Filed 11/19/26 In re Melanie L. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re Melanie L., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E088710
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. DPRI2300073)
v. OPINION
C.L. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Walter H. Kubelun,
Judge. Affirmed.
Paul A. Swiller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant, C.L.
William D. Caldwell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant, R.L.
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Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Jamila T. Purnell, Chief Assistant County Counsel
and Prabhath Shettigar, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Celeste L. (Mother) and R.L. (Father) appeal from the juvenile court’s order
terminating parental rights to their daughter, Melanie L. Mother argues that the court and
the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) failed to comply with
the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related state
law. She contends that DPSS failed to discharge its duty of initial inquiry because the
agency did not attempt to contact certain maternal relatives. Father joins the argument.
We affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Overview of prior dependency proceedings and Melanie’s dependency
Melanie has six maternal half siblings who are not subjects of this appeal. One
half brother is an adult. Four of the half siblings were the subject of dependency
proceedings initiated in 2022 in San Bernardino County. In 2024, the court terminated
parental rights to one of those half siblings. The court ordered legal guardianships for the
three other half siblings. Melanie’s sixth half sibling, Elias F., was the subject of
dependency proceedings initiated in 2023 in Riverside County. The court ordered
reunification services for Mother in Elias’s case but terminated her services at the six-
month review hearing. Elias’s case was still pending when DPSS received a referral
concerning Melanie.
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One-month-old Melanie came to DPSS’s attention in November 2024, when the
agency received a referral alleging general neglect. After investigating, DPSS filed a
petition under subdivisions (b) and (j) of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,
alleging that Mother and Father abused methamphetamine; Mother had a criminal
history; Mother had a dependency history with Melanie’s half siblings and failed to
reunify with them; and Elias had been abused or neglected, and Melanie was at
substantial risk of suffering similar harm. (Unlabeled statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.)
The court detained Melanie from both parents in December 2024, and the infant
was placed in a foster home. In February 2025, the court found true all of the allegations
in the petition, removed Melanie from the parents’ custody, and ordered reunification
services for both parents. Melanie was placed in a new foster home in May 2025. Those
foster parents were in the process of adopting her half brother, Elias, and they wanted to
adopt her as well.
The court terminated the parents’ reunification services at the six-month review
hearing in September 2025. Mother and Father had another child in December 2025; that
infant was placed in the foster home with Melanie and Elias.
The court held the section 366.26 hearing in May 2026. The court found that
Melanie was likely to be adopted and terminated parental rights.
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II. ICWA-related background
According to the detention report, the social worker initially was unable to locate
Mother and Melanie. The worker eventually located Mother at the paternal grandparents’
home. Mother said that she was living with the maternal grandparents, although she went
“back and forth” between that home and Father’s home.
The detention report stated that Mother, Father, and the paternal grandparents
denied any Indian ancestry.1 The report also noted that the juvenile court in Elias’s case
found that ICWA did not apply to Elias. The report included a summary of a 2021
referral that was investigated and substantiated. According to that summary, Mother and
the half siblings were living with her “boyfriend’s parents” (i.e., Melanie’s paternal
grandparents), but they relocated to the maternal grandmother’s home in Mexico after the
child welfare agency started investigating. The children had previously lived with the
maternal grandmother in Mexico. The agency attempted to “cross report the concerns to
Mexico” but was unsuccessful, and it lost contact with Mother. The detention report
further noted that in connection with a 2018 referral, Mother “left to Mexico” with some
of her children after the child welfare agency started an investigation.
The paternal grandparents were present at the detention hearing, and the court
asked them whether Melanie had any Indian ancestry. They replied that Melanie did not.
The court found that ICWA “likely” did not apply, but it directed DPSS to continue its
1 Because ICWA uses the term “Indian,” we use it as well “to reflect the statutory
language.” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1125, fn. 1 (Dezi C.).) No disrespect
is intended.
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ICWA inquiry. Father filed Judicial Council form ICWA-020 stating that he did not have
any Indian ancestry. There were no maternal relatives present at the detention hearing,
but Mother asked that maternal relatives be permitted to visit Melanie. The court
authorized the maternal grandparents to attend Mother’s visits with Melanie.
In preparation for the jurisdiction and disposition hearings, Mother reported that
she resided at Father’s home. Mother further reported that she had a “positive
relationship” with the maternal grandparents and her three siblings. She said that the
maternal grandfather lived in Mexico. She identified the maternal grandmother as one
source of support. Mother wanted Melanie to be placed with the maternal grandmother
or the paternal grandparents.
At the jurisdiction and disposition hearings, the court found that DPSS had
conducted a sufficient ICWA inquiry and that ICWA did not apply to Melanie.
DPSS asked Mother about Indian ancestry on three occasions in preparation for
the six-month review hearing, and Mother denied any such ancestry as “to herself or any
maternal family.” At that time, Mother was living with Melanie’s adult half brother.
Mother had numerous supervised visits with Melanie, but there is no indication that the
maternal grandparents attended any of the visits.
Mother and Melanie’s adult half brother were at the section 366.26 hearing. The
court asked both of them if they had Indian ancestry, and they both denied any. The
court found that there had been a sufficient ICWA inquiry and that ICWA did not apply
to Melanie.
