a group of youths, and the evidence
demonstrates that Loya was the one who initially proposed the carjacking and persuaded
others to participate. The participants had also been drinking alcohol and smoking
marijuana, and at least one marijuana cigarette was reportedly laced with
methamphetamine. These circumstances support consideration of whether R.L.’s
conduct reflects the judgment of a 17-year-old acting under peer influence rather than
exercising the judgment of a mature adult.
Those circumstances do not, however, negate evidence of criminal sophistication.
The statutory inquiry concerns the degree of sophistication, not whether the conduct can
be explained by immaturity or adverse circumstances. A juvenile may be immature,
susceptible to peer influence, and affected by childhood trauma while nevertheless
demonstrating substantial criminal sophistication in the commission of a particular
offense. And the juvenile court was not required to give evidence of gang influence or
other mitigating circumstances greater weight than the evidence of R.L.’s actual conduct.
27.
To that end, the evidence that R.L. progressed from participating in the plan to
actively helping execute the carjacking, driving the stolen vehicle, taking the firearm,
shooting Toste, fleeing, concealing the crime, and disposing of evidence while fleeing
from law enforcement provides substantial evidence of purpose and coordinated conduct
notwithstanding those mitigating circumstances.
2. Potential for Rehabilitation Prior to Expiration of Juvenile Court’s Jurisdiction
The second criterion asks “[w]hether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the
expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(B)(i).) In evaluating
this criterion, the court must consider “the minor’s potential to grow and mature.” (Id.,
subd. (a)(3)(B)(ii).) The focus “is whether there is enough time to rehabilitate the minor
while the minor is still eligible to remain under juvenile court jurisdiction.” (Miguel R.,
supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.)
The juvenile court concluded that this factor favors R.L, and substantial evidence
supports that finding. The record shows a sustained pattern of growth and maturation
that began while R.L. was still within the age range for juvenile court jurisdiction. R.L.
ceased criminal conduct and renounced his gang affiliation while he was in his early 20s.
Thereafter, he accumulated decades of positive institutional conduct, educational
achievement, employment, participation in rehabilitative programming, and mentorship
of others. Dr. Minagawa and Cottrell both opined that these circumstances demonstrate
an ability to grow and mature and support rehabilitation within the remaining period of
juvenile jurisdiction.
The contrary evidence principally concerns R.L.’s age and the limited services
available for a 47-year-old within Fresno County’s juvenile probation system. But the
evidence does not establish that R.L. lacked the capacity to continue his rehabilitation
during the two-year period of juvenile jurisdiction. To that end, Cottrell identified
various community-based programs capable of addressing R.L.’s needs as he transitions
from prolonged incarceration. Thus, while R.L.’s age and the available programming
28.
present practical considerations, they do not compel a finding that rehabilitation is
impossible before the expiration of juvenile court jurisdiction.
Nor does the juvenile court’s consideration of the available services demonstrate
that it adopted the Department’s position that R.L. could not be rehabilitated. The court
instead found that the criterion favors R.L., and it considered whether the available
resources were sufficient to permit rehabilitation during the remaining period of
jurisdiction.
3. Previous Delinquent History
The third criterion directs the juvenile court to consider the “minor’s previous
delinquent history” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(C)(i)) and, when doing so, to “give weight to any
relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the seriousness of the minor’s previous
delinquent history and the effect of the minor’s family and community environment and
childhood trauma on the minor’s previous delinquent behavior” (id., subd. (a)(3)(C)(ii)).
Juvenile courts enjoy “broad discretion to consider all evidence relevant to this inherently
case-by-case determination,” including all forms of delinquent behavior. (See D.C. v.
Superior Court (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 441, 455; see, e.g., id. at p. 456 [the juvenile court
considered the minor’s “behavior documented in his school records”]; In re J.S. (2024)
105 Cal.App.5th 205, 214−215 [the juvenile court considered the minor’s “ ‘significant
school delinquency’ history …, including poor behavior, suspensions, and multiple
attempts by school officials to rehabilitate” the minor].)
