Filed 9/21/26 In re N.B. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
In re N.B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court C104142
Law.
(Super. Ct. No. JJC-JV-DE-
THE PEOPLE, 2023-0000823)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
N.B.,
Defendant and Appellant.
In 2023, a juvenile wardship petition charged N.B. with the attempted murder
of her mother, N.G. (mother), the murder and robbery of Xavier Morales (mother’s
boyfriend), and the child endangerment of her younger sister based on the sister’s
presence in the room where the crimes were allegedly committed. When N.B. allegedly
asked another minor at the juvenile hall to call N.B.’s boyfriend and use certain code
words to convey that he was supposed to kill N.B.’s mother and sisters to prevent them
from testifying against N.B., a new wardship petition was filed charging N.B. with three
counts of attempting to dissuade a witness from testifying. N.B. was 16 years old when
she allegedly committed the crimes.
The People requested a hearing to determine whether N.B. should be
transferred to the jurisdiction of the criminal court under Welfare and Institutions Code
1
section 707.1 Following an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court ordered N.B.
transferred.
N.B. appeals, asserting that the juvenile court’s findings were not supported
by sufficient evidence and/or were the result of an improper evaluation of the statutory
criteria. Finding sufficient evidence to support the transfer order, and no improper
evaluation of the statutory criteria, we will affirm the transfer order.
APPLICABLE LAW
“When a minor age 16 or older is alleged to have committed a felony, the
prosecution may move to transfer the minor to criminal court. [Citation.] Upon the
motion, the juvenile court must order the probation officer to submit a report on the
minor’s ‘behavioral patterns and social history.’ [Citation.] The parties may submit
‘other relevant evidence’ in connection with the transfer motion. [Citation.]” (In re O.F.
(2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 133, 158 (O.F.); see § 707, subd. (a)(1), (3).)
In determining whether to transfer the minor to criminal court, the juvenile court is
required to consider the following statutory criteria: “(1) ‘[t]he degree of criminal
sophistication by the minor’; (2) ‘[w]hether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the
expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction’; (3) ‘[t]he minor’s previous delinquent
history’; (4) the ‘[s]uccess of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate
the minor’; and (5) ‘[t]he circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition
to have been committed by the minor.’ [Citation.]” (O.F., supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 158-159; see § 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)-(E).)
Effective January 1, 2023, Assembly Bill No. 2361 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)
amended section 707 to require that the juvenile court “find by clear and convincing
evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2
of the juvenile court” before it may transfer the minor to criminal court. (§ 707,
subd. (a)(3), as amended by Stats. 2022, ch. 330, § 1.) “ ‘This changed the finding a
juvenile court must make before ordering a transfer in two ways: (1) raising the standard
of proof; and (2) requiring a new specific finding regarding amenability to rehabilitation.’
[Citation.] [Assembly Bill No.] 2361 also amended section 707 to require the court to
‘recite the basis for its decision in an order’ that includes ‘the reasons supporting the
court’s finding that the minor [is] not amenable to rehabilitation while under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court.’ [Citation.]” (O.F., supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at pp. 159-
160.) And, effective January 1, 2024, Senate Bill No. 545 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.)
amended section 707 “to require that with respect to each of the five criteria, the juvenile
court ‘shall give weight to’ the statutory factors listed as relevant to each criterion.
[Citation.]” (Id. at p. 160.)
“We review the juvenile court’s ruling on a transfer motion for abuse of discretion.
[Citation.] ‘The abuse of discretion standard is not a unified standard; the deference it
calls for varies according to the aspect of [the] ruling under review. The [juvenile]
court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are
reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary
and capricious.’ [Citation.] The juvenile court’s findings with respect to each of [the]
five criteria are findings of fact reviewed for substantial evidence.” (In re Miguel R.
(2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 152, 165 (Miguel R.).) “Likewise, we review for substantial
evidence the juvenile court’s ultimate finding ‘that the minor is not amenable to
rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.’ [Citation.] Because the
juvenile court must make that finding by clear and convincing evidence, we ‘determine
whether the record, viewed as a whole, contains substantial evidence from which a
reasonable trier of fact could have made the finding of high probability demanded by’
the clear and convincing evidence standard.” (Ibid.)
