Filed 8/26/26 In re Neena A. CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
In re NEENA A., a Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
________________________________ B348078
(Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 19CCJP01014-C)
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
MILDRED N.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Lucia J. Murillo, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed in
part and dismissed in part.
Kineta Flowers and Mary Manuel, under appointment by
the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Navid Nakhjavani, Principal
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_____________________________
INTRODUCTION
Mildred N. appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction
findings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,
subdivisions (a) and (b)(1),1 and disposition orders declaring her
daughter, Neena A., a dependent child of the court, removing
Neena from Mildred, and requiring monitored visitation. Mildred
argues substantial evidence did not support the court’s
jurisdiction findings and disposition orders. We affirm the
jurisdiction findings and dismiss Mildred’s appeal from the
disposition orders as moot.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In April 2025 the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services received a report that Mildred and
14-year-old Neena got in a fight, that Mildred slapped Neena five
times and punched her chest 16 times, and that Neena refused to
return home. Neena had slight redness below her collar bone,
but no marks or bruises.
Neena told the social worker that she arrived home late
after school because she was looking for her backpack, but that
1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
2
her mother did not believe her. Neena said that Mildred yelled at
her and slapped her in the face and that Neena hit her mother
back. When Neena told Mildred she was going to leave, Mildred
blocked the door. Eventually Neena left, went to a friend’s house,
and stayed overnight at her boyfriend’s house. Neena said that
this was the first time she and Mildred hit each other, but that
Mildred previously hit her with a belt and threatened to hit her
with a hanger.
Mildred said she knew Neena lied about looking for her
backpack because she told the same story twice before. Mildred
said that Neena “got in her face” and that Mildred “pushed her in
her chest and made her sit back down on the couch.” Neena said
“she did not want to be in the home and she was going to leave”
and started hitting Mildred. Mildred “pushed Neena in her chest
to get her out of her face.” When Neena tried to leave, Mildred
blocked the door, and they “started tussling.” A cousin arrived
and called the police.
Mildred said that Neena had been “ditching school and
going to her boyfriend’s house,” that Neena was “disrespectful at
home,” and that she “throws a fit when she does not get what she
wants.” Mildred said that she had “done safety plans in the past
but they did not work” and that Neena’s behavior was “getting
worse.” She said that Neena had “threatened her and told her
that she is going to have her put in jail” and that Mildred would
let Neena go into foster care because she did not want to risk
losing her two younger children, who were four and 10 years old.
The Department filed a petition on behalf of the three
children under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j).2 The
2 The juvenile court later dismissed allegations relating to
the two younger siblings.
3
Department alleged in counts a-1 and b-1 Mildred “physically
abused” Neena, “struck [Neena’s] face with [her] hand,”
“forcefully pushed [Neena] back down onto a couch,” and “threw
items around the home.” The Department also alleged that on
prior occasions Mildred hit Neena with belts and threatened to
hit her with a hanger. The Department alleged Mildred’s
physical abuse endangered Neena’s physical health and safety,
created a detrimental home environment, and placed Neena and
her siblings at risk of serious physical harm, damage, danger,
and physical abuse. The Department alleged in count b-2 that
Mildred was “unwilling and unable to continue
providing . . . Neena with appropriate care and supervision, due
to [Neena’s] behavior, including runaway behavior,” and that
Mildred refused to implement a safety plan and asked the
Department to detain Neena.
At the detention hearing the juvenile court detained Neena
and ordered monitored visitation for Mildred. At the jurisdiction
hearing the juvenile court sustained counts a-1, b-1, and b-2 and
dismissed two counts under section 300, subdivision (j). At
disposition the court removed Neena from Mildred, ordered
Mildred to participate in individual counseling and conjoint
counseling when recommended by Neena’s therapist, and ordered
monitored visitation. Mildred timely appealed from the court’s
jurisdiction findings and disposition orders. While this appeal
was pending, at the six-month review hearing under
section 366.21, subdivision (e), in July 2026 the juvenile court
returned Neena to Mildred.3
3 We take judicial notice of the juvenile court’s July 22, 2026
order. (See Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.) Under the
Supreme Court’s decision in In re S.R. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 1042
4
DISCUSSION
A. Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile Court’s
Findings Under Section 300, Subdivisions (a) and (b)
1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Under section 300, subdivision (a), the juvenile court may
assert jurisdiction if “the child has suffered, or there is a
substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm
inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by the child’s parent or
guardian.” “‘Nonaccidental’ generally means a parent or
guardian ‘acted intentionally or willfully.’” (In re Cole L. (2021)
