Filed 8/26/26 In re N.R. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
B349371
In re N.R. et al., Persons Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 25CCJP00340AB)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
K.P.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Craig S. Barnes, Judge. Affirmed.
Jennifer Peabody and Nicole Kronberg, under
appointments by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and William D. Thetford, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
K.P. (mother) appeals the juvenile court’s order at the six-
month review hearing in a dependency case concerning her
daughters, N.R. and N.P. The court found that the Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) had
provided or offered reasonable reunification services. Mother
contends this finding was an abuse of discretion but does not
otherwise challenge the order. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
Mother and J.R. (father) are the parents of N.R., now 15
years old, and N.P., now 12 years old.2 Between December 2015
and May 2017, the children were dependents of the juvenile court
based on sustained allegations of father’s domestic violence
against mother in the presence of the children, mother’s use of
marijuana, and father’s use of alcohol. The juvenile court
awarded mother sole legal and physical custody of the children.
1 The parties cite the record filed in a prior appeal (DCFS v.
K.P., B345338, Ct. App., Second Dist., Mins. Nov. 26, 2025), but
did not request that we take judicial notice of it. We do so on our
own motion. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)(1); Lang v. Roché
(2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 254, 257, fn. 1 [taking judicial notice of
prior appeals “because they are related prior proceedings leading
to the present appeal”].) We also rely on the record filed in the
prior appeal when discussing the background of this case.
2 Father is not a party to this appeal. We discuss only the
facts relevant to mother’s appeal.
2
Between 2015 and 2024, the family was the subject of 14
referrals alleging general neglect. DCFS determined that two
were unfounded, two were substantiated, and five were
inconclusive. Five were evaluated out. The family was also the
subject of referrals alleging physical abuse by maternal
grandfather, which DCFS found to be unfounded; caretaker
absence with respect to mother, which DCFS determined to be
inconclusive; and emotional abuse, which DCFS determined to be
inconclusive.
Detention Hearing
In December 2024, DCFS received a referral alleging that
maternal grandfather, with whom N.R. and N.P. were living,
physically abused the children and that the children had lice for
months. Maternal grandfather had an extensive criminal
history, which included convictions for inflicting corporal injury
to spouse or cohabitant, willful cruelty to a child, and battery
with serious bodily injury. Maternal grandfather denied the
allegations and denied using drugs.
Maternal grandfather told the investigating social worker
that mother lived in her car in Las Vegas and father was
incarcerated. The children started living with maternal
grandfather in June or July 2024. Mother had signed a notarized
letter designating maternal grandfather as the children’s “legal
guardian.” Maternal grandfather filed a petition to be appointed
the temporary guardian of the children in October 2024. The
petition stated that mother was “ ‘homeless and is not in her
right mind oftentimes. She is unpredictable. If on a call, she will
just hang up at times.’ ” The probate court denied the petition.
The social worker interviewed N.R. and N.P. regarding the
referral allegations. N.R. said maternal grandfather sometimes
3
hit her for no reason and threw full water bottles and cans at her.
Recently, maternal grandfather had approached N.R. on the
couch where she slept, put a pillow over her face, and punched it,
saying “ ‘I’m going to kill you.’ ” Maternal grandfather did not
deny the incident but claimed “he was just trying to show [N.R.]
what gang members could do to her if she keeps associating with
them.”
N.P.’s clothes were dirty and she did not appear well
groomed. N.P. said maternal grandfather hit her when he got
mad. She had not been going to school because maternal
grandfather did not take her. Mother had dropped off food and
toys three days prior, then left. Mother did “not talk to them over
the phone anymore.”
Maternal grandmother and a neighbor of maternal
grandfather both believed maternal grandfather was using drugs.
Maternal grandmother said that maternal grandfather had used
crack cocaine during their marriage and physically abused her.
During an unannounced home visit, the social worker observed
maternal grandfather’s “eyes to be wide-eyed and red all around
the iris, filling the sclera.” Maternal grandfather admitted to
using marijuana and, later, to using cocaine.
