Filed 10/20/26 In re R.J. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re R.J., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES,
E087898
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super.Ct.No. SWJ1500502)
v.
OPINION
B.R. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Kelly L. Hansen, Judge.
Affirmed.
Brent Riggs, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant B.R.
Jack A. Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant M.J.
Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Jamila T. Purnell, Chief Assistant County Counsel,
and Catherine E. Rupp, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
Parents M.J. (father) and B.R. (mother) appeal the reinstatement by the Riverside
County juvenile court of the order terminating their parental rights as to R.J. (the child)
following a remittitur hearing to ensure compliance with the inquiry provisions set forth
in Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2 and rule 5.481 of the California Rules of
Court, California’s provisions designed to implement and enhance the federal Indian
Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.), often referred to herein as
Cal-ICWA.1 We will affirm.
BACKGROUND
1. The Relevant Cal-ICWA Inquiry Requirements and Standard of Review
Section 224.2 provides in relevant part that, if a county welfare department (the
county) takes a child into protective custody, it is required to ask the child, the parents,
extended family members, and others who have an interest in the child whether the child
is or may be an Indian child and where the child and parents are domiciled (the initial
inquiry). (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(1).) An “ ‘Indian Child’ ” is any unmarried person under
age 18 who is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) eligible for membership in an
Indian tribe and the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe. (25 U.S.C
§ 1903(4).)
If the initial inquiry results in a reason to believe a child is an Indian child because
the court or social worker obtains information suggesting that either the parent of the
1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise
indicated. All references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
2
child or the child is a tribal member or citizen (or may be eligible for membership or
citizenship in a tribe), then the county must make further inquiries, including
interviewing the parents and extended family members for any further information they
may have as well as contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and State Department
of Social Services, the tribes the child may be affiliated with, and anyone else who may
have information regarding the child’s membership or eligibility for membership in a
tribe. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2) (§ 224.2(e)(2)); In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1132-
1133 (Dezi C.).)
At the further inquiry stage, “[c]ontact with a tribe shall, at a minimum, include
telephone, facsimile, or electronic mail contact to each tribe's designated agent for receipt
of [ICWA] notices,” and “shall include sharing information identified by the tribe as
necessary for the tribe to make a membership or citizenship eligibility determination, as
well as information on the current status of the child and the case.” (§ 224.2, subd.
(e)(2)(C).)
Rule 5.481(a)(5) requires the county to include in its filings on an ongoing basis a
detailed description of (i) all ICWA inquiries undertaken, (ii) all information it received
pertaining to the child’s Indian status, and (iii) how and when the information received
was provided to the relevant tribes. Whenever the county receives new information, that
information must be expeditiously provided to those tribes using, at minimum, telephone,
facsimile transmission, or electronic mail to each tribes’ designated agent for receipt of
notices. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(C); rule 5.481(a)(5).)
3
If the county makes diligent, proper, and adequate further inquiries as required by
section 224.2(e)(2) and the resulting record does not provide a reason to know the child is
an Indian child, then the juvenile court may find ICWA does not apply to the
proceedings.2 (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)
The juvenile court is afforded relatively broad discretion in making a no-ICWA
finding and reviewing courts will uphold its determination on appeal if it is supported by
sufficient evidence and documentation in the record. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at
pp. 1132-1133.) If, however, a record is not well developed because inquiry was not
properly undertaken and reported as required, then the juvenile court’s discretion
necessarily becomes more limited. (Id., at pp. 1141, 1151.) In those cases, conditional
reversal is required because, until the county gathers, shares, and documents the
information required by Cal-ICWA, it is not possible to know what information a
properly conducted inquiry might reveal. (Id., at pp. 1136, 1152.)
2 There is reason to know a child in a proceeding is an Indian child under any of
the following circumstances: “(1) A person having an interest in the child, including the
child, an officer of the court, a tribe, an Indian organization, a public or private agency, or
a member of the child’s extended family informs the court that the child is an Indian
child. [¶] (2) The residence or domicile of the child, the child’s parents, or Indian
custodian is on a reservation or in an Alaska Native village, as defined in subdivision (c)
of Section 1602 of Title 43 of the United State Code. [¶] (3) Any participant in the
proceeding, officer of the court, Indian tribe, Indian organization, or agency informs the
court that it has discovered information indicating that the child is an Indian child. [¶] (4)
The child who is the subject of the proceeding gives the court reason to know that the
child is an Indian child. [¶] (5) The court is informed that the child is or has been a ward
of a tribal court. [¶] (6) The court is informed that either parent or the child possess an
identification card indicating membership or citizenship in an Indian tribe.” (§ 224.2,
subd. (d).)
