Filed 9/29/26 In re N.V. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re N.V. et al., Persons Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E086612
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. DPSW2400208)
v. OPINION
J.B.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Sean P. Crandell, Judge.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
Robert McLauglin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Jamila T. Purnell, and Julie Jarvi, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant, J.B. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court’s findings and
orders asserting jurisdiction over her minor children, N.V. and M.B., and removing them
from her care. We reverse the court’s jurisdictional findings in part but otherwise affirm.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In early June 2024, plaintiff and respondent the Riverside County Department of
Social Services (DPSS) received a referral alleging that Mother rear-ended another car
while N.V. (then six years old) and M.B. (then 11 months old) were in her car. Mother
was taken to the hospital, where she appeared to be under the influence of alcohol given
her erratic behavior and a strong odor of alcohol emanating from her. A blood alcohol
test revealed that Mother’s blood alcohol content (BAC) was .185 percent, more than
double the legal driving limit. But when a DPSS social worker spoke with Mother at the
hospital, she denied she was driving drunk. About a week later, N.V. and M.B. were
taken into protective custody and placed with the maternal grandmother.
During DPSS’s subsequent investigation, they learned that Mother had a history of
domestic violence with both fathers. Father V. reported that, in 2017, Father V. requested
a restraining order protecting him and N.V. against Mother. Father V. alleged that Mother
physically assaulted him, threatened to kill him and his family, and she was arrested. The
court eventually entered a three-year restraining order protecting Father V. and N.V.
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against Mother, and Mother’s request for a restraining order against Father was denied.
Mother filed for permanent restraining orders against Father twice in 2019, but they were
both denied. Father V., however, was arrested in 2019 and 2023 for domestic violence
against Mother.
Father V. reported that Mother had physically attacked him at least 12 times during
their relationship. He also claimed that she violated the restraining order three times. On
one occasion, Father V. was asleep in his car before picking up N.V. and woke up to
Mother yelling at him. When Father V. tried to get N.V., Mother kicked him in the crotch
and swung at his face, so Father V. pushed her away.
In February 2022, Mother obtained a three-year restraining order against Father V.
Mother alleged, among other things, that Father V. assaulted her in front of N.V. The
court awarded Mother sole legal and physical custody of N.V. and ordered Father V. to
complete a 52-week batterer’s program.
In April 2024, Mother obtained a one-year restraining order against Father J., after
he physically abused her while she was pregnant with M.B. The court awarded Mother
sole legal and physical custody of M.B. and ordered Father J. to complete a 52-week
batterer’s program.
N.V. reported that he saw Father J. choke Mother and throw a phone at her. He
also reported that he saw Mother throw a milkshake at Father J.
DPSS also discovered during its investigation that Mother had been charged with
driving under the influence in 2024, but the charged were dismissed and she was instead
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convicted of reckless driving.
In June 2025, DPSS filed a petition on the children’s behalf under Welfare and
1
Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1) (section 300(b)(1)). The petition
alleged, among other things, that (b-1) while driving with the children in her car, Mother
drove with a blood alcohol content (BAC) level of .185 percent and crashed her car; (b-2)
Mother has a criminal history of driving under the influence and reckless driving, which
“plac[ed] her children at risk of physical and/or emotional harm”; (b-3) Mother and
N.V.’s father, R.V. (Father V.) have a child welfare history due to domestic violence; (b-4)
Mother and Father V. have a history of engaging in domestic violence in front of N.V.;
and (b-5) Mother and M.B.’s father, M.J. (Father J.) have a history of engaging in
domestic violence, which “plac[es] the children at risk of physical and/or emotional
harm.”
In August 2024, M.B. was placed with Father J. while N.V. was placed with the
paternal grandparents.
In the months after DPSS filed the petition, Mother routinely refused to cooperate
with DPSS and did not properly coparent with the fathers. DPSS staff “reported constant
harassment from [] [M]other,” and considered her behavior to be consistently “hostile,
harassing, and argumentative.” Other DPSS workers described Mother as consistently
“combative.” In DPSS’s view, Mother “engaged in this type of behavior until she gets
her way.” At times, Mother would cooperate with DPSS, but “becomes difficult to
1
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
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engage in conversation with” when she gets an answer or response from DPSS she does
not like or agree with. DPSS viewed Mother’s behavior toward the fathers as “bullying.”
Mother’s uncooperative, argumentative behavior continued with DPSS and both fathers
throughout the proceedings.
On one occasion at a DPSS office, Mother spent the time she was supposed to be
having a supervised visit with the children disrupting other meetings and visits. Mother
gave unsolicited advice to other DPSS clients and followed some into the parking lot.