The social worker texted mother and asked to speak with
her about the children. Mother responded: “ ‘I’m homeless and
my kids are safe. How can I help you.’ ” Mother then called the
social worker, who explained to mother why N.R. and N.P. were
not safe, and asked to meet with mother. During the in-person
meeting, mother was “not cooperative and hard to engage with”
and “displayed visible indication of substance use.” Mother failed
to answer questions and “stare[d] blankly at [the social worker]
with sunken, open-wide eyes.” When the social worker reviewed
4
the allegations and asked whether mother was aware of them,
she replied, “ ‘No Comment.’ ” Mother also replied “ ‘No
Comment’ ” when asked whether she was under the influence of
drugs or alcohol. Mother did not respond when asked if she was
willing to drug test.
In January 2025, maternal grandfather asked maternal
grandmother to take the children because he did not have the
resources to feed them. Maternal grandmother took them to stay
with maternal aunt.
Maternal aunt told the social worker that maternal
grandfather is a drug addict and he had tried to molest her when
she was 14 years old. Maternal aunt had not spoken to mother in
two years. At that time, maternal aunt had found what appeared
to be opioid pills in mother’s jacket. She believed mother was
“ ‘off her rocker.’ ” Maternal aunt was willing to care for the
children.
In February 2025, the juvenile court authorized the
removal of the children from mother. DCFS filed a petition under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1),
which alleged that mother failed to make an appropriate plan for
the children’s ongoing care and supervision when she left them
with maternal grandfather, who physically abused them and
used cocaine in their presence, and that mother had a history of
substance abuse.3 The juvenile court found that a prima facie
case existed, detained the children from mother, and placed them
3 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare
and Institutions Code.
5
with maternal aunt. Mother was present at the hearing and
represented by counsel.4
Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearing
When interviewed for the jurisdiction report, N.R. said
“mother ha[d] been ‘in and out’ of her life since [N.R.] was 5 and
[N.R.] and [N.P.] ha[d] lived with other relatives for most of their
lives.” The children lived with mother from 2023 to 2024. They
were no longer able to live with mother after she and her
boyfriend were evicted from their apartment “ ‘because [mother’s]
boyfriend . . . stabbed [mother] in the head.’ ” N.R. believed
mother knew maternal grandfather was abusive because mother
had taken them to a domestic violence shelter in the past because
of maternal grandfather. N.R. said she “had no reliable way to
contact mother while she was living with [maternal
grandfather],” and “that mother would ‘pop in and out out of
nowhere’ and that would be the only times she would see
mother.” N.R. believed mother only used marijuana. Mother was
“ ‘rude and distant’ ” while under the influence of marijuana. She
allowed N.R. to use marijuana with her.
N.P. said “she had told mother about the conditions living
in [maternal grandfather’s] home, but mother would ‘zone out’
and not answer [N.P.] when she expressed these concerns.”
There were also periods of time that N.P. could not get in contact
with mother while living with maternal grandfather. Mother
4 At the detention hearing, mother’s counsel requested
transportation and housing assistance, which the court ordered.
In March 2025, social workers met with mother and provided her
with resources for housing and offered mother a bus pass, which
mother refused. The supervising social worker also advised
mother to enroll in an inpatient drug and alcohol treatment
program so that she would also have somewhere to stay.
6
“regularly use[d] marijuana” and “regularly smoke[d] marijuana
in front of [N.P.]” When mother was under the influence, “she
would ‘zone out’ and would not speak to or respond to anyone if
they spoke to her.” N.P. was not aware of mother using other
substances.
Both children said they had not had contact with mother
since they were detained. N.R. said she “may be open to visits
with mother ‘but it depends on how she is. If she doesn’t have
her life together and she’s zoning out the whole time then no.’ ”
N.P. similarly said that “she wants to have visits with mother
only ‘if she gets better. Because otherwise she’ll zone out the
whole time.’ ”
On the day of her scheduled interview, mother was
unwilling to participate. She later agreed to speak with the
DCFS investigator. Mother denied having concerns about
maternal grandfather because “ ‘[w]e all have lived with my dad
our whole lives so there was no concerns.’ ” Mother said she had
no knowledge of maternal grandfather using drugs or being
physically abusive towards her or the children. She denied that
the children told her of any issues while living with maternal
grandfather. Mother refused to provide information about where
she was living. She admitted that the children were sometimes
unable to contact her. According to mother, “ ‘that was the whole
point of the notarized letter to allow my dad . . . to sign as a
parent and have guardianship of the children.’ ”
Mother denied substance use. She agreed to drug test for
the department but said she could not test that day because she
was out of state. Mother anticipated being out of state until the
next hearing. Mother said she had not seen the children but
wanted to.
