Filed 9/8/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re N.S., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G065591
v. (Super. Ct. No. 25DL0203)
N.S., OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Joseph Kang, Judge. Affirmed.
Alexander Amar Kannan, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General,
Robin Urbanski and Monique Myers, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
* * *
This Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 case arises from a
police officer’s search of N.S. for weapons at his middle school. The juvenile
court found that N.S. had violated Penal Code section 148, subdivision (a)(1),
by willfully resisting, delaying, or obstructing the weapons search.1 N.S.
challenges this finding on two grounds. First, he claims there was insufficient
evidence to support the court’s finding that he unlawfully resisted, delayed,
or obstructed the search. Second, he argues he did not violate the statute
because the police officer’s search was unlawful. We find no error and affirm
the court’s order.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In February 2025, N.S. walked by a school liaison officer (the
liaison officer) at his public middle school during school hours. The liaison
officer was a Fullerton Police Officer assigned to patrol the school, wearing a
full police uniform with a badge and gun. N.S. looked at the liaison officer’s
gun on her hip, then remarked, “‘I have a Glock, too.’” 2 At trial, the liaison
officer testified that N.S.’s statement was significant “because he’s a minor,
he’s at school, and he told me that he has a weapon on campus.” She further
testified that given N.S.’s statement, she had a duty to search him to make
sure he was not armed and was not a threat to the other students.
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Glock is an Austrian gun manufacturer. It “has become one of the
largest producers of handguns for the United States market. Glock pistols
have also become popular for police and military use in the United States and
around the world.” (Klein, In the Hands of the Maker: The Failure of
Consumer Product Safety Oversight of Guns (2021) 33 Loy. Consumer L. Rev.
58, 75.)
2
The liaison officer immediately instructed a school staff member
to send N.S. to the principal’s office. After N.S. arrived, the liaison officer said
she needed to search him due to his comment about the Glock. N.S.
reportedly responded, “‘no, f*ck you. You’re not searching me.’” He then
reportedly said “‘f*ck you’ again,” and walked out of the principal’s office
towards the parking lot. The liaison officer followed N.S. to the parking lot.
She ordered him to return, but he did not comply with her initial command,
prompting her to ask, “[y]ou want me to tackle you right now, dude?” N.S.
replied, “I’ll slap the shit out of you.”
N.S. walked about 40 feet across the parking lot toward an area
with a bench. The liaison officer followed him. At the bench, N.S. both denied
making the comment and insisted it was a joke. The liaison officer explained
that a comment of that nature made on school grounds warranted an
investigation. N.S. eventually told the liaison officer, “I’m not letting you
search me. [¶] . . . [¶] Because . . . you have no probable cause.”
After this exchange, the liaison officer again ordered N.S. to
return inside to the principal’s office to be searched, but N.S. refused, stating,
“No, I’m not going back inside.” N.S. then told the liaison officer, “[I]t’s the
law for you guys to [have] probable cause, but you don’t have fucking
probable cause.” The liaison officer ordered N.S. to return inside five times,
and each time, he verbally refused to comply.
N.S. remained by the bench and refused to return to the
principal’s office to be searched for around 10 minutes. After the liaison
officer’s partner arrived, N.S. agreed to return to the principal’s office where
he and his belongings were searched. N.S. was then arrested and booked into
juvenile hall.
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The Orange County District Attorney filed a petition under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, charging N.S. with resisting,
delaying, or obstructing a peace officer in violation of section 148, subdivision
(a)(1). Following a jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court issued an order (the
order) finding the allegation against N.S. as to section 148, subdivision (a)(1),
to be true beyond a reasonable doubt. At the disposition hearing, the court
declared N.S. to be a nonward for a period not to exceed six months and
ordered him to complete various probation terms and conditions. (Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 725, subd. (a).)
On appeal, N.S. challenges the portion of the order finding that
he violated section 148, subdivision (a)(1).
DISCUSSION
I.
APPLICABLE LAW
“‘The legal elements of a violation of section 148, subdivision (a)
are as follows: (1) the defendant willfully resisted, delayed, or obstructed a
peace officer, (2) when the officer was engaged in the performance of his or
her duties, and (3) the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that
the other person was a peace officer engaged in the performance of his or her
duties. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The offense is a general intent crime,
proscribing only the particular act (resist, delay, obstruct) without reference
to an intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence.” (In re
Muhammed C. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1329.)
N.S. argues that the first and second elements were not met here.
As to the former, he argues there was insufficient evidence that he willfully
resisted, delayed, or obstructed the liaison officer. As for the latter, he
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contends that at the time of the alleged violation, the liaison officer was not
engaged in the performance of her duties because her search was unlawful.
II.