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BACKGROUND
N.B.’s mother was 17 years old when she gave birth to N.B. in 2007. After briefly
living with N.B.’s grandmother, they moved in with E.D. (father). N.B.’s brother was
born in 2008. Father, a gang member, was shot and paralyzed in 2011. Mother and
father separated around the same time. After the separation, N.B. “spent much more time
living with [father] than she did living with [mother].” She was “extremely close” with
father.
Mother started dating mother’s boyfriend in 2015 and gave birth to N.B.’s
sisters, A.M. (the middle sister) and J.M. (the youngest sister), in 2017 and 2019.
While mother was pregnant with the youngest sister, after a series of “off-again, on-
again” stints in her relationship with mother’s boyfriend, they moved into a house on
Myran Avenue in Stockton. N.B. continued dividing her time between mother’s house
and father’s house, where a grandmother lived. She also spent a lot of time living with
an aunt.
Mother’s boyfriend sold drugs and occasionally brought N.B. along for drug deals.
Mother regularly used drugs. So did father, who died in 2021 from an overdose. N.B.
was 14 years old at the time and took father’s death “very hard.”
N.B. attended counseling for a month or two after her father died. Her aunt
described her as “very depressed” and said that she “oftentimes talked about wanting
to kill herself.” N.B. attempted suicide on one occasion, overdosing on fentanyl,
and was taken to the hospital. But because she did not tell anyone that the overdose
was intentional, the hospital treated it as accidental. N.B. began regularly using
fentanyl about a year after her father died. Mother’s boyfriend provided her with
the pills, which she took “close to daily.” She also occasionally used alcohol and
marijuana.
N.B. struggled in school prior to her father’s death. “Teachers described her
as bright but unwilling to apply herself.” After her father died, she “started acting out”
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by being disrespectful to teachers and staff, fighting with other students, and refusing
to go to school. As a result of her habitual truancy, N.B. was enrolled in an
alternative education program. Although she was not charged with any juvenile
offenses prior to the current crimes, the record indicates she was engaging in shoplifting
with friends around that time, reflecting a “growing emotional and behavioral
disturbance.”
Turning to the facts of the current offenses, we note that N.B. has not been
convicted of committing the crimes. However, because the juvenile court was required
to consider “[t]he circumstances and gravity of the offense[s] alleged … to have been
committed by the minor” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(E)(i)), we provide those circumstances
based on evidence adduced at the transfer hearing.
On June 24, 2023, N.B. asked her mother to take her to another minor’s house
“to sell him some weed.” Mother did so. After they returned to the Myran house, mother
went out with a friend for the afternoon, picked up dinner, and returned to the house
around 7:00 or 8:00 p.m. Around 9:30 p.m., mother’s boyfriend made mother a cocktail
comprised of a sedative and an opioid mixed into a soda. About an hour later, mother
started to fall asleep on the couch in the living room. Mother’s boyfriend and the
youngest sister were also in the living room. N.B. was upstairs with the middle sister.
Around that time, N.B. came downstairs and told her mother to go upstairs because she
looked tired. Mother remained on the couch and fell asleep. Around midnight, N.B.
“came back downstairs … and said the same thing.” Mother thought this was strange,
but did not go upstairs and instead repositioned herself on the couch. Mother’s boyfriend
was also on the couch, playing a video game, and the youngest sister was still playing in
the living room.
Also around midnight, one of N.B.’s friends drove to her house to pick her up.
The friend had two other people in the car. Earlier in the day, they had arranged to
smoke marijuana together that night. The friend sent N.B. a text message saying that she
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was there. N.B. responded that “she was still waiting on her mother … to go upstairs
and she was waiting on [mother’s boyfriend] to sell something.” The friend drove around
until N.B. said she was ready to be picked up.
About two hours later, mother woke up feeling “warm” and saw that mother’s
boyfriend was dead on the floor. His face and head were covered in blood. N.B. was
standing over him, taking a thick roll of cash out of his pants pocket and putting it in a
bag. N.B. was dressed in black, wearing gloves, and holding a handgun. Mother stood
up, saw that she also had blood on her clothes, and said to her daughter, “you killed him.”
N.B. “said she was sorry.” Mother started to walk toward her, but N.B. pointed the gun
at her and told her to back up. N.B. told her mother that she loved her and that N.B. had
to go.
N.B. left the house and walked to her friend’s car, which was now parked at a
nearby intersection. Inside the car, “seeming fine,” N.B. passed marijuana around
for her and the other occupants to smoke. They drove to N.B.’s grandmother’s house
and continued to smoke marijuana. At some point, apparently the same night, N.B.
discarded the gun, the clothing she wore during the murder, and her cell phone.