70 Cal.App.5th 591, 601; see In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 629.)
Section 300, subdivision (b)(1), provides the juvenile court
may exercise jurisdiction where a “child has suffered, or there is a
substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm
or illness, as a result of . . . [¶] (A) [t]he failure or inability of the
child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the
child.” Under this provision the child protective agency must
prove “‘(1) the parent’s or guardian’s neglectful conduct or failure
or inability to protect the child; (2) causation; and (3) serious
physical harm or illness or a substantial risk of serious physical
harm or illness.’” (In re S.F. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 696, 712; see
In re Cole L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 601.)
We review the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings for
substantial evidence. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773; In re
Mildred’s challenge to the jurisdiction findings based on physical
abuse is not moot because sustained allegations of physical child
abuse are reportable for inclusion in California’s Child Abuse
Central Index.
5
Miguel J. (Aug. 3, 2026, B339932) ___ Cal.App.5th ___, ___
[2026 WL 2225188, p. 6].) We “draw all reasonable inferences in
support of the findings, view the record favorably to the juvenile
court’s order and affirm the order even if there is other evidence
to the contrary.” (In re A.L. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 628, 645; see
Miguel, at p. 6.) “‘We do not consider the credibility of witnesses
or reweigh the evidence.’” (In re L.B. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 402,
411-412; see In re S.F., supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 713.)
2. Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile
Court’s Jurisdiction Findings Based on
Mildred’s Physical Abuse of Neena
Mildred argues substantial evidence did not support the
juvenile court’s findings. Substantial evidence, however,
supported the findings for counts a-1 and b-1 based on Mildred’s
physical abuse of Neena.
During the physical altercation with Neena, Mildred
slapped Neena in the face, hit her in the chest, pushed her onto
the couch, and held her down. When Neena tried to leave,
Mildred blocked the door and fought (“tussled”) with Neena.
Mildred denied hitting Neena, but admitted that she pushed
Neena in the chest and that she might have scratched her.
Though Neena did not suffer serious physical harm during this
altercation, the court could reasonably find that, based on the
continuing conflict between Mildred and Neena, there was a
substantial risk Mildred would inflict serious physical harm in
the future. (See § 300, subd. (a) [“a court may find there is a
substantial risk of serious future injury based on the manner in
which a less serious injury was inflicted”]; In re Marquis H.
(2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 718, 726 [“the court is vested with broad
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discretion in determining whether ‘there is a substantial risk
that the child will suffer . . . serious physical harm inflicted
nonaccidentally’”]; see also In re O.M. (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th
489, 507 [“When evaluating the potential of future risk, the
juvenile court may consider a parent’s insight (or lack thereof)
into the problems that led to the child welfare agency’s
intervention.”].)
Mildred had struggled to manage Neena’s behavior since
Neena began dating her boyfriend eight months earlier. Mildred
stated: “‘It’s been a major change with Neena, she’s a liar and
acting as if she is gangsta to fit in with her boyfriend.’” The
record does not support Mildred’s contention the altercation was
“a single, isolated altercation that both parties acknowledged had
never occurred before and had not recurred.”4 Though it may
have been the first time Mildred and Neena came to blows, even
by Mildred’s account their previous arguments had come close.
Mildred said the incident was not the first time Neena had yelled
at Mildred and got “in [her] face as if she want[ed] to hit”
Mildred, but “it was the first time she had the ‘balls’ to actually
do something” to Mildred. Because Neena’s relationship with her
boyfriend was a continuing source of conflict between Neena and
Mildred, and there was no evidence Neena’s relationship with the
boyfriend had ended, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude
physical altercations were likely to recur, creating a substantial
risk Mildred would inflict serious physical harm on Neena in the
future. (See In re L.B., supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 410 [“‘The
4 Because Neena left home immediately after the altercation
and the Department placed her in a foster home, that the
altercation did not recur is not probative of the risk Neena would
suffer physical harm had she continued to live with Mildred.