Mother insisted on being present at all meetings of any kind involving the
children, but both fathers were concerned for their safety because of Mother’s erratic
behavior. DPSS created group chats with the fathers to cooperate drop-offs and pick-ups,
but Mother consistently used the chats to argue and complain.
Although Mother passed several random drug tests, she was a “no show” for at
least two. Mother also demanded that she decide when to drug test.
At one point, Mother accessed M.B.’s medical account and changed the login
information so Father J. could not access it. DPSS found this “extremely concerning”
because M.B. was in Father J.’s custody.
Both fathers consistently reported that Mother did not coparent with them.
Because Mother’s behaviors had “escalated,” DPSS recommended that her visits, which
had become unsupervised, return to being supervised in a DPSS office. Although the
fathers and grandparents were cooperative with DPSS, Mother’s behavior made it so that
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DPSS still had to coordinate exchanges of the children and communication between the
parties.
Because of Mother’s behavior, DPSS filed an amended petition in February 2026,
to add an allegation under section 300, subdivision (c) (c-1). That allegation stated, “the
children are suffering serious emotional harm due to the mother’s ongoing efforts to
interfere with the fathers’ reunification efforts.”
The juvenile court held a contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing over the course
of several months between November 2025 and March 2026. The court eventually
sustained the (b-1) through (b-5) allegations, as well as the (c-1) allegation. The court
then ordered the children dependents, removed them from Mother’s care and custody and
placed them in their respective father’s care with family maintenance services, and
ordered reunification services for Mother.
Mother timely appealed.
III.
DISCUSSION
Mother challenges all the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings as lacking
sufficient evidence. As to the (b-2) and (b-5) allegations, DPSS concedes, and we agree,
that section 300(b) does not provide for jurisdiction for “emotional harm.” (See In re
Daisy H. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 713, 718, disapproved on other grounds in In re D.P.
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 278.) We therefore reverse the allegations’ language about
“and/or emotional harm.” We otherwise affirm all the (b) allegations. But we reverse the
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(c-1) allegation because there is insufficient evidence that Mother’s behavior caused the
children to suffer “severe emotional damage.” We nonetheless affirm the order removing
the children from Mother’s care.
A. Standard of Review
We review the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and disposition findings for substantial
evidence. (In re Tania S. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 728, 733.) Under this standard, we view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s order and draw every
reasonable inference in support of the judgment. (In re Marina S. (2005) 132
Cal.App.4th 158, 165.) We do not reweigh the evidence nor assess credibility. (Ibid.)
We must affirm “even if other evidence supports a contrary conclusion.” (In re
Christopher L. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1326, 1333-1334.)
“[T]he burden of proof is substantially greater at the dispositional phase than it is
at the jurisdictional phase if the minor is to be removed from his or her home. [Citation.]
[The] burden of proof in jurisdictional phase is preponderance of the evidence; [the]
burden of proof at disposition phase is clear and convincing evidence.” (In re Basilio
T. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 155, 169.)
B. Section 300(b) findings
Section 300, subdivision (b)(1), allows the juvenile court to assume dependency
jurisdiction when “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will
suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her
parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child, . . . or by the willful or
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negligent failure of the parent or guardian to provide the child with adequate food,
clothing, shelter, or medical treatment . . . .”
“[S]ection 300 requires proof the child is subject to the defined risk of harm at the
time of the jurisdiction hearing,” although the parent’s “‘“[p]ast conduct may be
probative of current conditions” if there is reason to believe that the conduct will
continue.’” (In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 601-602.)
The “‘three elements’” for jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b) are “‘(1)
neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms; (2) causation; and (3)
“serious physical harm or illness” to the minor, or a “substantial risk” of such harm or
illness.’” (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 628, italics omitted.) “‘The court need not
wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take the steps
necessary to protect the child.’” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)
Substantial evidence supports all the juvenile court’s section 300(b) findings
(except for the language about emotional harm, which we reverse).
The (b-1) finding alleged that Mother got into an accident while driving drunk
while the children were in the car. The (b-2) finding alleged that Mother has a history of
driving under the influence, as evidence by an arrest for driving under the influence
(allegedly of marijuana) in 2014, which Mother claimed her attorney “got [] down” to a
“wet reckless.”
There was ample evidence to support both findings. As to the (b-1) allegation,
Mother’s BAC at the hospital after the accident (.185 percent) was far above the legal
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limit. As to the (b-2) allegation, Mother pled guilty to reckless driving while under the
influence of marijuana. The juvenile court thus properly found that Mother drove under
the influence at least once before driving while highly intoxicated and crashing her car
while the children were in it, both of which supported the court’s assertion of jurisdiction
over the children.
