Filed 7/17/26 In re N.D. CA2/3
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
B341706
In re N.D. et al., Persons Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP05687C–D)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
G.D.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Linda Sun, Judge. Affirmed and remanded with
instructions.
Sean Angele Burleigh, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Bryan Mercke, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Appellant G.D. (father) appeals from juvenile court
jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders sustaining a
petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300
and asserting dependency jurisdiction over minor children N.D.
and M.D. In our original nonpublished opinion, we accepted the
parties’ stipulation to correct two clerical errors, remanded the
matter with instructions, and otherwise dismissed the appeal as
nonjusticiable.
Our Supreme Court granted review and transferred the
case back to this court with directions to vacate our decision and
reconsider the case in light of In re S.R. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 1042
(S.R.), pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.528(d).
Having done so, we again remand with instructions, and
otherwise affirm the challenged orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Father and mother S.R. (mother) have two children
together, N.D. and M.D. Mother previously had another child,
A.S., with nonparty J.S.
On April 26, 2024, the Department of Children and Family
Services (DCFS) received a referral alleging that father had
2
pinched A.S. on the hand, causing a purple bruise.1 A.S. also
reported that father recently “put his foot on her face” and gave
her a bloody nose, and that he “always hits her” in the face, side,
and thigh. She further reported that mother hit her legs with a
hanger. The report was closed as inconclusive.
DCFS received another report as to A.S. on May 9, 2024.
A.S. reported that father had pinched her hand and the social
worker observed a small bruise. The child denied that father or
mother ever sexually abused her. She also denied being hit with
objects or witnessing her siblings being physically disciplined.
When interviewed about the referral, father denied
pinching A.S., but he speculated that he may have accidentally
scratched her while holding her hand.
During a May 9, 2024 home visit, a DCFS social worker
reported that A.S. appeared comfortable in the home and well
bonded with father. The social worker observed no bruising or
marks on N.D. and M.D. Both children were too young to provide
a statement.
During a physical examination on or about May 13, 2024,
A.S. reported that mother hit her with hangers when she got
“ ‘bad colors’ ” at school, and she had a bruise that could have
been caused by a hanger. A.S. also stated that father had
punished her in the past by covering her mouth and biting her
ear.
On May 22, 2024, mother admitted to hitting a table with a
hanger to scare A.S., but she denied hitting the child. Father and
mother both denied that father had put his foot on A.S.’s face,
1 Mother reported that J.S. was not involved in A.S.’s life at
this time and had not visited the child for about two months.
3
gave her a bloody nose, or physically disciplined her in any other
way. Mother disclosed that father and A.S. sometimes “ ‘play
fight’ ” and that this occasionally made A.S. upset.
On May 24, 2024, DCFS received a report that A.S. arrived
at school with two “big scratches” on her arm, which she said
mother caused. A DCFS social worker went to the school and
observed two purple scratches on A.S.’s arm measuring about one
and a half inches each. A.S. said that mother told her not to
report that anyone hit her at home, otherwise the police would
take her away. A.S. also reported that father hit her when she
misbehaves, and that father once hit her on the mouth and gave
her a bloody lip. She denied that father or mother physically
abused or disciplined M.D. or N.D. Later that day, mother
disclosed that she accidentally scratched A.S. with a broken
hanger while trying to spank her.
While the social worker was interviewing A.S. about the
scratches, without provocation, A.S. stated that father touched
her private parts at night while mother was sleeping, and that he
also touched A.S. while she was in the shower. A.S. told father to
stop and he stopped. The child said this had happened “ ‘100
times,’ ” and mother knew about it but did nothing. She reported
that father sometimes touched her over her clothes, and other
times he put his hand “ ‘inside,’ ” and “she lifted her pants to
show that it was under the clothes.” According to A.S., father
told the child not to tell mother about the touching. A.S. also
reported that she had seen father’s penis in his “ ‘pocket,’ ” and
she drew a penis for the social worker.
Father denied the allegations of sexual abuse and improper
touching. Mother denied any knowledge of anyone sexually
abusing A.S., and denied that the child had told her about any
4
such abuse. Mother explained that A.S. might have seen a
picture of a penis on an iPad. About a month later, mother said
that A.S. might have drawn a penis after seeing N.D.’s diaper
being changed or seeing “something on Twitter.”
