Filed 5/8/17 In re P.B. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA In re P.B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. R.F., Defendant and Appellant. D071138 (Super. Ct. No. J516235H) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Sharon L. Kalemkiarian, Judge. Affirmed. Clare M. Lemon, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County Counsel and Kristen M. Ojeil, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiffs and Respondents. Judith Klein, for Respondents Martha and Lisa S. 2 When P.B. was approximately four months old, the juvenile court removed her, along with her seven siblings, from her mother, R.F. (Mother) and placed her with foster parents. P.B. remained with the foster parents for the following 18 months before having a 60-day trial visit with Mother and her siblings. P.B. struggled to adjust and started displaying negative behaviors during the visit, and although the juvenile court returned the siblings to Mother, it placed P.B. back with the foster parents, terminated Mother's reunification services as to P.B. and, eventually, terminated Mother's parental rights to allow the foster parents to adopt P.B. Mother appeals the order terminating her parental rights and argues the court erred by not applying either the beneficial parental-child relationship or the sibling bond exception set forth in Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26, subdivisions (c)(1)(B)(i) and (v). We conclude the exceptions do not apply to outweigh the benefits of permanency through adoption and affirm the judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In January 2014, the San Diego Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) received a referral after a police officer conducting a well check found P.B. and her seven older siblings2 unsupervised in the living room of a home deemed to be unsanitary and unsafe for children. P.B. was approximately four months old at the time but did not have a birth certificate, or medical insurance, because Mother had not registered her birth. Although this was the Agency's first encounter with P.B., Mother had a history of 1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 2 The present appeal relates only to P.B. and, as such, we discuss facts related to the other seven siblings only to the extent relevant to P.B. 3 substantiated referrals for general neglect of the older siblings. The juvenile court took jurisdiction over P.B. and her siblings and placed each of the children in various foster homes. The Agency recommended reunification services, noting Mother's inability to provide suitable housing was the result of a lack of resources and not substance abuse or mental health issues, and the court adopted the Agency's recommendation.3 Mother initially told the Agency she planned to clean the house the family had been living in so the children could return, but later determined it would not be possible to do so and began looking for alternative housing. The Agency gave Mother a list of available shelters but she was not willing to go to a shelter due to a previous negative experience so the Agency provided a list of additional housing resources. While she continued to search for housing, Mother visited all of the children regularly despite their various locations and her reliance on public transportation. With respect to P.B., Mother had weekly individual unsupervised visits as well as weekly group visits with P.B. and her siblings. The visits generally went well but the foster parents expressed concerns over Mother bringing sugary drinks and snacks despite a number of the children undergoing significant dental repairs. In addition, Mother routinely brought friends or family to help with the visits with all eight children and, while the Agency applauded Mother's use of her support network, it remained unsure of Mother's ability to care for the children on her own. 3 The court ordered reunification services for P.B.'s father (Father) as well but his participation was limited and he is not a party to this appeal. 4 By August, Mother had begun working two jobs. She continued to visit the children regularly but the visits became less consistent due to the demands of her jobs. She was still looking for suitable housing and told the Agency that, because she was reliant on public transportation, she wanted to stay near her support network and jobs, despite the higher cost of housing in that area. The Agency reminded her that few situations would be perfect, encouraged her to focus on getting housing wherever possible to get the children back, and referred her to Casey Family Programs (Casey), a program that provides monetary assistance and case management to help families stay together. Casey accepted Mother's case. In November 2014, Mother told the Agency two family friends would provide her with a home and a vehicle for transportation. About a week later, the friends informed the Agency Mother had been demanding and disrespectful, a physical altercation had occurred involving Mother and her then boyfriend, and thus they were no longer willing to help. Mother later informed the Agency the address of the home the friends gave her did not exist. Mother had told the children they would be spending Thanksgiving together in the new home and when the home did not work out, she told them they would spend Thanksgiving together in a hotel. The Agency worked with each of the caregivers to allow