7
court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to
assume jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to protect the
child.’”]; In re Cole L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 601 [same]; see
also In re Miguel J., supra, ___ Cal.App.5th at p. ___ [2026 WL
2225188, p. 5] [a “‘“parent’s ‘“[p]ast conduct may be probative of
current conditions” if there is reason to believe that the conduct
will continue’”’”].)
Mildred’s reliance on In re Isabella F. (2014)
226 Cal.App.4th 128 is misplaced. In Isabella F. the “mother
became physical” with her nine-year-old daughter after the
daughter “resisted getting ready for school,” inflicting scratches
on the daughter’s face and a gouge mark on her earlobe. (Id. at
pp. 131-132.) The daughter said the mother hit her in the face,
grabbed her neck, and locked her in the bathroom. (Id. at p. 131.)
The mother said that the daughter “was having a ‘really bad
tantrum’” and that she tried to pull her into the bathroom to calm
down. (Id. at p. 132.) The child protective agency filed a petition,
but the next day recommended returning the daughter to the
mother. (Id. at p. 133.) Two weeks later, the daughter told the
social worker that the incident “was the first time anything like
that had happened,” that she was not afraid of her mother, and
that she did not want to be removed from her mother’s care. (Id.
at pp. 133-134.) At the jurisdiction hearing the mother, who was
attending anger management classes and participating in
therapy, “acknowledged that she did not handle the incident with
her daughter in the best way possible and that she could use
support dealing with anger management,” “took responsibility for
the incident,” and “testified that the services she had received so
far had helped . . . .” (Id. at pp. 134-135.) The court in Isabella F.
held substantial evidence did not support the finding that the
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child suffered serious physical harm or that she faced a
substantial risk of serious physical harm. (Id. at pp. 138-139.)
The court stated the “primary motivating factor in declaring
jurisdiction appear[ed] to have been to offer [the] mother
services.” (Id. at p. 139.)
Unlike the mother in Isabella F., Mildred did not take
responsibility for the incident or admit she needed help managing
her anger. Unlike the daughter in Isabella F., Neena did not
want to return home. Nor did the juvenile court in this case
sustain allegations against Mildred simply to offer her services.
In re J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1010, which Mildred
cites, is also distinguishable. In J.N. the intoxicated parents got
into a car accident, injuring their young children. (Id. 1014.) The
court in J.N. reversed the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings,
stating: “Despite the profound seriousness of the parents’
endangering conduct on the one occasion in this case, there was
no evidence from which to infer there is a substantial risk such
behavior will recur.” (Id. at p. 1026.) The court stated that the
juvenile court in that case did not find the parents were
substance abusers, that the evidence did not establish the
parents consumed alcohol on a regular basis, and that “both
parents were remorseful, loving, and indicated that they were
willing to learn from their mistakes.” (Ibid.) Here, in contrast,
as discussed substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s
finding there was a substantial risk Mildred’s behavior would
recur.
Mildred also argues she acted in self-defense. She contends
that Neena “struck first” and that she had to “defend herself from
her daughter’s physical aggression.” But Neena stated Mildred
hit her first, and the juvenile court found Neena’s statements
9
were credible. (See In re C.L. (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 53, 67 [“we
defer to the juvenile court’s credibility findings”].) Moreover,
even if Neena hit first, Mildred admitted she pushed Neena onto
the couch and blocked the door when she tried to leave. Mildred
provides no authority for her assertion her “physical response in
the context of mutual combat” was “categorically different from
the nonaccidental infliction of harm.” Even if Mildred hit or
pushed Neena in response to Neena’s physical aggression, the
juvenile court could reasonably conclude Mildred’s conduct was
physical abuse, not reasonable self-defense. Mutual combat is
not a defense to child abuse.
Finally, Mildred argues the juvenile court “failed to apply
the reasonable parent discipline doctrine.” She contends a
“parent has the right to reasonably discipline a child and to
administer reasonable punishment without being liable for
abuse.” Mildred forfeited the argument by not raising it in the
juvenile court. (See In re P.L. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 406, 409
[a “‘reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a
ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the
trial court’”].) Even if not forfeited, the argument is meritless
because there was no evidence the altercation had anything to do
with discipline.
