In re M.P. CA2/5

Filed 9/10/26 In re M.P. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re M.P. et al., Persons B351955
Coming Under the Juvenile (Los Angeles County
Court Law. Super. Ct. Nos.
_____________________________
23PSJP00086B-C)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,

Plaintiff,

v.

JEANETTE Z. and JOSE P.,

Defendants and
Appellants.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Stacy Wiese, Judge. Affirmed.
William Hook, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant, Jose P.
Aida Aslanian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant, Jeanette Z.
Megan Turkat-Schirn, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Respondent minors M.P. et al.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, and Jessica
Buckelew, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff.

******
In this juvenile dependency proceeding, both parents
appeal from orders (1) denying their petitions under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 3881 to modify prior orders and grant
additional reunification services for their young twin children,
and (2) terminating their parental rights.
The juvenile court found the mother had demonstrated
changed circumstances but had not shown additional
reunification services would serve the children’s best interests,
and that the father’s circumstances were changing rather than
changed and additional services would not serve the children’s
best interests.
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying
either parent’s section 388 petition. We affirm the orders.

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
A. The family
Jeanette Z. (mother) and Jose P. (father) have three
children together: twins M.P., and J.P., (born in 2023) and Mia
P., (born in 2025) during the pendency of these proceedings.
Mother also has a daughter, Audrey G., born in 2020, whose
father is deceased. Only M.P. and J.P. are the subjects of this
appeal.
B. Circumstances giving rise to jurisdiction
M.P. and J.P. were born at 29 weeks’ gestation, each
weighing about three pounds. Because they were medically
fragile, they remained in the neonatal intensive care unit after
birth. Mother and both children tested positive for amphetamine;
Mother and J.P. also tested positive for marijuana. Mother
admitted she had used marijuana daily and amphetamine about
three times per week during her pregnancy. She had received no
prenatal care. At that time, mother and father were homeless
and living in a tent.
Mother had an extensive history of substance abuse,
including six years of daily methamphetamine use. She also
acknowledged incidents of domestic violence in her relationship
with father. Father had a 29-year history of substance abuse,
beginning with marijuana at age 13 and methamphetamine at
age 14. Father had a prior dependency case and had not seen his
older children since 2018 because he had been “lost to the streets
and drugs.” He had served approximately one and one-half years
in jail following a conviction for willful cruelty to a child. Father
additionally admitted to an incident of domestic violence against
mother.

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II. Procedural Background
A. Jurisdiction and disposition
On September 1, 2023, the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (the Department)
filed a petition asking the juvenile court to exercise dependency
jurisdiction over M.P. and J.P. The petition alleged: (1) mother
and father had “histor[ies] of substance abuse including
marijuana, amphetamine, and methamphetamine,” and were
current substance abusers; (2) M.P. and J.P. were born suffering
from “detrimental condition[s],” as reflected in their positive
toxicology screens for marijuana and amphetamine; and (3)
father has a history of physically abusing M.P. and J.P.’s half
siblings, as well as an unrelated child. The petition further
alleged that the parents’ conduct “endanger[ed] [M.P. and J.P.’s ]
physical health and safety and place[d] [M.P. and J.P.] at risk of
serious physical harm [and] damage,” warranting the exercise of
jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j).
At the November 2023 adjudication hearing, the juvenile
court sustained the allegations regarding mother’s substance
abuse and M.P. and J.P.’s positive toxicology screens. The court
also sustained allegations concerning father’s long-term
substance abuse and the risk posed by his prior physical abuse of
children.2 The juvenile court declared M.P. and J.P. dependents
of the court, removed them from parental custody, and ordered
reunification services.

2 The petition also alleged that father’s physical abuse of the
half siblings and the unrelated child supported jurisdiction under
subdivisions (a) and (b). The juvenile court dismissed those
allegations.

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Mother’s case plan required drug testing, a full drug-and-
alcohol program, a 12-step program with a sponsor, parenting
education, and individual counseling. Father received a
substantially similar plan. The court ordered monitored
visitation for both parents.3
B. Reunification period
Mother completed residential substance-abuse treatment in
January 2024, but had not enrolled in aftercare services. She
was then living in a vehicle with father. In February 2024,
mother tested positive for cocaine. She stated father had given
her a vape pen that was laced with cocaine.
Mother’s visits were generally affectionate, but concerns
persisted regarding her ability to simultaneously supervise and
care for each twin. At times, mother focused on one child while
leaving the other insufficiently supervised, requiring the
caregivers to intervene for the children’s safety Mother rarely
inquired about the twins’ medical care, development, routines, or
needs.
After several initial visits, father stopped visiting M.P. and
J.P., did not drug test, and did not make himself available to the
Department. In March 2024, mother and father were arrested
following a road-rage incident in which father pulled a gun on
another driver. Father was incarcerated and did not participate
in services or visitation.
At the six-month review hearing in May 2024, the juvenile
court found mother had made partial progress and father had
made “unsubstantial” progress. The court continued mother’s

3 M.P. and J.P. remained hospitalized after their birth and
were released in late September 2023. At that time, they were
placed with their current caregivers.