The juvenile court found this criterion to be neutral, and the record supports that
finding. R.L.’s prior delinquent history is significant. At the time of the instant offenses,
he had prior juvenile adjudications for petty theft, disturbing the peace, and vandalism.
When R.L. was convicted of the current offense, a disposition remained pending in Kings
County for a weapons charge. Thus, the juvenile court reasonably could view R.L.’s
history as demonstrating escalating delinquent behavior and as weighing against his
amenability to rehabilitation.
29.
But section 707 also requires the court to consider the circumstances surrounding
that history. And as discussed, the record shows that R.L.’s delinquent behavior occurred
against a backdrop of gang influence, family dysfunction, substance abuse, childhood
trauma, and limited rehabilitative intervention. Moreover, his delinquent conduct ceased
at a relatively young age.
Although the juvenile court described this criterion as essentially neutral, that does
not mean it was required to find R.L.’s prior history irrelevant. Rather, the court could
reasonably recognize that his prior offenses provide some evidence against amenability
while also determining that the circumstances underlying that conduct and his subsequent
rehabilitation substantially reduce its weight.
On this record, the juvenile court reasonably could conclude that R.L.’s prior
delinquency weighs against amenability, but that its significance is offset by the
circumstances underlying that conduct and his subsequent decades of maturation and
rehabilitation. Substantial evidence therefore supports the court’s neutral finding on this
criterion.
4. Success of Prior Rehabilitation Attempts
The fourth criterion requires the juvenile court to consider whether the “[s]uccess
of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor” weighs in favor of
transfer. (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(D)(i).) When evaluating this criterion, the juvenile court
must “give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the adequacy of
the services previously provided to address the minor’s needs.” (Id., subd. (a)(3)(D)(ii).)
Consistent with the juvenile court’s conclusion, the fourth criterion does not
provide substantial evidence of unamenability. Although R.L. had been placed on
informal and formal probation and did not successfully complete those interventions, the
record establishes that those interventions were limited and did not meaningfully address
the circumstances underlying his delinquency.
30.
That finding is supported by the record. Dr. Minagawa testified that R.L.’s
medical and psychological circumstances, exposure to abuse and violence, substance
abuse, and gang involvement were not meaningfully addressed through his prior
probationary experiences. Thus, although R.L.’s failure to successfully complete prior
probationary interventions provides some evidence weighing against rehabilitation, the
record does not show that he had been given meaningful opportunities to address the
circumstances underlying his delinquency and repeatedly failed to respond to them. On
the contrary, his subsequent cessation of criminal conduct and sustained behavioral
improvement provide substantial evidence that he was capable of rehabilitation when
provided with different circumstances and opportunities.
The juvenile court’s observations that the prior interventions were unsuccessful
and “minimal” are not necessarily inconsistent. The court could recognize that R.L.
failed to complete those interventions while also recognizing that the interventions were
too limited to provide a meaningful test of his capacity for rehabilitation. Accordingly,
the juvenile court reasonably could find that R.L.’s unsuccessful prior interventions
provide limited evidence against amenability because those interventions themselves
were minimal. Substantial evidence supports the court’s assessment of this criterion.
5. Circumstances and Gravity of the Alleged Offenses
The fifth and final criterion, the “circumstances and gravity of the offense” (§ 707,
subd. (a)(3)(E)(i)), “focuses on the offense ‘ “alleged in the petition” ’ [citation], and like
the other statutory criteria, it is ‘based on the premise that the minor did, in fact, commit
the offense.’ [Citation.] But the allegation that a minor committed a serious offense,
including murder, does not ‘automatically require a finding of unfitness.’ ” (Kevin P. v.
Superior Court (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173, 189, italics omitted.) When evaluating this
criterion, the juvenile court must give weight to any relevant factor, including evidence
that, while not justifying or excusing the crime, tends to lessen its magnitude,
“ ‘including, but not limited to, the actual behavior of the person, the mental state of the
31.
person, the person’s degree of involvement in the crime, the level of harm actually caused
by the person, and the person’s mental and emotional development.’ ” (Ibid., quoting
§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(E)(ii).)