7
A last minute information stated that the social worker
created a visitation schedule for mother, which the children
signed. However, the children were still unwilling to have visits
with mother. The social worker and maternal aunt would
“continue to engage with the children regarding visitation.” The
day before the information was filed, the social worker called
mother multiple times to discuss visitation but received no
response.
On April 1, 2025, the juvenile court sustained the petition
as alleged and found that it was necessary for the children to be
removed from mother. The court ordered mother to participate in
a full drug and alcohol program and 12-step program, take a
parenting course, participate in individual counseling, and
submit to weekly on-demand drug testing. The court instructed
that the children should participate in conjoint counseling with
mother if recommended by their individual therapists. It also
ordered monitored visitation of a minimum of six hours per week,
with discretion to liberalize.5
Six-Month Review Hearing
The status review report filed in September 2025 stated
that N.P. had received therapy on a weekly basis, beginning July
18, 2025. N.R. had completed the intake process at the same
time as her sister but was not interested in participating in
counseling. The mental health services provider “deactivated
her” as a patient as a result. The children were thriving in
maternal aunt’s care.
5 Mother’s counsel did not request housing assistance at the
jurisdiction hearing and the juvenile court did not order it as part
of the case plan.
8
During each monthly visit with the children, the social
worker asked whether the children wanted to have visitation
with mother. They refused. The social worker suggested that the
visits could begin as phone or Facetime calls. Both children said
they did not feel comfortable having visitation with mother. At
each visit, the social worker reminded the children to let her
know if they wanted visitation and she would arrange it. N.R.
and N.P. agreed but expressed that they did not wish to have
contact with mother. When the social worker asked the children
whether they would ever consider seeing their mother, N.P. did
not reply and N.R. said, “[A]s of now I do not want to but I can
not [sic] speak of the future.”
Mother did not make herself available to DCFS during the
review period and did not participate in any drug testing for
DCFS. Mother drug tested through her outpatient drug and
alcohol treatment program and tested positive for marijuana on
five occasions between June and August 2025.
A DCFS service log stated that a social worker called
mother on April 2 but received no response. Another social
worker called mother on April 8 and requested that mother come
to a DCFS office to discuss the juvenile court’s orders. Mother
replied that “she now has a LA address and needs a social worker
change.” When the social worker asked for her address, mother
said “ ‘still homeless.’ ” The social worker said she would consult
her supervisor.
On April 17, the social worker submitted a request for
funds for mother’s individual counseling. The request was denied
because additional information about the counseling was needed.
The program in which mother had intended to enroll had been
9
unable to reach her. The social worker tried to contact mother
about the funding but mother did not respond.
On May 28, a social worker contacted mother about her
failure to show up for drug testing. Mother said she did not have
“access to a charger to call for her drug testing days” because she
is homeless. Mother provided the social worker with her case
manager’s information for the classes she enrolled in. The social
worker contacted the case manager and provided mother’s case
plan.
On June 30, mother came to the DCFS office without
notifying the social worker. Mother left before the social worker
returned to the office. The social worker texted mother to ask
what she needed but received no reply. Between June 30 and
August 7, the social worker sent certified mail to mother at
maternal grandmother’s address, which was mother’s address on
file and the address mother had previously told social workers to
use.
On August 28, mother texted the social worker that she
“ ‘[had not] had a phone these past few months’ ” but had
obtained one through her service provider. The social worker
asked whether mother had enrolled in any other classes. She
was awaiting a response when she logged the interaction.
On September 20, a Saturday, mother texted the social
worker that she was trying to reach the social worker but the
social worker would not contact her. The following Monday,
September 22, the social worker replied that she had tried to
reach mother every month at the phone numbers and address
mother had provided. Mother said she had “ ‘[n]o way of
[receiving] mail at all.’ ” The social worker texted mother
information for the upcoming court hearing and asked whether
10
mother had been attending classes and if there was anything
mother wanted the social worker to know. Mother replied that
she was attending her drug and alcohol program and was willing
to drug test.
