Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

In re Oliver F. CA2/1

Filed 8/24/26 In re Oliver F. CA2/1
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 8/24/26 In re Oliver F. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re OLIVER F., B352325

a Person Coming Under the (Los Angeles County
Juvenile Court Law. Super. Ct. No. 25CCJP03598)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DANA F.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Cristina Gutierrez Legaspi, Judge. Affirmed.
John P. McCurley, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Brian Mahler, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________

Appellant Dana F. (Mother) challenges the juvenile court’s
assertion of jurisdiction over her son Oliver F. (born 2019). The
child’s presumed father, Justin C. (Father), did not participate in
the proceedings below and is not a party to this appeal. As
substantial evidence supports the court’s jurisdictional findings,
we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We summarize only those portions of the record pertinent
to our consideration of Mother’s jurisdictional challenge.
A. Initial Referral and Investigation
At the time relevant to this appeal, Oliver lived with
Mother. Father was absent; he had an extensive criminal
history, had absconded from a halfway house in Missouri, and
was a fugitive with an outstanding warrant for his arrest.
On November 18, 2025, the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a
referral alleging general neglect of Oliver by Mother. Neighbors
had told police officers conducting a welfare check at Mother’s
apartment that Mother appeared mentally ill and had been
acting erratically and breaking things for the past six months.
Neighbors also reported hearing the child inside Mother’s home
sounding distressed, scratching a wall, and saying “ ‘ let me out.’ ”
When police arrived, no one was at Mother’s apartment but the
front door was open. When later contacted about what police had

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observed, one of the officers told DCFS that he saw both sliding
bolt and chain locks outside what appeared to be the child’s
bedroom.
On November 18, 2025, DCFS spoke to staff at Oliver’s
school, who said that his attendance was sporadic and that
Mother had checked the child out of school the previous week.
DCFS went to Mother’s apartment; the front door was broken off
its hinges and no one appeared to be home. One neighbor said
she had recently seen the child on the balcony alone at 4:30 a.m.
talking to himself. Another neighbor told DCFS that she had
called police based on concerns about the child’s safety. While in
her own apartment above Mother’s, the neighbor heard the child
scream “let me out” from what the neighbor believed was the
child’s bedroom.
Maternal aunt Chelsea B.,1 who lived in Florida, told DCFS
that Mother had diagnoses of bipolar disorder and schizophrenia,
and that Chelsea did not believe Mother was taking her
medication. Chelsea reported that a few weeks earlier Mother
had left California in an electric car. Mother abandoned the car
in Kentucky after it lost charging power, and Mother and Oliver
were taking buses back to California. Chelsea learned of
Mother’s travel when Mother unexpectedly showed up at the
home of another maternal aunt, Shannon M., in Missouri.
Shannon told Chelsea that Mother appeared to be manic and
suffering from mental health issues, and that Oliver was autistic
and kept misbehaving. Mother told Shannon that Mother had
taken the child out of school because of his behavioral issues and

1 The record sometimes also spells maternal aunt’s first
name as “Chelsey.”

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had deactivated her Facebook account. After staying for a while,
Mother and Oliver left Shannon’s home abruptly and departed
for California.
After hearing from Shannon, Chelsea reached out to a
family friend who lived in Southern California, R.C., asking if he
could check on Mother. R.C. went to Mother’s apartment, but no
one responded when he knocked on the door. Saying he did so at
Chelsea’s request, R.C. forced the door open (which knocked it off
its hinges) and found Mother sitting in the dark. Mother
appeared to be “high.” R.C. did not see Oliver. Upon hearing this
from R.C., Chelsea wondered if Mother was abusing Adderall as
Mother was addicted to it in the past. When DCFS contacted
R.C., he confirmed Chelsea’s account but said Mother appeared
either “high as a kite or depressed.” He also stated that he saw a
deadbolt lock outside a bedroom door in the apartment.
When DCFS returned to Mother’s home later on
November 18, 2025, no one answered the door. DCFS then saw
the garage door open and Mother exit through it looking
disheveled. When DCFS attempted to speak to Mother, she
refused to engage, got in her car with Oliver, and drove off.
During DCFS’s investigation, Oklahoma Child Protective
Services (OCPS) contacted DCFS. OCPS stated that local police
in Oklahoma had received calls about Mother when she and the
child were in the state, including a report on October 18, 2025,
that Mother was seen hitting the child in a parking lot and
having difficulty controlling his behavior. When local police in
Oklahoma contacted Mother, she told them that she and Oliver
were using ride shares to go to Missouri to visit family. Mother
asked the officers for OCPS’s phone number so she could ask