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reunification services and terminated father’s services.
At the 12-month review hearing in December 2024, mother
disclosed that she was pregnant with Mia. The court found
mother’s progress had not been substantial, but continued her
services and advised her that this would likely be her final period
of reunification.
Father resumed visitation in late 2024. He left early
during one visit and missed four of 11 scheduled visits between
December 2024 and January 2025. He told the Department he
would not change M.P.’s diaper because “it was not appropriate
for a man to change a girl.” Father did not ask the caregivers
about the twins’ medical needs, routines, or over-all development.
At the 18-month review hearing in March 2025, the court
found that returning the children to mother would create a
substantial risk of detriment. It terminated mother’s
reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing.
The children remained with the caregivers, to whom they
were strongly attached. They referred to the caregivers as
“daddy” and “papa,” and the caregivers wished to adopt them.
After the termination of reunification services, mother cancelled
11 visits between March and June 2025. She relied on the
caregivers to provide food, diapers, clothing, and other supplies,
and she needed regular coaching regarding supervision, feeding,
diapering, safety, and redirection.
Father’s visitation was likewise inconsistent. He did not
meaningfully inquire about the children’s well-being or medical
care, and he relied on the caregivers to soothe and care for them
during visits. After some visits with father, M.P. and J.P. were
distressed, clingy, and had difficulty eating and sleeping.
In September 2025, mother asked to move her visits to a

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Department office so that a neutral observer, rather than the
caregivers, would monitor them. The court granted the request,
while warning mother that the change would likely reduce her
visitation because of the office’s limited weekday hours and the
caregivers’ distance from it. The court also authorized
assessment of maternal grandmother and paternal aunt as
monitors for father’s visits. Mother’s visitation decreased: she
had no visits in September 2025, one in October, and two in
November. Mother and father remained in a relationship and
attended visits together with Mia, who was not removed from
their care.
C. The section 388 petitions and hearing
On October 13, 2025, mother and father separately
petitioned under section 388 to modify prior orders and grant
additional reunification services. Mother relied on her continued
participation in aftercare, sobriety, negative drug tests,
visitation, and care of Mia. Father relied on his completion of a
six-month drug-and-alcohol program, negative drug tests,
visitation, and care of Mia.
At the December 9, 2025 evidentiary hearing, mother
submitted on the Department’s reports. Father testified he had
not completed all components of his case plan, had ceased visiting
the children for approximately one year because he was “still
using [drugs],” and had only recently begun anger-management
and parenting education. He did not know the children’s birth
dates, sleep schedules, doctors, pediatrician, or the nature of
their developmental services. Father had not attended any of the
children’s medical appointments.
Counsel for the children opposed the petitions, arguing that
the parents had not demonstrated circumstances warranting

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modification and that further reunification would not serve the
children’s need for permanence and stability.
The juvenile court denied both petitions. As to father, the
court found that his circumstances were changing, rather than
changed. It noted that father had not completed his case plan
during the 27 months since the initiation of dependency
proceedings and had only recently commenced key components of
it. The court also found that father had not established a bond
with the twins and that granting additional reunification services
would not serve their best interests.
As to mother, the court found she demonstrated changed
circumstances. She completed her court-ordered services,
remained in aftercare, participated in a 12-step program with a
sponsor, and continued to test negative. The court nevertheless
found additional reunification services would not be in the
children’s best interests. It reasoned that M.P. and J.P. had lived
with their caregivers practically their entire lives; mother had
never progressed beyond monitored visitation; she had not
attended their medical appointments or demonstrated sustained
knowledge of their daily needs; and the children had formed a
strong parental bond with their caregivers.
D. Termination of parental rights
The juvenile court conducted the contested section 366.26
hearing over several dates in December 2025 and January 2026.
On January 21, 2026, the court found M.P. and J.P. adoptable. It
found mother had maintained regular visitation, but neither
parent had established a beneficial parental relationship with the
children. The court further found that neither the beneficial
parental relationship exception nor the sibling-relationship
exception to adoption applied. The court terminated the parental