Mildred relies on In re D.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 634,
where the court stated “‘“a parent has a right to reasonably
discipline his or her child and may administer reasonable
punishment . . . .”’” (Id. at pp. 640-641.) The court in D.M.
articulated three factors for deciding whether a parent’s use of
discipline on a particular occasion is reasonable: “(1) whether the
parent’s conduct is genuinely disciplinary; (2) whether the
punishment is ‘necess[ary]’ (that is, whether the discipline was
10
‘warranted by the circumstances’); and (3) ‘whether the amount of
punishment was reasonable or excessive.’” (Id. at p. 641.)
Mildred argues that D.M. is “directly on point” and that the
juvenile court should have applied those three factors.
Even assuming that D.M. was correctly decided and that
the court’s three-part test is the appropriate standard, the case
does not support Mildred. In D.M. the mother told the social
worker she disciplined her young children by spanking them “on
the buttocks with her bare hand or with a sandal.” (In re D.M.,
supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 637.) The court held the juvenile
court erred in sustaining allegations under section 300,
subdivision (a), based on a “categorical view that ‘hitting children
with shoes’ is ‘physical abuse’ and ‘not a proper form of
discipline.’” (D.M., at p. 637.) Unlike the mother in D.M.,
Mildred never claimed she was disciplining or punishing Neena;
she denied hitting Neena, claimed Neena hit her, and explained
her actions by saying “she was defending herself and she was not
going to allow her daughter to be in her face and hitting her.”5
5 Because we affirm the jurisdiction findings on counts a-1
and b-1 based on physical abuse, we do not consider whether
substantial evidence also supported the jurisdiction findings on
count b-2 based on Mildred’s inability or unwillingness to
continue to care for Neena. (See In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266,
283 [“‘“[a]s long as there is one unassailable jurisdictional
finding, it is immaterial that another might be inappropriate”’”];
In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773 [same]; In re Landon M.
(2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 686, 693 [same].)
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B. Mildred’s Appeal from the Order Removing Neena
and Requiring Monitored Visitation Is Moot
“‘A court is tasked with the duty “‘to decide actual
controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and
not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions,
or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the
matter in issue in the case before it.’” [Citation.] A case becomes
moot when events “‘render[ ] it impossible for [a] court, if it
should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant him any
effect[ive] relief.’” [Citation.] For relief to be “effective,” two
requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff must complain of
an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be redressable or
capable of being rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks.’”
(In re S.R. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 1042, 1051; see In re D.P. (2023)
14 Cal.5th 266, 277; In re Jayden A. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1334,
1343.)
“A reviewing court must “‘decide on a case-by-case basis
whether subsequent events in a juvenile dependency matter
make a case moot and whether [its] decision would affect the
outcome in a subsequent proceeding.”’” (In re S.R., supra,
18 Cal.5th at p. 1051; see In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276.)
“‘[W]hen a parent has demonstrated a specific legal or practical
consequence that will be averted upon reversal, the case is not
moot, and merits review is required. When a parent has not
made such a showing, the case is moot, but the court has
discretion to decide the merits nevertheless.’” (S.R., at p. 1052;
see D.P., at p. 283.)
Because the juvenile court returned Neena to Mildred at
the six-month review hearing, Mildred’s appeal from the court’s
order removing Neena and requiring monitored visitation is
12
moot. We cannot grant Mildred any effective relief because she
has already obtained the relief she seeks in her appeal from the
disposition orders. (See In re Jayden A., supra, 111 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1347 [“The court’s orders returning [the child] to [the
father’s] custody and terminating jurisdiction rendered [the]
appeal moot.”].) In a supplemental brief Mildred argues we
should exercise our discretion to review the juvenile court’s
disposition orders “because they were derived from the juvenile
court’s erroneous jurisdictional findings.” Because substantial
evidence supported the jurisdiction findings, we decline to
exercise our discretion to review the merits of Mildred’s moot
appeal from the juvenile court’s removal and visitation orders.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings are affirmed.
Mildred’s appeal from the orders removing Neena and requiring
monitored visitation is dismissed as moot.
SEGAL, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
FEUER, J.
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