Filed 6/17/26 In re P.S. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
In re P.S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court C104034
Law.
THE PEOPLE, (Super. Ct. No.
Plaintiff and Respondent, JJCJVDE20240000263)
v.
P.S.,
Defendant and Appellant.
P.S. (the minor) was a passenger in a stolen car whose driver refused to yield
when law enforcement initiated a traffic stop. Following a high speed pursuit, the car
became disabled, and the minor and the other occupants fled from the car and ran from
police. The juvenile court determined the minor received the stolen vehicle (Pen. Code,
§ 496d, subd. (a))1 and that he resisted, obstructed, or delayed a peace officer (§ 148,
subd. (a)(1)). On appeal, he contends that substantial evidence does not support either
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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count. We agree as to the receiving a stolen vehicle offense. We therefore reverse the
judgment as to that count but otherwise affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In April 2024, the district attorney filed a juvenile wardship petition (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 602, subd. (a)) against the minor alleging nine firearm-related offenses2 with
attached gang enhancements (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). The petition further alleged the
minor took a vehicle without the owner’s consent (vehicle theft) (§ 10851, subd. (a)—
count 10), received a stolen vehicle (§ 496d, subd. (a)—count 11), evaded a pursuing
peace officer while operating a motor vehicle (Veh. Code, § 2800.1, subd. (a)—count
12), and resisted, obstructed, or delayed a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)—count 13).
During a contested jurisdictional hearing, the victim M.C. testified that he reported
his Infiniti car (the Infiniti) stolen on March 3 or 4, 2024. At the time, no one else had
permission to drive the Infiniti and he had both sets of keys for the car. M.C. did not
know who stole his car.
Shortly before midnight on March 6, 2024, San Joaquin County Sheriff’s
Department Deputy Carson Shah was on patrol in south Stockton when he spotted the
Infiniti being driven with a broken rear passenger window. Deputy Shah called for
backup and initiated a traffic stop, but the Infiniti sped away. The driver turned down a
dead end road, and the Infiniti became disabled near a diverting canal. The minor and
2 These offenses included: carrying a concealed firearm in a vehicle (§ 25400, subds.
(a)(3), (c)(2), (c)(3)—counts 1-3, respectively), carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle
while in a public place (§ 25850, subd. (a)—count 4), carrying a stolen loaded firearm on
his person while in a public place (§ 25850, subds. (a), (c)(2)—count 5), carrying a
loaded firearm on his person in a public place while actively participating in a criminal
street gang (§ 25850, subds. (a), (c)(3)—count 6), having an unregistered loaded firearm
on his person and/or vehicle (§ 25850, subds. (a), (c)(6)—count 7), possessing a firearm
as a minor (§ 29610—count 8), and possessing live ammunition as a minor (§ 29650—
count 9).
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three others exited the Infiniti, and the minor attempted to flee into the diverting canal.
Evidence conflicted on whether the minor fled from the rear driver’s or passenger’s side
door.
Deputy Shah ordered the minor to show his hands and get out of the canal. The
minor complied. Deputy Shah testified that retrieving the minor from the canal did not
prevent him or the other responding officers from pursuing and detaining the other
fleeing suspects. Officers recovered three discarded firearms on the ground near the
Infiniti’s passenger side.
Detective John Griffin of the Stockton Police Department testified as an expert on
the West Side Bloods gang in Stockton. Two of the occupants of the Infiniti were
members of or associated with the West Side Bloods or the Crow Valley Bloods; both
gangs were rivals to the Fly Boys or South Mob gang. According to Detective Griffin,
the Infiniti was driving through the Fly Boys/South Mob gang territory when it was
apprehended; none of the occupants had cell phones on them when arrested.
Based on his training and experience, Detective Griffin testified that gang
members commonly possess stolen vehicles, which they use to commit other crimes or as
getaway cars. Gang members sometimes do not carry cellphones on them when
committing crimes to prevent law enforcement from later determining their location
based on cell phone tower data near a crime scene. In his opinion, the minor and his
compatriots (who were dressed in all black with several firearms but without cell phones)
intended to commit a gang shooting in the Fly Boys/South Mob’s territory before police
contacted them the night of the incident. However, Detective Griffin conceded that he
was unaware of any connection between the minor with any gang in Stockton, that the
minor had not been documented as a gang member by the Stockton Police Department,
that he had not previously been investigated for gang-related activity, that he had not seen
the minor on any gang-related social media accounts, and that the present incident was
the only time the minor was linked to one of the documented gang members.