On May 24, 2024, pursuant to an agreed safety plan, N.D.
and M.D. moved in with paternal grandmother and A.S. began
staying with maternal aunt. On May 30, 2024, the social worker
coordinated for A.S. to move in with J.S. after confirming that his
home was safe.
On June 3, 2024, DCFS filed a Welfare and Institutions
Code section 300 petition alleging that N.D., M.D., and A.S. were
endangered because father sexually and physically abused A.S.
and because mother physically abused A.S.
At the June 17, 2024 initial hearing, the juvenile court
temporarily detained A.S. from mother and temporarily detained
N.D. and M.D. from father pending disposition of the petition.
On July 29, 2024, J.S. told a DCFS social worker that A.S.
peed her pants while playing hide and seek. While discussing the
incident, A.S. spontaneously told J.S. that she sometimes pooped
her pants because she did not want to be touched by father.
At a July 31, 2024 forensic interview, A.S. reported that
father “ ‘hit [her] all the time.’ ” She described one incident
where father accidentally hit her nose with his toes while she was
asleep, but she could not provide the details of any other hitting
or physical abuse. She did not disclose any inappropriate
touching or sexual abuse.
At the October 10, 2024 adjudication and disposition
hearing, the juvenile court stated that it would sustain amended
allegations that father inappropriately touched A.S. (the b-1
count), and it struck allegations that mother failed to protect A.S.
5
from this touching. The court did not identify which children
were at risk of harm because of father’s conduct. During the
dispositional phase of the hearing, father’s counsel asserted that
the court “did not sustain as to [N.D.] and [M.D.] the potential for
sexual abuse because they are clearly differently situated or
inappropriate touching.” Later, the court stated that it had
“sustained the inappropriate discipline count against the father,
but did not sustain the inappropriate touching against the father.
And [N.D. and M.D.] are not similarly situated,” and it “adopt[ed]
all of [father’s] argument with that.” In the interlineated petition
filed later that day, the amended inappropriate touching count
alleged that father inappropriately touched A.S. and that this
endangered A.S., without reference to N.D. and M.D. The minute
orders as to N.D. and M.D. both state that the inappropriate
touching count was sustained as to those children.
The court also sustained amended allegations that father
inappropriately disciplined A.S. by pinching the child, biting her
ear, striking her causing a cut lip, and putting his hand over her
mouth such that she could not breathe; and that this conduct
endangered all three children (the b-3 and j-3 counts). The
original allegations described father’s conduct as physical abuse.
At the hearing, father’s counsel argued that at most, the two
counts should be sustained to “conform to proof to include
inappropriate physical discipline.” The juvenile court sustained
the two counts “according to proof as suggested by” father’s
counsel, and it described the j-3 count as involving “inappropriate
discipline.” The interlineated petition described father’s conduct
as physical abuse once in the b-3 count and once in the j-3 count.
Finally, the court sustained allegations that mother’s
inappropriate discipline of A.S. endangered all three children.
6
The juvenile court declared N.D. and M.D. dependents of
the court. It found that releasing N.D. and M.D. to father and
mother would not be detrimental to their safety, and therefore
ordered the two children released to father and mother. The
court ordered father to “participate in sexual abuse counseling,
anger management, parenting, family preservation, individual
counseling.”
Father timely appealed as to N.D. and M.D. Shortly before
oral argument, the parties stipulated that certain clerical errors
should be corrected on remand. In our initial nonpublished
opinion, we accepted the parties’ stipulation, remanded with
appropriate instructions, and otherwise dismissed the appeal as
nonjusticiable. In particular, we rejected father’s argument that
his appeal was justiciable because the challenged orders as to
N.D. and M.D. describe conduct that is reportable for inclusion in
the Child Abuse Central Index (CACI).
Our Supreme Court granted review and transferred the
matter to this court with directions to vacate our decision and
reconsider the case in light of S.R., supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 1055.
The parties did not submit supplemental briefing, as permitted
under California Rules of Court, rule 8.200(b)(1). After
reconsideration, we remand with instructions to correct the two
stipulated clerical errors, and otherwise affirm.
DISCUSSION
I. We accept the parties’ stipulation to remand for
correction of two clerical errors
On November 18, 2025, after this appeal was fully briefed,
the parties filed a “joint application and partial stipulation”
asking this court to remand the matter to correct two clerical
7
errors in the juvenile court orders and the interlineated petition.
