Filed 9/16/26 In re R.A. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re R.A., a Person Coming B350095
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos.
17CCJP00427,
17CCJP00427K)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent.
v.
S.M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Mary E. Kelly, Judge. Affirmed.
Jill Smith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Assistant
County Counsel, Navid Nakhjavani, Principal Deputy County Counsel.
INTRODUCTION
The juvenile court sustained allegations of repeated physical and
sexual abuse by Sandy M. (mother) and her male companion. The court
removed her children from her care and bypassed reunification services based
on prior sustained allegations of physical and sexual abuse. Mother later
filed a petition for modification under Welfare and Institutions Code section
388.1 She sought the return of one of her children, Russell, or reunification
services with him. The juvenile court denied her petition. Mother appeals,
arguing the court abused its discretion. We find no abuse of discretion and
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
As the parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history of the
case, we do not restate those details in full here. Below, we discuss only the
facts and history as needed to resolve—and provide context for—the issues
presented on appeal.
Mother has several children and an extensive history of involvement
with the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services
(Department). As relevant here, in 2022, the juvenile court sustained
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code, unless otherwise stated.
2
allegations that mother failed to protect two of her daughters, S.C. and F.C.,
from sexual abuse by her male companion, S.B. As part of her case plan,
mother was ordered to participate in parenting classes and individual
counseling, which she did. Mother also told the Department that she planned
to obtain a restraining order against S.B. and end all contact with him. The
juvenile court ultimately returned mother’s children to her care (except S.C.,
who was placed with her father). As part of its order, the juvenile court
required mother and her children to reside with the children’s maternal
grandmother or in another residence approved by the Department. The
dependency proceedings terminated in February 2024.
But mother never terminated her relationship with S.B. Instead,
mother began living with S.B. in June 2022, while the dependency
proceedings were still pending. Mother also allowed S.B. to have contact
with her children beginning in November 2023. And two months after the
dependency proceedings were terminated in February 2024, mother moved,
with five of her children—B.C., F.C., M.C., Russell, and K.B.—into a
residence S.B. shared with members of his family. Mother, her children, and
S.B. slept on two inflatable mattresses in the living room.
S.B. then resumed his sexual abuse of mother’s children, this time
targeting F.C. (age 8) and M.C. (age 6).
In April 2024, F.C. reported physical and sexual abuse to a school
employee. The school reported the abuse to the police, who arrested mother
and S.B.2 In forensic interviews, F.C. and M.C. both reported extensive
sexual abuse by S.B., which mother knew of, facilitated, and participated in.
2 When mother was arrested she lied to the police, stating she had not
seen S.B. since he was arrested in connection with the allegations of sexual
abuse in 2022.
3
F.C. also reported that her mother instructed her to keep the abuse a secret.
In an interview, Russell (age 5) reported that he witnessed mother and S.B.
have sex on several occasions.
F.C., M.C., and Russell also reported ongoing instances of physical
abuse by mother, stating that mother regularly hit them with a phone
charging cable or a stick from their younger brother’s crib. Russell recalled
one incident where mother repeatedly struck his face, and he was kept home
from school until the bruises on his face had faded.
In April 2024, the Department filed a section 300 petition alleging
several counts based on these claims of physical and sexual abuse by mother
and S.B. Mother denied the allegations, calling F.C. an “evil child” and a liar
who needed to be on medication. The juvenile court found the children
credible and sustained the allegations against mother and removed her
children from her care. The juvenile court denied reunification services for
mother under section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(3) and (b)(6), based on the prior
sustained allegations of physical and sexual abuse from the 2022 proceeding.
In June 2025, mother filed a petition under section 388, asking the
court to either return Russell to her care or grant her reunification services
and liberalize her visits.. Mother argued that she was participating in a
parenting program, sexual abuse counseling sessions, and other counseling
“focusing on court related matters and providing a safe environment for
[Russell].” Mother also noted that she was now employed as a security guard
and had obtained new housing.
The petition was accompanied by a declaration from mother stating
that she “ha[s] been consistently addressing all the case issues that ha[ve]
brought this matter before the Court. I have completed Parenting Classes
and attended Sexual Abuse Counseling sessions.” Mother also submitted
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letters corroborating her involvement in the programs and counseling
identified in her petition.
The Department and minors’ counsel opposed mother’s petition. The
Department acknowledged that Russell had a strong bond with mother and
expressed a desire to live with her again. However, the Department and
minors’ counsel argued that, despite her participation in classes and
programs, mother still had not taken any responsibility for the repeated
physical and sexual abuse that gave rise to the proceedings. The Department
additionally noted that mother had a new dependency case pending arising
from allegations of emotional abuse of Russell’s 11-month-old sibling, K.B.
