Filed 6/17/26 In re N.C. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re N.C., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND D087486
HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,
(Super. Ct. No. NJ016086)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
B.C.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Alejandro Morales, Judge. Affirmed.
William D. Caldwell for Defendant and Appellant.
Damon M. Brown, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado Chief Deputy
County Counsel, Kristen M. Ojeil, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Neale B. Gold for Minor.
Appellant B.C. (Father) appeals from an exit order governing child
custody and visitation issued by the juvenile court in a dependency
proceeding.
In January 2024, Father moved from Indiana to California with C.W.
(Mother) and their child, N.C. Father had received military orders stationing
him in San Diego. At that time, Father and Mother were not in a
relationship, and Father had full physical custody of N.C. under an order
issued by an Indiana court. The family came to the attention of the San
Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) after Father
committed at least two acts of physical violence against Mother in N.C.’s
presence. The Agency brought a petition under Welfare and Institutions
Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1) (section 300(b)(1)), seeking to protect N.C.
from exposure to further violence.
After the juvenile court learned of the Indiana court order at the
detention hearing, it contacted the Indiana court to discuss jurisdiction issues
under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
(UCCJEA; Fam. Code1, § 3400 et seq.). During that communication, the
Indiana judicial officer ceded jurisdiction to the juvenile court. The Indiana
judge concluded the parents and N.C. no longer resided in Indiana and
determined California was the more appropriate forum. As a result of the
Indiana court ceding jurisdiction, the juvenile court proceeded to conduct a
contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing. It made a true finding on the
petition, removed N.C. from Father’s custody, and gave Mother full legal and
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
2
physical custody. The juvenile court also authorized Mother to move with
N.C. back to Indiana, where she had significant family support.
On appeal, Father raises two issues. First, he contends the juvenile
court failed to comply with the UCCJEA when it asserted permanent subject
matter jurisdiction over the child’s custody matter. Father complains that
neither the California juvenile court nor the Indiana court it contacted
sufficiently considered the fact that Father was in California only due to
military orders, which, he asserts, means he is not a resident of California.
In Father’s view, Indiana continues to be N.C.’s home state and it possesses
continuing exclusive jurisdiction, rendering the California juvenile court’s
custody order invalid.
Second, Father contends that even if the juvenile court properly
asserted permanent jurisdiction over N.C., the court abused its discretion in
ordering Father to have only supervised visitation with his son.
Having considered both of Father’s arguments, we affirm the juvenile
court’s order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Father and Mother grew up in Indiana and their families continue to
reside there. N.C. was born in Indiana in October 2022.
On June 5, 2023, an Indiana court issued an order regarding N.C.’s
custody. Because the parents were not married at the time of N.C.’s birth,
the Indiana court adjudged Father the legal and biological father of N.C. It
also confirmed by order the parents’ agreement that they would share legal
custody and Father would have primary physical custody. With all pending
issues resolved, no further hearings were set by the Indiana court.
Approximately six months later, in January 2024, the parents and N.C.
moved to California together after Father received military orders stationing
3
him in San Diego. Although Mother and Father were no longer in a romantic
relationship, the parties lived together after the move. Mother began
working at the Brown Child Development Center in March 2024. Mother
also attended vocational college in San Diego from January through
June 2025.
The family first came to the attention of the Agency in May 2025 due to
a report of domestic violence. N.C. was a little over two and half years old at
the time. Mother reported to law enforcement that Father had punched her
in the face, pushed her, grabbed her by her hair, and hit her head into a wall.
During this incident, N.C. was knocked to the ground as well, where he hit
his head. Mother refused to seek an Emergency Protective Order at this
time.
Mother moved out of the home, at least temporarily. Both parents were
offered referrals for services through the Family Advocacy Program and the
Agency, but neither participated in the services at this point.
Mother returned to the shared home on August 22, 2025.2 The next
day, August 23, more violence occurred. Mother attempted to leave the
home, and Father grabbed her from behind, forcing her to the ground. He
restrained Mother by placing his left arm around her neck. He also pointed a
loaded rifle at Mother, for approximately two hours, and threatened to shoot
her and kill himself. N.C. was present in the home during these events and
had been going in and out of the room where the violence was occurring.
2 The Agency report documenting this information refers to the date
Mother returned to the home where Father lived as “08/22/2023,” but the
year reference appears to be typographical error.
4
Police reviewed a video Father took during the incident. In it, Mother
appeared frantic and appeared to be struggling to breathe. Father was
arrested, and Mother sought and obtained an emergency protective order. A
few days later, she obtained a temporary restraining order protecting herself
and N.C.