4
2. The Juvenile Court Proceedings Leading to the Parents’ First Appeal3
In June 2023, respondent Riverside County Department of Public Social Services
(the Department) filed a juvenile dependency petition alleging the child came within
section 300. The juvenile court sustained the petition, adjudged the child a dependent of
the court, and removed him from parental custody. Reunification services for the parents
were bypassed and the juvenile court set the case for a section 366.26 permanent plan
selection hearing.
In June 2024, while the section 366.26 hearing was pending, the paternal
grandparents, who had initially denied the child had any Indian ancestry, reported the
paternal grandfather had Cherokee ancestry on his mother’s side of the family but had no
birth certificates or other documents to support that claim.
In July 2024, the Department sent electronically and by certified mail an “ICWA
Further Inquiry Letter” to the Cherokee Nation, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians
(the Eastern Band), the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians (the United
Keetoowah Band), and the BIA. The inquiry letter set forth the names and birth dates of
the child, the parents, and the paternal grandparents but did not include any identifying
information about the paternal grandfather’s maternal relatives.
In response to the July 2024 inquiry, two tribes (the United Keetoowah Band and
the Eastern Band) informed the Department that the child was not a member or eligible to
3 We take judicial notice on our own motion of the record and opinion in the
parents’ prior appeal, our case No. E084694. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd.
(a).)
5
be a member of the tribe, and the third tribe (the Cherokee Nation) said the child was not
an Indian child in relation to that tribe. In September 2024, the juvenile court terminated
the parents’ rights as to the child and the parents appealed.
3. The Parents’ Appeal Results in Conditional Reversal of the Order Terminating
Parental Rights
On appeal, we held the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile court’s
no-ICWA finding because the Department had not complied with its duty of further
inquiry after the paternal grandfather reported he had Cherokee ancestry on his mother’s
side of the family. (In re R.J. (July 14, 2025, E084694) [nonpub. opn.], petn. review den.
Oct. 22, 2025, S292569 (R.J.I).) We found the paternal grandfather’s information
provided reason to believe the child may be an Indian child and, at that juncture, the
Department was required to ask readily available family members, including extended
family members, and others who have an interest in the child if they had information
about the paternal ancestors that might bear meaningfully on the question whether ICWA
applied to the proceedings. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(A); In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 735, 742, disapproved on other grounds in Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 1152, fn. 18; see In re Josiah T. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 388, 408 [“the court may not
find that ICWA does not apply when the absence of evidence that a child is an Indian
child results from a [child services agency’s] inquiry that is not proper, adequate, or
demonstrative of due diligence”].)
We conditionally reversed the order terminating the parents’ rights as to the child
and remanded with instructions to the juvenile court to order the Department to make
6
further ICWA inquiries, to provide any information obtained to the pertinent tribes, and to
provide the juvenile court with a detailed description of all inquiries undertaken, and all
information received pertaining to the child’s Indian status. (R.J.I, supra, E084694.)
4. The Department’s Further Inquiries and the Remand Proceedings Ultimately
Resulting in Reinstatement of the Order Terminating Parental Rights
In October 2025, after our opinion in R.J.I, supra, E084694 became final and the
remittitur issued, the Department advised the juvenile court it was already working on
curing the ICWA inquiry deficiencies noted in the opinion but needed time to file the
report. The juvenile court reappointed counsel for the parents “for the sole purpose of the
ICWA inquiry,” instructed the Department to file a report detailing actions taken to
comply with instructions on remand set forth in R.J.I, and set a hearing on the remittitur
for December 12, 2025.
(a) The Department’s Efforts to Obtain Additional Information Relevant to the
Child’s Status Under ICWA
Shortly after we issued R.J. I, supra, E084694 in July 2025, the Department began
making further inquiries to obtain information relevant to the child’s ICWA status.
(i) Social worker Tracy Valoff’s interview of the paternal grandparents
In August 2025, social worker Valoff met with the paternal grandparents. The
paternal grandmother reported that she had no knowledge of any Native American
ancestry in her family and denied ever attending tribal school or ever receiving medical,
financial, or other benefits from a tribe (collectively, tribal services). She had never
7
heard of anyone in her family having Native American ancestry or receiving any tribal
services and did not have contact information for any of her family members.
