Filed 10/9/26 In re Price CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re STEVEN V. PRICE
on Habeas Corpus. E085953
(Super.Ct.No. WHCSB2400197)
OPINION
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of habeas corpus. Gregory S.
Tavill, Judge. Petition granted.
Jan B. Norman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Petitioner.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Sara J. Romano, Assistant Attorney General,
Amanda J. Murray and Gregory J. Marcot, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Petitioner Steven V. Price is currently a prisoner in the custody of the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). Petitioner had surgery in 2012
for prostate cancer and, as a result, suffers from permanent incontinence requiring him to
wear adult undergarments. In this petition for writ of habeas corpus, petitioner does not
challenge his conviction or sentence but contends only that CDCR’s refusal to provide
him with a specific type of undergarment subjects him to cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the United States and California Constitutions.
After consideration of the parties’ submissions in response to our order to show
cause on the petition, we conclude that petitioner has made a sufficient showing to
warrant an evidentiary hearing on his claim. We grant the petition for writ of habeas
corpus, discharge the order to show cause, and remand the matter to the superior court for
the purpose of conducting an evidentiary hearing on the issues raised in the petition.
II. BACKGROUND
Petitioner is currently serving a sentence of three consecutive terms of 25 years to
life and an additional term of 10 years in state prison as the result of convictions for
multiple offenses in 1997. He filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that
CDCR’s refusal to provide him with adequate medical care arises to the level of cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the United States and California Constitutions.
According to the petition, petitioner underwent surgery for prostate cancer in
2012, causing him to suffer permanent fecal and urinary incontinence requiring a specific
type of undergarment to prevent complications from his medical condition. Since that
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time, he has been housed in at least four different correctional facilities. At each
correctional facility, it was eventually determined that petitioner’s medical condition
necessitated the provision of a specific type of undergarment instead of the standard
unisex undergarments that were typically available to prisoners. The petition attached
medical notes from 2017, 2020, and 2022, in which four different medical professionals
recommended or confirmed the use of the specific type of undergarment requested by
petitioner. In 2024, petitioner was transferred to the California Institution for Men (CIM)
and was subsequently denied the specific type of undergarment he had previously been
provided at other correctional facilities. Petitioner alleges that this failure causes him to
suffer rashes, swelling, sores, and other physical ailments.
In response to this court’s order to show cause, CDCR filed a return in which it
(1) admitted petitioner suffers from a permanent medical condition requiring the
provision of undergarments to prevent complications from his condition; (2) admitted
that petitioner has previously suffered rashes and swelling related to his medical
condition; (3) declined to dispute petitioner’s claim that prior medical professionals at
other CDCR facilities had determined petitioner needed a “ ‘permanent’ accommodation”
for a specific type of undergarment; and (4) could not admit or deny whether petitioner
suffers ongoing rashes, swelling, or other complications from his medical condition as a
result of CIM’s refusal to provide him with a specific type of undergarment. CDCR
attached the declaration of the chief physician and surgeon at CIM, who declared that he
had conducted a review of petitioner’s medical records. Based upon that review, he
concluded that a different treating physician at CIM had examined petitioner and
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determined no need for any specific type of undergarment beyond the standard unisex
undergarments normally provided by CDCR. CDCR also alleged that the reason it could
not admit or deny whether petitioner suffered from ongoing medical conditions caused by
improper undergarments was due to petitioner’s refusal to submit to a medical
examination.
In his traverse, petitioner reaffirmed the allegations of the petition but denied the
allegations of the return that petitioner had refused to submit to a medical examination
while at CIM.
III. DISCUSSION
A. General Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“Our state Constitution guarantees that a person improperly deprived of his or her
liberty has the right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus.” (People v. Duvall (1995)
9 Cal.4th 464, 474; In re Estevez (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1445, 1460 (Estevez).) “ ‘The
function of the writ of habeas corpus is solely to effect “discharge” from unlawful
restraint, though the illegality in respect to which the discharge from restraint is sought
may not go to the fact of continued detention but may be simply as to the circumstances
under which the prisoner is held ….’ ” (Estevez, at pp. 1460-1461.) Thus, a prisoner’s
claim that the denial of medical care rises to the level of cruel or unusual punishment in
violation of the prisoner’s constitutional rights may be raised in a petition for writ of
habeas corpus. (Estevez, at p. 1461; Thor v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 725, 748; In
re Coca (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 493, 501-503.)