She gave some of the money she took from mother’s boyfriend to the passengers in the
car.
Mother called 911 after N.B. left the house. She told the operator that N.B. shot
mother’s boyfriend and added: “I’m bleeding, I think she shot me too!” Police and
paramedics arrived a short time later. Mother’s boyfriend was pronounced dead at the
scene. He died from a gunshot wound to the head. Mother had two gunshot wounds, one
to the chest and one to the leg. She was taken to the hospital and treated for her injuries.
During the shooting, the youngest sister was lying on the couch next to mother.
On June 29, 2023, four days after the murder, N.B. was arrested in Carson City,
Nevada. She gave the arresting officer a different name in an attempt to avoid arrest.
After N.B. was transported to the juvenile hall in San Joaquin County, she called her
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boyfriend and asked to speak to her brother. N.B. asked that her Instagram password be
changed and her account disabled because, as she put it, “detectives is coming in today
on some bull shit, talking about some, ‘We got a fucking warrant to go into your
account … .’ ” A search of that account uncovered many photos of N.B. with guns.
In an interview with a detective, N.B. said mother’s boyfriend had raped her on
more than one occasion between February and April 2023, and she provided the details
of one of those rapes. She said she told her cousins, aunt, and grandmother about the first
rape a short time after it happened. When her aunt and grandmother were interviewed,
however, they said the first time they heard about a rape was when N.B. called them from
custody in Nevada. According to another minor, T.G., who became friends with N.B.
in juvenile hall, N.B. said she made up the rape allegation “[s]o she could beat her case.”
T.G. further testified that N.B. offered to pay her to call N.B.’s boyfriend and use certain
“code words” to convey he was supposed to kill N.B.’s mother and sisters to prevent
them from testifying against N.B.
Based on the foregoing, N.B. was charged in two juvenile wardship petitions with
murder, attempted murder, robbery, child endangerment, and three counts of attempting
to dissuade a witness from testifying. Pursuant to section 707, subdivision (a)(1), the
juvenile court ordered the probation department to prepare a transfer report. The report,
filed in October 2023, concluded that N.B. was not amenable to rehabilitation while
under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. That conclusion was based primarily on the
criminal sophistication exhibited by N.B. during the alleged offenses and the grave nature
of those offenses, although the report also noted that N.B. reportedly shoplifted in the
past, “failed to follow even the simplest of directives of [juvenile] hall staff,” and was
“the subject of multiple incidents” while at the juvenile hall.
In April 2024, N.B. was examined by Dr. Carolyn Murphy, Ph.D., a forensic
psychologist retained by N.B.’s defense counsel for purposes of offering an opinion
regarding transfer. Dr. Murphy’s report concluded that N.B. was amenable to
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rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. After describing N.B.’s
history, including several adverse childhood events “correlated with later maladjustment,
particularly with respect to emotional self-regulation and impulse control, problem
solving, and judgment,” Dr. Murphy addressed the five criteria set forth in section 707.
Regarding the first statutory criterion, criminal sophistication, Dr. Murphy
acknowledged “some degree of planning,” flight from the scene, and an attempt to avoid
arrest in Nevada, but concluded those facts did not suggest that N.B. was “advanced or
more highly criminogenic when compared to other youths her age, and therefore in need
of adult court consideration.” Turning to the second criterion, whether the minor could
be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, Dr. Murphy
concluded in the affirmative, explaining that “services are available for her within
the juvenile delinquency system, as she is already receiving counseling and mental
health care to address her abuse, and can be provided with additional coping skills,
educational, and substance abuse services moving forward. … Rehabilitation for [N.B.]
will necessarily involve not simply substance abuse treatment or an education (both of
which she does need), but an intensive program of services that can get to the impact
of her … exposure [to adverse childhood events] and sexual assault, and how this
culminated in her serious acting out behavior.” As for the third criterion, N.B.’s previous
delinquent history, Dr. Murphy concluded it did not support transfer, noting that N.B.
“has no prior [juvenile court] adjudications, although it was understood that she was
skipping school, using [drugs], and had been involved in some shoplifting incidents with
peers.” With respect to the fourth criterion, the success of previous attempts at
rehabilitation, Dr. Murphy stated: “This is [N.B.’s] first offense … and therefore there
are no previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate this youth. Regarding the
fifth criterion, the circumstances and gravity of the offense, Dr. Murphy declined to
“weigh in on” those matters.