The paternal grandfather reported his grandmother (the paternal great-great-
grandmother) had been adopted and he had been told by his parents that the paternal
great-great-grandmother was originally from Arkansas, she was half Cherokee Indian,
and she had died “possibly in 1960.” He said everyone in the family with additional
information about the paternal great-great-grandmother had passed away except his sister
(the paternal great-aunt). The paternal grandfather had never lived on an Indian
reservation, had never received financial assistance from a tribe, and he was not
registered with or eligible for enrollment in a tribe.
In a September 2025 follow-up interview, the paternal grandfather told social
worker Valoff the paternal great-great-grandmother’s adoptive surname, that she was
possibly born in 1896, and they did not have her birth certificate or any other
information. He gave Valoff the names of his father, his maternal and paternal
grandparents, his grandmothers’ maiden names, and the names and contact information
for the child’s half-siblings.
(ii) Social worker Valoff’s interview of the paternal great-aunt
In a November 2025 interview, the paternal great-aunt, who lives in Arkansas, said
the paternal great-great-grandmother was half Indian and born around 1895 but the aunt
could not identify the Indian tribe the paternal great-great-grandmother was related to.
The great-aunt reported none of her relatives had lived on an Indian reservation or had
received any tribal services, and there were no relatives (other than the paternal
8
grandfather with whom Valoff had already spoken) who would have any additional
information about the family’s Native American heritage.
(iii) Valoff’s interview of the parents
In a November 2025 telephone call with the parents, father told Valoff that he had
heard the paternal great-great-grandmother had Cherokee ancestry “from Oklahoma or
Arkansas,” adding that she was on the Dawes Rolls as a certified Native American but he
did not know if she ever lived on an Indian reservation or received financial assistance
from a tribe.4 Father denied being an enrolled member of a tribe and did not know if he
was eligible for enrollment, and said he had no additional information to provide but that
his father (the paternal grandfather) would know more. Mother denied any Indian
ancestry and was unaware of any family member living on an Indian reservation or
receiving any financial assistance from any tribe, and said she had no other relatives that
could be contacted for further inquiry.
(iv) Interview of the paternal half-siblings
Social worker Valoff also personally interviewed the child’s paternal half-sister.
The half-sister had no knowledge of any extended family members having Native
American ancestry, she had not lived on an Indian reservation or received any financial
assistance from a tribe, and said she was not registered with, or eligible for enrollment in,
a tribe.
4 In 1896, Congress directed the Dawes Commission to create membership rolls of
the so-called Five Civilized Tribes of Oklahoma, which included the Cherokee Nation.
(Vann v. Kempthorne (D.C. Cir. 2008) 534 F.3d 741, 744.)
9
A social services supervisor interviewed the child’s paternal half-brother who was
being held in the Robert Presley Detention Center. The half-brother said he possibly had
Native American ancestry on his father’s side of the family but was not sure, he thought
perhaps father or the paternal grandfather had said something along those lines but had
not mentioned a particular tribe. The half-brother identified himself as white and
Hispanic, and told the supervisor he never lived on an Indian reservation or received any
tribal services.
(b) The Department’s November 2025 New Information Inquiry Letter to the
Cherokee Tribes and the BIA
On November 13, 2025, the Department sent electronically and by certified mail
to the BIA and the three Cherokee tribes a “new information” letter. (Boldface and
capitalization omitted.) The letter noted the paternal grandfather had provided the
paternal great-great-grandmother’s birth name and her adopted surname, and said she was
thought to be half Cherokee from Arkansas or Oklahoma, was “possibly born in 1896”
and “possibly” died in the 1960’s, that she was listed in the Dawes Rolls, and that neither
the father nor the paternal grandfather are registered tribal members.5 The letter also
informed the recipients that a remittitur ICWA hearing had been set.6
5 The letter to the tribe states father said “he” is listed on the Dawes Rolls list,
which appears to us to be a typographical error; it seems the sentence was intended to say
“she” (referring to the paternal great-great-grandmother) is listed on the Dawes Rolls list.
6 We note the letter stated the hearing was set for “12/1/2025”; the hearing date
was noticed for December 2, 2025, but had in fact been set for December 12, 2025.
10
(c) The December 12, 2025 Remittitur Hearing
In anticipation of the December 12, 2025 remittitur hearing set for review of the
Department’s postremittitur compliance with the inquiry requirements, the Department
submitted a report detailing its efforts to discover additional information concerning the
family’s Indian ancestry and its transmission of that information to the tribes on
November 13.