The fifth criterion strongly favors transfer insofar as it concerns the objective
circumstances and gravity of the offense and R.L.’s degree of involvement. R.L.
orchestrated a violent carjacking and robbery, personally used a firearm to control Toste,
and ultimately shot Toste in the head after the target crimes had been accomplished. The
juvenile court therefore had substantial evidence for its conclusion that the offense
involved unusually grave and heinous circumstances.
But this criterion requires more than an assessment of the offense’s objective
seriousness. Section 707 expressly permits consideration of the person’s mental state and
mental and emotional development. The defense presented substantial evidence that R.L.
was unusually immature and vulnerable at the time of the offense, had experienced
significant childhood trauma, and had been recruited into gang activity by an older gang
member when he was only 14 years old. Dr. Minagawa opined that these circumstances
are relevant to understanding R.L.’s conduct and his subsequent capacity for change.
However, the juvenile court was not required to accept that evidence or
Dr. Minagawa’s opinion, nor was it required to conclude that those circumstances
outweigh the objective circumstances of R.L.’s conduct. The record shows the court
weighed, rather than merely heard, this evidence. The court acknowledged that R.L. “had
a very rough start in life,” including the childhood injury and his mother’s abandonment,
and its analysis of the first criterion expressly addresses his age, trauma, and
susceptibility to peer influence. The court was not required to repeat those findings under
every criterion to demonstrate that it had considered them in reaching its final
determination.
Read as a whole, the ruling reflects that the court weighed R.L.’s developmental
history and nonetheless concluded that his substantial and independent participation in an
32.
extraordinarily grave offense supports transfer. That conclusion is not merely based on
the fact that a murder occurred. Rather, it rests on R.L.’s conduct during the murder,
including his active participation in the carjacking, his taking of the firearm, executing
Toste, and subsequent efforts to flee and conceal the crime. Those circumstances provide
evidence bearing on the degree of responsibility and sophistication R.L. demonstrated
notwithstanding his youth and background.
Thus, even assuming the juvenile court could have given greater weight to the
mitigating evidence, that does not establish that its finding lacked substantial evidentiary
support. Accordingly, the evidence substantially supports the court’s factual
determination that the offense was extraordinarily grave and that R.L.’s degree of
involvement in it weighed against retention of juvenile jurisdiction.
6. Conclusion
Considering the five statutory criteria as a whole, the record presents substantial
evidence both supporting and opposing transfer. The circumstances of the offense are
extraordinarily grave, and substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings
concerning R.L.’s degree of involvement and the criminal sophistication displayed in the
offense. Those findings provide a substantial basis for concluding that the first and fifth
criteria weigh against retention of juvenile jurisdiction.
Conversely, the juvenile court expressly found that R.L.’s ability to be
rehabilitated within the remaining period of juvenile jurisdiction favors retention. R.L.
ceased criminal conduct in his early twenties, renounced his gang, and thereafter
demonstrated decades of positive institutional conduct, including educational
achievement, employment, mentoring, and the absence of recent disciplinary violations.
However, while this criterion is significant, it is neither dispositive of the juvenile court’s
ultimate determination concerning R.L.’s amenability to rehabilitation, nor is it entitled to
greater weight than any of the other factors. (See Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 166–167.) Because no single criterion is entitled to controlling weight, that principle
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cuts both ways: The second criterion’s favorable finding is not entitled to override the
court’s findings on the first and fifth criteria.
The ultimate inquiry under section 707, subdivision (a)(3) is whether the minor is
amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile court system, not merely whether there is
enough time remaining to rehabilitate the minor. The prosecutor bears the burden of
proving by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation.
“Section 707[, subdivision ](a)(3)’s focus on the minor’s amenability to rehabilitation
under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction thus requires the court to consider not only time but
also other reasons why the minor might or might not be responsive to the available
rehabilitative services. Time is only one of the five statutory criteria that the court must
consider in making the determination.” (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 167.)
Weighing in R.L.’s favor is also the fact that his previous contacts with the
juvenile system did not involve significant or individualized rehabilitative services.
Thus, R.L.’s failure to respond to those earlier interventions provides limited evidence
that he is incapable of rehabilitation. His subsequent conduct, moreover, provides
affirmative evidence of his capacity to change.
