Filed 7/6/26 In re R.A. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re R.A. et al., Persons B343316
Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos.
21CCJP01958,
21CCJP01958D-F)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and
Respondent.
v.
G.M.,
Defendant and
Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Diane C. Reyes, Temporary Judge. Affirmed.
Ernesto Paz Rey, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Jessica Buckelew, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Guadalupe M. (mother) appeals a juvenile court
disposition order removing her three children from her care. On
appeal, mother first argues that there is a conflict between the
court’s oral pronouncement for “home of parents,” and its written
ruling removing the children from her care. Mother contends the
oral ruling should control. We find that under the circumstances,
based on the record as a whole, the written ruling better reflects
the court’s intent. Thus, the written ruling controls.
Next mother contends the juvenile court removed the
children from her without making the findings required under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 361, subdivisions (c) and
(e).1 We agree the court failed to make the required findings but
find that the error was harmless. We therefore affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Initiation of case
R. was born in 2009, E. was born in 2020, and M. was born
in 2022. The children came to the attention of the Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) in
October 2023 after a domestic violence incident between mother
and E. and M.’s father, Jose, in the presence of the children. The
family also had a long history of DCFS involvement before 2023.
1 All undesignated section references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
On November 3, 2023, DCFS filed a juvenile dependency
petition under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b)(1), and (j) relating
to the domestic violence incident, as well as mother and Jose’s
alleged substance abuse. At the detention hearing, the juvenile
court detained the children from Jose and released them to
mother. At the adjudication hearing on January 30, 2024, the
juvenile court exercised jurisdiction over the children under
section 300 based on the domestic violence between mother and
Jose. The court dismissed the allegations relating to the parents’
substance abuse. R. was released under a home-of-parents order
to mother and her father, Angel. E. and M. were released to
home of mother. The court ordered mother to participate in a 12-
step program with random drug and alcohol testing, as well as
other services.
Jose cooperated with DCFS and complied with his case
plan. In August 2024, the juvenile court changed E. and M.’s
placement from home of mother to home of parents.
B. Petitions under sections 342 and 387
In October 2024, a new referral was generated after DCFS
received a report that mother was under the influence of alcohol
while caring for the children. The reporting party stated that
mother was drunk and slurring her words. R. called the
reporting party for help, and mother told the party to come pick
up the children and that “she gives up.” Mother arranged for E.
and M. to be placed with two paternal aunts because Jose was
incarcerated. R. eventually moved to Angel’s home.
Mother told two children’s social workers (CSWs) on
October 16, 2024 that she no longer wanted the children in her
care, and she would no longer cooperate with DCFS or comply
with her case plan. Mother denied drinking alcohol that day, but
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the CSWs reported that mother appeared to be under the
influence. Mother refused multiple requests over the next two
days to take a drug test or continue participating in services. The
home smelled of cat urine, and mother said she does not clean the
home because no one helps her. When a CSW met with mother
on October 17 and the CSW asked about mother’s drinking,
mother “under her breath stated she drank yesterday, today, and
will drink tomorrow.” On October 28, however, mother said she
would continue cooperating with services to get the children back.
On October 23, before R. moved to Angel’s home, R.
reported that she had witnessed mother drinking alcohol for
several successive days. Angel reported that earlier that week
when he dropped R. off at mother’s home, mother was drunk,
swaying, talking slowly, and she smelled of alcohol. The home
was dirty, with unwashed dishes in the kitchen, trash on the floor
that had been swept aside but not picked up, and a strong smell
of cat urine. Angel also reported that when he opened the door,
two-year-old M. ran out of the apartment and mother did nothing
to get her back inside; he “stated mother did not react because
she was drunk.” Angel showed the CSW a video from that day in
which he questioned mother about her drinking and the state of
the apartment; mother hit him in response. Angel also noted
that R. had excessive absences from school.
One of the paternal aunts who was caring for E. and M.,
Aunt G., reported that mother had called Aunt G. on October 16
to pick up the children; mother was slurring her words. Another
paternal aunt, Aunt A., went to pick up the children in response.
When she arrived, mother smelled of alcohol and it seemed she
had not showered. Although mother was purportedly sending the
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children to live with the aunts, she did not pack anything for the
children to take with them.
On October 30, 2024, DCFS filed petitions under sections
342 and 3872 alleging that mother’s alcohol abuse placed the
children at risk of harm. The section 342 petition also alleged
that mother was “unwilling and unable to provide ongoing
parental care and supervision of the children.”
At a detention hearing on November 14, 2024, the court
ordered R. detained from mother and placed with Angel, and the
younger children detained from mother and placed with their
paternal aunts. The court ordered nine hours per week of
monitored visitation for mother.