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The juvenile court sustained the petition as to count 11 (receiving the stolen
vehicle) and count 13 (resisting, obstructing, or delaying a peace officer). The court
found the prosecution failed to prove the remaining counts and allegations true beyond a
reasonable doubt and dismissed them. In doing so, the court found “there was no
evidence that [the minor] drove or otherwise took this vehicle.”
Regarding the receiving stolen property offense, the juvenile court found the
minor “aided in withholding from its owner property that had [been] stolen, he knew it
had been stolen, and that he knew the presence of the property. He was riding in the
vehicle, and when the vehicle was stopped[,] he fled from it. To the extent of jumping
into the cold waters of a canal.” The court found two or more people could possess the
property at the same time and the minor’s “flight after arrest [was] evidence of guilt.”
Regarding the resisting offense, the juvenile court found that when the deputy
activated his lights and sirens, the minor knew or reasonably should have known that he
was a peace officer attempting to perform his lawful duties. By fleeing from the stolen
car and jumping into the canal, the court found the minor willfully resisted, obstructed,
and delayed the deputy from performing his lawful duties.
In April 2025, the juvenile court adjudged the minor (now over 18 years of age) a
ward of the court, and ordered him to serve 50 hours of community service. The court
declared the receipt of stolen property offense a felony, and determined the maximum
period of confinement as two years four months. The court awarded the minor 27 days of
credit for time served. The minor timely appealed.
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II. DISCUSSION
A. Receipt of Stolen Property
The minor first asserts that there is insufficient evidence to sustain the petition on
the receiving a stolen vehicle count (§ 496d, subd. (a)—count 11).3 He argues substantial
evidence does not show he aided in withholding the stolen vehicle from its owner, as the
juvenile court found, because nothing shows he took any affirmative action to aid and
abet the receipt of stolen property, and that his mere presence as a passenger, without
more, is not sufficient to show he possessed the stolen vehicle. We agree.
The same standard governs review of the sufficiency of the evidence in adult
criminal cases and juvenile cases. (In re Amanda A. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 537, 545; In
re Matthew A. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 537, 540.) We examine the whole record in the
light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (In re
Amanda A., supra, at pp. 545-546.) While substantial evidence includes circumstantial
evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, such inferences may not be based
on suspicion alone, or on imagination, or speculation. (People v. Grant (2020) 57
Cal.App.5th 323, 330.)
Section 496d, subdivision (a) provides in part: “Every person who buys or
receives any motor vehicle … that has been stolen or that has been obtained in any
manner constituting theft or extortion, knowing the property to be stolen or obtained, or
3 The People argue sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the
minor aided and abetted in vehicle theft. Our review of the record discloses no such
finding. The juvenile court expressly found there was no evidence that the minor drove
or otherwise took the vehicle, and it dismissed the vehicle theft count after finding the
prosecution failed to prove the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, the court
found that the minor aided in withholding the stolen vehicle from the owner for purposes
of sustaining the petition on the receiving stolen property count.
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who conceals, sells, withholds, or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding any motor
vehicle … from the owner, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, shall be
punished by imprisonment .…” To sustain the petition on the receiving a stolen vehicle
count, the People had to prove: (1) the motor vehicle was stolen; (2) the minor knew it
was stolen; and (3) the minor received, concealed, or withheld the stolen vehicle from its
owner. (People v. Land (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 220, 223-224 (Land); In re Anthony J.
(2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 718, 728; see CALCRIM No. 1750.)
Receipt, or possession of stolen property, may be actual or constructive and need
not be exclusive. (See Land, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 223 [construing similar
language in context of § 496, general receiving stolen property statute].) “Physical
possession is also not a requirement. It is sufficient if the defendant acquires a measure
of control or dominion over the stolen property.” (Id. at p. 224.) Constructive possession
occurs when the defendant maintains control or a right to control the property; possession
may be imputed when the property is found in a place that is immediately and exclusively
accessible to the defendant and subject to his or her dominion and control, or to the joint
dominion and control of the defendant and another. (People v. Rushing (1989)
209 Cal.App.3d 618, 621-622.)
Possession may be established through circumstantial evidence and resulting
reasonable inferences. “However,… mere presence near the stolen property, or access to
the location where the stolen property is found is not sufficient evidence of possession,
standing alone, to sustain a conviction for receiving stolen property.” (Land, supra,
30 Cal.App.4th at p. 224; People v. Myles (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 423, 429 [evidence the
defendant was passenger in car and found standing close to car trunk containing stolen
goods insufficient to infer possession for conviction of receiving stolen property].)