That evidence, however, does not compel the conclusion that R.L. is amenable to
rehabilitation under juvenile court jurisdiction. Nor is it our role to reweigh it. Because
the juvenile court’s weighing of section 707 criteria is reviewed for arbitrary and
capricious application of the law (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 165), our
inquiry is whether the record reasonably supports the balance the court struck—not
whether we would have struck the same one. To that end, we conclude that the record
does.
The court’s findings that R.L. personally orchestrated an extraordinarily grave
offense and displayed a high degree of criminal sophistication in doing so are supported
by substantial evidence, and the court did not act arbitrarily in concluding that those
findings outweigh the mitigating evidence concerning R.L.’s background and his post-
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incarceration conduct. The record contains substantial evidence supporting R.L.’s
amenability to rehabilitation, but the existence of that evidence does not establish that the
contrary finding lacks support. The juvenile court considered each of the five statutory
criteria, expressly found that the second criterion favors R.L., treated the third and fourth
as neutral, and found that the first and fifth weigh against retention of juvenile
jurisdiction.
Viewing the evidence as a whole, and considering the clear and convincing
evidence standard, we conclude that the record contains substantial evidence from which
a reasonable trier of fact could find the required high probability that R.L. is not
amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
II. THE PROBATION OFFICERS’ REPORTS.
R.L. challenges the court’s reliance upon the probation officers’ reports, arguing
they unilaterally excluded R.L. from rehabilitation services, were inadequate, biased, and
the product of a legally invalid position. According to R.L., the Department’s alleged
dereliction of its duties must be attributed to the juvenile court because the Department
acts as the court’s agent. The record shows, however, that trial counsel failed to raise any
of these challenges below.
R.L. alternatively contends that trial counsel’s failure to preserve these claims
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. We conclude that the claim fails.
A. Background
The record shows that trial counsel did not specifically challenge the adequacy or
basis of the probation officers’ reports, the Department’s asserted legal position, or the
imputation of the Department’s conduct to the juvenile court. Although counsel
criticized the Department for failing to prepare for reverse transfer proceedings and for
making no efforts to identify adult rehabilitation services for R.L., those remarks did not
adequately raise the challenges R.L. now advances on appeal.
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For example, trial counsel stated that the Department “wants to put its head in the
sand and pretend that these reverse transfer hearings … are not going to happen or not
going to be successful.” She also accused the Department of “doing nothing to prepare
for this” and commented that “[n]o efforts are being made to determine what adult type
of rehabilitative services could exist for someone like [R.L.]” She later added, “The
changes in the laws through [Proposition] 57 … mandates the juvenile probation
department to stop pretending that they’re not going to have to supervise adults over the
age of 25.”
These comments challenged the Department’s failure to prepare for reverse
transfer proceedings and identify potential adult rehabilitation services, but they did not
challenge the probation officers’ reports on the grounds R.L. now asserts or argue that the
Department’s conduct should be imputed to the juvenile court. Accordingly, R.L.
forfeited these claims by failing to raise them below.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The federal and California Constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the right to
adequate representation by counsel. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15;
People v. Anderson (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1416.)
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show
both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. (Strickland v. Washington (1984)
466 U.S. 668, 687 (Strickland); People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 674.)
To establish the first Strickland prong, a defendant must show that counsel’s
performance “ ‘ “ ‘ “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Barrett (2025) 17 Cal.5th 897, 969.) In evaluating
this prong, “ ‘a reviewing court defers to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions, and
there is a presumption counsel acted within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1013–1014.)
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To establish the second Strickland prong, a defendant must demonstrate
“ ‘resulting prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient
performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” (People v.
Jasso (2025) 17 Cal.5th 646, 675.) “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome.” (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694.) “A
defendant must prove prejudice that is a ‘ “demonstrable reality,” not simply
speculation.’ ” (People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1241.)