No response to the Department’s November 13, 2025 updating information
correspondence had been received from any of the tribes by the time of the hearing. At
the hearing, mother’s counsel represented she had received information from mother that
day of a “rolls number” from the Eastern Band and requested a continuance to determine
if the paternal great-great-grandmother was a registered member of the Eastern Band and,
if so, whether the child is eligible for enrollment in that tribe.
The juvenile court continued the matter until January 12, 2016, to permit the
Department to provide the new information to the Eastern Band and cautioned the parents
to provide forthwith to the Department any additional information they had, that the court
would not permit further delay in the child’s case on account of “getting pieces [of
information] here and there” with respect to ICWA inquiry. It authorized the Department
to present an oral report to the court of the Eastern Band’s response concerning the
child’s membership or enrollment eligibility.
11
(d) The Department’s December 2025 Amended Information Letter to the BIA and
the Tribes, and the Parties’ No-IWCA Stipulation at the Postpermanency Hearing
On December 17, 2025, five days after the December remittitur hearing, the
Department sent electronically and by certified mail to the BIA and the three Cherokee
tribes an “amended information” letter containing new details provided by the parents
and informing the recipients of the new hearing date of January 12, 2026. The new data
included several “AKA” (also known as) names for the parents, the paternal grandfather,
and the paternal great-great-grandmother, as well as a “certificate number,” a “rolls
number” and a “volume range” provided by mother. (Boldface and capitalization
omitted.) Also added were the names of a person identified only as a paternal relative
provided by the paternal grandfather, a person mother recollected was the paternal great-
great-grandfather, and another person also identified as a paternal great-great-grandfather.
On December 30, 2025, the parties stipulated to, and the juvenile court accepted, a
postpermanency planning hearing and order, which included an agreement that ICWA did
not apply to the proceedings.
(e) The Department’s January 2026 Addendum Report and Additional Information
Letter, and Continuance of the Remittitur Hearing
On December 23, 2025, the parents advised social worker Valoff of their discovery
of further information about father’s Indian ancestry on Ancestry.com, which they would
review and email to Valoff. When an email was not forthcoming, Valoff called the
parents on January 5, 2026, and mother sent the Ancestry.com report to her the next day.
12
The new information consisted of three additional “AKA” names for the paternal
great-great-grandmother as well as an additional death and birth date for her, a birthdate
for the one of the two paternal great-great-grandfathers previously identified, and a birth
year for the paternal relative previously listed.
The Ancestry.com report did not tie the paternal great-great-grandmother to
Arkansas or Oklahoma but instead showed (i) she was born in Indiana to a father from
Tennessee and a mother from Kentucky, and (ii) that she and one of the persons named as
a paternal great-great-grandfather had a daughter (L.J.) born in Indiana who appears to be
the same person previously identified by the paternal grandfather as a paternal relative.
On January 7, 2026, the Department sent to the tribes and the BIA an additional
information letter containing the new data and enclosed copies of the Ancestry.com
report, including L.J.’s birth certificate. It also filed a report advising the court of the
status and details of its inquiry efforts. Those efforts included a telephone conversation
Valoff had with a person (whose official capacity, if any, is unknown) who answered
Valoff’s call to the Eastern Band’s “tribal registration number.” That person said
enrollment of the child in the tribe would require production of birth and, as applicable,
death certificates of all individuals related to the child who may have Cherokee ancestry.
On January 12, 2026, the juvenile court continued the remittitur hearing to
February 19, 2026, to permit time for receipt of any responses to the Department’s
inquiries.
13
(f) The Order Terminating Parental Rights Is Reinstated at the February 2026
Remittitur Hearing
The Eastern Band and Cherokee Nation did not respond to the Department’s
January 7, 2026, updated inquiry by the time of the February 19, 2026, hearing on the
remittitur. The United Keetoowah Band responded to the Department’s updating
information letters, though the response does not indicate whether the tribe was
responding to the December 2025 update or to the January 2026 update. It reported the
child did not meet ICWA’s definition of an Indian child.
At the hearing, mother argued the information provided to the Department
indicated the child may be an Indian child and, therefore, “the Department needs to make
efforts in order to register [the] child as a tribal member.” Father expressed his belief that
the Department has “the resources and the ability to do the registration of the child.”
After discussing whether the Department has the duty to register the child with a
tribe, the juvenile court found there was no reason to believe the child is an Indian child,
noting the Department made diligent efforts to determine if ICWA applied to the
proceedings and none of the tribes responded that the child is an Indian child.
Accordingly, the juvenile court reinstated its order terminating the parents’ rights as to the
child. The parents appealed.