We accept the stipulation. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th
181, 185 [reviewing court may correct clerical error in order that
does not accurately reflect oral ruling].)2
First, the parties stipulate that the b-1 count should be
stricken from the orders as to N.D. and M.D. At the adjudication
and disposition hearing, father’s counsel argued that the court
“did not sustain as to [N.D.] and [M.D.] the potential for sexual
abuse because they are clearly differently situated or
inappropriate touching.” The juvenile court confirmed that, with
respect to the b-1 count, N.D. and M.D. “are not similarly
situated,” and the interlineated petition omitted those two
children from that count. However, the October 10, 2024 minute
orders entered as to N.D. and M.D. following the hearing both
state that count b-1 was “sustained as amended” as to those
children. The parties stipulate that the court intended to strike
N.D. and M.D. from the b-1 count, and that this was a clerical
error that may be corrected by this court. We therefore remand
the matter, and direct the juvenile court to strike all references to
2 The parties assert that the stipulation comports with Code
of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(8), which specifies
the circumstances under which an appellate court may reverse or
vacate a judgment. However, the parties have not asked us to
reverse or vacate a judgment—they request that we remand with
instructions to correct clerical errors, which will not result in
reversal of any judgment or order. Code of Civil Procedure
section 128 therefore does not govern our analysis.
8
the b-1 count from the October 10, 2024 minute orders as to N.D.
and M.D.3
Second, the parties stipulate that the October 10, 2024
interlineated petition should be amended to conform with the
juvenile court’s oral ruling on the b-3 and j-3 counts. At the
adjudication and disposition hearing, father’s counsel contended
that these counts should be sustained, at most, as inappropriate
discipline counts, and the court sustained those counts according
to proof “as suggested by” father’s attorney. In the interlineated
petition, each count includes one reference to father committing
“physical abuse.” The parties stipulate that the reference to
“physical abuse” in the fourth sentence of each count is a clerical
error that may be corrected by this court.4 Thus, on remand, we
also direct the juvenile court to strike the term “physical abuse”
in the fourth sentence of the b-3 and j-3 counts in the
interlineated petition, and replace it with the term “inappropriate
discipline.”
II. The juvenile court properly exercised jurisdiction
over N.D. and M.D.
Father also contends that the b-3 and j-3 counts must be
reversed because the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings were
3 Father did not appeal from any findings or orders relating
to A.S. As father concedes, this court lacks jurisdiction over those
findings and orders, meaning we have no power to address the
b-1 findings as to A.S.
4 The parties’ stipulation references the third sentence of
these two counts. In fact, the fourth sentence of each count
contains the reference to physical abuse.
9
inconsistent and confusing. For the reasons discussed herein, we
disagree and affirm.
A. Justiciability and dependency appeals
As a threshold matter, we note that “an appeal will not be
entertained unless it presents a justiciable issue.” (In re I.A.
(2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1489 (I.A.).) “An important
requirement for justiciability is the availability of ‘effective’
relief—that is, the prospect of a remedy that can have a practical,
tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status.” (Id. at p.
1490.) Relatedly, “ ‘[w]hen a dependency petition alleges multiple
grounds for its assertion that a minor comes within the
dependency court’s jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the
juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of
the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the
petition is supported by substantial evidence. In such a case, the
reviewing court need not consider whether any or all of the other
alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the
evidence.’ ” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)
Father concedes that the juvenile court properly asserted
dependency jurisdiction over N.D. and M.D. Specifically, in
addition to its findings as to father, the juvenile court sustained
allegations that mother inappropriately disciplined A.S. and that
this conduct endangered N.D. and M.D. Thus, even if we agreed
with father’s arguments, we would not conclude the juvenile
court lacked jurisdiction over N.D. and M.D., nor would we take
any other action that could affect father. (In re D.P. (2023) 14
Cal.5th 266, 283–284 (D.P.); I.A., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at pp.
1491–1492.)
Father nonetheless contends his appeal is justiciable
because reversal of the “inconsistent and confusing” jurisdictional
10
findings could support reversal of the dispositional order,
pursuant to which father was required to complete sexual abuse
counseling for predators. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 283
[“where a jurisdictional finding ‘serves as the basis for
dispositional orders that are also challenged on appeal’ [citation],
the appeal is not moot”].) But father fails to explain why reversal
of any jurisdictional findings would necessarily affect the
dispositional order. The juvenile court has “broad discretion . . .
to formulate disposition orders to address parental deficiencies
when necessary to protect and promote the child’s welfare,” even
when those deficiencies were not the basis for dependency
jurisdiction. (In re K.T. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 20, 25.) Thus,
even if we reversed all jurisdictional findings as to father, the
juvenile court still would have discretion to enter a dispositional
order requiring father to participate in services based on the
evidence in the record. Father does not argue that the court
would have abused its discretion in doing so.