According to the jurisdiction/disposition report filed
December 23, 2024, E. and M. remained with paternal relatives
and R. remained with Angel. Angel reported on December 13,
2024 that twice recently he had witnessed mother apparently
under the influence. Aunt A. and Aunt G. reported that at a
recent celebration for E.’s birthday, mother appeared to be under
the influence and was not supervising the children. Aunt G. and
two of the children’s adult siblings reported seeing mother visibly
intoxicated on previous occasions as well, including while
transporting the children for visits.
2 Section 342 states in relevant part that in an active
dependency case, a section 342 petition may be filed to “allege[ ]
new facts or circumstances, other than those under which the
original petition was sustained, sufficient to state that the minor
is a person described in Section 300.” Section 387 provides that a
supplemental petition may be filed to seek a change or
modification of a previous juvenile court order.
5
In a phone interview on December 16, 2024, mother told
the CSW she wanted to waive all reunification services and have
the case closed. The CSW asked mother “if she was willing to
participate in weekly testing or enroll in an inpatient program.
The mother began using profanity and stated that she did not see
a need to participate in either service. [The CSW] attempted to
explain that due to prior outpatient services not being effective,
an inpatient service is recommended. The mother went on to
state, ‘and it’s not going to work.’” During this conversation,
mother seemed to be under the influence because she slurred
words and had “trouble with her thought process.” When asked
about the allegation that mother was unwilling to care for the
children, mother responded, “Yes, that is true,” and reported that
she was not willing to enroll in services.
DCFS recommended that the children be removed from
mother, and that the juvenile court order reunification services
for mother.
C. Hearing and court ruling
At the January 6, 2025 adjudication hearing on the section
342 and 387 petitions, mother’s counsel stated that despite
mother’s previous comments, mother was willing to continue
participating in services, she was working with a therapist, and
was trying to get into an alcohol treatment program. The
juvenile court found that mother had a history of substance
abuse, and the current disposition had not been effective in
protecting the children. The court sustained the section 342 and
387 petitions regarding mother’s alcohol abuse affecting her
ability to care for the children, but dismissed the allegation that
mother was unwilling and unable to care for the children.
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In the disposition phase of the hearing, mother’s counsel
asked that mother be placed in a “full alcohol program” and
receive the nine hours per week of monitored visitation that the
court ordered after the children were detained. The juvenile
court expressed concern that the January 2024 order had
removed E. and M. from Jose. The children’s counsel directed the
court to the August 2024 home-of-parents order.
The juvenile court terminated jurisdiction over R. with an
exit order for sole physical custody to Angel, with joint legal
custody and monitored visitation for mother. For E. and M., the
court stated, “We will remain as a home-of-parents order;
however, now I will be offering enhancement services. The plan
will remain that [E. and M.] remain with the relative. . . .” The
court ordered enhancement services for mother.
The minute orders from the January 6, 2025 hearing stated
that DCFS “made reasonable efforts to prevent removal but there
are no services available to prevent further detention,” and that
the court found by clear and convincing evidence that it was
necessary to remove the children from mother, and the present
placement was modified to be home-of-father.
Mother timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Mother correctly notes that at the January 6 hearing the
trial court stated that the “home-of-parents” order pertaining to
E. and M. would “remain.” The previous home-of-parents order,
entered in August 2024, included mother. However, the court’s
written ruling from January 6 stated that the children had been
removed from mother and were placed in the homes of their
fathers. Mother argues that the written orders “incorrectly
reflect” that the court ordered the children removed from her
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care, and that the “oral pronouncement of judgment controls.”
She asserts that the juvenile court “explicitly ruled that it would
continue to be a home of parents[ ] order and was not removing
the boys [sic3] from Mother.” She also argues that if the juvenile
court was going to remove the children from her care, it was
required to make findings under section 361, subdivisions (c) and
(e),4 and here the court did not do so. Mother contends that in
light of the oral statements and the court’s failure to make any
findings under section 361, it was “reasonably probable that the
court found the boys [sic] were safe absent removal.” She asks
that we “remand the case for the [juvenile] court to make
dispositional findings.”
We disagree that the record can be reasonably interpreted
to mean that the juvenile court did not intend to remove the
children from mother’s care. Dependency cases “have reached
differing conclusions regarding which order controls when a
juvenile court’s oral pronouncements differ[ ] from its written
order.” (In re Karla C. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1259 fn. 9.)
3 Two of the three children are girls.
4 Section 361, subdivision (c)(1) states that a child shall not
be removed from a parent “unless the juvenile court finds clear
and convincing evidence” that “[t]here is or would be a
substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or
physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were
returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the
minor’s physical health can be protected without removing the
minor from the minor’s parent’s . . . physical custody.” Section
361, subdivision (e) requires the court to “make a determination
as to whether reasonable efforts were made to prevent or to
eliminate the need for removal of the minor from their home,”
and “state the facts on which the decision to remove the minor is
based.”