A social worker from the Agency helped Mother create a safety plan to
protect N.C. Father, who had posted bail, declined to participate in creating
a safety plan and asserted he would only participate if N.C. were placed in
his care. Father later declined to participate in a domestic violence group,
and he denied the violent incident had occurred.
Six days after the incident, Father’s military command issued a
military protective order (MPO) protecting Mother and N.C. and prohibiting
Father from contacting them. Father did not provide the Agency with a copy
of this order, but he later reported that the MPO had been modified to permit
him to have supervised visitation with N.C.
At a hearing that took place on September 22, 2025, in the parents’
restraining order proceedings, a family court judge granted Father four hours
of supervised visitation with N.C. on Saturday and on Sunday, every week.
The court denied Father’s request to remove the temporary restraining order
that had been put in place.
Two days later, the Agency filed a petition under section 300(b)(1),
seeking to protect N.C. from ongoing domestic violence. The detention
hearing took place on September 29, 2025, and at that hearing, the juvenile
court asserted emergency jurisdiction over N.C. under the UCCJEA. It also
decided to “conduct an inquiry” into permanent subject matter jurisdiction.
In response to the juvenile court’s inquiry, Mother explained that N.C. had
been born in Indiana, and she described her extended family as being in
5
Johnson County, Indiana. She recalled that she, Father, and N.C. moved to
San Diego County, California in January 2024, as a result of Father’s
military assignment.
The juvenile court indicated it would conduct “further inquiry from
Indiana, specifically Johnson County.” It then made a prima facie finding on
the Agency’s petition, determined continued care in Father’s home would be
contrary to N.C.’s welfare, and detained him in Mother’s care.
In early October 2025, the juvenile court documented an ex parte
telephone call it had conducted with the Honorable Michael T. Bohn,
Magistrate of the Juvenile and Family Division of the Johnson Circuit Court
of Indiana. Judge Bohn informed the juvenile court that the Johnson Circuit
Court had been involved in a paternity matter involving the family. The
Indiana court had entered an order establishing paternity and confirming a
custody arrangement the parties had reached.3 Given the Indiana court’s
“limited involvement” with the family, as well as the fact that the parties
were now living in California, Judge Bohn determined the Indiana court
would cede its permanent subject matter jurisdiction over N.C. to the
California court. Alternatively, he determined that the Indiana court would
cede jurisdiction because the California court was a more appropriate forum
for addressing the most recent matters involving the family.
In its jurisdiction and disposition report, the Agency recommended N.C.
be placed with Mother, with the Agency providing Mother family
maintenance services. The Agency also recommended Father receive
enhancement services, as well as liberal but supervised visitation consistent
3 A copy of the Indiana court order was provided to the juvenile court and
filed in the California proceeding.
6
with the MPO. Mother and Father presented differing views to an Agency
social worker regarding what had occurred between them. Mother
maintained her allegations of domestic violence were true, while Father
claimed Mother was lying. He did not participate in services.
At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing on October 20, 2025, the
juvenile court set the matter for a contested trial and authorized Mother to
travel with N.C. for a brief visit to Indiana.
In an addendum report filed with the court in early January 2026, the
Agency recommended Mother be granted full physical and legal custody of
N.C., with Father continuing to have “liberal supervised visitation.” At this
point, the Agency recommended the juvenile court issue the custody orders
and terminate jurisdiction. The juvenile court held a trial on jurisdiction and
disposition on January 7, 2026. The court indicated to the parties that it had
received the custody order issued by the Indiana court when it conducted its
UCCJEA inquiry with Judge Bohn. The Agency, Mother, and minor’s counsel
all requested the juvenile court follow the recommendations for custody made
in the Agency’s addendum report. Mother was also requesting authorization
to allow her to relocate to Indiana with N.C. Counsel for N.C. agreed with
Mother’s request. Father opposed the Agency’s recommendations and argued
N.C. should be returned to his care. The juvenile court continued the hearing
to allow the parties a chance to review case authorities that had been raised
at the hearing and to complete additional research.
Five days later the parties returned and offered additional legal
arguments. At that point in time, Father submitted a letter from the district
attorney’s office indicating no charges had been filed against him. Father’s
attorney acknowledged the juvenile court possessed broad discretion to issue
custody orders, including ones that would permit a parent to move out of
7
California, but argued that it would not be in N.C.’s interest to permit
Mother to move him out of state.