However, father also argues that his appeal is justiciable
because the challenged findings in the b-3 and j-3 counts describe
conduct that is reportable for inclusion in the CACI.5 An appeal
is justiciable if the court can provide effective relief. “For relief to
be ‘effective,’ two requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff
must complain of an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be
5 In his appellate briefing, father argued that the amended
petition described conduct that is reportable for inclusion in the
CACI, but he did not specify what findings, if any, were
necessarily reportable. We rejected this argument as speculative.
In his petition for review to our Supreme Court, father asserted
that the conduct described in the b-3 and j-3 counts is
indisputably reportable.
11
redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome the
plaintiff seeks.” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276.)
We first consider whether father has identified an ongoing
harm. Agencies such as DCFS are required to forward reports of
child abuse to the California Department of Justice for inclusion
in the CACI. (Pen. Code, §§ 11169, subd. (a), 11165.9.)6 Child
abuse “includes physical injury or death inflicted by other than
accidental means upon a child by another person . . . .”
(§ 11165.6.) Here, in the b-3 and j-3 counts, the juvenile court
sustained allegations that father pinched A.S.’s hand, bit her ear,
struck her face causing a cut lip, and put his hand over her
mouth so that she could not breathe. We agree that these
findings describe nonaccidental infliction of physical injury,
which is reportable child abuse within the meaning of section
11165.6. Accordingly, father has identified an ongoing harm:
that his conduct has been or will be reported for inclusion in the
CACI. (S.R., supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 1053.)
We next consider whether this ongoing harm is “capable of
being redressed by a favorable court decision.” (D.P., supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 277.) “[W]here a court reverses a jurisdictional
finding of severe child abuse for lack of sufficient evidence, an
individual may no longer be listed in the CACI.” (S.R., supra, 18
Cal.5th at p. 1055, citing § 11169, subd. (a).) And, if the parent
remains listed in the CACI after such a reversal, he or she may
request a grievance hearing to seek removal. (S.R., at p. 1055,
citing § 11169, subds. (d), (e), & (h).) Thus, reversal of
jurisdictional findings describing conduct that is reportable for
6 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
12
inclusion in the CACI could redress an ongoing harm. (D.P., at
pp. 283–284.) We will therefore consider the merits of father’s
challenge to the b-3 and j-3 counts, at least insofar as the
challenged findings describe conduct that is reportable for
inclusion in the CACI.
Father also challenges one other finding within the b-3 and
j-3 counts: that A.S. was afraid of father.7 Agencies such as
DCFS are required to report substantiated reports of child abuse
or neglect, but the fact that a child feared someone is not itself
reportable. (§ 11169, subd. (a).) Father asks us in the alternative
to exercise our discretion to consider this challenge. But the fact
that a child is afraid of a person is not particularly pernicious or
stigmatizing. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 285–286 [reviewing
court may exercise discretion when the challenged finding “is
based on particularly pernicious or stigmatizing conduct”].)
Father also contends that the challenged findings could impact
future dependency proceedings, but he fails to identify any
specific proceeding at which the findings might be relevant. (Id.
at p. 278 [speculative harm insufficient].) Dependency matters
focus on “the then prevailing circumstances of parent and child.”
(I.A., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1495.) In a hypothetical future
dependency proceeding, the juvenile court would be obligated to
independently assess the then-existing circumstances to evaluate
the risk of harm to the minor child or children. In short, having
considered the factors identified in D.P., we decline to exercise
our discretion to reach the merits of father’s challenge to the
finding that A.S. was afraid of father. (Ibid.)
7 Father specifically argues that this is inconsistent with the
juvenile court’s oral finding that A.S. was not afraid of father.
13
B. Father has not identified any clear discrepancy
between the interlineated petition and the
court’s oral ruling
Father contends that the b-3 and j-3 counts must be
reversed because the interlineated petition is inconsistent with
the juvenile court’s oral ruling. When there is a clear discrepancy
between the juvenile court’s oral ruling and its written ruling, the
oral ruling controls. (In re Nia A. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1241,
1247 (Nia A.).) Here, we find no basis to reverse or amend the
written ruling.