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about “custody and possible adoption” of the child because she
could not control his behavior.
DCFS spoke to maternal aunt Shannon about Mother’s
visit. Shannon reported that in mid-October 2025, Mother called
in a manic state needing somewhere to stay as Mother had
abandoned her electric car after running out of money to recharge
it. Mother said she was trying to get Oliver’s attention deficit
disorder (ADD) medication refilled. Mother admitted to abusing
ADD medication, and said she was suffering from withdrawal
symptoms which were causing her erratic behavior. Shannon
said that when Mother showed up at Shannon’s house in
Missouri, “nothing made sense.” Mother had no change of clothes
for her or the child, said she had accidentally smashed her
cellphone, and was very vague about what was going on.
Shannon said Oliver acted like a “ ‘Tasmanian devil’ ” and often
caused trouble while at Shannon’s home. After staying a week,
Mother left to retrieve her car. Shannon later received a text
message from Mother indicating that she and Oliver had
returned to California.
B. Dependency Petition and Initial Proceedings
On November 24, 2025, DCFS filed a Welfare and
Institutions Code2 section 300 petition alleging Oliver was at
substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm based on
Mother’s failure or inability to adequately supervise him and/or
Mother’s inability to regularly care for him as a result of her
untreated mental illness.

2 Unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

5
That same day, DCFS executed a removal order at Mother’s
home with police officers present. Upon entering the home, a
DCFS social worker observed that it smelled of smoke and was in
disarray, including broken mirrors, the mattress in the child’s
bedroom flipped on its side along with carved scratches in the
wall, and a hammer near the kitchen sink. A police officer
informed DCFS that the smoke had resulted from Mother
smashing her cellphone. DCFS then observed Mother’s broken
cellphone submerged in water to prevent it from reigniting. After
Oliver was taken into protective custody, DCFS learned Mother
had been involuntarily hospitalized due to concerns with self-
harm.
On November 25, 2025, the juvenile court held an initial
hearing at which Mother was not present due to her
hospitalization. The court ordered the child to remain detained
from parental custody and to be suitably placed by DCFS.
On December 2, 2025, Mother met with DCFS. Mother
denied any mental health diagnoses or current substance abuse.
Mother believed that the people DCFS previously interviewed
during its investigation “had hacked into her phone and stolen
her identity.” Mother also believed unnamed people from Texas
had stolen her identity a few months earlier. Mother explained
that she took the child with her when she ended up in Missouri
because she wanted to see family in-person due to concerns that
the messages Mother was receiving from purported family
members were instead coming from those who hacked her phone.
Mother asserted DCFS had spoken with people impersonating
the maternal aunts rather than Chelsea and Shannon. Mother
said when she spoke to police in Oklahoma, she was feeling
stressed from “everything that had happened to her” including

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the child’s misbehavior. Mother said she took the child out of
school after returning to California because she was concerned
about his safety “due to the people watching her and hacking into
her phone.”
On December 3, 2025, DCFS spoke to Ms. G, one of the
child’s then-current resource parents. Ms. G. said Oliver was
very nervous about his visit with Mother that day, and stated he
did not want to return to Mother’s home and instead remain with
the resource family.
Later that same day, a social worker met with Oliver before
the child visited Mother at DCFS’s offices. When asked if he
knew why he was removed from Mother’s care, the child replied,
“ ‘Because my mom hammered her phone and smoke came out
and the fireman came to put out the fire.’ ” After the visit began,
Mother watched some videos on her cell phone. When the child
asked if he could also watch, Mother told him not to touch the
phone’s screen because “this is how they stole their identity.”
On December 4, 2025, Ms. G. informed DCFS that the child
had returned from his visit with Mother with a backpack, dog
harness, and shoes that Mother had given him. While emptying
out the backpack, Ms. G. “felt something strange and heard a
bing sound,” and discovered a tracking device sown into the
backpack’s lining. Ms. G. later also discovered tracking devices
secreted inside the dog harness and one of the shoes. Fearful
that Mother now knew her address, which was confidential,
Ms. G. requested that the child be placed in a new home. When
asked about these devices, Mother claimed she forgot there was a
tracking device in the backpack and asserted it was not active.
Mother also told the DCFS social worker who called about the
tracking devices that Mother would like to forward false