“Where a reviewing court finds the factual allegations of a habeas corpus petition,
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taken as true, establish a prima facie case for relief, the court will issue an [order to show
cause].” (In re Sims (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 195, 203.) The issuance of the order to show
cause “creates a ‘ “cause” ’ giving the People the right to reply to the petition by a return
and to otherwise participate in the court’s decision making process. … The return must
allege facts tending to establish the legality of the petitioner’s detention. … It is the
interplay between the return and the petitioner’s traverse that frames the issues the court
must decide.” (Id.at pp. 203-204.) “Once the issues have been joined in that way, the
court must determine whether an evidentiary hearing is needed. … If the return and
traverse reveal that whether the petitioner is entitled to relief hinges on the resolution of
factual disputes, the court should order an evidentiary hearing.” (Id. at p. 204.) And
where an evidentiary hearing is warranted, a reviewing court “may transfer the matter to
the superior court, for a determination of the disputes” and “may confer jurisdiction on
that court to either grant or deny relief based upon the findings.” (In re Vargas (2000)
83 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1132.)
B. The Return and Traverse Show a Sufficient Factual Dispute Warranting an
Evidentiary Hearing
In this case, the sole claim for relief raised by petitioner is that the refusal to
provide a specific type of undergarment to address his medical condition rises to the level
of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the United States and California
Constitutions. In our view, the return and traverse show that the issue requires an
evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed facts before a court can conclude relief is
warranted.
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“Cruel and unusual punishment is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and article I, section 17 of the California Constitution.”
(People v. Mantanez (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 354, 358; U.S. Const., 8th Amend.; Cal.
Const., art I, § 17.)1 With respect to the Eighth Amendment claim, the United States
Supreme Court has explained that the Eighth Amendment “proscribes more than
physically barbarous punishments” and, instead, “embodies ‘broad and idealistic
concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency’ … against which we
must evaluate penal measures.” (Estelle v. Gamble (1976) 429 U.S. 97, 102.) “These
elementary principles establish the government’s obligation to provide medical care for
those whom it is punishing by incarceration.” (Id. at p. 103.) As a result, “deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain,’ … proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” (Id.at p. 104.) The
test for whether a prisoner has shown that the failure to provide medical care rises to the
1 We recognize that “[u]nlike the Eighth Amendment that ‘ “prohibits the
infliction of ‘cruel and unusual’ punishment. … Article I, section 17 of the California
Constitution prohibits infliction of ‘cruel or unusual’ punishment” ’ ” and “ ‘ “[t]he
distinction in wording is ‘purposeful and substantive rather than merely semantic.” ’ ”
(People v. Christensen (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 187, 197-198.) As a result, courts will
normally “ ‘ “construe the state constitutional provision ‘separately from its counterpart
in the federal Constitution.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) However, the provision of the California
Constitution is generally considered to “ ‘separately and independently la[y] down the
same prohibition’ ” as the Eighth Amendment (People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907,
938) while affording “greater protection to criminal defendants by prohibiting cruel ‘or’
unusual punishment” (People v. Haller (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1092). Thus, we
need not separately consider the California constitutional provisions in this opinion given
our conclusion that defendant is already entitled to an evidentiary hearing under the more
restrictive provisions of the Eighth Amendment.
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level of an Eighth Amendment violation is whether there has been a deliberate
indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate. (Farmer v. Brennan
(1994) 511 U.S. 825, 828; Estelle, at p. 106; In re Coca, supra, 85 Cal.App.3d at p. 502.)