the children to spend the day together with Mother at the hotel, and confirmed pick up and drop off times the day before Thanksgiving. However, Mother cancelled the gathering at the last minute and stated she could not pay for the hotel room. 5 In December 2014, Casey facilitated a meeting to discuss possible housing solutions for the family. Mother said a family friend would stay with her to help with child care and half of the rent. Casey asked the friend to provide documentation supporting her ability to pay half the rent but she did not immediately do so and a couple of months later Mother informed the Agency the friend was no longer employed. Around this same time, Casey learned a potential landlord had refused to rent a home to Mother after Mother failed to return phone calls or view the house, so a Casey worker began going with Mother to view potential homes to ensure she was communicating effectively with property owners. In February 2015, a court appointed special advocate (CASA) filed a report describing her observations of Mother's visitations with P.B. The CASA noted Mother gave a lot of attention to P.B. and P.B. seemed to enjoy the attention, but P.B. was doing well in foster care and it was unclear whether Mother would be able to provide a stable home for the children on an ongoing basis as she continued to struggle with finding housing. The CASA recommended P.B. remain in her placement with the foster parents. Shortly before the scheduled 12-month review hearing in March, Mother found a house for rent within her budget. However, she was not able to move in right away as the home needed some repairs. The juvenile court continued the matter to a combined contested 12- and 18-month review hearing. Meanwhile, P.B. began having trouble sleeping and exhibiting signs of separation anxiety such as fussiness and clinginess whenever separated from either of her foster parents. Her foster parents reported these behaviors occurred simultaneously with 6 increased visitation with Mother and the Agency referred P.B. to therapy. P.B.'s foster parents also expressed concern Mother was not following the lactose free diet that P.B. needed during visits, causing her to have digestive problems upon return to their care. In April 2015, approximately 15 months after the children were removed, Mother began having overnight visits with the older children on the weekends at a hotel and, in May, Mother had two overnight visits with P.B. at the hotel. Mother was able to provide for the basic needs of all of the children, including P.B., during the visits but the CASA described the visits as chaotic and the Agency continued to have concerns regarding Mother's ability to care for all eight children at once, particularly when she did not have assistance from another adult. At the end of May, Mother moved into the rental home and had two overnight weekend visits with all eight children, both of which went well. Shortly thereafter, though, the Agency discovered Mother had allowed Father to visit with the children in the home, in violation of the court's visitation orders. As a result, the juvenile court returned the visits to weekly supervised visits in a park and, later, in the home. In June, a Casey social worker supervised a visit in the home and noted P.B. was reluctant to leave the foster parent, but eventually did so without concern and was then clingy and stayed directly in contact with Mother throughout the visit. The social worker also noted all of the children appeared to be bonded to Mother and each other. On two subsequent visits, the social worker observed that P.B. cried when initially handed to Mother, but settled and stopped crying within a couple of minutes after the foster parents 7 left. After observing several visits, the worker stated it was evident there was a loving and positive parent-child relationship between Mother and each of the children. The CASA submitted another report in July 2015 in which she expressed concern Mother had not demonstrated she had benefited from services and had shown poor judgment by letting Father into the home against the court's orders. Thus, the CASA recommended the juvenile court terminate reunification services for Mother with respect to the youngest siblings, including P.B. Around the same time, the Casey social worker observed additional visits and noted again that the children were bonded to one another, and the Agency social worker noted Mother interacted with and held P.B. during most of an observed visit. P.B.'s therapist indicated P.B.'s anxiety around transitions had decreased. At the combined contested 12- and 18-month review hearing in late August 2015, the court returned Mother's visitation to unsupervised with overnights, ordered a 60-day trial visit, and continued the matter for an additional 75 days to allow all parties to report on the trial visit. Before the 60-day trial visit began, the children continued with extended overnight visits. The Agency reported the house was messy but there were no safety hazards, and the children seemed happy but noted the children's caregivers had expressed concerns that Father was frequently at the home and Mother was short tempered with the children. Two of the children reported their Mother had gotten upset and told the children "I'm going to beat your ass," and another reported Mother had chased him around the house and almost slapped him. Thus, the Agency expressed concern Mother was becoming frustrated with the children on these extended visits. 