The Department also contacted the therapist who conducted mother’s
sex offender treatment program. According to the therapist, mother was in
the process of working on implementing healthy boundaries, understanding
healthy sexual behaviors, and developing an awareness of sexual abuse.
Mother’s therapist also expressed the hope that, with continued participation
in the program, mother would “be able to reach her goals and be able to take
accountability for the abuse that occurred and accept responsibility for the
sexual offenses.”
The juvenile court denied mother’s petition, expressing concern that
mother had not accepted responsibility for the sexual abuse that brought the
family to the attention of the Department. The court concluded that “[O]ne
cannot fix a problem one does not admit one has.”
Mother timely appealed the denial of her section 388 petition.3
3 Russell’s biological father is deceased.
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DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standards
Section 388 allows a parent to petition to change, modify, or set aside
any previous juvenile court order. (§ 388, subd. (a).) “To obtain an
evidentiary hearing on a section 388 petition, a parent must make a prima
facie showing that circumstances have changed since the prior court order,
and that the proposed change will be in the best interests of the child.
[Citations.]” (In re Alayah J. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 469, 478 (Alayah J.).) The
parent petitioning under section 388 has the burden of establishing both
prongs by a preponderance of the evidence. (In re J.M. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th
833, 845.) “To support a section 388 petition, the change in circumstances
must be substantial.” (In re Ernesto R. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 219, 223
(Ernesto R.).) A petition that only shows changing—not changed—
circumstances is insufficient to require an evidentiary hearing. (Ibid.; In re
Baby Boy L. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 596, 610.)
A section 388 petition may not be based on a parent’s conclusory
assertions. (In re Anthony W. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 246, 250 (Anthony W.).)
Nor is it “enough for a parent to show just a genuine change of circumstances
under the statute. The parent must show that the undoing of the prior order
would be in the best interests of the child. [Citation.]” (In re Kimberly F.
(1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 529.) “After the termination of reunification
services, a parent’s interest in the care, custody and companionship of the
child is no longer paramount. [Citation.] Rather, at this point, the focus
shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability.” (In re Angel B.
(2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 464.)
“In determining whether [a section 388] petition makes the required
showing, the court may consider the entire factual and procedural history of
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the case.” (In re K.L. (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 52, 62.) “We normally review
the grant or denial of a section 388 petition for an abuse of discretion.”
(Alayah J., supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 478.) “A court exceeds the limits of
legal discretion if its determination is arbitrary, capricious or patently
absurd. The appropriate test is whether the court exceeded the bounds of
reason.” (In re L.W. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 840, 851, citing In re Stephanie M.
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318–319.)
II. Analysis
Mother argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her
section 388 petition. We disagree.
In moving for relief under section 388, it was mother’s burden to
establish a change in circumstances. Mother attempted to carry her burden
primarily with evidence of her participation in different parenting programs,
classes, and counseling.
We find no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court’s determination
that this participation was insufficient to justify relief under section 388.
The record shows that mother previously participated in similar parenting
programs and counseling in connection with the 2022 dependency
proceedings only to move back in with S.B., provide him with unfettered
access to her children, and actively participate in the sexual abuse of her
children.
It is true that mother was also participating in a treatment program for
sex offenders; a program that was not part of her case plan in the 2022
proceedings. However, the therapist from that program acknowledged that
mother had not yet accepted responsibility for her involvement in the
repeated sexual abuse of her children. (See In re Esmeralda B. (1992) 11
Cal.App.4th 1036, 1044 [“denial is a factor often relevant to determining
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whether persons are likely to modify their behavior” because it signals a
resistance to the “treatment necessary to effect behavioral changes to insure”
a child’s safety in the parent’s custody].)
In light of this evidence, the vague and self-serving claim in mother’s
declaration that she was “consistently addressing all the case issues that
ha[ve] brought this matter before the Court,” was insufficient to establish a
genuine change of circumstances warranting relief under section 388.
(Anthony W., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 250) At most, the evidence before
the juvenile court suggested that mother’s circumstances were changing, not
changed.4 We therefore find no abuse of discretion by the juvenile court in
denying mother’s section 388 petition. (Ernesto R., supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at
p. 223.)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order denying mother’s section 388 petition is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
ZUKIN, P. J.
We concur:
MORI, J. DAUM, J.
4 As mother did not carry her burden to show a genuine change of
circumstances, we do not reach the separate question of whether her
requested relief was in Russell’s best interests under the second prong of the
section 388 analysis. (Alayah J., supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 478.)
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