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To determine which one controls, courts have relied on case-
specific circumstances to ascertain the juvenile court’s intent.
(Ibid. [concluding that the “oral pronouncement prevails”]; In re
Aryanna C. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1241 fn. 5 [“under the
circumstances the juvenile court’s comments and orders stated at
the dispositional hearing prevail over the order contained in the
clerk’s transcript, to the extent they are inconsistent with the
written order”]; In re Jerred H. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 793, 798
and fn. 3 [the juvenile court’s written order terminating parental
rights prevailed over contrary comments at the hearing]; In re
Jennifer G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 752, 756 fn. 1 [regarding
visitation, “[t]o the extent that the court’s oral pronouncement
differed from its written order, the written order controls”].)
Here, at the disposition phase of the hearing, neither the
parties nor the court suggested that the children should be
returned to mother’s care. Mother’s counsel requested monitored
visitation with the children; she did not request the children’s
return. Mother also requested joint legal custody of R.; she did
not request joint physical custody. Attorneys for the children and
DCFS asked that the children be removed from mother and
placed with their fathers. The court terminated jurisdiction for
R. with sole physical custody to Angel and monitored visitation
for mother. The court orally stated that E. and M. would remain
with their paternal aunts, with visitation and enhancement
services for mother. Enhancement services are “‘child welfare
services offered to the parent not retaining custody, designed to
enhance the child’s relationship with that parent’” (In re Destiny
D. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 197, 212), suggesting that the court
considered mother to be a parent who was not retaining custody.
From the totality of the circumstances, it appears that the
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juvenile court intended to remove the children from mother as
reflected in the written orders. Thus, the written rulings prevail
over any contrary statements during the hearing.
Mother also asserts that to the extent the juvenile court
removed the children from her care, it failed to make the findings
required by section 361, subdivisions (c) and (e). DCFS argues
that mother forfeited any such argument by acquiescing to the
children’s removal. It points out that mother removed the
children from her own care by asking relatives to take them, and
that mother did not request their return at the hearing, but
rather requested visitation.
The forfeiture rule may be applied to disposition
proceedings. (See, e.g., In re Richard K. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th
580, 590.) However, even when a parent submits “on a particular
record, the court must nevertheless weigh evidence, make
appropriate evidentiary findings and apply relevant law to
determine whether the case has been proved.” (Id. at p. 589; see
also In re Javier G. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 453, 464.) The
juvenile court was obligated to make the findings required by
section 361 regardless of whether mother objected. Thus,
forfeiture does not apply.
It was error for the court to remove the children from
mother without making the findings required by section 361; the
statute states that such findings “shall” be made. Nevertheless,
we agree with DCFS that the error was harmless. “‘[C]ases
involving a court’s obligation to make findings regarding a
minor’s change of custody or commitment have held the failure to
do so will be deemed harmless where “it is not reasonably
probable such finding, if made, would have been in favor of
continued parental custody.”’” (In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th
10
227, 247.) Thus, “when a juvenile court fails to make the factual
findings required under section 361, subdivision (e), its removal
order is subject to the constitutional mandate that no judgment
shall be set aside ‘unless, after an examination of the entire
cause, including the evidence, the [appellate] court shall be of the
opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a
miscarriage of justice.’ [Citations.] Under this mandate, a
‘miscarriage of justice’ will be declared only when the appellate
court, after examining the entire case, is of the opinion that ‘“it is
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing
party would have been reached in the absence of the error.”’
[Citation.] A ‘“probability” in this context does not mean more
likely than not, but merely a reasonable chance, more than an
abstract possibility.’” (In re D.P. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1058,
1068.)
Here, it is not reasonably probable that a different result
would have occurred if the court made the findings required
under section 361. Notably, mother does not address DCFS’s
harmless error argument, nor does she assert that the evidence
was insufficient to support removal findings.
Clear and convincing evidence demonstrated a substantial
danger to the health and well-being of the children if they
returned to mother’s care, and that there was no reasonable
means by which the children could be protected without removing
them from mother. (§ 361, subds. (c)(1), (e).) Mother herself
equivocated about whether she was willing to care for the
children or participate in a case plan that would allow her to
reunify with them. Many relatives witnessed mother failing to
care for the children as a result of her intoxication, including
Angel seeing M. run out the door of the apartment and mother
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doing nothing to stop her or get her back. No evidence presented
at the hearing suggested that mother was currently capable of
and willing to care for the children; at most, mother was willing
to work toward reunification. Thus, it is not reasonably probable
that a result more favorable to mother would have been reached
had the court made the section 361 findings on the record. The
error was therefore harmless.
DISPOSITION
The January 6, 2025 disposition orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
COGLIATI, J.*
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
MORI, J.
* Judge of the Santa Cruz Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
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