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On the ultimate question of amenability to rehabilitation, Dr. Murphy stated:
“Amenability speaks to a degree of openness to treatment and to behavior change. While
[N.B.] does still struggle with impulsivity, anger, and immature decision making at times,
given her involvement in various altercations and rules violations [while at the juvenile
hall], this speaks to her need for longer term[] services and time to mature and develop,
not her amenability to said services.” The doctor opined that N.B. was “slowly opening
up” to treatment and “does not have any developmental delays” that would slow or
prevent such treatment, “but she does continue to struggle with severely depressed mood
as well as situational stress.”
That same month, Dr. Alison Vargas, Psy.D., a general psychologist retained by
the district attorney, drafted a report recommending transfer. Dr. Vargas did not
interview N.B., but based on the documentary evidence, along with interviews with
mother and a probation officer, she concluded that N.B. was not amenable to
rehabilitation during the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. Regarding criminal sophistication,
Dr. Vargas noted that N.B. “tried to convince her mother to be out of the room, … wore
gloves during the commission of the offense, and … stole money from [mother’s
boyfriend].” According to Dr. Vargas, other facts suggesting criminal sophistication
included “setting up a plan for escaping after the homicide (by having a friend act as a
driver),” attempting to avoid arrest in Nevada, trying “to recruit others to kill her mother
and sister,” and using a rape allegation against mother’s boyfriend to avoid responsibility
or reduce her punishment.
Turning to whether N.B. could be rehabilitated prior to the end of the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction, Dr. Vargas explained that N.B. would “age out of juvenile detention
in January 2032, leaving at most just under 8 years for her to participate in treatment.”
The doctor stated that N.B. was participating in an evidence-based treatment program at
the juvenile hall, but that those “treatment programs are only effective if the individual is
a willing and motivated participant.” Based on certain disciplinary incidents at the
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juvenile hall, the doctor opined that N.B. “is not currently benefitting from the available
treatment, and this is unlikely to change without a significant change in her behavior.”
Dr. Vargas added that N.B. had “a history of … refusing to take advantage of programs.”
As for previous delinquent history, Dr. Vargas noted N.B.’s shoplifting and drug
use. On the topic of previous rehabilitation attempts, the doctor explained that there were
no previous court-ordered attempts at rehabilitation, but while participating in
rehabilitation programs at the juvenile hall, N.B. had been engaging in negative incidents.
Addressing the gravity of the offenses, Dr. Vargas stated that premeditated murder is “a
very serious offense” and that N.B. continued “to traumatize her mother and siblings” by
attempting to recruit others to kill them to prevent them from testifying against her.
The transfer hearing was held between March and May 2025. In the meantime, in
December 2024, the juvenile court ordered the probation department to file a new transfer
report. That report also concluded that N.B. was not amenable to rehabilitation during
the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. In addition to the matters noted in the original transfer
report, on the question of whether N.B. could be rehabilitated during the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction, the new report stated: “Between January 2024 and January 2025, [N.B.] has
accumulated 226 reports of [d]isobedience, 97 of which were primarily for refusing to
attend school or participate in structured programs. This reflects a pattern of
noncompliance, as [she] has consistently declined to engage in programs that would
significantly benefit her during her time in [the juvenile hall].”
Based on our review of the juvenile hall incident reports, N.B. was written up over
250 times between October 2023 and March 2025, mostly for minor rules violations.
On over 100 occasions, she refused to participate in juvenile hall programming. On over
90 occasions, she was written up for inappropriate talking, disrespect toward staff, yelling
or making inappropriate comments to other minors, passing or trading food, refusing to
clean her room, talking or passing notes to boys housed in another unit, and standing on a
sink to talk to other minors through a vent in her room. On almost 40 occasions, she was
10
found in possession of contraband, such as extra blankets, pencils, food, and hygiene
items that were not allowed in her room.
About 20 incident reports recount more serious misconduct. Between
October 2023 and February 2025, N.B. participated in three large-scale fights and seven
smaller-scale fights. She appears to have started one of those smaller fights. On one
occasion, in March 2024, N.B. was written up for possessing dangerous contraband, a
sharpened comb. On several other occasions, she was written up for “causing a safety
and security issue.” For example, in February 2024, after she did not return to her unit
from the intake area, she was found in a large indentation space in the hallway. The
incident was characterized as an attempt to escape. Five days later, after a court
appearance, N.B. “did not press the button on the sally port door” and instead continued
to linger in the court hallway. About two weeks later, while on the recreation yard, N.B.
tried to use her body weight to force open a door to another unit’s recreation yard. About
two hours later, during a fight between two other minors, N.B. did not comply with staff
directives to get into a prone position on the ground.