“Something more must be shown to support inferring of [dominion and control]. Of
course, the necessary additional circumstances may, in some fact contexts, be rather
slight.” (People v. Zyduck (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 334, 336 [evidence defendant was
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passenger in car with stolen chain saw in rear seat insufficient evidence to infer his
possession of stolen item].)
In this case, the minor does not contest two of the three elements of the crime of
receiving stolen property—that the car was stolen and that he knew it was stolen. M.C.
reported his car stolen, and a trier of fact reasonably could infer that the minor, who was
sitting in the back seat of the stolen car near where a back window had been broken, and
who fled from the police when officers attempted to pull the car over, was aware the car
was stolen.
The issue, then, is whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s
additional finding that the minor possessed or aided in withholding the stolen vehicle
from M.C. We find Land instructive on this point.
In Land, the reviewing court considered under what circumstances a passenger in
a stolen car, knowing the car is stolen, may be properly found to have possession or
dominion or control over the stolen vehicle to support a conviction for receiving stolen
property. (Land, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 225.) The court found substantial evidence
that the defendant possessed the stolen vehicle, even though he was merely a passenger:
he and the driver were friends; they drank and did drugs together; the defendant knew the
car was stolen; the car was stolen near the defendant’s residence, and they drove it within
an hour of the theft; they used the vehicle for their own benefit and enjoyment; the car
was instrumental to their joint criminal enterprise that evening when they used it during a
store theft and a robbery, assault, and attempted murder of a second victim; and the
defendant made no effort to disassociate himself from his friend or the stolen vehicle
during the possession although he had ample opportunity. (Id. at p. 228.)
Here, the evidence falls far short of the evidence found sufficient in Land. The
People’s evidence at most demonstrated the minor’s mere presence as a passenger in the
stolen vehicle. No evidence established who stole the car, or when the minor first
became a passenger in the car after it was stolen. No evidence identified the individual
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driving the car, or the minor’s relationship to that individual, and no evidence showed the
minor was friends with any of the individuals in the car. Nor did any evidence show the
minor had engaged in criminal activity with the other occupants in the past. Although
Detective Griffin opined the group intended to commit a gang-related shooting before
they were apprehended, Detective Griffin conceded the minor was not a documented
gang member, he had not previously been investigated for gang-related activity, he was
not seen on any gang-related social media accounts, and only three guns were recovered
from the scene even though there were four occupants in the car. In sum, the record is
devoid of evidence showing that the minor exercised dominion and control over the
stolen vehicle as a passenger, i.e., that the minor actually or constructively possessed the
stolen vehicle.
The People cite CALCRIM No. 376, the pattern jury instruction on possession of
recently stolen property as evidence of a crime, to support the juvenile court’s true
finding on the receipt of stolen property offense. While it is true that conscious
possession of recently stolen property itself raises a strong inference that the possessor
knew the property was stolen (People v. O’Dell (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1574;
People v. Anderson (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 414, 420-421), the issue here is whether, as a
mere passenger, he actually or constructively possessed the stolen car as a section 496d
conviction requires. CALCRIM No. 376 itself recognizes that evidence regarding the
time, place, and manner of possession may be relevant when determining whether a
defendant is guilty of receiving stolen property, like the factors considered in Land. As
we have explained, unlike in Land, substantial evidence here does not support the
juvenile court’s finding that the minor possessed the stolen vehicle regardless of whether
he knew the vehicle was stolen. To the extent the juvenile court noted that a defendant’s
flight may show a consciousness of guilt under CALCRIM No. 376, evidence that a
defendant fled does not prove guilt by itself, particularly where no evidence showed a
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defendant-passenger possessed the stolen vehicle in the first instance. (See CALCRIM
No. 372.)