Father first notes that the juvenile court stated orally that
it would amend the b-3 and j-3 counts “according to proof as
suggested by” father’s counsel. Father asserts that this is
inconsistent with the interlineated petition. We find no
inconsistency. At the hearing, father’s counsel stated: “At most
the court could sustain [the b-3 and j-3 counts] and conform to
proof to include inappropriate physical discipline.” In its oral
ruling, the court sustained the two counts “according to proof as
suggested by” father’s counsel. Consistent with this ruling, the
interlineated petition amended the b-3 and j-3 counts to reflect
the exact change that father proposed when he asked the court to
conform the counts to proof: that father inappropriately
disciplined A.S., but did not physically abuse her.8
8 As we have discussed, the interlineated petition included
references to physical abuse, and we have accepted the parties’
stipulation to conform the petition to the court’s oral ruling.
14
Father nonetheless contends that his request for the court
to “conform to proof” the b-3 and j-3 counts clearly encompassed a
request to completely strike allegations that father bit A.S.’s ear,
struck her face, and put his hands over her mouth so she could
not breathe. We disagree. At the hearing, father’s counsel
emphasized that father denied that he had bitten A.S.’s ear, put
his hand over her mouth, or hit her face. Father’s counsel also
noted that A.S. made these accusations only one time. In short,
father appeared to assert that he was more credible than A.S.
and that the court should strike these allegations, or dismiss the
counts entirely. But father never expressly connected these
arguments to his request that the court conform the counts to
proof. Nor did father offer any specific proposed amendment in
connection with this request.9
Father also asserts that the interlineated petition omits the
court’s oral finding that father struck A.S. by accident on one
occasion. Specifically, at the hearing, the court noted that A.S.
reported that father put his foot in the child’s face and caused a
nosebleed, but the court expressly found that this was an
accident. Father asserts that this finding is inconsistent with the
interlineated petition, which found that “father struck the child’s
face inflicting a bleeding laceration to the child’s lip.” We again
find no inconsistency—at the hearing, the court discussed an
accident that led to a bloody nose, and the interlineated petition
mentions an incident that caused a cut lip. The juvenile court
9 For example, mother’s counsel read into the record a
proposed amendment to the b-2 count. Father offered no such
proposal.
15
made no oral finding as to whether the latter injury was caused
accidentally.
In sum, the interlineated petition is not clearly inconsistent
with the juvenile court’s oral ruling, meaning the interlineated
petition controls. (Nia A., supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 1247.)
C. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile
court’s jurisdictional findings
On appeal, father does not argue that the jurisdictional
findings in the b-3 and j-3 counts are unsupported by substantial
evidence. However, out of an abundance of caution, we will
briefly address this issue. We conclude that the findings are
supported by substantial evidence.
We review jurisdictional findings “ ‘ “in the light of the
whole record” ’ ‘to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value . . . .’ ” (In re I.C. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 869, 892.) “ ‘In
making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences
from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the
dependency court; we review the record in the light most
favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues
of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.’ ” (In re
R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633.) “The appellant has the burden of
showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature
to support the findings or orders.” (In re E.E. (2020) 49
Cal.App.5th 195, 206.)
Through the b-3 and j-3 counts in the interlineated petition,
the juvenile court sustained allegations that father
inappropriately disciplined A.S. by pinching her hand, biting her
ear, striking her face causing a cut lip, striking her on another
occasion, and putting his hands over her mouth so she could not
16
breathe. Father conceded that he pinched A.S. A.S. reported
each of the other incidents, and “[e]vidence from a single witness,
even a party, can be sufficient to support the trial court’s
findings.” (In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451.)
Although father disputed that some of the incidents occurred, we
must resolve evidentiary conflicts in favor of the respondent. (In
re Veronica G. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 179, 185.) Accordingly, we
affirm the jurisdictional findings in the b-3 and j-3 counts.
17
DISPOSITION
We remand and instruct the juvenile court to correct the
October 10, 2024 minute orders asserting dependency jurisdiction
over N.D. and M.D., by striking all references to count b-1. We
further instruct the juvenile court to correct the October 10, 2024
interlineated petition by striking the term “physical abuse” in the
fourth sentence of the amended b-3 and j-3 counts, and replacing
that language with the term “inappropriate discipline.” The
orders are otherwise affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
HANASONO, J.
We concur:
EGERTON, Acting P. J.
ADAMS, J.
18