As “[t]he object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel’s
performance,” where possible, it is preferable “to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on
the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice” without addressing whether counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. (Strickland, supra,
466 U.S. at p. 697.)
C. Analysis
We need not determine whether counsel performed deficiently by failing to
specifically challenge the probation officers’ reports. R.L.’s failure to establish prejudice
from any presumed error is fatal to his claim. Even assuming the Department had an
obligation to conduct a more thorough and neutral investigation, R.L. has not shown a
reasonable probability that counsel’s failure to challenge the reports resulted in a more
favorable amenability determination. (See Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694.)
The purpose of the Department’s investigation was to provide the juvenile court
with relevant information concerning R.L.’s background and circumstances and his
amenability to rehabilitation. Assuming the reports failed to adequately perform that
function, the juvenile court was presented with substantial information concerning R.L.’s
background, gang involvement, rehabilitative efforts, and potential for rehabilitation
through other evidence and testimony.
Trial counsel presented argument and evidence addressing R.L.’s history and
circumstances, including his vulnerability to gang recruitment and the effect of his gang
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involvement on his development and conduct. The court also heard testimony from
R.L.’s retained expert, Juliana Cottrell, who conducted an extensive social history
assessment and provided an evaluation that considered R.L.’s childhood trauma,
developmental history, gang involvement, and subsequent rehabilitative efforts.
The deficiencies R.L. identifies in the reports were explored at the transfer
hearing. For example, Officer Rossi admitted that she did not make efforts to determine
R.L.’s rehabilitative needs before reaching her conclusion that he could not be
rehabilitated in the juvenile system. She also acknowledged that information concerning
childhood trauma, substance abuse, bullying, his time in foster care, and other aspects of
R.L.’s history could have been relevant to the statutory criteria, and some of this
information was either omitted from the report or addressed under a different statutory
factor. Thus, the court was not presented with a one-sided record concerning R.L.’s
background and rehabilitative potential. The very omissions R.L. contends rendered the
reports inadequate were brought to the court’s attention through trial counsel’s cross-
examination.
R.L. also relies on testimony suggesting that that the Department has adopted a
categorical view that individuals of R.L.’s age cannot be rehabilitated within the juvenile
justice system.14 But even assuming the testimony established an improper departmental
policy, R.L. does not identify any additional evidence counsel could have developed or
presented that would have created a reasonable probability of a different result. Nor does
14 The Department appears to have applied a categorical approach to R.L.’s amenability to
rehabilitation based on age. Apodaca testified that although R.L.’s age did not itself preclude
juvenile court jurisdiction, the Department considers everyone over age 25 to be “automatically”
mature for purposes of determining amenability to rehabilitation. She agreed that, because such
individuals were considered mature, the would “always” be found unamenable “[u]nder that
criteria,” regardless of their individual conduct. Apodaca clarified that this was one component
of the Department’s overall transfer analysis. She did not state that the Department views
everyone over age 25 as automatically unable to transfer.
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the record indicate that the juvenile court relied upon the Department’s asserted inability
to provide rehabilitative services to individuals over age 25 in making its decision.
To that end, the juvenile court was not bound by the Department’s
recommendation or any limitations the Department may have perceived concerning its
ability to provide rehabilitative services. Rather, it independently considered the
section 707 statutory criteria and the evidence presented by both sides, including
evidence concerning R.L.’s age, developmental history, circumstances, and potential for
rehabilitation.
Nor does R.L.’s characterization of the alleged deficiencies as a due process
violation alter the prejudice analysis. The question presented by his ineffective assistance
of counsel claim is whether counsel’s failure to challenge that conduct created a
reasonable probability of a more favorable amenability determination. R.L. has not
demonstrated such a probability. The record does not establish that the juvenile court
relied on the alleged departmental policy or any purported inability to provide
rehabilitative services to individuals over age 25.
Nor has R.L. identified any additional evidence that counsel could have presented,
or any additional argument counsel could have made concerning the reports, that would
have been reasonably likely to have changed the court’s decision. (See Strickland, supra,
466 U.S. at p. 694.) His claim instead rests on the premise that, had counsel more
forcefully attacked the reports, the court necessarily would have reached a different
conclusion. But prejudice cannot be established through speculation. (People v.
Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 933 [“A factual basis, not speculation, must be
established before reversal of a judgment may be had on grounds of ineffective assistance
of counsel.”].)