DISCUSSION
The parents argue reversal of the juvenile court’s order reinstating the termination
of their parental rights as to the child is called for because (i) the juvenile court’s no-
ICWA finding was based on a finding unsupported by evidence that the United
14
Keetoowah Band’s blood quantum requirement for membership in that tribe applied as
well to membership in the Eastern Band and Cherokee Nation; (ii) the Department had
not fully complied with its duty of further inquiry because it did not obtain birth and
death certificates of the child’s lineal ancestors; (iii) the court failed to order the
Department to ascertain what documents or information the Eastern Band and Cherokee
Nation needed to determine the child’s eligibility for membership in those tribes and to
require the Department to assume the burden and costs of producing whatever
information and documents it discovered; and (iv) the juvenile court abused its discretion
when it declined to grant the parents’ request for a continuance of the February 19, 2026
remittitur hearing to give the Department time to establish the child’s eligibility for
enrollment in “the Cherokee tribe.”
We are not persuaded and will find the juvenile court’s no-ICWA finding is
supported by substantial evidence.
1. The Juvenile Court Did Not Find ICWA Inapplicable Based on an Assumption
That the Eastern Band and Cherokee Nation Have a Blood Quantum
Requirement
Mother, joined by father, claims the juvenile court’s no-ICWA finding was
improperly bottomed on an assumption that the child lacked the necessary blood quantum
to meet the membership requirements of the Eastern Band and Cherokee Nation. They
are mistaken.
On January 16, 2026, the United Keetoowah Band advised the Department that,
based on its review and research of its tribal registry, the child was not an Indian child. It
15
also noted that all members of that tribe, without exception, must have a Certificate of
Degree of Indian Blood indicating at least one-quarter Keetoowah blood and must also
have direct ancestry to an individual listed on the 1949 Keetoowah Base Roll or the
Dawes Roll. In discussions with counsel during the remittitur hearing about the United
Keetoowah Band’s response and the child’s paternal great-great-grandmother, the
juvenile court noted “the Cherokee tribe says [the blood quantum] has to be a quarter,
which mean[s] a grandparent at the most[] [a]nd if you’re at [the] great-grandparent level,
then you’re not qualified.”
Contrary to the parents’ assertions, the juvenile court’s remark is not a finding of a
blood quantum requirement for membership in the Eastern Band or Cherokee Nation but
rather it is an acknowledgment of the United Keetoowah Band’s membership
requirement. The record establishes the court’s determination that ICWA is inapplicable
to the proceedings was based upon its finding that the Department fully complied with its
duty of further inquiry, no tribe had responded that the child is an Indian child, and there
was no reason to believe he is an Indian child.
2. The Parents’ Claims of Inadequate Cal-ICWA Compliance Are Unavailing
Father argues the juvenile court erred in two respects: it did not require the
Department to make an effort to obtain birth and death certificates to establish the child’s
eligibility for enrollment in a Cherokee tribe and it did not grant mother’s request for a
continuance of the remittitur hearing to permit the Department to accomplish that task.
Mother, joined by father, argues the juvenile court erred when it did not continue
the hearing with an order requiring the Department (i) to ascertain and obtain at its
16
expense any documents and information the Eastern Band and Cherokee Nation deemed
necessary for determining the child’s eligibility for membership in those tribes, (ii) make
efforts “to complete required tribal forms, obtain ancestral birth and death certificates,
and complete any DNA testing needed to tribally register [the child].”7
Each of the parents’ arguments suffer from the same fallacious foundation that the
Department’s further inquiry obligations imposed by Cal-ICWA includes determining the
tribes’ prerequisites for membership and making efforts to satisfy those requirements on
behalf of the child. In Dezi C., California’s Supreme Court stated that “it bears emphasis
that ‘the obligation is only one of inquiry and not an absolute duty to ascertain or refute
Native American ancestry.’ ” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1143.)
In an effort to support her duty-to-undertake-enrollment-efforts claim, mother
points to the opinion in Guardianship of Saul H. (2022) 13 Cal.5th 827, 849 (Saul H.) not
only for the proposition that the Department should undertake and pay for efforts to
“tribally register” the child because the parents are impoverished but also argues without
benefit of a separate heading that Saul H. calls for de novo review in this case because the
juvenile court did not hold an evidentiary hearing on ICWA’s applicability to the
proceedings.8
7 Mother sometimes limits her arguments to the child’s eligibility for membership
in the Eastern Band; at other times, she refers to both the Eastern Band and the Cherokee
Nation. For the purposes of our discussion, we treat her arguments and those of father as
encompassing both of those tribes.
