Filed 8/31/26 In re N.K. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re N.K. et al., Persons Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, E087433
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.Nos. J298428 &
J298693)
v.
OPINION
L.K.,
Defendant and Appellant.
In re N.K. et al., Persons Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law. E087664
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY (Super.Ct.Nos. J298428 &
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES J298693)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
L.K.,
Defendant and Appellant.
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APPEALS from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Annemarie G.
Pace, Judge. Affirmed.
Emily Uhre, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Helena C. Rho, Deputy County Counsel, and Laura Feingold, County Counsel, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
By a prior order, this court consolidated two appeals by L.K. (Mother) in case
Nos. E087433 and E087664, which we resolve together here. In case No. E087433,
Mother challenges the juvenile court’s finding that visitation with her sons, N.K. and
R.K., in the postreunification phase of these dependency proceedings was detrimental,
resulting in termination of the visits. R.K. (hereafter Minor) was two years old at the
time of the court’s finding; Mother challenges the detriment finding only as to Minor, not
the older child, N.K. Mother argues in case No. E087664 that termination of her visits
with Minor due to the erroneous detriment finding led to the juvenile court erroneously
terminating her parental rights.
While the record is lengthy, involving incorporation of an earlier, abandoned
appeal in which Mother challenged a vaccination order (E086184), our conclusion is
straightforward: even assuming the juvenile court erred in terminating Mother’s visits
because they were detrimental, ending the visits was harmless error. In other words, we
conclude Mother was not legally prejudiced when the court discontinued her visits with
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Minor. We therefore affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating Mother’s parental
rights, and, in doing so, we need not reach the issue of risk of detriment from Mother’s
visits.
BACKGROUND
Dependency proceedings involving Minor’s parents and N.K. began before Minor
was born. In September 2023, law enforcement conducted a welfare check at a
motorhome in a remote desert location, which brought N.K. to the Department of
Children and Family Service’s (CFS’s) attention. Mother was approximately eight
months pregnant with Minor at the time.
The motorhome, located in a dry lakebed in the Joshua Tree area, had no running
water or electricity and was infested with flies, including inside the refrigerator, inside of
food packaging, and inside food containers in the cupboard. Three loaded firearms were
discovered within reach of N.K., who was seven years old at the time. Exposed electrical
wiring throughout the motorhome also presented a danger, as did an outdoor propane
stove set up for use inside the motorhome, without proper ventilation. There was
minimal food available for N.K. to eat; he had never been to the doctor or a dentist since
he was born.
When law enforcement entered the motorhome, the alleged father of N.K., C.P.
(Father), who was naked, stated “I am God” and attempted to wrestle the officers.
Mother was naked from the waist down and began screaming. N.K. also became upset,
but the officers were able to calm him; he appeared to have unspecified developmental
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delays causing him to have some difficulty understanding questions. Mother and Father
were arrested for felony child endangerment. (Pen. Code, §273a, subd. (a).) CFS
detained N.K. in protective custody.
Later that week, in mid-September 2023, CFS filed a child welfare petition
seeking juvenile court dependency jurisdiction over N.K. on grounds that Mother and
Father failed to provide N.K. a safe living environment, Father’s substance abuse
impaired his parenting, and neither parent was able to arrange suitable care for N.K.
while in jail on pending charges. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subds. (b), (g).)1 The
juvenile court at the detention hearing found the statutory requirements for detaining
N.K. out of his parents’ custody satisfied.
Father in written communication with CFS stated concern for N.K.’s education,
claiming the child “always had the option for any kind of schooling he finds interesting,”
including what Father termed “organic schooling.” But in practice N.K. reported bizarre
lessons, including that his “dad taught him about the voices” emanating from the family
couch, apparently in the motorhome. N.K. learned that the “good couch make you do
good decisions, bad couch makes you do bad decisions.” In the latter category, N.K.
gave as an example watching “spider videos” at night during which “the bad couch was
with him when he was watching the videos.”
Father characterized the family’s lifestyle as simply “alternative living.” He
admitted marijuana use, claiming it was for spiritual purposes. In his interview with a
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
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social worker, his pupils were dilated “irregularly large,” and he made bizarre statements
such as greeting the social worker with “Are you of the truth” and claiming he did not
resist the officers who arrested him, but only asked them the same question. He admitted
the firearms in the motorhome were loaded, but denied they could be securely stored
because then “they are of [no] use for protection.” They presented no danger to N.K.,
according to Father, because the child understood they “are not for playing with.”