Based upon the parties’ submissions, we believe that the test articulated in Farmer
requires the resolution of multiple disputed facts in this case. While it is undisputed that
CDCR has not provided the specific type of undergarment that defendant contends is
medically necessary, the parties dispute whether petitioner suffers any risk of serious
harm as a result. Petitioner alleged and CDCR admitted that petitioner has had a history
of suffering rashes, swelling, and sores as complications of his medical condition.
Additionally, petitioner submitted excerpts of medical records from prior correctional
facilities suggesting that medical professionals at each facility ultimately decided to grant
him an accommodation for specialized undergarments. This evidence creates a strong
inference that petitioner could be exposed to ongoing serious harm resulting from the
failure to provide him adequate undergarments. On the other hand, CDCR presented an
expert opinion that the need for a specific type of undergarment is not necessarily
permanent, and medical professionals may reach different conclusions when a patient’s
condition changes. Yet CDCR was unable to admit or deny whether petitioner currently
suffers from any specific conditions because medical professionals had not been able to
conduct an updated physical examination of petitioner. Thus, the record presented by the
parties creates a reasonable inference that petitioner continues to suffer from the same
risk of harm he experienced at other correctional facilities, but it is sufficiently disputed
that we cannot reach such a conclusion as a matter of law. In our view, the nature and
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extent of the risk of harm to petitioner cannot be resolved absent an evidentiary hearing
on the matter.
Similarly, even if it is determined that petitioner faces a serious risk of harm from
complications related to his medical condition, reasonable minds could reach different
conclusions on the question of whether CDCR has displayed deliberate indifference to
that risk. The “[w]aiver of treatment discharges the duty to treat and negates the
possibility of ‘deliberate indifference.’ ” (Thor v. Superior Court, supra, 5 Cal.4th at
p. 746.) And CDCR contends that petitioner has refused to submit to medical
examination and has been, instead, combative and uncooperative such that medical
professionals cannot evaluate petitioner’s current medical needs. In response, petitioner
denies these allegations and contends that individual medical staff at CIM have dismissed
his requests for assistance and falsified medical records on this issue.2 Clearly, the
declaration of the medical director submitted by CDCR, providing only a summary of
medical records prepared by others is not sufficient for this court to resolve this type of
factual dispute as a matter of law. Instead, an evidentiary hearing is warranted so that the
2 During oral argument, CDCR asserted that the express denials in petitioner’s
traverse do not truly create a dispute because petitioner failed to submit any evidence in
support of the denial. However, in the context of a petition for habeas corpus, the return
and traverse function as pleadings to clarify the allegations that are disputed. (In re
Jenkins (2023) 14 Cal.5th 493, 522-523.) There is no requirement that the petitioner
submit evidence to refute the allegations of the return when filing a traverse. The
function of the traverse is analogous to an answer in civil actions (In re Lewallen (1979)
23 Cal.3d 274, 277) and intended to identify the allegations of the return that are denied
in order to prevent those allegations from being deemed admitted (In re Marquez (2007)
153 Cal.App.4th 1, 12).
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credibility of the percipient witnesses actually involved with providing petitioner medical
care at CIM can be evaluated regarding whether petitioner refused care or, alternatively,
to determine whether the steps taken by medical staff at CIM did or did not amount to
deliberate indifference.3
3 On January 21, 2026, petitioner filed a request for judicial notice of a related
habeas corpus proceeding in the Superior Court of Monterey County. Because we have
concluded that petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing upon remand, consideration
of the matters identified in his request for judicial notice is unnecessary to our disposition
in this proceeding, and we deny the request for judicial notice on this basis. Upon
remand, petitioner may renew his request with the superior court to the extent he believes
the matters subject of his request may be relevant at the time of any evidentiary hearing.
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IV. DISPOSITION
The petition for writ of habeas corpus is granted. The matter is remanded to the
superior court to appoint counsel for defendant and hold an evidentiary hearing on
whether CDCR has exposed petitioner to a substantial risk of serious harm as a result of
deliberate indifference to his medical needs. We confer jurisdiction upon the superior
court to grant or deny relief based upon the law and facts determined at the conclusion of
such an evidentiary hearing.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
FIELDS
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
P. J.
CODRINGTON
J.
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