The court acknowledged Father had not been prosecuted but noted the
standard of proof for a criminal case is different from the proof to be applied
in a dependency proceeding. The court explained it believed Mother’s initial
statements about what had occurred, even though at one point she appeared
to recant. Specifically, the court gave great weight to Mother’s early, specific
statements about the violence because there was corroborating evidence to
support her claims. Thus, the court believed the domestic violence was
significant and involved Father pointing a gun at Mother for hours, while at
times straddling her and placing her in a “stronghold.”
The court noted California’s policy that children have the right to be
safe and free from abuse, and that the perpetration of domestic violence in
the household where a child lives is detrimental to that child’s health, safety,
and welfare. Father, however, repeatedly denied the abuse happened and
“barely engaged in services.” In fact, the court noted multiple times that
Father consistently denied the abuse occurred, both to his commanding
officers and to law enforcement. In the context of the significant violence that
had taken place, the court concluded that placing N.C. in Father’s care would
create a “substantial risk” to N.C.’s safety and emotional well-being.
In contrast, Mother had “engaged in protective steps by obtaining the
restraining order, [and] by enrolling in classes in a timely fashion.” The court
acknowledged Mother’s support system was in Indiana. It had heard from
both the Agency and Mother that this support network would be beneficial to
help Mother protect N.C. from further exposure to domestic violence. The
court ultimately awarded Mother sole legal and physical custody and
approved her request to move with N.C. to Indiana, finding these orders
8
would be in N.C.’s best interest. The court also ordered its jurisdiction would
be terminated after a brief seven-day stay of its orders.
Father’s attorney requested that he be granted virtual or telephone
visits four times per week for a minimum of 30 minutes, and that if he were
to travel to Indiana he be permitted in-person visitation, offering that such
visitation could be supervised “by a mutually agreed-upon third party.”
Mother did not oppose the request, and the court adopted those visitation
orders, which included in-person supervised visitation of at least two hours
per week if Father traveled to Indiana.
DISCUSSION
The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Asserting Permanent Subject
Matter Jurisdiction Under the UCCJEA
Father contends the juvenile court improperly exercised permanent
subject matter jurisdiction, given that Father was living in California solely
due to military orders. According to Father, neither the California nor
Indiana court “considered Father’s active-duty military status and the impact
o[f] that status on his domicile and residency.”
The UCCJEA “ ‘is designed to avoid jurisdictional conflicts between
states and relitigation of custody decisions, promote cooperation between
states, and facilitate enforcement of another state’s custody decrees.’ ” (In re
Aiden L. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 508, 516.) Nearly every state in the United
States, including Indiana, has adopted the UCCJEA. (Ind. Code Ann.
§ 31-21-1-1 et seq.; see In re L.C. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 728, 735 [noting 49
states have adopted the UCCJEA].)
The UCCJEA provides the exclusive method for determining the proper
forum to decide custody issues involving a child who is subject to a
sister-state custody order. (§ 3421, subd. (b) [“[s]ubdivision (a) [of § 3421] is
9
the exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a child custody determination by
a court of this state”]; see Segal v. Fishbein (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 692, 702;
In re A.C. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 661, 668.) A primary purpose of the
UCCJEA is “ ‘ “to encourage states to respect and enforce the prior custody
determinations of other states, as well as to avoid competing jurisdiction and
conflicting decisions.” ’ ” (Segal, at p. 702.) Thus, “ ‘[t]he UCCJEA ensures
that only one state has jurisdiction to make “child custody determinations” ’ ”
at a time (id. at p. 702), and it “takes a strict ‘ “ ‘first in time’ ” ’ approach to
jurisdiction.” (Id. at p. 703.)
“The general rule of the UCCJEA, subject to certain delineated
exceptions, is that once the court of an appropriate state—that is, one having
jurisdiction under its terms—has made an initial child custody
determination, that court obtains exclusive, continuing subject matter
jurisdiction over the child.” (A.H. v. Superior Court (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th
504, 523 (A.H.).)4
The parties agree that even where a different state possesses exclusive,
continuing subject matter jurisdiction over a child, California may
nevertheless assert temporary emergency jurisdiction to protect a child from
an imminent risk of mistreatment or abuse. (See § 3424, subd. (a); In re
Jaheim B. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1349–1350.) And Father concedes
the California court properly exercised temporary emergency jurisdiction to
protect N.C. He contends, however, that the court’s “emergency jurisdiction
4 A “ ‘ “[c]hild custody determination” ’ ” means any judgment, decree, or
other order providing for the legal or physical custody of, or visitation with, a
child, and it includes permanent, temporary, initial, and modification orders.