Despite photographic evidence, Father denied the presence of flies inside the family’s
food packaging.
Mother gave passing acknowledgment to concerns such as using the outdoor stove
inside the motorhome and the “really bad” fly infestation (they “were everywhere”). But
she regarded such matters as “temporary things going on,” triggering unnecessary CFS
involvement because of “one moment.” She was largely dismissive and minimized risks
to N.K. She claimed law enforcement photographs had been fabricated and denied
Father was aggressive during the welfare check, attributing their arrests to just “a lot of
chaos at that time.”
N.K. felt safe in his foster caregiver’s home and enjoyed his placement there. In
particular, he was “very expressive . . . that he is enjoying being able to go to school with
other children, and that he enjoys learning.” He “reported that he is making friends and
really likes his teacher, because she reminds him of his mother.” He also enjoyed being
“able to try new foods and have new experiences.”
5
Minor was born in October 2023 in the motorhome. CFS responded to a new
referral regarding continuing unsafe conditions in Mother and Father’s care. Minor was
found to be “super hungry,” consuming a large amount of formula “for a child [his] age,”
according to nursing staff who examined him. He had “dried . . . feces” that were “stuck
on . . . at the top of his buttocks,” indicating “he may not have had a [diaper] change for
some time.” Dirt under his fingernails, dried skin all over his body, multiple rashes on
his legs, and an odor as if he had not been cleaned since birth were also cause for
concern.
Mother was vague about the date Minor was born, suggesting it was “last week”
when, instead, the nursing staff estimated Minor was two or three weeks old. Minor was
detained under a protective custody warrant and placed in foster care once he cleared his
emergency medical examination. CFS filed a dependency petition regarding Minor,
seeking juvenile court protection on grounds of parental neglect and abuse of a sibling.
(§ 300, subds. (b), (j).)
In the weeks leading up to the combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing for
both children, Mother and Father continued to minimize concern for Minor’s and N.K.’s
safety and welfare, while also displaying new erratic behavior. Father seemed to sleep
during an interview, claimed to be meditating, but became aggressive when advised of
visitation rules, stating that “we will do whatever we want.” Mother’s veracity was in
doubt, including because she first claimed to have had a midwife present during Minor’s
birth, then denied it. The parents on monitored phone calls with N.K. attempted to coach
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him on what to say to social workers, defying visitation rules. The calls made N.K.
fearful, as his parents threatened that “aliens will come.”
Family members expressed concern about the parents’ mental health. Threatening
the social workers with “kidnapping and abuse” charges, the parents made
unsubstantiated claims stating that “[b]oth of our kids have been well documented on
social media as being happy and healthy.” The parents sent voluminous email missives to
the social worker, claiming unjust treatment and persecution, rather than taking,
according to the social worker, “steps to partner with the Department to mitigate [CFS’s]
concerns.”
In late November 2023, the juvenile court at the jurisdiction and disposition
hearing sustained the dependency petitions regarding both children, finding they required
the court’s protection. (§ 300, subds. (b), (j).) The court ordered reunification services
for the parents, including weekly visitation for two hours at a time with each child or four
hours total.
Mother separated from Father and made progress on her reunification case plan.
Based on Mother’s initial progress, the juvenile court extended reunification services at
the six-month review hearing.2 Unfortunately, Mother’s participation then waned, as did
the extent and quality of her visitation.
2 Father’s case plan participation was minimal, characterized primarily by his
“absen[ce].” He does not join in either of Mother’s appeals, nor do Mother’s appeals
involve N.K., so our factual background includes further references to Father and N.K.
only as they are relevant to Minor’s continuing dependency.
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Early in the 12-month review period, Mother failed to appear for an early
disposition hearing in her criminal matter. She did not resolve the ensuing warrant and
was rearrested and incarcerated for nearly two and one-half months. She missed her
reunification services and visitation opportunities during that time. Mother appeared not
to recognize, or did not want to discuss with the social worker, that the gap in visits
stemmed from her jailing. Instead, she complained that “visits were suddenly
discontinued, without notice or explanation.”