8 The 60-day trial visit officially began in October 2015. P.B. stopped receiving therapy at that time as the referral had been to help with transitions between Mother and the foster parents and P.B. was now placed with Mother. A CASA observed P.B. once a week during the trial visit and noted that P.B.'s personality changed dramatically; P.B. was now shy, withdrawn, whiny and at times cried for her foster parents. Mother allowed P.B.'s foster mother to continue to take P.B. to a music class she was enrolled in once a week and the CASA noted P.B. clung to the foster mother during class and did not participate as she had done in the past. The foster parents reported it was always difficult to return P.B. to Mother after their visits because P.B. would cry and state that she wanted to go to "my house, not mamas." P.B. also began using swear words and making statements like "I'm gonna hit your bot bot." By December 2015, Mother was unemployed and no longer had a source of income besides cash aid and food stamps. Although Mother continued to believe she could stay in the home she was currently renting, the CASA expressed concern Mother would not be able to maintain the household absent continued support from Casey, which was not guaranteed. The CASA also noted that P.B. and the other younger children had formed significant bonds with their foster parents who had raised them for the majority of their lives and expressed concern that Mother would fall back into old patterns absent ongoing assistance resulting in further trauma to the children, particularly since she had expressed poor judgment in allowing Father into the home in violation of court orders. The CASA therefore recommended the juvenile court place P.B. with the foster parents and terminate Mother's reunification services. 9 The Agency also noted P.B. was having a difficult time transitioning back to Mother, had become surprisingly aggressive, and had begun using inappropriate language. As P.B. had sustained several minor injuries from the other children while in her care, the Agency expressed concern about Mother's ability to supervise the younger children as well as Mother's long-term ability to safely parent P.B. and the other children. At the conclusion of the continued 18-month review hearing in December 2015, the juvenile court returned P.B. to the care of the foster parents, terminated reunification services for Mother, and set a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing for P.B.4 Mother appealed the order and the appellate court stayed the permanency hearing pending the outcome of the appeal. While the appeal was pending, Mother had liberal unsupervised visitation but only asked for one four-hour visit with P.B. each week. During the visits, Mother bathed, fed and cared for P.B. P.B. often fought with her next oldest sibling, but Mother intervened when they hit or yelled at one another. On one occasion, P.B. immediately ran to her foster parents when they arrived to pick her up and pulled back when Mother attempted to hug her goodbye. In May, this court affirmed the juvenile court's order placing P.B. with the foster parents and terminating Mother's services, noting that Mother's actions, including failing to provide adequate housing and disobeying the court order regarding visitation with Father, were a significant factor in the length of time P.B. was living with her foster 4 The court placed the other seven siblings with Mother. 10 parents and the trauma caused by her going back and forth between Mother and her foster parents. Following this court's appellate decision, the juvenile court set a date for the section 366.26 permanency hearing. At the section 366.26 hearing, Mother and the siblings argued the court should not terminate Mother's parental rights as to P.B. based on the parent-child relationship exception in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), and the sibling bond exception in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v). The juvenile court heard testimony from two Agency social workers, Mother, and two of P.B.'s siblings and accepted a number of the reports into evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court acknowledged this was a difficult case but ultimately determined neither exception applied and terminated Mother's parental rights to allow for adoption.5 Mother appeals. DISCUSSION I. General Legal Principles and Standard of Review Once the juvenile court terminates reunification services, the court's focus shifts from preserving the family to promoting the best interest of the child, and that includes the child's interest in a stable, permanent placement that allows the caregiver to make a full emotional commitment to the child. (In re Fernando M. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 529, 534.) At the section 366.26 permanency hearing, the court has three options: 5 We discuss the reasoning of the juvenile court regarding each exception in more detail below. 11 (1) terminate parental rights and order adoption as the permanent plan, (2) appoint a legal guardian for the dependent child, or (3) order the child placed in long-term foster care. (Ibid.) If the child is adoptable, adoption is the preferred plan. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573; § 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) Thus, the juvenile court will terminate parental rights to allow for an adoption unless that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under statutorily specified exceptions. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) Here, there is no dispute P.B. was generally adoptable and her foster parents were willing and able to adopt her, but Mother argues the court erred in terminating her parental rights because two of the statutory exceptions, a beneficial parent-child relationship and beneficial sibling relationships, applied to outweigh the presumption towards adoption. (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i) and (v).) We review the juvenile court's determination as to whether any of the exceptions set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B) apply under a mixed standard of review. (In re Anthony B. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 389, 395; In re Isaiah S. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 428, 437-438.) We review any underlying factual findings for substantial evidence but defer to the juvenile court's weighing of the relevant factors, and thus review the court's final determination for an abuse of discretion.6 (In re Anthony B., at p. 395; In re Isaiah S., at p. 438; see also In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314-1315 [confirming the mixed standard of review applies to both exceptions].) 6 We note that some courts have applied only a substantial evidence standard (see In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621), but, as a practical matter, the analysis is essentially the same as broad deference is afforded to the juvenile court's determination under either standard. (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351.) 12 II. The Beneficial Parent-Child Relationship Exception The beneficial parent-child relationship exception applies when "termination would be detrimental to the child" (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)) because "[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) A child will almost always benefit to some degree from interacting with his or her natural patent, but pleasant visits, frequent and loving contact, and even an emotional bond between the parent and child are not sufficient, without more, to establish the beneficial parent-child relationship exception applies. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575; In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 826-827.) Instead, the "parent must show he or she occupies a 'parental role' in the child's life" (In re Derek, p. 827), and that their relationship with the child "promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the wellbeing the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents." (In re Autumn H., at p. 575; In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 555; see In re Derek W., at p. 827.) Here, the juvenile court determined the benefit of maintaining the parent-child bond between Mother and P.B. did not outweigh the permanency of adoption. The court found Mother had been diligent about maintaining regular, weekly visits with P.B. but that her contact with P.B.'s caregivers had decreased leading up to the section 366.26 hearing. The court then found that because P.B. was so young when she was removed and had spent much of the next two years relying on her foster parents for her day-to-day care, she viewed her foster parents, as opposed to Mother, as the primary parental figures 13 in her life. Most importantly, the court found P.B. suffered harm when removed from the foster parents but that there was no evidence suggesting P.B. had any difficulty adjusting or suffered any harm when removed from Mother after the 60-day trial visit. Finally, the court expressed concern about the impermanence of guardianship, particularly since there was evidence indicating Mother did not approve of the foster parents. Thus, the court concluded a bond had not developed between Mother and P.B. that outweighed the benefits of adoption. The evidence supports the court's determination that Mother and P.B. did not have a beneficial parent-child relationship within the meaning of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). There is no dispute Mother made it a priority to visit P.B. regularly and the two interacted in a loving manner during the visits with Mother often carrying P.B. around. However, the court removed P.B. from Mother's care when she was only four months old and she spent much of the next two years of her life with her foster parents attending to her daily needs. By contrast, her visits with Mother lasted a few hours and occurred at most a couple of times a week, often with several other children present. P.B. had trouble transitioning to Mother and asked for her foster parents at times, and easily transitioned back to her foster parents at the end of visits. Thus, the evidence supports the courts conclusion that although Mother had a friendly and loving relationship with P.B., she did not have a parental relationship with P.B. of the nature contemplated by the statute. (See In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 529; In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1418-1419 [mother had frequent and loving contact with children but children considered caregiver to be their primary mother figure]; In re Angel B. (2002) 97 14 Cal.App.4th 454 [child was removed at a young age, spent few hours visiting with mother as