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rights of mother and father and designated the caregivers as the
children’s prospective adoptive parents.
On January 26, 2026, mother and father each filed notices
of appeal from the orders denying their section 388 petitions and
terminating their parental rights.
DISCUSSION
A. Principles governing modification of a
dependency order
A juvenile court dependency order may be changed,
modified, or set aside at any time. (§ 385.) A parent may petition
the court for such a modification on the grounds of a change of
circumstance or new evidence. (§ 388, subd. (a)(1).) To obtain the
requested modification, the parent must demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence both a change of circumstance/new
evidence and that the proposed change of order is in the child’s
best interests. (§ 388; In re Alayah J. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 469,
478 (Alayah J.); In re Mickel O. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 586, 615.)
“This is a difficult burden to meet in many cases, and particularly
so when . . . reunification services have been terminated . . . .”
(In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 464.) At that point,
the parent’s interest in reunification is no longer paramount; the
child’s need for permanence and stability becomes the court’s
central concern. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 307,
309–310.) Thus, the question is not whether a parent’s efforts
are commendable. It is whether the requested order would
promote the child’s interests in permanence and stability. (In re
J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 526–527.)
We review an order denying a section 388 petition for abuse
of discretion. (In re Alayah J., supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 478.)
The order is presumed correct, and the appellant bears the

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burden of demonstrating reversible error. (In re Sade C. (1996)
13 Cal.4th 952, 994.)
B. Father’s petition
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding
father’s circumstances were changing, rather than changed. Nor
did it abuse its discretion in alternatively finding that further
reunification services would not serve the children’s best
interests.
Father’s sustained problems were substance abuse as well
as his prior physical abuse of his older children and an unrelated
child. Father used marijuana and methamphetamine from an
early age, had a prior dependency case arising from substance
abuse and child abuse, and was convicted of willful cruelty to a
child. He tested positive for methamphetamine shortly after
these proceedings began and, in March 2024, mother reported he
was again using methamphetamine.
Father’s services were terminated in May 2024. By the
December 2025 hearing—some 19 months later—he had
completed an outpatient substance-abuse program and was
testing negative. Those were positive developments. But the
court could reasonably find they did not establish a durable
change in circumstances. Father did not enroll in aftercare until
December 4, 2025, five days before the hearing. He had attended
only three Alcoholics Anonymous meetings in the preceding
weeks and had no sponsor. He reenrolled in anger management
only eight days before the hearing. Although he began parenting
education in September 2025, he had not completed it. The court
also reasonably found, based on father’s own testimony, he failed
to participate in any individual counseling. Father had not
meaningfully addressed the prior child-abuse findings: he denied

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or minimized the conduct and declined to discuss it with the
social worker.
The timing of father’s participation in the lives of the
children was also significant. After M.P. and J.P. were detained,
father visited them only three times in October and November
2023. He then had no contact with them for approximately 13
months, until December 2024. Father attributed that lapse to his
drug use. On this record, the court could reasonably characterize
father’s efforts as a recent beginning in anticipation of the section
388 hearing, not a completed and sustained resolution of the
problems that led to dependency.
Even if father’s recent progress established changed
circumstances, he did not show that additional reunification
services would promote the children’s best interests. Although
paternal aunt described him as affectionate and increasingly
engaged during recent visits, the court was entitled to give that
testimony limited weight in light of father’s lengthy absence and
his limited knowledge of the children’s daily lives. Father was
unaware of basics such as the children’s sleep schedules, the
name of their pediatrician, or the nature of their developmental
services. He did not even know their birth dates and, despite
their medical issues, he had never attended a child’s medical
appointment. The court could reasonably distinguish father’s
ability to play with, feed, or diaper the children during monitored
visits from a parental relationship reflecting knowledge of and
interest in their daily needs. M.P. and J.P., meanwhile, had lived
with their caregivers for virtually their entire lives. The
caregivers attended to the children’s routines, medical care, and
developmental services. Father did not establish further delay of
the children’s permanent plan was warranted.

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Father’s care of Mia did not compel a different result. The
fact that Mia remained in the parents’ custody did not establish
that father’s circumstances had changed or that delaying M.P.
and J.P.’s permanent plan would promote their best interests.
Moreover, the Department had expressed concerns about father’s
anger-management progress and incomplete case plan.
C. Mother’s petition
Mother’s sobriety and completion of her case plan
supported the court’s changed-circumstances finding. They did
not, however, compel a finding that six additional months of
services would promote the children’s best interests.
M.P. and J.P. had lived with their caregivers since their
discharge from the neonatal intensive care unit in September
2023 and had never lived with mother. The caregivers
consistently met the children’s daily, medical, developmental,
and emotional needs. M.P. and J.P. were affectionate and
comfortable with the caregivers, whom they called “daddy” and
“papa.”
By contrast, mother had not progressed beyond monitored
visitation during approximately 27 months of dependency
proceedings. The court could reasonably find that she continued
to need substantial assistance in caring for both children at once.
The caregivers supplied food, diapers, clothing, and other
necessities during visits and regularly coached mother regarding
supervision, feeding, diapering, safety, and redirection. At times,
mother focused on one child while the other was insufficiently
supervised; at other times, she froze when confronted with a
safety issue. Mother also had not attended, or asked to attend,
the children’s medical appointments. This evidence supported
the court’s conclusion that further services were not likely to