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DISCUSSION
Mother argues that the court failed to ensure that DPSS discharged its duty of
initial inquiry, so the court’s finding that ICWA did not apply is unsupported. We
disagree.
The child welfare agency and the juvenile court have an “affirmative and
continuing duty to inquire” whether a child in a dependency proceeding “is or may be an
Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) “The duty to inquire consists of two phases—the duty
of initial inquiry and the duty of further inquiry.” (In re Ricky R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th
671, 678 (Ricky R.), disapproved on another ground by Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 1152, fn. 18.)
“The duty of initial inquiry applies in every dependency proceeding.” (Ricky R.,
supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 678.) The child welfare agency’s duty to inquire begins
“when first contacted regarding a child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(1).) The agency must ask
the “party reporting child abuse or neglect whether the party has any information that the
child may be an Indian child,” and the agency must also ask the child and the child’s
family members, including extended family members, upon first contact with those
individuals. (Ibid.) In addition, if the child is taken into the agency’s temporary custody
under section 306, “or if they were initially taken into protective custody pursuant to a
warrant described in Section 340,” then the agency must ask “the child, parents, legal
guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest in the
child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an
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Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(2).) Extended family members include adults who are
the child’s stepparents, grandparents, siblings, brothers- or sisters-in-law, aunts, uncles,
nieces, nephews, or first or second cousins. (§ 224.1, subd. (c)(1).)
Although the child welfare agency is required to conduct an ICWA inquiry of
extended family members, state law “‘does not require the agency to “find” unknown
relatives and others who have an interest in the child, merely to make reasonable
inquiries. The operative concept is those people who are reasonably available to help the
agency with its investigation into whether the child has any potential Indian ancestry
should be asked.’” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1140.)
Juvenile courts must conduct their own initial inquiry as well. “Federal
regulations require state courts to ask each participant ‘at the commencement’ of a child
custody proceeding ‘whether the participant knows or has reason to know that the child is
an Indian child.’” (Ricky R., supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at pp. 678-679, quoting 25 C.F.R.
§ 23.107(a) (2022).) Similarly, state law requires the court to pursue an ICWA inquiry at
the first hearing on a dependency petition (or at the first court appearance of a party or
“other interested person[],” if the party or other interested person was not present at the
first hearing). (§ 224.2, subd. (c).) Further inquiry is required only if the court or the
child welfare department has “reason to believe” that an Indian child is involved.
(§ 224.2, subd. (e).)
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The juvenile court may find that ICWA does not apply to the proceedings if it
finds “that an agency’s inquiry and due diligence were ‘proper and adequate,’ and the
resulting record provided no reason to know the child is an Indian child.” (Dezi C.,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1134.) “[T]he juvenile court’s fact-specific determination that an
inquiry is adequate, proper, and duly diligent is ‘a quintessentially discretionary function’
[citation] subject to a deferential standard of review. [Citations.] ‘“On a well-developed
record, the court has relatively broad discretion to determine whether the agency’s
inquiry was proper, adequate, and duly diligent on the specific facts of the case.
However, the less developed the record, the more limited that discretion necessarily
becomes.”’ [Citations.] [¶] If, upon review, a juvenile court’s findings that an inquiry
was adequate and proper and ICWA does not apply are found to be supported by
sufficient evidence and record documentation as required by California law [citation],
there is no error and conditional reversal would not be warranted even if the agency did
not inquire of everyone who has an interest in the child. On the other hand, if the inquiry
is inadequate, conditional reversal is required so the agency can cure the error and
thereby safeguard the rights of tribes, parents, and the child.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th
at p. 1141.)
Mother contends that the court erred because DPSS did not attempt to inquire of
the maternal grandparents and Mother’s siblings. She points out that she told the social
worker that she had a positive relationship with those relatives. But there is no indication
that she gave DPSS contact information for those relatives or even gave the agency their
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names. Mother stated that she was living with the maternal grandparents when this case
began, but she later reported to be living elsewhere. She also said that the maternal
grandfather lived in Mexico. The maternal grandmother apparently lived in Mexico at
some point in the recent past. In 2021, Mother relocated to the maternal grandmother’s
home there, after the child welfare agency started investigating a referral. The court
authorized the maternal grandparents to attend Mother’s visits with Melanie, but they
never did so. If Mother did not provide names and contact information for the maternal
grandparents and Mother’s siblings, and the relatives otherwise had no contact with the
court or DPSS, then they were not reasonably available to the agency. DPSS was “not
required to ‘cast about’ for investigative leads.” (In re K.L. (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 989,
996.)
The record shows that DPSS and the court inquired of all the relatives with whom
they had contact—Mother, Melanie’s adult half brother, Father, and the paternal
grandparents. All of them denied any Indian ancestry. In addition, the court in Elias’s
case found that ICWA did not apply, and there is no indication that ICWA applied in the
recent dependency proceedings involving Melanie’s other half siblings. On this record,
the court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that DPSS had conducted an adequate
and proper ICWA inquiry.
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DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORT
MENETREZ
J.
We concur:
McKINSTER
Acting P. J.
RAPHAEL
J.
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