(A.H., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 523.)
10
never properly ripened to permanent jurisdiction,” and, in his view, Indiana
retained exclusive permanent subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA,
such that the California court acted without jurisdiction in issuing the
custody order Father now challenges.
“[A]s with any statute, interpretation of the UCCJEA is a question of
law we review de novo.” (Schneer v. Llaurado (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1276,
1287.) Factual findings made in connection with assessing jurisdiction under
the UCCJEA, however, are “reviewed under the deferential substantial
evidence standard” (id. at p. 1286) and its “resolution of conflicts in the
evidence and credibility assessments are binding on [a reviewing] court.” (Id.
at p. 1287.)
Section 3423 sets out the circumstances in which a California court can
go beyond emergency jurisdiction to assert permanent subject matter
jurisdiction over a child where another state otherwise possesses exclusive
subject matter jurisdiction because it previously ruled on custody. This
provision directs that a California court may alter a custody determination
entered by a court of another state only where (a) “a court of this state has
jurisdiction to make an initial determination under paragraph (1) or (2) of
subdivision (a) of Section 3421,” and (b) either “[t]he court of the other state
determines it no longer has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under
Section 3422 or that a court of this state would be a more convenient forum
under Section 3427,” or “[a] court of this state or a court of the other state
determines that the child, the child’s parents, and any person acting as a
parent do not presently reside in the other state.” (§ 3423.) As we explain,
the juvenile court’s assertion of jurisdiction was proper under this provision.
We begin with the part of section 3423 that requires a California court
to consider whether it would have jurisdiction to make an initial
11
determination under either paragraphs (1) or (2) of subdivision (a) of section
3421. These portions of section 3421 provide:
“(a) Except as otherwise provided in Section 3424, a court of
this state has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody
determination only if any of the following are true:
“(1) This state is the home state of the child on the date of
the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home
state of the child within six months before the
commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent
from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent
continues to live in this state.
“(2) A court of another state does not have jurisdiction
under paragraph (1), or a court of the home state of the
child has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the grounds
that this state is the more appropriate forum under Section
3427 or 3428, and both of the following are true:
“(A) The child and the child’s parents, or the child and at
least one parent or a person acting as a parent, have a
significant connection with this state other than mere
physical presence.
“(B) Substantial evidence is available in this state
concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and
personal relationships.” (§ 3421, subd. (a)(1), (2).)
We need not decide whether subdivision (a)(1) of section 3421 applies
here because the record includes substantial evidence to support the juvenile
court’s determination the circumstances set out in subdivision (a)(2) are
present. First, and importantly, upon learning of the Indiana court’s custody
order, the juvenile court reached out to that court to discuss the emergency
matter that brought the family into a California juvenile court proceeding.
This was precisely what the UCCJEA directs a court to do when it becomes
aware a sister state has made a child custody determination: “When a
12
California court asserting temporary emergency jurisdiction is aware that a
child custody determination has been made by another jurisdiction, the
California court ‘shall immediately communicate with the other court.’ ” (In
re Cristian I. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1097, quoting § 3424, subd. (d).)5
Such coordination is necessary because “ ‘[t]o make an appropriate order
under the [UCCJEA], the California court needs to know whether the sister
state court wishes to continue its jurisdiction and how much time it requires
to take appropriate steps to consider further child custody orders.’ ” (Cristian
I., at p. 1097.)
During the telephone call, Judge Bohn of the Johnson Circuit Court of
Indiana confirmed an Indiana court had issued a custody order involving
N.C. However, Judge Bohn described the Indiana court’s involvement with
the family and N.C. as “limited.” Given this and given Judge Bohn’s
understanding that N.C. and his parents were currently living in California,
he determined the Indiana court would cede its continuing permanent subject
matter jurisdiction over N.C.’s custody determinations to the California court.
Judge Bohn also concluded that ceding jurisdiction to the California court
should occur because California was a more appropriate forum for addressing
the family’s most recent custody matters.
Based on the communication between the juvenile court and the
Indiana court, the juvenile court properly concluded the court of Indiana—
N.C.’s original “home state”—was “declin[ing] to exercise jurisdiction on the
5 And even where temporary emergency jurisdiction is not at issue, the
UCCJEA contemplates the need for communication between states as soon as
the court of one state determines a custody proceeding has already been
commenced in another state having jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. (See
§ 3426, subd. (b).)