compared to foster family, and mother-child interactions were positive but not indicative of a parent-child relationship].) Further, even if the evidence was sufficient to establish a beneficial parent-child relationship between Mother and P.B., it was reasonable for the juvenile court to find as it did that the benefits of adoption greatly outweighed any detriment P.B. would suffer by the severance of that relationship. There was no evidence indicating P.B. asked for Mother when she was with her foster parents or had trouble leaving Mother at the end of visits, but the evidence did indicate she asked for, and at times cried for, her foster parents when away from them and excitedly returned to them with no hesitation or need to transition. Perhaps even more telling, P.B. displayed anxiety and actual emotional harm when removed from her foster parents but as the juvenile court noted, there was no evidence P.B. suffered similar, or any, harm when removed from Mother at the end of the 60-day trial. (See In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 954 [beneficial parent-child relationship exception did not apply where child separated easily from mother but exhibited irritability and temper tantrums after visits, and child's mood stabilized when visits stopped].)7 Mother asserts these behaviors demonstrate nothing more than an ageappropriate need to adjust, but this explanation does not account for P.B.'s return to a 7 We recognize there were additional factors weighing in favor of adoption in the case of In re L.Y.L. that are not present here, such as the mother not expressing an interest in parenting L.Y. and L.Y. not wanting to visit with her mother. (In re L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 954.) However, as was the case with respect to L.Y.L., we conclude P.B.'s behavioral changes in response to visits with Mother were a significant and relevant factor for the juvenile court to consider in the present case. (Ibid.) 15 happy, seemingly well-adjusted child when placed back with her foster parents, despite this move being yet another adjustment for her, a fact the juvenile court reasonably considered to be significant. Moreover, while Mother asserts P.B. would benefit from a parent-child relationship with her, she does not cite any evidence indicating termination of her parental rights would significantly harm P.B. Mother argues this case is similar to In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, where the court found the beneficial parent-child relationship exception applied and precluded termination of parental rights. While there are some similarities, there are also significant differences. S.B. was three years old when the juvenile court removed her, her father had been her primary caregiver for those three years, and thus she had previously established a strong parent-child bond with him. (Id. at pp. 293, 298-300.) They then maintained that bond throughout their frequent visits, as evidenced by a bonding study and her expressed desire to stay with her father at the conclusion of their visits. (Id. at pp. 298- 300.) By contrast here, P.B. was only four months old when the court removed her, she asked for her foster parents during visits, and she willingly went with her foster parents at the end of visits. Further, Mother did not present a bonding study or any other evidence beyond the reports of generally positive and loving interactions during their visits indicating the existence a parent-child relationship between herself and P.B. (See In re Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1316 [exception did not apply where court removed child at two days old and interactions during visitation were more akin to playdates with a loving adult than parental in nature].) 16 Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's findings, and the court did not abuse its discretion in determining Mother did not have a beneficial parentchild relationship with P.B. within the meaning of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) that would preclude the termination of parental rights. III. The Sibling Relationship Exception There is also an exception to the preference for adoption where "[t]here would be substantial interference with a child's sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the child's best interest, including the child's long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) The purpose of the sibling relationship exception to termination of parental rights is to preserve long-standing sibling relationships that serve as anchors for dependent children whose lives are in turmoil. (In re Isaiah S., supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at pp. 437-438.) In determining whether the exception applies, the juvenile court must first determine if termination of parental rights would harm the potentially adoptable child by substantially interfering with a significant sibling relationship. (In re L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 952.) The court considers the nature and extent of the sibling relationship, including whether the child and sibling were raised in the same house, shared significant common experiences or have existing close and strong bonds. 