The juvenile court also reasonably found that Mother’s refusal to admit that she
was driving drunk during the accident and her failure to accept responsibility for her
actions further supported jurisdiction. Mother continued to deny that she drove drunk up
through her testimony at the jurisdiction hearing. Mother’s denial that she put her
children in serious risk of harm or death by driving drunk, coupled with her previous
driving under the influence, provided strong support for the juvenile court’s finding the
(b-1) and (b-2) allegations true, because “[o]ne cannot correct a problem one fails to
acknowledge.” (In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197; see also In re
A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293 [“‘[D]enial is a factor often relevant to determining
whether persons are likely to modify their behavior in the future without court
supervision.’”].)
This is true even though DPSS had “no concern for substance abuse” in January
2025 since Mother had been testing negative. The court could reasonably conclude that
about six months of sobriety was insufficient to find that Mother’s substance abuse no
longer posed a risk to the children, particularly given her previous instance of driving
under the influence (even if it occurred in 2014) and her steadfast denial that she was
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even drinking in the first place when the accident occurred. (See In re M.R. (2017) 8
Cal.App.5th 101, 107 [single drunk driving incident sufficient for jurisdictional finding];
In re S.F. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 696, 717-718 [juvenile court need not accept social
service agency’s assessment of ongoing risk].) Mother’s situation is thus not like the
parents’ situation in In re J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1010, which involved a single
instance of drunk driving after which “both parents were remorseful, loving, and
indicated that they were willing to learn from their mistakes.” (See also In re B.L. (2025)
111 Cal.App.5th 151, 161 [parent’s minimization of and secrecy around drunk driving
supported jurisdiction].)
What’s more, this case does not involve just a single instance of drunk driving, but
domestic violence as well. Substantial evidence also supports the juvenile court’s finding
true the (b-3), (b-4), and (b-5) allegations. These allegations asserted that Mother and the
fathers engaged in domestic violence, which placed the children at risk of substantial
harm. There is ample evidence to support these allegations and the juvenile court’s
corresponding assertion of jurisdiction. (See In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227, 238
[“Exposure to domestic violence may support jurisdiction under subdivision (b)(1) of
section 300.].”)
Mother and Father V. engaged in domestic violence for years, from 2017 until at
least 2023. During that time, they both obtained restraining orders against each other due
to domestic violence, and they both were ordered to complete a year-long batterer’s
program. Father V. was arrested twice for abusing Mother. Father V. claimed Mother
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engaged in at least a dozen acts of domestic violence against him during their
relationship, three of which occurred when he had a restraining order against her. Father
V.’s mother (N.V.’s grandmother) claimed that Mother threatened to “kick[] [her] ass”
and kill her.
Mother and Father J. likewise engaged in domestic violence. Mother obtained a
restraining order against him in 2024, which expired in April 2024, only about two
months before DPSS’s involvement in this case. N.V. witnessed at least some of the
domestic violence, including seeing Father J. choke Mother and throw a phone at her, and
Mother throwing a milkshake at Father J. N.V. also saw Mother’s friend stab Father V.
Although a DPSS social worker testified at the jurisdiction hearing in November
2024 that she had no “current concerns” about the “historical” domestic violence between
Mother and the fathers because there had been no instances of it since DPSS’s
involvement in June 2024, the juvenile court nonetheless properly sustained the (b-3)
through (b-5) allegations concerning their domestic violence.
But, given the lengthy history and severity of the domestic violence between
Mother and the fathers (particularly with Father V.), the court reasonably found that
domestic violence remained a concern, even there were no instances of it since the
dependency proceedings began in June 2024 and the juvenile court’s assertion of
jurisdiction in March 2025. Mother had consistently engaged in domestic violence with
Father V. since 2017, about eight years before the jurisdiction hearing, and Mother’s year-
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long restraining order against Father J. expired only a couple months before DPSS got
involved in this case.
Given the parties’ multiple instances of domestic violence over the course of many
years, the court reasonably found that the parents’ domestic violence put the children at
risk, even though they had not engaged in any in the months between the petition’s filing
and the jurisdiction hearing, they maintained different residences, and had ended their
relationships. Their lengthy history of domestic violence suggested that it was likely to
continue, particularly given that some of it occurred during child exchanges and the
parents continued to have very high-conflict, acrimonious relationships when
coparenting. (See In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 134 [parents’ “lengthy history
of domestic violence” placed the child at a substantial risk of physical harm]; In re M.W.