On September 30, mother filed progress letters from her
outpatient drug and alcohol program and from her individual
counseling. The first letter, dated September 29, stated that
mother was partially compliant in attending group, parenting,
and 12-step meetings, but was noncompliant in “sponsorship.”
Mother was also partially compliant in arriving on time,
participating in group, behavior, appearance and grooming, and
following instructions. Mother’s “attendance and participation in
treatment [was] sporadic.” Mother had tested positive for
cannabis eight times in random urinalysis testing and had no
negative test results. The second letter, dated September 25,
stated that mother had attended weekly individual therapy
sessions “consistently and shows strong motivation to improve
her quality of life. She is making progress in managing cravings,
preventing relapses, and developing effective parenting skills.”
At the review hearing on September 30, 2025, mother’s
counsel objected to DCFS’s recommendation that reunification
services be terminated because mother had not received
visitation and DCFS “never attempted . . . to set up conjoint
therapy.” The court found that mother was not in substantial
compliance with the case plan. It also found by clear and
convincing evidence that reasonable services had been provided.
However, the court observed: “Mother’s efforts to try and visit
with the minor, I think, has been impeded by the fact that the
children do not want to visit with her. Her case plan
contemplates conjoint counselling with the minors, but it does
11
have a predicate step where the therapists for the minors is to
recommend before that occurs. That has not taken place yet.”
The court ordered additional reunification services, and
recognized that “additional time may, in fact, be needed with
respect to conjoint counselling, which would be a key part in
terms of mother’s visitation.”
Mother timely appealed.6
DISCUSSION
Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s
Reasonable Services Finding
Mother contends the court erred in concluding that DCFS
provided her with reasonable reunification services because she
did not receive visitation or conjoint counseling with the children.
Mother further argues that DCFS unreasonably delayed in
getting the children into individual counseling, failed to make
N.R. participate in therapy, and failed to maintain regular
contact with her.
A. Applicable law and standard of review
“Dependency proceedings span up to four stages:
jurisdiction, disposition, reunification, and permanency.”
(Michael G. v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 609, 624 (Michael
G.).) “This case concerns the reunification stage. When a child
has been removed from a parent’s custody, the court ordinarily
must order child welfare services designed to facilitate the
reunification of the family.” (Ibid., citing §§ 361.5, subd. (a), 362,
subds. (c), (d).) “Visitation is an essential component of any
reunification plan. [Citation.] To promote reunification,
6 A parent may obtain review of a reasonable services finding
by appealing the order in which it was made. (In re A.O. (2025)
111 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1059 (A.O.).)
12
visitation must be as frequent as possible.” (In re Alvin R. (2003)
108 Cal.App.4th 962, 972 (Alvin R.).)
“Parents of children three or older are presumptively
eligible for at least 12 months of [reunification] services.”
(Michael G., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 625, citing § 361.5,
subd. (a)(1)(A).) “During the reunification stage, the juvenile
court must hold periodic review hearings to evaluate the status of
reunification efforts and appropriate next steps. [Citation.]
These review hearings ordinarily take place at six-month
intervals. At each review hearing, a court evaluates, among
other things, the adequacy of the reunification services offered or
provided and the extent of the parent’s progress. . . . [A]t the six-
and 12-month status hearings, the court must find that the
parent has been provided or offered reasonable reunification
services before the court can proceed to set a hearing to decide
whether to terminate parental rights and select a permanent
plan for the child.” (Michael G., at p. 625.) At both hearings, if
the child is not returned to the parent, the juvenile court is
required to determine by clear and convincing evidence whether
the social services agency provided or offered reasonable services
that were designed to aid the parent in overcoming the problems
that led to the initial removal and continued custody of the child.
(§ 366.21, subds. (e)(8), (f)(1)(A).)
The Department “must make a ‘ “ ‘good faith effort’ ” ’ . . . to
provide reasonable reunification services in spite of difficulties in
doing so or the prospects of success.” (In re Taylor J. (2014) 223
Cal.App.4th 1446, 1451.) “Although the statute does not define
‘reasonable services,’ the Courts of Appeal have generally held
that, to support a finding that services were reasonable, ‘the
record should show that the supervising agency identified the
13
problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed
to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with
the parents during the course of the service plan, and made
reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where
compliance proved difficult . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Michael G., supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 625, fn. 6.) “The standard is not whether the
services provided were the best that might be provided in an
ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the
circumstances.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.)