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information written by the original investigating DCFS worker,
and “information about her incident of ‘identity theft’ and
‘burglary.’ ”
In mid-December 2025, DCFS spoke again with maternal
aunt Chelsea. Chelsea reported that Mother had a history of
mental health and substance abuse issues. Mother’s mental
health issues included being diagnosed with bipolar disorder and
schizophrenia “a long time ago,” and having periodic manic
episodes and hallucinations. One recent hallucination was that
both maternal aunts “were AI” and “people [were] hacking into
her accounts.” Mother’s substance abuse included using
methamphetamine when she did not have her prescribed
Adderall and abusing drugs when pregnant with Oliver.
During DCFS’s investigation, Oliver displayed concerning
outbursts. During a monitored visit with Mother on
December 23, 2025, the child became upset when not allowed to
play games on Mother’s phone. He threw Mother’s purse and
stomped on it; he then found a bottle of water, dumped the water
on the floor, and refused to clean it up. After Mother left to get
some towels, the child tried to block the door and called Mother a
“fucking asshole.” Mother again asked the child to clean up the
water; the child refused and remained upset, telling Mother “ ‘I
hate you,’ ” and “ ‘I never wanted you [to] be [my] mom.’ ”
Eventually the child calmed down.
Outbursts also occurred with others besides Mother. On
January 12, 2026, the child’s placement changed. During a
medical visit in connection with that change, the child had a
violent outburst that included hitting, kicking, and biting. DCFS
also conducted a forensic interview in connection with the change
in placement. Although calm during the interview, the child

8
later became aggressive and violent when he was unable to find
games on the social worker’s phone. The child “trashed the whole
exam room,” “throwing furniture” and “br[eaking] equipment”
despite the social worker’s attempts to redirect him and calm him
down.
On January 14, 2026, the child’s then-current resource
parents requested a change in placement following an incident
earlier that same day. The resource parents had asked Oliver to
get ready because they needed to take another child in their care
to an appointment. Oliver “began to scream” that he did not
want to leave because he would lose his internet connection. The
resource parent replied they could reconnect to the internet at
the appointment facility and proceeded to buckle Oliver into his
car seat. The child unbuckled himself twice and threw items at
the resource parent. He also hit, scratched, and cursed at the
resource parent. The resource parent was unable to calm the
child down. A DCFS social worker advised an emergency
psychiatric evaluation, which occurred.
The next day, January 15, 2026, a social worker at the
child’s elementary school reported to DCFS that Oliver kicked
another student in the face and shoved two others while having a
tantrum; he referred to the children he injured as “ ‘fucking
asshole[s]’ ” and said “ ‘I want to kill them.’ ” The child also
injured four adults, including biting the school social worker so
hard that he broke her skin, and had previously punched, kicked,
and spat at others at the school.
Also on January 15, 2026, DCFS met with Mother and the
child’s wrap-around care team to discuss how best to address the
child’s behavioral issues and Mother’s goals to reunify.

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C. Jurisdiction/Disposition Hearing
On January 22, 2026, the juvenile court held a combined
jurisdiction and disposition hearing. The day before that
hearing, DCFS filed an amended section 300 petition. Count b-1,
which was carried over from the original petition, continued to
allege that Mother’s mental health issues rendered her incapable
of providing regular care and supervision for the child, and that
Mother had failed to consistently participate in mental health
treatment services and to regularly take prescribed psychotropic
medication. A new count, count b-2, alleged that Mother had
demonstrated a limited ability to provide appropriate parental
care and supervision in response to the child’s assaultive
behavior.
In connection with the jurisdiction portion of the hearing,
Mother called A.G. (a DCFS social worker involved with the
family) as a witness. A.G. testified that Oliver “can be very
violent towards staff at the school, his mother, caregivers, and
other children. He can hit, spit, kick, bite, and throw things.
There’s been multiple occasions where he’s left marks and bruises
on other staff at the school, kids, and the caregiver.” These
behaviors resulted in approximately five changes of placement.
A.G had monitored Mother’s visits, and testified Mother would
“[s]ometimes” “de-escalate Oliver” when he had tantrums or
outbursts during visits. Mother responded to the child’s
behavioral issues in different ways, including (1) trying to calm
the child down, (2) not engaging with the child, which was
sometimes effective, and (3) leaving the visitation room, which
included one instance where Mother left for over an hour due to
her not being able to deal with the child’s behaviors.

10
Counsel for both DCFS and the minor asked the court to
sustain the amended petition and assume jurisdiction over the
child pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1). Mother’s
counsel asked the court to dismiss the amended petition in its
entirety.
The juvenile court struck count b-1 and sustained count b-
2. As to count b-1, the court found DCFS failed to prove a nexus
between Mother’s history of mental and emotional problems and
the child being at the defined risk of harm. As support for its
ruling on count b-2, the court pointed to evidence that Mother
had barricaded the child in a room so that he could not leave,
resulting in the child screaming for help and to be let out, and
evidence of Mother hitting Oliver in Oklahoma before bystanders.
As to disposition, the juvenile court declared the child a
dependent of the court, ordered him returned to Mother’s
physical custody, granted Mother family maintenance services,
and denied Father any services based on his whereabouts being
unknown.
DISCUSSION
Mother contends substantial evidence does not support the
court’s sustaining of count b-2.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Section 300, subdivision (b)(1) permits a juvenile court to
assume jurisdiction over a child if a preponderance of the
evidence shows that “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a
substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm
or illness, as a result of . . . [¶] . . . [t]he failure or inability of the
child’s parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child.”
(§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(A); see also § 355, subd. (a).) “A jurisdiction