(2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1454 [“past abuse or violent behavior may predict future
abuse”]; In re R.C. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 930, 940 [when parents have children
together “‘[t]hey’re still going to be interacting with each other’”].) “The court need not
wait until the child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps
necessary to protect the child,” and the court “may consider past events in deciding
whether a child presently needs the court’s protection.” (In re N.M. (2011) 197
Cal.App.4th 159, 165.) The fact that N.V. witnessed several acts of violence further
supported the juvenile court’s assertion of jurisdiction here. Substantial evidence thus
supports the juvenile court’s finding the (b-3), (b-4), and (b-5) allegations true.
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C. Section 300(c) findings
The juvenile court sustained the (c-1) allegation, which stated in full: “the children
are suffering serious emotional harm due to the mother’s ongoing efforts to interfere with
the fathers’ reunification efforts.” We conclude substantial evidence does not support this
finding.
Section 300(c) supports juvenile court jurisdiction “in two situations: (1) when
parental action or inaction causes the emotional harm, i.e., when parental fault can be
shown; and (2) when the child is suffering serious emotional damage due to no parental
fault or neglect, but the parent or parents are unable themselves to provide adequate
mental health treatment.” (In re Alexander K. (1993) 14 Cal. App. 4th 549, 557.) This
case involves the first situation. DPSS thus had to “prove three things: (1) the offending
parental conduct; (2) causation; and (3) serious emotional harm or the risk thereof, as
evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal or untoward aggressive behavior.”
(Ibid.)
The statute thus “seeks to protect against abusive behavior that results in severe
emotional damage. We are not talking about run-of-the- mill flaws in our parenting
styles—we are talking about abusive, neglectful and/or exploitive conduct toward a child
which causes any of the serious symptoms identified in the statute. (In re Alexander K.,
supra,14 Cal.App.4th at p. 559.)
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We note at the outset that DPSS does not allege Mother was directly emotionally
abusive toward N.V. and M.B. DPSS instead argues that Mother’s behavior toward
2
DPSS and the fathers caused the children to suffer serious emotional harm.
As to M.B., there is insufficient evidence that he suffered “serious emotional
harm” as defined in section 300(c). The only evidence DPSS cites to support their
argument otherwise is that Father J. reported that M.B. was “moody, almost like a
zombie, whiney, and wants everything” after returning from weekend visits with Mother,
and that he took “about a whole day to readjust.” DPSS makes no attempt to explain how
this behavior qualifies as “serious emotional harm,” which section 300(c) limits to
“severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal or untoward aggressive behavior.” Notably,
when asked at the jurisdictional hearing whether Mother’s behavior was causing the
children emotional harm, the social worker focused solely on N.V. without mentioning
M.B. And DPSS also does not even try to explain how M.B.’s behavior was caused by
Mother’s allegedly abusive conduct. (Cf. In re Alexander K., supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p.
559 [reversing section 300(c) findings because they “focus[ed] on the child’s behavior
and reactions, not the father’s behavior].)
We acknowledge it may have been exceptionally difficult, if not impossible, to
prove M.B. was suffering from “serious emotional damage” due to Mother’s conduct
2
Although DPSS correctly notes that section 300(c) applies “to a child who is at
substantial risk of suffering serious emotional damage even when there is insufficient
evidence of actual harm,” DPSS does not argue that is the case here. (In re D.P. (2015)
237 Cal.App.4th 911, 919.) DPSS instead argues that both children actually suffered
serious emotional damage because of Mother’s behavior.
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given that he was not even two years old at the time of the jurisdictional hearing. But, on
this record, there is simply no evidence that M.B. suffered serious emotional harm
because of Mother’s behavior. (In re A.J. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1104 [10-year-
old child suffered “severe anxiety and emotional damage, as demonstrated by her
nightmares about Mother taking her away from Father, her fear of Mother, and her belief
Mother was crazy”]; see also In re Alexander K., supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 559 [section
300(c) is concerned with “abusive, neglectful and/or exploitive conduct toward a child
which causes any of the serious symptoms identified in the statute”].) We therefore
reverse the section 300(c) finding as to him.
The record presents a closer call as to N.V., but we conclude there is likewise not
substantial evidence that he suffered serious emotional damage because of Mother’s
behavior. To support its argument otherwise, DPSS relies exclusively on the jurisdiction
hearing testimony of a DPSS social worker. The social worker testified that N.V.’s
behavior while in Father V.’s care after visits with Mother showed that he was suffering
“emotional harm” because of Mother’s behavior. The social worker claimed that N.V.:
(1) had “outbursts;” (2) no longer had nightmares after returning to Father V.’s care; (3)
once poked himself with a toy and claimed he did so because DPSS’s involvement with
the family is “all his fault,”; (4) “was struggling in school” but was “doing a little bit
better” after returning to Father V.’s care; and (5) N.V. was initially closed off to DPSS
staff, appeared fearful of them, and was not allowed to talk to them.