Upon her release from jail, uncooperative tendencies reemerged when Mother
resumed her relationship with Father. She disputed her noncompliance with her case plan
requirements, failing to recognize or acknowledge that she did not provide three
consecutive negative drug tests necessary to progress to unmonitored visitation. Mother
was a consistent no-show for drug tests. She instead joined with Father to submit a 15-
page, single-spaced “Affidavit of Testimony” identifying themselves as “life spirit
Sovereign People.” Under that title or auspices, Mother demanded the immediate return
of N.K. and Minor to her custody “within 2 business days” for lack of any valid
“contracts verbal or written” with the juvenile court.
Mother rebuffed the social worker’s invitation to rejoin and continue services. Her
visitation before she was jailed included a concerning habit, against visitation rules, of
trying to provoke or elicit from N.K. unhappiness about his placement. She encouraged
N.K. to “vent” about his foster family, planted seeds of discord (“I remember you had a
lot of anger”), and made leading suggestions such as, “Now you can appreciate what you
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have because at first you didn’t know better. You must miss our food at home.” N.K. did
not take the bait, informing Mother he was “fine.” He was still “very excited” to see
Mother and otherwise enjoyed the visit.
Minor was placed in the same home with N.K., where both children were “doing
well,” at least initially. Though placed together, the visitation log said little or nothing of
Mother’s interaction with Minor during her last visit before her incarceration, and the
same pattern continued afterwards. Mother appeared to be focused on N.K. An interim
foster placement and visitation monitor suggested by Mother observed, for example, that
“it appears [Mother] primarily interacts with” N.K., in contrast to “minimal interaction
with” Minor.
At the 12-month review hearing in November 2024, Mother took the stand to
testify but was disqualified by the court after twice refusing to state her name for the
record. Finding based on CFS reports that Mother and Father failed to participate
regularly in their court-ordered case plan, the court terminated reunification services and
set a permanency planning selection and implementation hearing under section 366.26
(hereafter .26 hearing). The court also reduced visitation to once a month for two hours.
Though advised of her right to do so, Mother did not seek appellate extraordinary writ
review to challenge the juvenile court’s order setting the .26 hearing.
At CFS’s recommendation, the court subsequently took the .26 hearing off
calendar because the agency’s prior recommended permanent plan of adoption met
obstacles requiring CFS “to continue assessing . . . the caregiver’s ability to provide and
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care for the children long-term.” The court entered an order restricting Mother’s and
Father’s rights to make decisions regarding the children’s participation in educational and
developmental services. The court also set a permanency planning review hearing.
Mother appealed and then abandoned her appeal regarding a vaccination order the court
entered in May 2025.
In the meantime, Mother’s visitation with Minor did not meaningfully change.
During multiple in-person and by-phone visits, Mother had to be admonished by
monitors “for various reasons such as whispering to [N.K.], neglecting to interact with
[Minor], and speaking about the case . . . or making promises . . . ‘to live with her
soon.’ ” Mother ignored phone call, text message, and in-person attempts by the social
worker to address violation of visitation rules; she told the worker: “I will not be
speaking with you.” When the caregiver had trouble encouraging N.K. to finish a meal,
Mother’s interference was evident in his response, telling the caregiver: “I won’t have to
eat much longer because I’m leaving soon anyways.”
Minor’s new foster parent and multiple social workers “observed the mother to
primarily focus on [N.K.] during visitation,” leaving Minor “to run around in the space
mainly exploring the area alone.” Mother “essentially left the child with” the caregiver,
such that he was “ ‘babysitting’ the child . . . .” Mother’s “minimal[]” interaction with
Minor, according to one of the social workers, seemed to consist of getting Minor
interested in a toy, and then engaging with N.K. without returning her attention to Minor.
In one example, it took N.K.’s insistence for Mother to change Minor’s “soaked” diaper.
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Concerns about mother “not interacting” substantially with both children were addressed
with her “more than once.” Mother denied neglecting Minor, shifting blame for having
to attend to Minor to the caregiver for “deliver[ing] the child to the visit in a bad state.”