“When a finding that reunification services were adequate
is challenged on appeal, we review it for substantial evidence.
[Citations.] ‘ “ ‘In juvenile cases, as in other areas of the law, the
power of an appellate court asked to assess the sufficiency of the
evidence begins and ends with a determination as to whether or
not there is any substantial evidence, whether or not
contradicted, which will support the conclusion of the trier of
fact.’ ” ’ [Citations.] Even if there is no substantial conflict in the
evidence, we must nevertheless draw all legitimate inferences in
support of the findings of the juvenile court.” (Melinda K. v.
Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1158 (Melinda K.).)
Because the clear and convincing standard of proof applied to the
juvenile court’s finding, the substantial evidence standard of
review must also account for “the heightened degree of certainty
required by this standard.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9
Cal.5th 989, 997 (O.B.).)
B. Visitation
Relying on In re Hunter S. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1497,
mother argues that DCFS improperly delegated authority over
visitation to the children. The court in Hunter S. held that “[t]he
juvenile court cannot impermissibly delegate to the child’s
14
therapist, DCFS or any third person, unlimited discretion to
determine whether visitation is to occur.” (Id. at p. 1505.) It
further concluded that, in that case, “[t]he visitation order was
never enforced simply because [the child] continued to refuse any
contact with his mother,” and “[t]his failure to enforce the order
was error.” (Ibid.)
In In re Sofia M. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1038, the Court of
Appeal agreed that a juvenile court cannot delegate authority
over whether visitation will occur to a third party. (Id. at
p. 1046.) However, it found Hunter S.’s discussion of enforcement
“risk[ed] conflating two distinct issues: the propriety of the order,
and its enforcement,” and improperly “suggest[ed] that the court
errs when the child refuses a proper visitation order.” (Ibid.)
The court explained: “When a child refuses visitation, it is the
parent’s burden to request a specific type of enforcement, or a
specific change to the visitation order. Absent a request, it is not
the court’s burden to sua sponte come up with a solution to the
intractable problem of a child’s steadfast refusal to visit a parent.
Trial judges are not mental health experts, nor child behavior
experts. As one court noted, ‘[D]ependency courts “simply do not
have the time and resources to constantly fine tune an order in
response to the progress or lack thereof in the visitation
arrangement, or in reaction to physical or psychological conduct
which may threaten the child’s well-being.” ’ [Citation.] Those
sorts of changes are better handled, in the first instance, through
communication with [the social services agency], and, as needed,
through motions to modify the visitation order. It is the parent’s
burden to initiate those procedures, not the court’s.” (Ibid.)
We agree with Sofia M. Before DCFS and juvenile court
involvement, mother was not visiting or contacting the children
15
regularly. The juvenile court ordered visits. The social worker
consistently asked the children about visitation with mother and
suggested ways they could ease into in-person visits with her.
The children nevertheless refused to see mother. Although
mother “expressed to [the social worker that] she wanted to have
visitation with her daughters” before the jurisdiction hearing, she
failed to respond when a social worker tried to contact her a few
weeks later regarding visitation. Nothing in the record indicates
that mother requested visitation during the review period or
proposed any type of enforcement.7
N.P. and N.R. also stated that mother was “ ‘rude and
distant’ ” and “ ‘zone[d] out’ ” when under the influence of
marijuana, and they did not want to see her if she was “ ‘zoning
out.’ ” In other words, the children did not want to interact with
mother if she was using marijuana. Despite her participation in
a treatment program, mother tested positive for marijuana
throughout the review period. Moreover, the children had stated
that it was often impossible to reach mother when they lived with
maternal grandfather, and contact with mother remained
difficult during the review period. Attempts by DCFS to force
visitation when mother had not meaningfully addressed the
issues that led to dependency jurisdiction could have further
damaged the children’s relationship with mother. (See In re
Brittany C. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1356 [“ ‘child’s input
7 At the review hearing, mother’s counsel argued that
mother “inquired about visitation many times throughout this
reporting period, and the social worker has still not set up
conjoint therapy to get to the issue of the minors wanting to visit
their mother.” “Argument of counsel is not evidence.” (Fuller v.
