Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

In re Melanie L. CA4/2

Filed 11/19/26 In re Melanie L. CA4/2
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 11/19/26 In re Melanie L. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re Melanie L., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.

RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E088710

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. DPRI2300073)

v. OPINION

C.L. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Walter H. Kubelun,

Judge. Affirmed.

Paul A. Swiller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant, C.L.

William D. Caldwell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant

and Appellant, R.L.

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Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Jamila T. Purnell, Chief Assistant County Counsel

and Prabhath Shettigar, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Celeste L. (Mother) and R.L. (Father) appeal from the juvenile court’s order

terminating parental rights to their daughter, Melanie L. Mother argues that the court and

the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) failed to comply with

the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related state

law. She contends that DPSS failed to discharge its duty of initial inquiry because the

agency did not attempt to contact certain maternal relatives. Father joins the argument.

We affirm.

BACKGROUND

I. Overview of prior dependency proceedings and Melanie’s dependency

Melanie has six maternal half siblings who are not subjects of this appeal. One

half brother is an adult. Four of the half siblings were the subject of dependency

proceedings initiated in 2022 in San Bernardino County. In 2024, the court terminated

parental rights to one of those half siblings. The court ordered legal guardianships for the

three other half siblings. Melanie’s sixth half sibling, Elias F., was the subject of

dependency proceedings initiated in 2023 in Riverside County. The court ordered

reunification services for Mother in Elias’s case but terminated her services at the six-

month review hearing. Elias’s case was still pending when DPSS received a referral

concerning Melanie.

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One-month-old Melanie came to DPSS’s attention in November 2024, when the

agency received a referral alleging general neglect. After investigating, DPSS filed a

petition under subdivisions (b) and (j) of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,

alleging that Mother and Father abused methamphetamine; Mother had a criminal

history; Mother had a dependency history with Melanie’s half siblings and failed to

reunify with them; and Elias had been abused or neglected, and Melanie was at

substantial risk of suffering similar harm. (Unlabeled statutory references are to the

Welfare and Institutions Code.)

The court detained Melanie from both parents in December 2024, and the infant

was placed in a foster home. In February 2025, the court found true all of the allegations

in the petition, removed Melanie from the parents’ custody, and ordered reunification

services for both parents. Melanie was placed in a new foster home in May 2025. Those

foster parents were in the process of adopting her half brother, Elias, and they wanted to

adopt her as well.

The court terminated the parents’ reunification services at the six-month review

hearing in September 2025. Mother and Father had another child in December 2025; that

infant was placed in the foster home with Melanie and Elias.

The court held the section 366.26 hearing in May 2026. The court found that

Melanie was likely to be adopted and terminated parental rights.

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II. ICWA-related background

According to the detention report, the social worker initially was unable to locate

Mother and Melanie. The worker eventually located Mother at the paternal grandparents’

home. Mother said that she was living with the maternal grandparents, although she went

“back and forth” between that home and Father’s home.

The detention report stated that Mother, Father, and the paternal grandparents

denied any Indian ancestry.1 The report also noted that the juvenile court in Elias’s case

found that ICWA did not apply to Elias. The report included a summary of a 2021

referral that was investigated and substantiated. According to that summary, Mother and

the half siblings were living with her “boyfriend’s parents” (i.e., Melanie’s paternal

grandparents), but they relocated to the maternal grandmother’s home in Mexico after the

child welfare agency started investigating. The children had previously lived with the

maternal grandmother in Mexico. The agency attempted to “cross report the concerns to

Mexico” but was unsuccessful, and it lost contact with Mother. The detention report

further noted that in connection with a 2018 referral, Mother “left to Mexico” with some

of her children after the child welfare agency started an investigation.

The paternal grandparents were present at the detention hearing, and the court

asked them whether Melanie had any Indian ancestry. They replied that Melanie did not.

The court found that ICWA “likely” did not apply, but it directed DPSS to continue its

1 Because ICWA uses the term “Indian,” we use it as well “to reflect the statutory
language.” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1125, fn. 1 (Dezi C.).) No disrespect
is intended.

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ICWA inquiry. Father filed Judicial Council form ICWA-020 stating that he did not have

any Indian ancestry. There were no maternal relatives present at the detention hearing,

but Mother asked that maternal relatives be permitted to visit Melanie. The court

authorized the maternal grandparents to attend Mother’s visits with Melanie.

In preparation for the jurisdiction and disposition hearings, Mother reported that

she resided at Father’s home. Mother further reported that she had a “positive

relationship” with the maternal grandparents and her three siblings. She said that the

maternal grandfather lived in Mexico. She identified the maternal grandmother as one

source of support. Mother wanted Melanie to be placed with the maternal grandmother

or the paternal grandparents.

At the jurisdiction and disposition hearings, the court found that DPSS had

conducted a sufficient ICWA inquiry and that ICWA did not apply to Melanie.