Drs. Murphy and Vargas testified at the transfer hearing consistent with the
opinions and recommendations set forth in their reports. Dr. Vargas added that she had
reviewed a report from 2025 stating that N.B. attacked a pregnant minor, apparently
during one of the fights at the juvenile hall.
The probation officers who drafted the transfer reports also testified in a manner
consistent with their reports. In addition, Eva Silva, a family support counselor, testified
at the transfer hearing. Silva administered the Passport Program, an evidence-based
rehabilitation program at the juvenile hall. The curriculum for the program covered
various behavioral interventions. N.B. participated in the program somewhat
sporadically. She started the curriculum in July 2023, when she was first detained at the
juvenile hall, but by the time of the transfer hearing, she had only completed the
orientation, and only 47 of 154 required hours. However, in a progress report written in
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March 2025, Silva wrote that N.B. was attending every group session, trying to maintain
a positive attitude, and finishing her lesson work. Silva stated that N.B.’s communication
skills had improved and there were no behavior issues to report.
In June 2025, the juvenile court ordered N.B. transferred to criminal court.
Relevant portions of the juvenile court’s ruling will be set forth in the discussion
portion of this opinion.
DISCUSSION
N.B. contends the juvenile court’s findings were not supported by sufficient
evidence and/or were the result of an improper evaluation of the statutory criteria.
We will assess the evidence supporting each of the statutory criteria with the exception
of the third criterion pertaining to previous delinquent history (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(C)(i)),
which the juvenile court found did not weigh in favor of transfer. In doing so, we will
address N.B.’s specific arguments. We will then separately consider whether the juvenile
court’s ultimate amenability finding is supported by substantial evidence.
A
In considering the first statutory criterion, “criminal sophistication exhibited by
the minor” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(i)), “the juvenile court ‘consider[s] the whole picture,
that is, all the evidence that might bear on the minor’s criminal sophistication, including
any criminal sophistication manifested in the present crime.’ [Citation.] Criminal
sophistication can be shown with facts demonstrating an ‘ “ability to appreciate the risks
and consequences of [one’s] criminal behavior” and [one’s] awareness “of the
wrongfulness … of [one’s] conduct.” ’ [Citation.] The court may also consider post-
offense events in evaluating a minor’s criminal sophistication. [Citation.] The court
‘shall’ give weight to factors such as ‘the minor’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, and
physical, mental, and emotional health at the time of the alleged offense; the minor’s
impetuosity or failure to appreciate risks and consequences of criminal behavior; the
effect of familial, adult, or peer pressure on the minor’s actions; the effect of the minor’s
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family and community environment; the existence of childhood trauma; the minor’s
involvement in the child welfare or foster care system; and the status of the minor as a
victim of human trafficking, sexual abuse, or sexual battery on the minor’s criminal
sophistication.’ [Citation.]” (O.F., supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at pp. 166-167; see § 707,
subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii).)
Here, after reciting the relevant factors, the juvenile court stated that N.B.
displayed “age-appropriate maturity during her many appearances in court,” she “has
never been diagnosed with any learning or mental disability,” and evidence in the record
“shows that she has intellectual ability to comprehend and complete tasks.” Based on
mother’s testimony, the juvenile court found that the manner in which N.B. allegedly
carried out the offenses demonstrated criminal sophistication, specifically, “her attempts
to get her mother and sister out of the room before carrying out her plan to rob [mother’s
boyfriend], her wearing of gloves during the shooting, her picking through the pockets of
[mother’s boyfriend] to get money, and most notably the fact that it was clear that her
original intent was not to harm her mother, but when her mother remained downstairs she
decided she could not allow her mother to be a witness against her, and also attempted to
kill her own mother.” The juvenile court also noted that N.B. “made arrangements for
someone to pick her up in order to flee after the shooting,” she “disposed of the gun and
her clothes,” she “paid others from the money she took to facilitate her escape,” and she
“also gave a false name when confronted by the police” in Nevada. In addition, the
juvenile court considered N.B.’s conduct in the juvenile hall, specifically the phone call
she made to her boyfriend and brother seeking to prevent police from accessing her
Instagram account, her efforts to persuade others to kill her mother and sisters “to
eliminate witnesses against her,” and the fact that “she made up a story” about mother’s
boyfriend raping her so she could “beat her case.” The juvenile court stated: “In other
words, she was still carrying out her plan while detained in juvenile hall,” showing “a
degree of criminal sophistication unlike that previously seen by the court.”