13
grounds that” California “is the more appropriate forum under Section 3427
or 3428”6 (§ 3421, subd. (a)(2)).
The next question the juvenile court faced was whether N.C. and at
least one parent “have a significant connection with” California other than
merely being present in the state. (See § 3421, subd. (a)(2)(A).) There is
abundant evidence of N.C. and both parents having a “significant connection”
to California. Both parents moved to California with N.C. in January 2024,
and these proceedings occurred over a year later. During that time, Father
was assigned to San Diego for his military duty, and Mother obtained
employment at a child development center after attending a vocational
college in San Diego for six months. N.C. attended daycare at the center
where Mother worked, and he received regular medical care in San Diego.
Both parents sought the assistance of the San Diego Superior Court to obtain
mutual restraining orders. These connections are sufficiently “significant” for
purposes of the UCCJEA. (See In re Ari S. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 1125, 1132
[significant connections existed where evidence demonstrated mother and
child lived in various parts of the state, mother owned property and had
litigated in California].)
6 Section 3427 provides in relevant part: “A court of this state that has
jurisdiction under this part to make a child custody determination may
decline to exercise its jurisdiction at any time if it determines that it is an
inconvenient forum under the circumstances and that a court of another state
is a more appropriate forum. The issue of inconvenient forum may be raised
upon motion of a party, the court’s own motion, or request of another court.”
(§ 3427, subd. (a).) Alternatively, section 3428 provides that if a California
court “has jurisdiction under this part because a person seeking to invoke its
jurisdiction has engaged in unjustifiable conduct, the court shall decline to
exercise its jurisdiction unless one of” three enumerated circumstances is also
true.
14
In addition, it is clear that the vast majority of evidence “concerning
[N.C.’s] care, protection, training, and personal relationships” is in California.
(§ 3421, subd. (a)(2)(B).) Again, N.C. was only approximately a year old when
the parents relocated him to San Diego, and he had been living in California
for more than a year at the time of the proceedings. The domestic violence
that caused N.C. to come to the attention of the court occurred in California.
N.C. was receiving daily care and health care in San Diego. And the services
Mother and Father had received to try to ensure N.C.’s safety and well-being
all took place in California. Thus, evidence regarding N.C.’s care and
protection existed in California.
Finally, section 3423 requires either that “[t]he court of the other state
determines it no longer has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under
Section 3422 or that a court of this state would be a more convenient forum
under Section 3427” (id., subd. (a)), or that “[a] court of this state or a court of
the other state determines that the child, the child's parents, and any person
acting as a parent do not presently reside in the other state” (id., subd. (b)).
The record demonstrates, at a minimum, that the first of these was true.
Again, Judge Bohn expressly told the juvenile court that the Indiana court
was ceding jurisdiction on two grounds, one of which was that California
would be a more convenient forum to decide the custody issues.
In sum, the record supports the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings
and its ultimate conclusion that it possessed jurisdiction to alter the Indiana
court’s earlier custody determination. Specifically, the court possessed
jurisdiction to make a final custody determination regarding N.C. because it
had jurisdiction “to make an initial determination [regarding custody] under
paragraph . . . (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 3421” (§ 3423) and the Indiana
court ceded jurisdiction after determining “that a court of this state would be
15
a more convenient forum” (id., subd. (a)). Because it is clear the juvenile
court properly asserted permanent subject matter jurisdiction under
statutory provisions that do not necessitate any finding with respect to
whether Father resided in California, we need not determine the effect, if
any, of military assignments or orders on the question of a parent’s residence
under the UCCJEA. And, to the extent Father questions the correctness of
the Indiana court’s conclusion that the parties no longer resided in Indiana, it
should go without saying that this court has no ability to review a sovereign
sister court’s UCCJEA findings and determinations as to whether and when
to cede jurisdiction in any particular case. Further, the juvenile court had no
reason to second-guess the Indiana court’s UCCJEA determinations.
Instead, given the family’s significant connections to California, the juvenile
court acted reasonably in relying on the Indiana court’s decision to cede its
continuing exclusive jurisdiction to the California juvenile court. Again, what
occurred in this matter is what the UCCJEA contemplates should occur:
once the California juvenile court became aware that the Indiana court had
already exercised jurisdiction to make a custody order regarding N.C., it
communicated with the Indiana court to inquire whether that court wished to
retain jurisdiction. And it was only after the Indiana court decided the
California court was the most convenient forum and ceded its jurisdiction
that the juvenile court issued its custody order. The juvenile court committed
no error.