17 (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(E).) If such a relationship exists, "the court then weighs the benefit to the child of continuing the sibling relationship against the benefit to the child adoption would provide." (In re L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 952-953.) In making this determination, the court considers the best interests of the child being considered for adoption, and not the best interests of other siblings. (In re Isaiah S., supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 438.) The exception rarely applies when the child at issue is young, as the need for a competent, caring and stable parent is particularly paramount in such cases. (In re Valerie A. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987, 1014.) Here, the juvenile court considered the bond from P.B.'s perspective and found that although P.B. loved her siblings, she would not be emotionally damaged if she was no longer able to see them. Further, the court found any potential harm was minimized because P.B.'s foster parents had made ongoing efforts to allow P.B. to spend time with her siblings and had expressed a willingness to continue to do so, although it also stated it would have concluded the sibling exception did not apply even if the foster parents had not done so. Thus, the court concluded it would not be detrimental to P.B. if the termination of Mother's parental rights interfered with the sibling relationship, and that it would be in P.B.'s best interests to be adopted despite any impact adoption may have on the sibling relationship. The evidence supports the juvenile court's findings. As with Mother, P.B. had not spent a significant portion of her life living with her siblings. She was only four months when the court placed her in foster care and initially only saw her siblings during weekly visits for the majority of the two years that followed. Although she showed affection to 18 some of her siblings at times, there was no evidence indicating she was particularly close with any of them, and there was some evidence her younger siblings were aggressive towards her. The older siblings testified they loved P.B. and wanted her to remain in the home, but the court correctly conducted its analysis from P.B.'s perspective, and not the siblings' perspective, and found little evidence the sibling bond was particularly beneficial to P.B. Mother argues there was evidence P.B. was part of a bonded sibling group and we agree. The Agency noted at the outset of the case that the children were part of a bonded sibling group such that reunification would be in their best interest, and the Casey social worker noted on several occasions that the children were bonded. However, the majority of these comments were in reference to the sibling group as a whole and not just P.B., who was the youngest and only four months old when removed, such that she was likely not as bonded to the siblings as they were to her or one another. Mother also asserts the children visited frequently and maintained these bonds, but the sibling visits occurred only one morning a week and the court only extended them to longer visits in the hotel and then the home for a short period approximately 15 months after P.B.'s initial removal. Meanwhile, as discussed above, P.B. had formed strong bonds to her foster parents over the course of those 15 months. The social worker and the CASA thus agreed that while P.B. loved her siblings, she would not suffer any significant harm because of the termination of Mother's parental rights and the severance of any sibling relationships, and that the benefits of adoption outweighed any harm that might occur. The juvenile court was entitled to assess the credibility of the witnesses and to give significant weight to the 19 social worker and CASA's concurring opinions. (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 53.) Further, as the court noted, the foster parents had facilitated sibling visits in the past and agreed to do so on an ongoing basis. Although this was not the determining factor in the court's decision, it was reasonable for the court to consider the likelihood that P.B. would continue to have contact with her siblings even if the court terminated Mother's parental rights. (See In re D.O. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 166, 175.) Mother asserts future visits were even more tenuous because of her own deteriorating relationship with the foster parents, but there is no indication the foster parents would not allow for sibling visits based on any conflicts they had with Mother. Further, as noted, the court considered the circumstances of mother's relationship with the foster parents and found, if anything, they weighed in favor of affording P.B. increased permanency through adoption. Further still, the juvenile court expressly considered the option of formal guardianship as opposed to adoption but determined guardianship was not in P.B.'s best interests because it could lead to instability. Substantial evidence supports that finding. P.B. had already demonstrated substantial harm from instability insofar as she had experienced anxiety, withdrawal, and other negative effects when she separated from her foster parents. Thus, we conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's findings and the court did not abuse its discretion in determining, based on those findings, that the 20 sibling-relationship exception did not outweigh the benefits of adoption for P.B. or preclude the termination of parental rights. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. BENKE, Acting P. J. WE CONCUR: HUFFMAN, J. NARES, J.