This is particularly true because the court’s ultimate determination did not rest
solely upon the probation officers’ recommendations. The court considered the statutory
criteria, the evidence presented by both sides, and the competing assessments of R.L.’s
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amenability. R.L.’s expert, for example, offered a substantially more favorable
assessment of R.L.’s rehabilitative potential, based on an extensive review of records and
multiple interviews with R.L. Thus, the court received independent evidence concerning
R.L.’s developmental history, circumstances, and potential for rehabilitation, even if
those subjects were not adequately addressed in the probation reports.
Accordingly, even assuming the Department’s reports were deficient in every
respect as R.L. contends and that counsel could have more effectively challenged the
reports, R.L. has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that doing so would have
altered the result. Because he has failed to establish prejudice, his ineffective assistance
of counsel claim fails.
III. CONSIDERATION OF R.L.’S GANG AFFILIATION AS EVIDENCE OF
HUMAN TRAFFICKING.
R.L. asserts that as a juvenile who was coerced into joining and indoctrinated by a
criminal street gang, the court should have treated him as a victim of human trafficking
for purposes of its amenability determination. He contends that the court’s omission
violated his constitutional right to due process and a fair proceeding. The Attorney
General argues that R.L.’s claim is both forfeited and meritless.
We need not address the Attorney General’s forfeiture argument, or R.L.’s
alternative claim of ineffective assistance. We conclude that R.L.’s claim fails on the
merits.
A. Relevant Law
Section 707 provides the following:
“When evaluating the criterion specified in clause (i) [the degree of
criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor], the juvenile court shall give
weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s age,
maturity, intellectual capacity, and physical, mental, and emotional health
at the time of the alleged offense; the minor’s impetuosity or failure to
appreciate risks and consequences of criminal behavior; the effect of
familial, adult, or peer pressure on the minor’s actions; the effect of the
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minor’s family and community environment; the existence of childhood
trauma; the minor’s involvement in the child welfare or foster care system;
and the status of the minor as a victim of human trafficking, sexual abuse,
or sexual battery on the minor’s criminal sophistication.” (§ 707,
subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii), italics added.)
B. Analysis
R.L. contends that the juvenile court violated his constitutional rights by failing to
consider his indoctrination into a criminal street gang as evidence of human trafficking.
We disagree.
R.L.’s argument assumes a legal proposition that the statutory language does not
establish; that a minor who was recruited, indoctrinated, or coerced into criminal street-
gang activity necessarily qualifies as a “victim of human trafficking” within the meaning
of section 707, subdivision (a)(3)(A)(ii). We are not persuaded that the record or existing
law supports extending the statutory term that far.
There is no question that evidence concerning R.L.’s gang involvement was
relevant to the amenability inquiry. The evidence shows that R.L. was recruited by an
older gang member and that his involvement exposed him to criminal behavior and illicit
substances. But it does not follow that the juvenile court was required to characterize
R.L.’s gang affiliation as evidence of human trafficking. Section 707,
subdivision (a)(3)(A)(ii) directs the court to consider a minor’s status as a victim of
human trafficking; it does not state that every form of gang recruitment or coercion
constitutes human trafficking. And R.L. identifies no controlling authority holding that
recruitment of a juvenile into a criminal street gang, without more, constitutes human
trafficking under section 707.
Nor did the court ignore R.L.’s gang history. On the contrary, gang involvement
was discussed in connection with his delinquent history and the circumstances of his
offenses, and the defense expressly presented evidence concerning R.L.’s vulnerability to
gang recruitment and influence. The fact that the court did not adopt R.L.’s preferred
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characterization of that evidence does not establish that the court failed to consider the
evidence itself.
R.L. argues that the court should have viewed his gang involvement through the
lens of human trafficking and should therefore have understood his criminal
sophistication, delinquent history, and conduct differently. Whatever the merits of that
characterization as a matter of policy, R.L. has not demonstrated that the law required the
juvenile court to adopt it in assessing his amenability to rehabilitation. We therefore
reject his claim.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order granting transfer of R.L.’s case to adult court is
affirmed.
HILL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
SNAUFFER, J.
SANDHU, J.
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