Tucker (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1173.)
16
and refusal and the possible adverse consequences if a visit is
forced against the child’s will are factors to be considered in
administering visitation’ ”].)
Mother contends that DCFS made greater efforts to
facilitate visitation in A.O., supra, 111 Cal.App.5th 1048 and In
re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41 (Julie M.), which supports
the conclusion that the juvenile court’s reasonable services
finding here was an abuse of discretion.
Mother argues that the social worker’s efforts to foster a
relationship between her and the children were insufficient
because the social worker only suggested phone and Facetime
calls, rather than “written correspondence and possibly . . .
videotaped messages.” (Julie M., supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 48;
see id. at p. 47.) DCFS is not required to suggest every
alternative to in-person visitation for its reunification efforts to
be reasonable. Moreover, this “non-confrontational” approach
was necessary in Julie M., where the mother had “an ongoing
history of . . . assaultive behavior” (id. at p. 44), was physically
abusive to one of the children, and the children’s counsel obtained
a restraining order against the mother on their behalf (id. at
pp. 44–45). Although mother faults the social worker for failing
to suggest alternatives to in-person visitation every time she saw
the children, there is no indication that the social worker in Julie
M. suggested these alternatives more than once. (See id. at
p. 48.) Indeed, it is unclear whether the social worker attempted
to implement the letters or recorded messages. His report only
“expressed ‘the hope . . . that with the mother’s cooperation a
relationship between the girls and their mother can be fostered’ ”
through alternative means of communication. (Ibid.)
17
As mother acknowledges, the mother in A.O. had not yet
visited the child when the review hearing took place. (A.O.,
supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1062.) Even if DCFS seemingly
went to greater lengths to attempt to arrange visitation in that
case, the family’s circumstances were different. The juvenile
court had ordered visitation in a therapeutic setting, and the
social worker had to attempt “ ‘to secure a therapist with
expertise in children with special needs, bilingual and willing to
accommodate therapeutic setting visitations.’ ” (Id. at p. 1056.)
Here, visits were not required to take place in a therapeutic
setting. Rather, the greatest obstacles to visitation were mother’s
lack of communication and continued drug use, which were not
within DCFS’s control.
The “adequacy of reunification plans and the
reasonableness of [DCFS’s] efforts are judged according to the
circumstances of each case.” (Robin V. v. Superior Court (1995)
33 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1164.) The circumstances of Julie M. and
A.O. do not compel the conclusion that DCFS’s efforts to arrange
visitation in this case were not reasonable.
C. Individual and conjoint counseling
Mother further argues that substantial evidence did not
support the juvenile court’s reasonable services finding because
DCFS did not promptly ensure that the children were enrolled in
individual therapy, N.R. did not participate in therapy, and the
family did not engage in conjoint counseling.
i. N.R.’s refusal to participate in therapy
Mother contends there is no evidence that DCFS raised the
subject of the N.R.’s participation in therapy for five months. We
disagree. N.R. completed the intake process for therapy in July
2025. We may infer that DCFS was involved in referring the
18
children to the Department of Mental Health service provider,
even if it is not expressly stated in the service log. N.R. later said
that she was not interested in therapy. N.R. had similarly told
the Multidisciplinary Assessment Team assessor that she “does
not need therapy,” even though maternal aunt was “encouraging
her to engage in therapy.”
The circumstances of this case are thus distinguishable
from In re M.F. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1 (M.F.), on which mother
relies. In M.F., a social worker gave the father a list of four
therapists who did not appear to be taking new patients and did
not respond to father’s calls. (Id. at pp. 9, 16.) Approximately
one month later, a new social worker assigned to the case failed
to respond to e-mails from the father’s attorney explaining his
difficulties in obtaining a therapist. (Id. at p. 11.) When the
social worker met with the father months later, he did not
provide referrals for other therapists. (Id. at pp. 11, 16.) At the
12-month review hearing, the social worker testified that the
father completed all aspects of his case plan except therapy. (Id.
at p. 11.) The juvenile court concluded reasonable services had
not been provided or offered to the father (id. at p. 12), and the
appellate court agreed the record established that the social
worker failed to assist the father in a timely manner (id. at p. 16).