8 We remind counsel that rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) requires each point to be stated under
a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point.
17
In Saul H., a young teenager from El Salvador fled that country against his
parents’ wishes to escape gang violence and came to the United States. (Saul H., supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 836.) His petition to the probate court for issuance of the predicate
findings needed to support his application for special United States immigration status
was denied on the grounds (i) the teen’s inability to reunify with his parents was due to
their poverty, not because of abuse, neglect, abandonment, or other similar basis under
California law, and (ii) a failure to find that it would not be in Saul’s best interests to be
returned to El Salvador. (Id., at pp. 836-837.)
The California Supreme Court reversed. (Saul H., supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 837.) In
the course of agreeing with Saul’s argument that it was error to focus on his family’s
poverty instead of the risks he would face if returned to his native county, the Supreme
Court acknowledged that a trial court may not terminate parental rights unless the state
has first made efforts to assist a parent suffering from poverty, citing this court’s opinion
in In re Serenity S. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 355, 374 [where family bonds are strained by
the incidents of poverty, the social services department must take steps to assist the
family, not simply remove the child and leave the parent on their own to resolve their
condition and recover their children] (Serenity S.). (Saul H., at p. 849.)
This case is readily and decisively different from Saul H. and Serenity S. The duty
of further inquiry is not, as mother suggests, akin to a “predicate finding” necessary to
establish special immigrant juvenile status. The child was not removed and his parents’
rights to him were not subsequently terminated because his parents are impoverished.
And, there is simply no support in ICWA or Cal-ICWA for the notion that the Department
18
is required to register a child in a tribe where, as here, no tribe has determined the child is
an Indian child. Indeed, in In re Abbigail A. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 83, 88, 92-93, the
California Supreme Court invalidated former rule 5.482(c), which had inter alia required
membership applications to be made on behalf of children who had not been determined
to be Indian children and, as mentioned ante, the court recently emphasized in Dezi C.,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at page 1143, that the Department’s obligation under ICWA and Cal-
ICWA “is only one of inquiry.”
The parents’ assertion that the juvenile court should have conducted an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether the Department had fulfilled its duty of further inquiry is
clearly without merit because the remittitur hearing from which this appeal is taken was
an evidentiary hearing on that issue.
3. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Denied a
Continuance
Mother asserts the juvenile court erred in denying her request for a continuance of
the February 2026 remittitur hearing but does not present an argument on that subject.
Father argues the denial was an abuse of discretion because there was good cause for a
short delay of the proceedings so the Department could try to obtain birth and death
certificates “the Cherokee tribe told the Department it needed.” We disagree.
The parents made no mention of a “need” for birth or death certificates when
requesting a continuance. Rather, they requested a continuance on the grounds (albeit
related to the purported need for the certificates) the child “may be an Indian child, and
that the Department needs to make efforts in order to register this child as a tribal
19
member,” and because “the child is a dependent of the court and within the care and
custody, technically, of the Department, they have the resources and ability to do the
registration of the child and follow up with that.”
As we have already noted, the Department did not have a duty to register the child
with a tribe and, therefore, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
the parents’ requests for a continuance to give the Department time to undertake that task.
4. The Juvenile Court’s No-ICWA Finding Is Supported by Substantial Evidence
At the February 19, 2026 remittitur hearing, the juvenile court found the
Department had made diligent efforts to determine if ICWA applies, none of the tribes
had responded that the child is an Indian child, and there was no reason to believe he is
an Indian child. That finding is supported by ample evidence.
As set forth in detail ante, after our opinion issued in R.J.I, supra, E084694 in
July 2025, the Department made diligent efforts to obtain information relevant to the
issue whether the child is or may be an Indian child. It interviewed the parents and
paternal grandparents on more than one occasion, it spoke with the paternal great-aunt, it
interviewed the paternal half-siblings, and it contacted the three Cherokee tribes and the
BIA. It provided all newly acquired information to each of the three tribes and to the
BIA, sending three updating information letters between November 2025 and January
2026, and duly provided the juvenile court with copies of the updating information
letters, a detailed description of the inquiries undertaken, and copies of the responses
from the tribes.
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Because the juvenile court’s no-ICWA finding is supported by substantial
evidence, we affirm its decision to reinstate the order terminating the parents’ rights to the
child.
DISPOSITION
The order of the juvenile court reinstating the termination of parental rights is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ
P. J.
We concur:
MILLER
J.
MENETREZ
J.
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