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The juvenile court acknowledged that N.B. “did not have a family life that helped
set a moral compass for her,” and chronicled many of the hardships she experienced
during her young life, including the loss of her father and subsequent drug use and
depression. The juvenile court also summarized portions of Dr. Murphy’s testimony
regarding those adverse childhood experiences and noted that, based on the experiences,
“it would be understandable why [N.B.] chose not to attend school and engaged in [the
shoplifting incidents].” But those experiences did not, in the juvenile court’s view,
negate the other facts showing criminal sophistication. Although N.B. told Dr. Murphy
that she was under the influence of fentanyl at the time of the murder, the juvenile court
said “the facts of the incident do not lend themselves to someone who was under the
influence.” Based on all of the evidence, the juvenile court concluded the criminal
sophistication criterion weighed in favor of transfer based on clear and convincing
evidence.
N.B. argues the juvenile court “got some of the specific facts and circumstances
wrong” and reached “a faulty conclusion.” She does not, however, challenge any specific
factual finding made by the juvenile court in reaching the conclusion that the criminal
sophistication criterion weighed in favor of transfer. Instead, N.B. argues the juvenile
court downplayed Dr. Murphy’s observations that N.B.’s mental health, substance abuse,
and exposure to multiple adverse childhood experiences could have contributed to her
impulsive behavior and played a role in her decision-making processes in committing the
offense. But her “argument in essence asks us to reweigh the evidence, which is a task
we do not perform when assessing the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal.” (People v.
Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 817.) In any event, N.B. concedes that “the evidence
relied on by the [juvenile] court regarding the criminal sophistication criterion was
sufficiently clear and convincing.” We agree.
Turning to the second criterion, “[w]hether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to
the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(B)(i)), we begin by
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explaining that the criterion is not the same as the ultimate determination as to the
minor’s amenability to rehabilitation. (O.F., supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 163.) Whereas
“the ultimate finding [as to amenability] concerns a global assessment of the minor’s
suitability to rehabilitation” while under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, “the focus of the
second criterion is whether there is enough time to rehabilitate the minor while the minor
is still eligible to remain under juvenile court jurisdiction.” (Miguel R., supra,
100 Cal.App.5th at pp. 167 & 166.) Additionally, “proper analysis of [the second]
criterion generally requires ‘expert testimony concerning the programs available, the
duration of any of the programs, or whether attendance would rehabilitate [the minor]
before termination of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.’ [Citation.]” (In re S.S. (2023)
89 Cal.App.5th 1277, 1291.) “When evaluating this criterion, ‘the juvenile court shall
give weight to … the minor’s potential to grow and mature.’ [Citation.]” (O.F., supra,
at p. 163; see § 707, subd. (a)(3)(B)(ii).)
At the time of the transfer hearing, N.B. was 18 years old. That left about seven
years of juvenile court jurisdiction before she would reach the age of 25 years, at which
point she would need to be discharged unless an order for further detention is made under
section 1800. (§§ 1769, subd. (b), 607, subd. (c), 707, subd. (b)(1).) No expert testified
that this was not enough time to rehabilitate N.B. if she fully applied herself to the
rehabilitative programming offered by the juvenile hall. Indeed, in O.F., also involving a
minor charged with murder, the appellate court noted that five years and two months
“was not an insignificant amount of time” for the minor to be rehabilitated. (O.F., supra,
119 Cal.App.5th at p. 163.) In that case, however, there was undisputed evidence that the
minor, a gang member, had demonstrated the potential to grow and mature and overcome
his gang roots before jurisdiction expired. (Id. at pp. 164-165.)
Here, the juvenile court found that the second criterion weighed in favor of
transfer because N.B. had not demonstrated the ability to change “unless it’s on her
terms, her time, and whether she feels like participating.” The juvenile court
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acknowledged that N.B. was a minor, albeit 18, and that her prefrontal cortex was still
developing, but it said the evidence indicated her continued misconduct, including
violence, was not so much attributable to immaturity as it was to a character trait that
programming had not been able to address. In support of that finding, the juvenile court
relied, in part, on Dr. Vargas’s testimony that rehabilitative “treatment is only as effective
as a person’s participation and willingness to apply the principles they learn and one’s
willingness to change.” The juvenile court referenced Dr. Vargas’s testimony that N.B.’s
behavior had not changed, there was “no lessening of disciplinary reports,” and N.B.