Here, we review the juvenile court’s finding that DCFS
provided reasonable services in the light most favorable to that
finding. In any event, unlike in M.F., DCFS did not fail to refer
N.R. to an available therapist. Rather, N.R., who was then 14
years old, stated she was not interested in participating in
therapy at all, despite maternal aunt’s encouragement. The
mental health service provider discharged N.R. as a result.
While it is possible the social worker could have done more to
19
urge N.R. to attend therapy, DCFS could not force her to do so,
and certainly could not make her meaningfully participate in it.
ii. Delay in commencement of therapy
Relying on Alvin R., mother further argues that the
unexplained delay in getting the children assessed for therapy
requires reversal of the juvenile court’s reasonable services
finding.
At the adjudication hearing in Alvin R., the juvenile court
ordered the child to “undergo weekly individual counseling with a
licensed therapist, and conjoint counseling with father when his
therapist deemed it appropriate or upon court order, to be
addressed after eight individual sessions.” (Alvin R., supra, 108
Cal.App.4th at pp. 966–967.) At the disposition hearing a few
weeks later, the child’s father requested an interim hearing and
said he was “concerned that [the child] had not begun his
individual counseling.” (Id. at p. 967.) The interim review
report, “filed nearly five months after reunification efforts should
have begun, . . . did not even address [DCFS’s] efforts to get [the
child] into counseling.” (Id. at p. 972.) At the time of the
hearing, the child had completed only one counseling session.
(Id. at p. 967.) The juvenile court “suggested . . . that an
explanation of the Department’s reasonable efforts with regard to
[the child’s] counseling be included in its next report, and ordered
that conjoint counseling begin as soon as [the child’s] therapist
deemed it appropriate . . . .” (Id. at p. 968.) However, DCFS’s
next report, filed approximately seven months after the court
ordered reunification services, stated that the child had
completed only three individual therapy sessions and did not
provide additional information about DCFS’s efforts or mention
conjoint counseling. (Ibid.) The court found the report
20
insufficient and requested an additional report, which DCFS filed
approximately one month later. (Ibid.) The minor had then
completed five individual counseling sessions. (Ibid.) Despite
father’s compliance with the case plan and the court’s order
dispensing with the eight-session requirement, DCFS continued
to recommend that the child complete eight therapy sessions
before conjoint counseling began. (Id. at pp. 968–969.) The
juvenile court concluded DCFS had made reasonable
reunification efforts. (Id. at p. 970.)
The Court of Appeal disagreed. It observed that
“reunification was not going to be accomplished without
visitation,” visitation was unlikely to occur under the
circumstances of that case without conjoint therapy, “[a]nd
conjoint therapy was not going to be accomplished unless some
effort were made to get [the child] into individual therapy.”
(Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 973.) The “[f]ather had
done all that was required of him under the plan,” only the child’s
participation in individual therapy “stood in the way of all
measures remaining under the reunification plan, and the
Department submitted no evidence of having made a good faith
effort to bring those sessions about.” (Ibid.) Under these
circumstances, the court found there was no substantial evidence
to support the finding that reunification services were
reasonable. (Ibid.)
Alvin R. does not compel the conclusion that DCFS failed to
provide reasonable services here. In Alvin R., the child’s
participation in individual counseling was both significantly
delayed and inconsistent. Here, although there was a delay of
approximately three and a half months before the children
completed the intake process for therapy, the status report and
21
service log state that N.P. thereafter participated on a weekly
basis. At the time of the hearing, N.P. would have completed 10
sessions, twice as many as the minor in Alvin R. completed in an
eight-month period. Moreover, N.P.’s participation in therapy
was not the only obstacle to reunification in this case. The
juvenile court found that mother was not substantially compliant
with the case plan, a finding she does not challenge on appeal.