WILLFUL RESISTANCE, DELAY, OR OBSTRUCTION
A. Standard of Review
Appellate review in this juvenile case “is governed by the same
principles applicable to adult criminal appeals.” (In re Muhammed C., supra,
95 Cal.App.4th at p. 1328.) “We review claims of insufficient evidence under
the substantial evidence standard.” (In re J.C. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1394,
1399.) Under this standard, “‘[t]he power of an appellate court begins and
ends with the determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the
determination, and when two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced
from the facts, a reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions
for those of the [juvenile] court. If such substantial evidence be found, it is of
no consequence that the [juvenile] court believing other evidence, or drawing
other reasonable inferences, might have reached a contrary conclusion.’”
(People v. Ortiz (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1363, italics omitted.)
B. Analysis
1. Substantial evidence
The record contains substantial evidence to support the juvenile
court’s finding that N.S. willfully resisted, delayed, or obstructed the liaison
officer’s search.
Section 148, subdivision (a)(1) most often applies to the physical
acts of a defendant. Common violations include flight, physical resistance,
running, hiding, and other forcible interference with an officer’s activities. (In
re Muhammed C., supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 1329.) “But section 148 ‘is not
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limited to nonverbal conduct involving flight or forcible interference with an
officer’s activities. No decision has interpreted the statute to apply only to
physical acts, and the statutory language does not suggest such a limitation.’”
(Id. at pp. 1329–1330.)
In In re Muhammed, the minor spoke to an arrestee through a
lowered rear window of a patrol car while three police officers were
processing the arrestee’s vehicle, which was across the street from the patrol
car. (In re Muhammed C., supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 1328.) The three
officers ordered the minor to step away from the patrol car for a total of five
times. (Id. at p. 1330.) At one point, the minor gestured defiantly towards the
officers, acknowledging their orders, but continuing to converse with the
arrestee. (Id. at pp. 1328, 1330.) The minor only complied with the fifth order
to step away from the patrol car after one of the officers started walking
across the street from the arrestee’s car towards him. (Id at p. 1328.) The
minor was arrested and found to have violated section 148, subdivision (a),
the predecessor to section 148, subdivision (a)(1). (In re Muhammed C., at pp.
1327–1328.)
The court in In re Muhammed held there was substantial
evidence that the minor violated section 148, subdivision (a). (In re
Muhammed C., supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 1327.) It concluded that the lower
court could reasonably infer that the minor “willfully delayed the officers’
performance of duties by refusing the officers’ repeated requests that he step
away from the patrol car: three officers ordered [the minor] five times to step
away before [he] complied; they had interrupted processing [the arrestee’s]
car to attend to [the minor]; and [one officer] specifically affirmed that the
elapsed time had delayed the [arrestee’s] investigation.” (Id. at p. 1330.)
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The court also rejected the minor’s argument “that he should not
be criminally culpable for doing no more than temporarily distracting the
officers from the performance of duties.” (In re Muhammed C., supra, 95
Cal.App.4th at p. 1330.) It explained that this argument was “simply an
interpretation of evidence. The trial court was entitled to conclude that [the
minor’s] defiant behavior constituted more than a temporary distraction.
That [the minor] did not pose a safety threat or a threatened interference
with the officers’ investigation . . . is simply circumstantial evidence from
which [the minor] could argue that he did not delay the officers.” (Ibid.)
N.S.’s conduct in this case is analogous to the minor in In re
Muhammed C. Like In re Muhammed C., where the minor ignored the
officers’ five repeated commands before complying and acknowledged the
officer’s orders with his hand gesture yet defied them, N.S. likewise willfully
delayed the liaison officer’s search. (See Muhammed C., supra, 95
Cal.App.4th at p. 1328.) N.S. refused the liaison officer’s five repeated
commands to return to the office to be searched until her partner arrived,
delaying the liaison officer from investigating whether there was a gun on
school grounds for 10 minutes. N.S. was aware that the liaison officer desired
to search him for a weapon. But he defied her orders by walking away from
her across the parking lot, causing her to pursue him, and repeatedly
verbally refusing her commands to return to the principal’s office to be
searched. As in In re Muhammed, the juvenile court could reasonably infer
that N.S. sufficiently delayed the liaison officer in her duties to conduct a
search for a weapon.
2. Failing to comply with alacrity
A person does not resist, delay, or obstruct an officer if he or she
verbally challenges or fails to comply with “alacrity to police orders.” (People
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v. Quiroga (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 961, 966 (Quiroga).) N.S. asserts that he
only initially declined to be searched by the liaison officer but later consented
when her partner arrived. According to N.S., being rude and failing to
respond with alacrity to police orders are insufficient to support a finding of
resistance, delay, or obstruction. N.S. likewise asserts that his speech
directed at the liaison officer was protected under the First Amendment and
did not violate section 148, subdivision (a)(1). We are not persuaded.