“declined to meet with behavioral health 53 times,” which Dr. Vargas found to be
“problematic for rehabilitation.” The juvenile court described some of the disciplinary
incidents contained in the record and credited testimony from one of the probation
officers that the “cognitive behavioral training programs [available at the juvenile hall]
are meant to benefit [N.B.], but she consistently refuses to participate.”
The juvenile court considered Dr. Murphy’s testimony, including her opinion that
N.B. “is amenable to rehabilitation” and “there’s enough time to rehabilitate her because
her prefrontal cortex continues to develop.” The juvenile court also considered Silva’s
testimony regarding N.B.’s participation in the Passport Program, including testimony
that the program “is built to fit the needs of the individual youth, and she can modify it to
focus on [certain] areas and spend more time if a youth needs it.” Notwithstanding that
evidence, the juvenile court found that the second criterion favored transfer.
N.B. argues “the juvenile court failed to appreciate the most recent effort on [her]
part to work on her rehabilitative needs, her progress, maturity and growth.” She also
faults the juvenile court for discounting Dr. Murphy’s testimony that she “did have the
potential to be rehabilitated within the remaining years of juvenile jurisdiction, or up to
the age of 25 years old.” But the juvenile court expressly considered N.B.’s “potential to
grow and mature” as required by section 707, subdivision (a)(3)(B)(ii), and also
considered Silva’s testimony concerning N.B.’s more recent efforts. The juvenile court
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was not required to accept Dr. Murphy’s opinion that there was enough time to
rehabilitate N.B. despite her persistent refusal to participate in rehabilitative
programming.
N.B. further argues that the juvenile court failed to appreciate that its jurisdiction
over her could be extended past the age of 25 under section 1800. Although the juvenile
court never mentioned the fact that juvenile jurisdiction could be extended under
section 1800, we presume the court was aware of the law in this regard. (See People v.
Braxton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 798, 814.)
The question for this court is whether the record, viewed as a whole, contains
substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found it to be highly
probable that there was not enough time to rehabilitate N.B. in light of her persistent
resistance to rehabilitation. (See Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) We
conclude the finding is supported by substantial evidence.2
Skipping the third criterion because it is not at issue and turning to the fourth, the
“[s]uccess of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor” (§ 707,
subd. (a)(3)(D)(i)), the juvenile court was required to “give weight to any relevant factor,
including, but not limited to, the adequacy of the services previously provided to address
the minor’s needs.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(D)(ii).) After reciting that factor, the juvenile
court stated: “[N.B.] has been in the hall with services available to her since July 2023, a
period of almost two years, and although she has completed some programming, it’s clear
from the evidence that she has refused much more programming … . She’s refused to
2 We do not interpret the juvenile court’s findings as conflating the second criterion,
enough time to rehabilitate, with the ultimate determination as to N.B.’s amenability
to rehabilitation. Each of the statutory criteria “must be ‘focused through the lens of
amenability to rehabilitation’ [citation].” (O.F., supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 162.)
The juvenile court viewed whether there was enough time to rehabilitate N.B. through
the lens of her demonstrated unwillingness to participate.
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engage with Behavioral Health Services stating that she prefers to work it out on her own.
The court has previously discussed [N.B.’s] problem with being amenable to
programming and following rules. [¶] While it is true she has completed 47 hours and
has received recognition for her artwork and some classes, the evidence shows by clear
and convincing evidence that her behaviors have not changed at all in nearly two years in
the hall, and that the efforts to rehabilitate her, even slightly, over this time have not been
successful.”
N.B. argues the juvenile court “erred by not appreciating the growth that [she] was
showing most recently by successfully participating in programming.” N.B. suggests that
she “is the type of child that requires lots of personal attention” and “[o]nce she began to
connect with a counselor she could trust, Silva, things began to turn around.” N.B.
argues the juvenile court erred by failing to appreciate “that she has the potential” to be
rehabilitated at the juvenile hall even though she has not yet “achieved the success the
juvenile court would have wanted.” These arguments go more toward the juvenile
court’s ultimate finding regarding amenability, discussed below. They do not undermine
the juvenile court’s finding that the previous attempts at rehabilitation have been
unsuccessful. That finding is supported by sufficient evidence.