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We do not doubt nor downplay that N.V. suffered “emotional harm” because of his
parents’ poor coparenting, the dependency proceedings, or Mother’s inappropriate
behavior toward the fathers and DPSS. But section 300(c) jurisdiction requires that the
3
child suffer (or be at risk of suffering) “severe emotional damage,” which is limited to
“severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior.” (See e.g., In
re A.J., supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 1104 [child suffered “severe anxiety and emotional
damage, as demonstrated by her nightmares about Mother taking her away from Father,
her fear of Mother, and her belief Mother was crazy”]; In re Roxanne B. (2015) 234
Cal.App.4th 916, 921 [child suffered serious emotional damage “in the form of major
depressive disorder” and “suicidal ideations”]; see also In re Matthew S. (1996) 41
Cal.App.4th 1311, 1320 [Mother’s psychosis and delusions brought “a foreboding sense
of dread, danger and catastrophe to the lives of her children,” which forced them “to
shoulder a tremendous burden”].)
The record notably lacks any psychological evaluation of N.V., any evidence from
a medical professional discussing his emotional struggles, or any evidence clearly
showing he suffered severe emotional damage. (See In re Brison C. (2000) 81
Cal.App.4th 1373, 1380 [reversing section 300(c) finding in part because “[w]hile Brison
mentioned having nightmares . . . the record contains no details. Occasional nightmares
are not per se abnormal. No psychological testimony was presented”]; In re Roxanne B.,
3
Again, DPSS does not argue N.V. was at risk of suffering severe emotional
damage.
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supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 921 [child had suicidal ideations].) Instead, DPSS relies
solely on the social worker’s handful of examples of “emotional harm” that N.V.
exhibited. But DPSS cites no authority, and we are unaware of any, that suggests N.V.’s
emotional struggles, while tragic and concerning, rise to the level of “severe emotional
damage” under section 300(c). In our view, there is no evidence that N.V. suffered severe
anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or aggressive behavior. We therefore reverse the section
300(c) finding as to him.
D. Removal
Mother contends the juvenile court erred in removing the children from her care.
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We disagree.
Section 361(c)(1) provides that in order to remove a child from their parents’
physical custody “the juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence that (1)
there ‘would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical
or emotional well-being’ of the child in the parents’ home, and (2) ‘there are no
reasonable means by which the [child’s] physical health can be protected
without’ removal.” (In re Zoe H. (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 58, 71.) We review the
juvenile court’s removal order for substantial evidence. (Ibid.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s order removing the children
from Mother’s care. To begin with, she drove highly intoxicated with them in the car and
4
Mother first contends the removal order is moot because the jurisdictional
findings should be reversed. Because we sustain most of those findings, the order is not
moot.
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rear-ended someone. Throughout the proceedings, she refused to take responsibility for
doing so and thus refused to acknowledge the life-endangering risk she placed her
children in. This, coupled with her previous instance of driving while intoxicated,
provided sufficient evidence for the juvenile court to find by clear and convincing
evidence that the children would remain in substantial danger if left in her care. (See I.J.,
supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 778 [“‘Some risks may be substantial even if they carry a low
degree of probability because the magnitude of the harm is potentially great.’”].)
There were no reasonable means to protect the children without removing them
from Mother’s care. Mother contends the children could have safely been placed in her
care while under DPSS’s supervision, but ample evidence suggests otherwise. As
outlined above, Mother consistently, and fervently, refused to cooperate with DPSS
throughout the entirety of the proceedings. Mother’s behavior and failure to progress
with her case plan led to her visits reverting from unsupervised to supervised. And
despite begin offered services, Mother refused to sign a release of information so that
DPSS could verify her progress. Mother also violated several court orders, including not
appearing at any DPSS office except for visits and Father V.’s restraining order against
her.
Given Mother’s lack of cooperation DPSS, her combative and argumentative
behavior with DPSS staff and both fathers, and her failure to make substantive progress
in her services, it was reasonable for the court to infer that there were no reasonable
means to protect the children short of removal.
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IV.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s (b-2) and (b-5) jurisdictional findings are reversed insofar as
the court found jurisdiction proper on the ground that Mother placed the children at risk
of “emotional harm.” The juvenile court’s (c-1) jurisdictional finding is reversed. In all
other respects, the juvenile court’s findings and orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J.
We concur:
MILLER
Acting P. J.
FIELDS
J.
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