N.S.’s argument that he only failed to respond with alacrity is
based on Quiroga, which is distinguishable. In Quiroga, police officers
responded to a report of a noisy party at an apartment. (Quiroga, supra, 16
Cal.App.4th at p. 964.) After a woman opened the apartment door, an officer
smelled marijuana and entered. The officer ordered the defendant to sit on
the couch. (Ibid.) The defendant argued with the officer before complying,
telling the officer “‘to get out of the house, [because they] needed a search
warrant to come into the house.’” (Ibid.) After the defendant sat down, the
officer observed him trying to reach between the couch cushions. The officer
directed him to place his hands on his lap. (Ibid.) The defendant initially
failed to comply but ultimately obeyed. (Ibid.) When the officer ordered him
to stand, the defendant refused several times before finally standing up when
the officer “‘pulled on his arm.’” (Ibid.) Police searched the couch area where
the defendant had been reaching and found a plastic bag with cocaine. The
defendant was then arrested. (Id. at pp. 964–965.)
The Quiroga court held the defendant’s conduct before his arrest
was insufficient to violate section 148, subdivision (a)(1). (Quiroga, supra, 16
Cal.App.4th at p. 966.) The court reasoned that although the defendant
complied slowly with the officer’s orders, the statute does not criminalize “a
person’s failure to respond with alacrity to police orders.” (Ibid.) Further, the
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defendant had the right to dispute the officer’s actions because verbal
criticism and challenge directed at police officers are protected speech under
the First Amendment. (Ibid.)
Unlike the defendant in Quiroga, N.S. did more than just fail to
respond with alacrity. In Quiroga, though the defendant dilatorily complied
with the officer’s commands and repeatedly refused to stand, he remained at
the scene and did not substantially interfere with the investigation to
constitute delay. (Quiroga, supra, 16 Cal.App.4th at pp. 964–966.) In
contrast, N.S. substantially interfered with and delayed the liaison officer’s
investigation by leaving the principal’s office after the liaison officer said she
needed to search him. N.S. then walked across a parking lot as the liaison
officer pursued him and repeatedly commanded him to return to the office to
be searched. In doing so, N.S. physically removed himself from the location of
the investigation and delayed the liaison officer’s ability to investigate a
potential firearm on school grounds. Based on these facts, the juvenile court
could reasonably conclude that N.S. resisted, delayed, or obstructed the
liaison officer’s investigation.
Nor are we persuaded by N.S.’s argument that the statements he
made to the liaison officer were protected by the First Amendment. “[W]hen a
person’s words go ‘beyond verbal criticism, into the realm of interference with
[an officer’s performance of his or her] duty,’ the First Amendment does not
preclude criminal punishment.” (In re Chase C. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 107,
117.) A violation of section 148, subdivision (a)(1), occurs when “the
defendant engage[s] in conduct beyond merely responding slowly and
challenging officers’ authority.” (In re Chase C., at p. 118.)
Here, N.S. was not found to have violated the statute based on
just statements or a slow response. Rather, as set forth above, it was his
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conduct of refusing the liaison officer’s attempts to search him despite his
prior statement that he had “‘a Glock, too.’” N.S. refused to be searched and
then walked away from the liaison officer and the principal’s office, causing
the liaison officer to pursue him and delaying the search for 10 minutes. A
juvenile court could reasonably conclude that N.S.’s conduct was more than
just a slow response and interfered with the liaison officer’s investigation.
(See In re Muhammed C., supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 1330.)
III.
PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES
The second element of section 148, subdivision (a), requires that
“the officer was engaged in the performance of his or her duties.” (In re
Muhammed C., supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at 1329.) Implicit in this element is the
requirement that the officer was acting lawfully at the time the alleged
offense was committed. (People v. Williams (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 71, 82.) A
person cannot be convicted under section 148, subdivision (a)(1), if the
relevant officer was acting unlawfully when the alleged violation occurred.
(Williams, at p. 82.)
N.S. appears to assert that the second element was not met
because the liaison officer’s search was unlawful. His argument revolves
around the applicable legal standard for the search. He claims that his
comment, at most, gave the liaison officer reasonable suspicion to conduct a
patdown search. He contends the liaison officer’s search unlawfully expanded
beyond a patdown, which required probable cause. In the alternative, N.S.
asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the
liaison officer had reasonable suspicion to search him.
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A. Legal Standard for School Searches
We begin by examining the legal standard governing public
school searches. Schools have an obligation to protect students and teachers
from violence. (New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985) 469 U.S. 325, 350 (conc. opn. of
Powell, J.) (T.L.O.).) Thus, under the Fourth Amendment, a “school official”
may search a student’s person and personal effects based on a reasonable
suspicion—requiring articulable facts, together with rational inferences from
those facts—that the search will disclose evidence that the student is
violating or has violated the law or school rules. (T.L.O., at pp. 341–342; In re
William G. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 550, 563–564.)
“Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than
probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be
established with information that is different in quantity or content than that
required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable
suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required
to show probable cause.” (Alabama v. White (1990) 496 U.S. 325, 330.)
“Ultimately, the legality of the search ‘depends, simply, on the
reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search.’” (In re Cody S.
(2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 86, 91.) In a public school “student’s legitimate
expectation of privacy must be balanced against the school’s obligation to
maintain . . . a safe environment for all students and staff.” (T.L.O., supra,
469 U.S. at p. 440; In re Cody S., at p. 91.)
N.S. argues that the reasonable suspicion standard does not
apply here because the liaison officer was a police officer and not a “school
official.” But for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, “school officials”
include police officers who are assigned to public schools as school resource or
school liaison officers. (In re William V. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1464, 1470–
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1471; In re K.J. (2018) 18 Cal.App.5th 1123, 1129.) Due to the importance of
providing students and staff with a safe learning environment, the ability to
search a student should not hinge on whether the school district or the city
employs the school security officer. (Id. at p. 1131.) The consequence of such a
rule would “‘force school districts to employ private security guards rather
than certified police officers, who may have superior training, which would
hardly enhance protection of the students’ Fourth Amendment rights.’” (Ibid.)
Because school liaison officers are school officials for the purposes
of conducting school searches, they only need reasonable suspicion before
conducting such searches, not probable cause. (In re K.J., supra, 18
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1130–1131.) Thus, we reject N.S.’s contention that the
reasonable suspicion standard did not apply here because the search was
conducted by a police officer.
B. Substantial Evidence of Reasonable Suspicion
N.S.’s also claims that the liaison officer lacked reasonable
suspicion to search him. We disagree.
We find instructive In re Alexander B. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d
1572, 1575–1576, in which school officials separated two groups of boys about
to engage in a fight. As the boys were being taken to the school office, an
unnamed boy said, “‘[d]on’t pick on us; one of those guys has a gun’” and
gestured to a third group of boys who were uninvolved in the fight but had
been yelling and making gang signs. (Id. at p. 1576.) A school official asked a
nearby police officer to “‘[c]heck’” the third group of boys because “‘[o]ne of
them [was] supposed to have a weapon.’” (Ibid.) The police officer began
searching each of the students in the third group and found that the
appellant was carrying a machete knife. (Ibid.)
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The In re Alexander B. court found that searching the third
group’s members was reasonable given the circumstances. It explained “that
the gravity of the danger posed by possession of a firearm or other weapon on
campus was great compared to the relatively minor intrusion involved in
investigating the veracity of the unidentified student’s accusation against a
handful of high school age boys.” (In re Alexander B., supra, 220 Cal.App.3d
at p. 1577.) It also rejected the minor’s argument that a blanket accusation
directed at a group of students did not furnish reasonable cause to believe
that he might have a weapon. The court explained, “suspicion was focused on
a group of five or six students. Given the potential danger to students and
staff which would have resulted from inaction, a weapons search of the
several accused students was reasonable.” 3 (Id. at pp. 1577–1578.)
Similarly, the facts of this case satisfy the reasonable suspicion
threshold. Here, N.S. himself remarked to the liaison officer that he had a
gun. The credibility of his statement is arguably greater than that in
Alexander B because the statement was made by N.S. himself. Though N.S.
contends he made the statement jokingly, that was a factual issue for the
juvenile court to weigh. (See, e.g., In re Muhammed C., supra, 95 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1330 [interpretation of a minor’s hand gesture was a factual issue for
the lower court to determine].) Further, the liaison officer’s search only
focused on N.S. rather than a group of students, and the potential danger of a
3 In In re Randy G. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 556, 567, our Supreme Court held
that “detentions of minor students on school grounds do not offend the
Constitution, so long as they are not arbitrary, capricious, or for the purposes
of harassment.” It disapproved of In re Alexander B., supra, 220 Cal.App.3d
1572, to the extent it held that such detentions required reasonable
suspicion. (In re Randy G., at p. 567, fn. 2.) But In re Randy G. did not
address the portion of In re Alexander B. concluding that the officer had
reasonable suspicions to perform a search for weapons.
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gun on campus outweighed N.S.’s privacy interests. (See In re Alexander B.,
supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1577–1578.)
N.S. also contends that his conduct did not give the liaison officer
“carte blanche authority to demand a full search of [him].” He appears to
suggest that the liaison officer should have conducted a more limited search,
such as a patdown. But he cites no authority for the proposition that school
officials must adopt lesser-intrusive means when conducting a search of a
student on campus based on reasonable suspicion. Thus, we will not address
this argument. (See People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793 [failure to
cite legal authority waives argument]; People v. Vaca (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th
1113, 1122, fn. 7 [undeveloped arguments are forfeited].)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
SCOTT, J.
SERVINO, J.
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