11
finding under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), requires [DCFS] to
prove three elements: (1) the parent’s . . . neglectful conduct or
failure or inability to protect the child; (2) causation; and
(3) serious physical harm or illness or a substantial risk of
serious physical harm or illness.” (In re Cole L. (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 591, 601.) Section 300, subdivision (b)(1) does not
require “a finding that a parent is at fault or blameworthy for her
failure or inability to supervise or protect her child.” (In re R.T.
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 624.)
We review whether substantial evidence supports a
challenged jurisdictional finding. (In re I.C. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 869,
892.) “Substantial evidence is a deferential standard, but it is not
toothless.” (Id. at p. 892.) “ ‘To be substantial, the evidence must
be of ponderable legal significance and must be reasonable in
nature, credible, and of solid value.’ ” (In re Cole L., supra, 70
Cal.App.5th at p. 602.) “We do not evaluate the credibility of
witnesses, reweigh the evidence, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.”
(In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.) “[W]e draw all
reasonable inferences in support of the findings, consider the
record most favorably to the juvenile court’s order, and affirm the
order if supported by substantial evidence even if other evidence
supports a contrary conclusion.” (Ibid.)
B. Substantial Evidence Supports Count b-2
Mother acknowledges Oliver’s behavioral issues “presented
challenges for her” and she made “less-than-perfect efforts to
manage them.” But she asserts that to demonstrate Oliver was
at substantial risk of serious physical harm, DCFS had to (and
failed) to show she “had a complete inability to manage these
behaviors.”

12
There is substantial evidence that Oliver presented
behavioral challenges to his caregivers and engaged in behavior
that endangered himself and others. Those behaviors posed
significant challenges for all involved, including Mother. The
evidence also shows that Mother repeatedly demonstrated an
inability to manage these behaviors, and that inability posed a
substantial risk of serious injury to the child. Mother had a
deadbolt and a chain lock on the outside of the child’s bedroom,
and repeatedly imprisoned the child inside his room for long
enough that neighbors became concerned. Oliver was forced to
claw at the walls and scream to be let out. Locking a six-year-old
in a room unsupervised for an extended period poses a
substantial risk of serious physical harm to that child. So did
Mother’s excessive physical discipline such as that observed in
Oklahoma. Mother’s lack of supervision also included allowing
Oliver to be alone on an apartment balcony at 4:30 a.m.; for a
child with impulse control issues, that also posed a substantial
risk of serious physical harm to the child.
Mother contends that Oliver was no longer at risk by the
time of the jurisdictional hearing because she was taking
advantage of DCFS referrals for services. We commend Mother
for engaging with these services, but we decline her invitation to
reweigh the evidence. Although the evidence Mother highlights
about her participation in services favored her position, other
evidence before the juvenile court pointed in the opposite
direction. Mother had been inconsistent with her psychotropic
medication and mental health treatment. When contacted by the
police in Oklahoma, Mother did not request help in managing
Oliver’s behavior but asked for information about how she could
give him away to state authorities. She sabotaged one of Oliver’s

13
placements (causing more emotional disruption to him) by
attempting to secret tracking devices in items she gave him; that
in turn appears to have exacerbated Oliver’s outbursts rather
than helped to limit or manage them. During one supervised
visit, Mother left Oliver in the care of the monitor for over an
hour rather than attempt to manage Oliver’s behavior.3
The underlying tenor of Mother’s argument appears to be
that her inability to handle Oliver’s outbursts was no worse (and
in fact better) than anyone else’s, and that his outbursts were
more frequent with others rather than with her, such that it was
unfair for the court to single her out. But as already explained,
section 300, subdivision (b)(1) “authorizes dependency
jurisdiction without a finding that a parent is at fault or
blameworthy for her failure or inability to supervise or protect
her child.” (In re R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 624.) Our
affirmance of the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings does not
cast blame Mother’s way. “ ‘The loss of parental control is rarely
if ever attributable solely to the parent or the child. It is instead
the result of a long and complicated chain of actions and
reactions culminating in the child’s refusal to submit to parental
authority. To attempt to affix responsibility on one party or the
other is alien not only to the spirit and letter of the juvenile court

3 These facts stand in contrast to those In re Joaquin C.
(2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 537, on which Mother relies. In that case,
the Court of Appeal held a section 300, subdivision (b)(1) charge
unsupported where there was no evidence that a mother with
mental illness had hit her child or “left [him] alone or
unsupervised,” and was instead “ ‘very attentive’ to her son’s
needs” and cared for him appropriately. (In re Joaquin C., at
pp. 562-563.)

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laws, but to any realistic view of family relationships.’ ” (Id. at
p. 635.)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s jurisdiction order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

WEINGART, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

BENDIX, J.

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