N.B. does not challenge the juvenile court’s finding as to the fifth criterion,
“circumstances and gravity of the offense” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(E)(i)), conceding
“the egregiousness and gravity of the offenses alleged in this matter.” We agree with,
and accept, her concession.
B
We now consider whether the juvenile court’s ultimate amenability finding is
supported by substantial evidence.
After going through the required statutory criteria, the juvenile court stated that it
struggled with the ultimate decision as to amenability because “it is always a possibility
that a person could change over time.” The juvenile court described the crimes charged
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against N.B. as “heinous” and “cold-blooded” but noted that “[t]he facts of the crime are
but one consideration,” that “[a]ll factors must be viewed in light of the minor’s potential
to be rehabilitated,” and that “[c]lear and convincing evidence is a very high standard.”
The juvenile court continued: “However, as to the ultimate issue of amenability, the
court notes that the definition of amenability means the ability to be cooperative, to be
open to influence and persuasion, and ability to be controlled. Dr. Murphy defined it as
‘an honest … willingness to engage in treatment services.’ Other than in those classes
where she likes the teacher of the class, or chooses to participate, none of those traits
describe her. She is resistant to authority, disrespectful, and defiant, and continues to plot
and commit crimes even while detained. During a time when she should be on her best
behavior to avoid a transfer to adult court, she has proved to be incapable of doing so,
and picks up levels, disobediences and fights, culminating in an attack on a pregnant
minor in detention. The concern the court has is that most youth similarly situated to
[N.B.] would at least [toe] the line pending a transfer hearing to at least put on the
appearance of wanting to change. She is either unwilling or incapable of doing so.”
The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that N.B. was not amenable to
rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, explaining that it gave
great weight to the degree of N.B.’s criminal sophistication, the gravity and
circumstances of the offenses, and her inability to be rehabilitated within the time left
under juvenile court jurisdiction.
Relying on O.F., supra, 119 Cal.App.5th 133, N.B. argues the juvenile court used
an erroneous definition of amenability. That case, quoting Merriam-Webster’s online
dictionary, defines amenability as “ ‘having or showing willingness to agree or to accept
something that is wanted or asked for,’ while rehabilitation is defined as ‘the process of
restoring someone (such as a criminal) to a useful and constructive place in society.’ ”
(O.F., at p. 162.) Thus, “amenable to rehabilitation” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)) means “willing
to accept treatment that would restore [the minor] to a constructive place in society.”
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(O.F., at p. 162.) That definition tracks the definition provided by Dr. Murphy, which
was quoted in the juvenile court’s ruling. The juvenile court also defined amenability
to mean “the ability to be cooperative, to be open to influence and persuasion, and ability
to be controlled.” That framing of the inquiry referenced a focus on ability rather than
willingness. However, the same dictionary quoted in O.F. also defines “amenable” to
mean “able to be controlled, organized, or affected by something” and “readily yielding,
submitting, or cooperating.” (Merriam-Webster’s Online Dict. (2026)
<https:/www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/amenable> [as of September 18, 2026].)
That is not materially different from the juvenile court’s definition. Indeed, if a minor
is not able to cooperate with or be controlled by the juvenile hall staff providing the
rehabilitation, and is not open to their influence and persuasion with respect to matters
of rehabilitation, she necessarily is not “amenable” to their rehabilitative efforts. N.B.
has not established reversible error.
The remainder of N.B.’s argument essentially asks this court to reweigh the
evidence. She points to evidence that she “was beginning to show a willingness to
engage in the services and therapeutic interventions available to her in juvenile hall.”
She argues that “rehabilitation takes time,” does not “occur overnight,” and “is
inherently a process that includes challenges and setbacks.” These were appropriate
arguments to make before the juvenile court. However, in this appellate challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the juvenile court’s transfer order, the question is
“whether clear and convincing evidence supports the juvenile court’s conclusion that
[N.B.], while under the court’s jurisdiction, is not willing to accept treatment that would
restore [her] to a constructive place in society.” (O.F., supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 162.)
Based on all of the criteria relied upon by the juvenile court, we conclude the juvenile
court’s ultimate amenability finding is supported by sufficiently clear and convincing
evidence.
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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s transfer order is affirmed.
/S/
MAURO, Acting P. J.
We concur:
/S/
KRAUSE, J.
/S/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
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