The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Ordering
Supervised Visitation for Father
Father next argues the juvenile court’s exit order should be modified to
allow him unsupervised visits with N.C. According to Father, the court
abused its discretion in ordering that his virtual visits from California to
16
Indiana and any in-person visits in Indiana be supervised. Father asserts
the order for supervised visits does not promote N.C.’s best interest.
When a juvenile court terminates jurisdiction over a dependent child,
section 362.4 authorizes it to make custody and visitation orders in the child’s
best interest. (In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 203.) The juvenile
court makes custody determinations by looking at the totality of the child’s
circumstances, without employing any preferences or presumptions. (Id. at
p. 206.) In making custody orders, the court possesses discretion to impose
conditions or restrictions on a parent’s visitation, and it may also deny
visitation in appropriate circumstances. (Id. at pp. 213–214.)
Father acknowledges a juvenile court’s custody order is reviewed for
abuse of discretion. (See Bridget A v. Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th
285, 300–301.) Under this standard, a reviewing court will not disturb a trial
court’s exercise of discretion unless the trial court’s decision was arbitrary,
capricious, or absurd. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.)
According to Father, the juvenile court abused its discretion in limiting
him to only supervised visits with N.C. because he participated in voluntary
services, provided financial and other types of support to N.C., and had not
been criminally charged in connection with Mother’s allegations of domestic
violence. He also asserts there were no continuing safety concerns regarding
his visitation with N.C. because Father and Mother no longer lived together.
Father also complains that the restraining order Mother obtained did not
limit him to supervised visits only, and he asserts the juvenile court
incorrectly believed he had stopped attending his domestic violence classes
and relied on that false belief to conclude supervised visits were necessary.
Father argues that given all of these circumstances, the “limitations” on his
17
visits are “arbitrary in light of the child’s entirely positive contact with his
father.”
We see no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court’s decision to require
Father’s visitation with N.C. be supervised. The domestic violence that
brought this family to the Agency’s attention was significant. And, while the
violence may not have been intentionally directed at N.C., the evidence
demonstrated not only that N.C. was present during lengthy episodes of
violence that occurred multiple times, but also that he himself was knocked
to the ground, where he hit his head.
The lack of formal charges against Father arising from these incidents
does not mean the violence did not occur. Nor does the absence of charges
mean the juvenile court should take a particular view of the evidence, or that
it should circumscribe its independent assessment of the historical facts and
its ultimate determination as to what would be in a child’s best interest. (See
In re Sylvia R. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 559, 562–563 [lack of criminal charges
does not establish that it would be in a child’s best interest to undo order
terminating reunification services].)
Further, the record demonstrates that Father repeatedly denied having
engaged in domestic violence, and although he eventually did start to
participate in a domestic violence group, his participation came later in the
process. As of November 20, 2025, Father had attended only three domestic
violence offender group sessions. And while Father argues the juvenile court
was incorrect in believing at the time of the January 2026 hearing that
Father “stopped going” to his domestic violence group class, the record before
the court reflected that Father’s most recent recorded attendance with his
domestic violence group occurred on November 17, 2025. The social worker’s
subsequent calls to check on Father’s attendance had been unanswered and
18
unreturned. In other words, the court was describing what appeared in the
record, and neither Father nor Father’s attorney objected to the court’s
description or offered testimonial or documentary evidence to the contrary.
But even if one were to assume the court incorrectly described Father
as having “stopped” attending his domestic violence group when Father had
continued to attend, the record demonstrates that the court’s true concern
about Father’s participation in the domestic violence group was less about
whether Father formally continued with or completed his services, and more
about the fact that Father’s current conduct indicated he had not managed to
incorporate the lessons from such classes into his life. For example, the court
repeatedly expressed unease with the fact that Father continued to deny the
domestic violence occurred. And the court was troubled by the fact that
Father’s own counselor relayed that Father was in another relationship that
appeared “toxic.” To the court, this indicated Father “hasn’t addressed [the]
domestic violence concerns.”
The court believed the totality of the circumstances, including Father’s
lack of accountability and insight about his past domestic violence and his
apparent failure to incorporate the lessons from the services in which he did
participate, meant that the risk of further domestic violence remained an
issue. On this record, we conclude it was reasonable for the court to be
concerned, and therefore the court did not abuse its discretion in deciding
that the course of action that would best promote N.C.’s safety and well-being
was to order Father’s visitation supervised.
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DISPOSITION
The order of the juvenile court is affirmed.
BUCHANAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
RUBIN, J.
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