Similarly, we conclude substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s
finding that the minor aided in withholding the stolen vehicle from its owner. As the
minor correctly notes, aiding and abetting the commission of a crime “ ‘require[s] some
affirmative action.’ ” (People v. Partee (2020) 8 Cal.5th 860, 868.) “ ‘Mere presence at
the scene of a crime which does not itself assist its commission or mere knowledge that a
crime is being committed and the failure to prevent it does not amount to aiding and
abetting.’ ” (People v. Pettie (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 23, 57; People v. Sedillo (2015)
235 Cal.App.4th 1037, 1039 [presence at crime scene, by itself, is insufficient to establish
aiding and abetting; relevant factors for determining aider and abettor liability may
include presence, companionship, and conduct before and after offense].)
Here, the People presented no evidence to show the minor directed the driver to
speed away from the pursuing officers or otherwise directed any movement of the Infiniti
as a passenger. There was no evidence that the minor had an opportunity to get out of the
car before the traffic stop, or once the driver sped away from the officers. The record is
also devoid of any evidence regarding the minor’s relationship to any of the other
occupants of the car, and the gang expert conceded the minor had no documented gang-
related contacts apart from this one incident. Absent evidence showing the nature and
extent of the relationship between the minor and the other occupants, or the
circumstances of the minor’s affirmative actions beyond simply running from the Infiniti,
we conclude the evidence established nothing more than that the minor was a passenger
in the stolen car, but not that he aided and abetted in the vehicle theft or in withholding
the stolen vehicle from its rightful owner. Accordingly, we shall reverse the juvenile
court’s finding that the minor received the stolen vehicle in violation of section 496d.
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B. Resisting, Delaying, or Obstructing a Peace Officer
The minor next contends that substantial evidence does not support the judgment
as to the resisting charge. He argues the officers lacked specific facts showing he was
involved in criminal activity when they first tried to stop the car, he did not willfully and
knowingly resist a peace officer because the driver, and not the minor, was the initial
target of the officer’s efforts to stop the vehicle, and he complied with the officers’
commands to stop after initially fleeing from the vehicle when it became disabled. We
are not persuaded.
The elements of a violation of section 148, subdivision (a)(1) are the following:
“ ‘ “(1) the defendant willfully resisted, delayed, or obstructed a peace officer, (2) when
the officer was engaged in the performance of his or her duties, and (3) the defendant
knew or reasonably should have known that the other person was a peace officer engaged
in the performance of his or her duties.” ’ ” (Yount v. City of Sacramento (2008)
43 Cal.4th 885, 894-895.) Before a person can be convicted of violating section 148,
subdivision (a), there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the officer was acting
lawfully at the time the offense against him was committed. (In re Joseph F. (2000)
85 Cal.App.4th 975, 982.)
“[P]hysical resistance, hiding, or running away from a police officer have been
found to violate section 148.” (In re Muhammed C. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1329;
see also In re T.F.-G. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 893, 903 [“One who flees an officer’s
lawful attempts to detain violates section 148, subdivision (a)(1)”]; People v. Allen
(1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 981, 986 [the defendant’s flight and concealment delayed the
officer’s performance of his official duty, violating § 148].) A suspect running away
from officers attempting to detain him is a “garden-variety section 148 violation.” (In re
Andre P. (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1164, 1169.) A suspect who is aware officers are
attempting to detain him has a duty to permit himself to be detained. (Allen, supra, at
p. 985.)
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In this case, Deputy Shah was engaged in the lawful execution of his duties when
he attempted to pull the Infiniti over after verifying it was stolen. Although the officer
activated his lights and sirens and initiated a lawful traffic stop, the Infiniti refused to
yield, reaching speeds of approximately 70 miles per hour in a residential area. As the
court found, and the minor does not dispute, he knew the Infiniti was stolen. Under these
circumstances, it was reasonable to conclude the driver and each of the other occupants,
including the minor, were aware law enforcement wanted to detain them all in relation to
investigating the stolen vehicle. Rather than remain in the Infiniti to be detained by the
pursuing officers once it became disabled, the minor and each of the other occupants fled
on foot. The minor ran down into the diverting canal and was attempting to cross the
canal to prevent the officers from detaining him. This flight from the stolen vehicle
amply supports the juvenile court’s finding that the minor resisted, delayed, or obstructed
the officers in performing their lawful duties. That the minor eventually responded to the
officer’s command to come out of the canal does not mean his initial flight was
insufficient to satisfy the statute.
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III. DISPOSITION
The receipt of stolen vehicle offense (count 11) is reversed. The judgment is
otherwise affirmed.
/S/
RENNER, J.
We concur:
/S/
EARL, P. J.
/S/
FEINBERG, J.
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