“Clearly, the delay in the minor’s individual counseling
rendered the services provided imperfect, but rarely will services
be perfect.” (Melinda K., supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 1159
[substantial evidence supported finding of reasonable services
despite six month delay in providing counseling services “due in
part to the caretaker’s ignorance of how to proceed . . . and in
part to the Department’s change of case social workers”].) Under
the circumstances of this case, the juvenile court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that DCFS made reasonable efforts with
regards to therapy.
iii. Conjoint counseling
Mother also contends the juvenile court abused its
discretion in finding that DCFS provided reasonable reunification
services because “[t]here is no evidence that [N.P.’s] individual
therapist considered conjoint therapy or discussed the option
with the Department’s social workers.”
The court-ordered case plan required DCFS “to provide
therapists . . . a copy of the sustained petition, case plan and all
DCFS reports.” The social worker was clearly in contact with
N.P.’s therapist, even though she did not log their
communications. The letter confirming N.P.’s participation in
therapy was written “[p]er [the social worker’s] request.” Thus,
while we agree there is no evidence that the social worker
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discussed N.P.’s readiness for conjoint therapy with her
therapist, a reasonable trier of fact could infer from the record
that N.P.’s therapist was aware of the case plan. (O.B., supra, 9
Cal.5th at p. 1008 [reviewing court “must indulge reasonable
inferences that the trier of fact might have drawn from the
evidence”].) N.P.’s therapist did not recommend that N.P. begin
conjoint counseling with mother. Although conjoint counseling
can be an important tool for fostering visitation and reunification,
its purpose is not to force a child to engage with a parent who has
not addressed the issues that led to the child’s removal. (See In
re Andrea G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 547, 555–556.) As described,
mother had not done so.
Mother also asserts that the court abused its discretion
because the social worker failed to discuss conjoint counseling
with N.P. and the caregiver, just as the social worker in M.F.
failed to discuss individual therapy with the father. (M.F., supra,
32 Cal.App.5th at p. 17.) M.F. is not instructive on this issue.
Communication between the father and the social worker was
clearly necessary in M.F., since the father needed assistance in
locating an available therapist. The case plan here did not give
maternal aunt or N.P. authority to decide when conjoint
counseling begins. Discussing the matter with them would not
advance the implementation of services.
D. Contact with mother
Finally, mother contends that DCFS’s failure to maintain
regular contact with her warrants reversal of the juvenile court’s
reasonable services finding.
There is “nothing in the statutory scheme to support” the
proposition that DCFS has “a duty to track [a parent] continually
throughout the dependency process even after [the parent] had
23
been identified, contacted by a social worker, apprised of the
proceedings, provided with counsel and participated in hearings.”
(In re Raymond R. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 436, 441.) “The
Department has a duty initially to make a good faith attempt to
locate the parents of a dependent child. Once a parent has been
located, it becomes the obligation of the parent to communicate
with the Department and participate in the reunification
process.” (Ibid.)
The social worker communicated with mother, or
attempted to reach her, by phone in April, May, June, August,
and September. The social worker also attempted to contact
mother in July and August by sending letters to maternal
grandmother’s address, which was mother’s address on file. This
was substantial evidence to support the court’s finding of
reasonable services. (Cf. Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60
Cal.App.4th 996, 1012 [substantial evidence did not support
reasonable services finding when DCFS failed to contact father
“during 13 months of the 17-month reunification period,” despite
father’s repeated efforts to contact social worker].)
Mother faults the social worker for not seeking her out in
person at her service provider’s office when she failed to respond.
However, mother was enrolled in an outpatient program and her
attendance was “sporadic.” There is no guarantee the social
worker would have found her there on any given day. In any
event, it was not the social worker’s responsibility to track
mother down when mother failed to respond to other apparently
viable means of contact.
E. Conclusion
Under the circumstances of this case, the juvenile court
could reasonably conclude that DCFS offered reasonable services,
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but mother’s continued use of marijuana and failure to maintain
regular contact with the social worker impeded DCFS’s ability to
fully implement the case plan. (In re Jonathan R. (1989) 211
Cal.App.3d 1214, 1220 [challenge to adequacy of reunification
services failed where parent’s own conduct prevented social
services agency from providing services].) We therefore find no
abuse of discretion.
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DISPOSITION
The order of the juvenile court is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, P. J.
We concur:
HANASONO, J.
ASHWORTH, J.*
* Retired Judge of the El Dorado Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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