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advance the children toward a stable reunification within a
timeframe consistent with their need for permanence.
Mother argues that the court improperly relied on her
continuing relationship with father. It did not. The court did not
treat mother’s relationship with father as independently
dispositive. Rather, it properly considered that relationship,
together with mother’s knowledge of father’s child-abuse history,
domestic violence, substance use during the proceedings, and
incomplete participation in services, in evaluating whether
mother had demonstrated the protective capacity necessary to
promote the children’s best interests.
The court’s concern regarding mother’s ability to protect
the children was supported by more than her continued
relationship with father. Mother had previously disregarded
court-ordered visitation restrictions by allowing Audrey
unauthorized unmonitored overnight visits with mother, which
resulted in Audrey’s removal from the maternal grandparent’s
care. The court could reasonably find that mother’s continued
relationship with father, considered with her prior disregard of
visitation/safety restrictions, bore on her ability to prioritize the
welfare of the children.
Mother correctly notes she sought additional services
rather than immediate return of the children. But the court did
not conflate those requests. The court evaluated whether
mother’s progress and parenting capacity made it likely that an
additional period of services would advance the children toward
stable reunification. Due to mother’s continuing need for
intensive assistance during monitored visits it was reasonable to
find additional services would not produce the desired result. In
re Malick T. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1109 does not compel a

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different result. There, the juvenile court effectively treated a
request for additional services as a request for immediate return
of seven children—a materially different inquiry. (Id. at pp.
1124–1128.) Here, by contrast, the court considered the relief
mother actually requested—an extension of reunification
services—and did not deny her petition merely because she could
not immediately assume custody.
Mother also argues the court impermissibly compared her
relationship with M.P. and J.P. to the caregivers’ relationship
with them. The court did not require mother to establish a
relationship equal or superior to that of the caregivers. It
properly considered the children’s established attachment to the
caregivers, their need for continuity, and the evidence that the
caregivers consistently met their daily, medical, developmental,
and emotional needs. At the post-reunification stage, those were
appropriate considerations in assessing the best interests of the
children. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.)
Mother isolates the court’s observation that addiction is a
lifelong issue. Read in context, however, the court did not impose
a categorical rule barring reunification for a parent with a history
of substance abuse. It expressly found that mother had changed
her circumstances. The court denied mother’s petition because it
found further services would not serve the children’s best
interests in light of their established placement, mother’s
continuing monitored visitation, concerns regarding her
protective capacity, and her regular difficulty meeting the
children’s needs. The court’s observation regarding the ongoing
nature of recovery does not establish an abuse of discretion.

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D. The Department’s recommendation does not
compel reversal
The Department recommended granting the parents’
section 388 petitions, principally because of their progress in
sobriety and services. County counsel submitted on that
recommendation at the hearing, while acknowledging the
accuracy of the factual representations made by minors’ counsel.
The juvenile court considered that recommendation, but it was
not bound by it. Nor did the recommendation relieve mother and
father of their burden to establish that the requested
modification would promote the children’s best interests. For the
reasons discussed above, the court could reasonably find that
further delaying permanence would not do so. 4
E. Termination orders
Mother and father also appeal from the orders terminating
parental rights. Neither, however, presents a separate challenge
to the juvenile court’s adoptability finding or its determination
that no exception to adoption applied. We therefore do not
address those orders further. (See In re Adrian L. (2022) 86
Cal.App.5th 342, 344, fn. 1, overruled on other grounds in In re
Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1152, fn. 18; Westside Center
Associates v. Safeway Stores 23, Inc. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 507,
529 [a party “effectively concedes” an issue by failing to address it
in briefing].)

4 The Department did not file an appellate brief. We need
not resolve whether the Department correctly characterizes its
appellate role. Counsel for M.P. and J.P. has filed a respondent’s
brief urging affirmance. The Department’s decision not to file a
brief does not alter the parent’s burden to demonstrate reversible
error.

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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

KUMAR, J.*
We concur:

BAKER, Acting P. J.

KIM (D.), J.

* Retired Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI,
section 6 of the California Constitution.

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