Mother continued to refuse the opportunity for substance abuse testing, the
original requisite condition for increased visitation. Nor would she let CFS assess her
living conditions.
By September 2025, N.K. expressed interest in being adopted by the current
caregivers, with whom the children had been placed since March 2025; it was their fifth
placement over the course of the dependency. At CFS’s request at a noticed hearing, the
juvenile court re-set the .26 hearing. The court also authorized a bonding study to assist
the court at the .26 hearing in assessing Mother’s relationship with N.K. Given Mother’s
lack of interaction with Minor during visits, however, the court concluded, “I don’t
believe there’s any basis for a bonding study with [Minor], who was essentially . . .
removed at birth.”
In October 2025, CFS submitted a packet to the juvenile court recommending that
the court enter a finding that Mother’s visits with the children were detrimental. CFS
based its recommendation on “observations and reports from multiple supervised visits.”
The recommendation repeated prior observations that Mother showed “minimal”
engagement with Minor during visits, that she “does not interact meaningfully with him,”
rarely changed his diaper, and left him “often running around by himself.”
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CFS’s detriment recommendation was also based on Mother’s prohibited conduct
with N.K. during visits, causing him “confusion and emotional distress.” Examples in
addition to Mother’s whispering campaign that his placement caregivers were “bad”
included her argumentative conduct with the visitation supervisor, which reduced a
“visibly upset” N.K. to tears. Mother objected to any suggestion her visits were
detrimental.
The court held a hearing on November 6, 2025, to consider whether Mother’s
visits were detrimental. Mother did not appear for the hearing. At the close of the brief
hearing, the court concluded: “Based on the information in the packet,” including “that
we’re not in reunification” (which had been terminated a year earlier, in November
2024), “I am going to find visits between the mother and the children to be detrimental.”
Based on its detriment finding, the court terminated Mother’s visits during the two
months leading up to the .26 hearing. Mother appealed the court’s “Termination of
Visitation” ruling.
Meanwhile, the .26 hearing proceeded as scheduled in January 2026. Neither
Mother nor Father appeared at the hearing. Mother’s counsel objected to termination of
her parental rights, suggesting legal guardianship as an alternative permanent plan.
Mother’s attorney argued that Mother had visited consistently when she had the
opportunity and she characterized the visits as “going fairly well.” The juvenile court
found both children to be adoptable and that the benefit of “the permanency of adoption
for these young children far outweigh[s] any detriment” from terminating parental rights.
12
The court entered orders terminating parental rights as to both N.K. and Minor. Mother
appealed, and this court consolidated her new appeal with her pending appeal regarding
termination of visitation.
DISCUSSION
Mother first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile
court’s decision that her visits with Minor were detrimental. “ ‘Detriment is a familiar
standard in child welfare determinations,’ ” under which “ ‘the risk of detriment must be
substantial, such that [the parent’s conduct] represents some danger to the child’s
physical or emotional well-being.’ ” (In re A.J. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 154, 160, new
bracketed language, original italics.) After terminating reunification services and setting
a .26 hearing, the juvenile court “shall continue to permit the parent . . . to visit the child
pending the hearing unless it finds that visitation would be detrimental to the child.”
(§ 366.21, subd. (h).) The juvenile court determines questions of detriment in the
postreunification period under the preponderance of evidence standard, rather than by
clear and convincing evidence. (In re Manolito L. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 753, 760.) On
appeal, we review detriment findings for substantial evidence. (Angela S. v. Superior
Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 763.)
We need not reach Mother’s detriment challenge. Juvenile court proceedings
continued pending Mother’s appeal of that court’s order terminating her visits with Minor
and, as noted, when the court terminated Mother’s parental rights and Mother appealed,
we consolidated her second appeal with her detriment challenge. We need only address
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Mother’s second appeal because, even assuming the juvenile court’s detriment finding
was unsupported by the evidence, that does not affect the validity of the court’s order
terminating her parental rights, as we explain.
Mother’s sole argument in her second appeal is that erroneous termination of her
visits with Minor resulted in wrongful termination of her parental rights because it
prevented her from establishing the consistent visitation prong of the parental benefit
exception to termination of parental rights. (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B); In re
Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 632 (Caden C.).) But for the exception to apply, the
parent must establish two further prongs in addition to consistent visitation: a beneficial
relationship with the child and that terminating the relationship would be so detrimental
as to outweigh the benefits of a new adoptive home. (Caden C., at p. 632.) “[A] parent
must prove all three components of the . . . exception,” and a “failure of proof on any one
of them is fatal.” (In re Katherine J. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303, 322, fn. 10, italics
omitted.)
Here, the second prong of the exception—a beneficial relationship—posed an
insurmountable obstacle for Mother, regardless of whether she had more visits. Simply
put, there is virtually no evidence in the record that Mother had any positive relationship
with Minor. He was removed from her care within weeks of his birth and, as noted,
multiple caregivers and social workers uniformly reported over the next two years that
Mother’s visits with Minor were marked by her disregard for him. She showed no
interest in forming a relationship with Minor. In setting the .26 hearing and authorizing a
14
bonding study for N.K. but not for Minor, the juvenile court observed in light of Mother’s
lack of interaction with Minor that there was no “basis for a bonding study with [Minor],
who was essentially . . . removed at birth.”
At oral argument, Mother suggested it was speculative to conclude terminating
visitation was harmless on grounds it was unlikely more visits before the .26 hearing
would have made a difference. We disagree. The requisite bond to establish the benefit
exception is measured from the perspective of the child. As Caden C. explained, “the
focus is on the child” in determining whether he or she “ ‘would benefit from continuing
the relationship.’ (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.)
“A slew of factors” informs whether the relationship is beneficial, “such as ‘[t]he age of
the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or
“negative” effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular
needs.’ ” (Ibid.) Of course, there is no “precise ‘quantitative measurement of the specific
amount of “comfort, nourishment or physical care” [a parent must] provide[] during [his
or] her . . . visits’ ” to qualify for the benefit exception. (Ibid. [bracketed language
adjusted].) But for two years Mother did nothing on any of these metrics to establish the
benefit exception. Nothing suggests anything would change over the course of two or
three more brief, one-hour monthly visits to foster Mother’s case for the benefit exception
at the .26 hearing.
Nor do we see any reasonable probability that a couple more visits would help
Mother establish the termination exception’s third prong—detriment from terminating the
15
parent-child relationship. On that prong, the juvenile court “must decide whether it
would be harmful to the child to sever the relationship and choose adoption.” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5tth at p. 633.) Evidence of such harm from the prospect of terminating the
parental relationship “might include emotional instability and preoccupation leading to
acting out, . . . insomnia, anxiety, or depression.” (Ibid.)
Unlike his older brother, N.K., Minor may have been too young to exhibit negative
symptoms from Mother’s conduct at visits, but there was also a complete absence of any
evidence that Minor had a “strong, positive, and affirming relationship” with Mother.
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) The detriment prong is necessarily intertwined
with whether there is a beneficial relationship that would be harmful to sever. (See In re
G.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 15, 26 [the three prongs of the benefit exception “naturally
inform and lead into each other”].) We think it is speculative to suppose Minor, a toddler,
would develop such a compelling relationship with Mother in just a few short visits that it
would “outweigh[] ‘the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer.’ ”
(Caden C., at p. 633.) To the contrary, Mother had been indifferent to Minor up to that
point, and nothing suggested Minor felt—or would feel—anything more for Mother than
she did for him.
Our state Constitution prohibits us from setting aside a judgment unless the lower
court’s alleged error has resulted in a “miscarriage of justice.” (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)
This prohibition means that a reviewing court may reverse a lower court ruling only if it
is reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable to the appealing party
16
but for the error. (See People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) This harmless error
analysis applies generally to dependency matters. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45,
60.)
Under this standard, we find no reasonable probability that additional visits would
have aided Mother to establish the second and third prongs of the benefit exception at the
.26 hearing to avoid termination of her parental rights. Consequently, any error in the
juvenile court’s order ending visits because they posed a risk of physical or emotional
detriment to Minor was necessarily harmless. We therefore affirm the juvenile court’s
order terminating Mother’s parental rights, and we do not decide whether the court’s
order terminating Mother’s visits was erroneous.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court orders that Mother challenges in case Nos. E087433
and E087664 are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
LEE
J.
We concur:
CODRINGTON
Acting P. J.
MENETREZ
J.
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