DPSS asked Mother about Indian ancestry on three occasions in preparation for

the six-month review hearing, and Mother denied any such ancestry as “to herself or any

maternal family.” At that time, Mother was living with Melanie’s adult half brother.

Mother had numerous supervised visits with Melanie, but there is no indication that the

maternal grandparents attended any of the visits.

Mother and Melanie’s adult half brother were at the section 366.26 hearing. The

court asked both of them if they had Indian ancestry, and they both denied any. The

court found that there had been a sufficient ICWA inquiry and that ICWA did not apply

to Melanie.

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DISCUSSION

Mother argues that the court failed to ensure that DPSS discharged its duty of

initial inquiry, so the court’s finding that ICWA did not apply is unsupported. We

disagree.

The child welfare agency and the juvenile court have an “affirmative and

continuing duty to inquire” whether a child in a dependency proceeding “is or may be an

Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) “The duty to inquire consists of two phases—the duty

of initial inquiry and the duty of further inquiry.” (In re Ricky R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th

671, 678 (Ricky R.), disapproved on another ground by Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at

p. 1152, fn. 18.)

“The duty of initial inquiry applies in every dependency proceeding.” (Ricky R.,

supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 678.) The child welfare agency’s duty to inquire begins

“when first contacted regarding a child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(1).) The agency must ask

the “party reporting child abuse or neglect whether the party has any information that the

child may be an Indian child,” and the agency must also ask the child and the child’s

family members, including extended family members, upon first contact with those

individuals. (Ibid.) In addition, if the child is taken into the agency’s temporary custody

under section 306, “or if they were initially taken into protective custody pursuant to a

warrant described in Section 340,” then the agency must ask “the child, parents, legal

guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest in the

child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an

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Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(2).) Extended family members include adults who are

the child’s stepparents, grandparents, siblings, brothers- or sisters-in-law, aunts, uncles,

nieces, nephews, or first or second cousins. (§ 224.1, subd. (c)(1).)

Although the child welfare agency is required to conduct an ICWA inquiry of

extended family members, state law “‘does not require the agency to “find” unknown

relatives and others who have an interest in the child, merely to make reasonable

inquiries. The operative concept is those people who are reasonably available to help the

agency with its investigation into whether the child has any potential Indian ancestry

should be asked.’” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1140.)

Juvenile courts must conduct their own initial inquiry as well. “Federal

regulations require state courts to ask each participant ‘at the commencement’ of a child

custody proceeding ‘whether the participant knows or has reason to know that the child is

an Indian child.’” (Ricky R., supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at pp. 678-679, quoting 25 C.F.R.

§ 23.107(a) (2022).) Similarly, state law requires the court to pursue an ICWA inquiry at

the first hearing on a dependency petition (or at the first court appearance of a party or

“other interested person[],” if the party or other interested person was not present at the

first hearing). (§ 224.2, subd. (c).) Further inquiry is required only if the court or the

child welfare department has “reason to believe” that an Indian child is involved.

(§ 224.2, subd. (e).)

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The juvenile court may find that ICWA does not apply to the proceedings if it

finds “that an agency’s inquiry and due diligence were ‘proper and adequate,’ and the

resulting record provided no reason to know the child is an Indian child.” (Dezi C.,

supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1134.) “[T]he juvenile court’s fact-specific determination that an

inquiry is adequate, proper, and duly diligent is ‘a quintessentially discretionary function’

[citation] subject to a deferential standard of review. [Citations.] ‘“On a well-developed

record, the court has relatively broad discretion to determine whether the agency’s

inquiry was proper, adequate, and duly diligent on the specific facts of the case.

However, the less developed the record, the more limited that discretion necessarily

becomes.”’ [Citations.] [¶] If, upon review, a juvenile court’s findings that an inquiry

was adequate and proper and ICWA does not apply are found to be supported by

sufficient evidence and record documentation as required by California law [citation],

there is no error and conditional reversal would not be warranted even if the agency did

not inquire of everyone who has an interest in the child. On the other hand, if the inquiry

is inadequate, conditional reversal is required so the agency can cure the error and

thereby safeguard the rights of tribes, parents, and the child.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th

at p. 1141.)

Mother contends that the court erred because DPSS did not attempt to inquire of

the maternal grandparents and Mother’s siblings. She points out that she told the social

worker that she had a positive relationship with those relatives. But there is no indication

that she gave DPSS contact information for those relatives or even gave the agency their

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names. Mother stated that she was living with the maternal grandparents when this case

began, but she later reported to be living elsewhere. She also said that the maternal

grandfather lived in Mexico. The maternal grandmother apparently lived in Mexico at

some point in the recent past. In 2021, Mother relocated to the maternal grandmother’s

home there, after the child welfare agency started investigating a referral. The court

authorized the maternal grandparents to attend Mother’s visits with Melanie, but they

never did so. If Mother did not provide names and contact information for the maternal

grandparents and Mother’s siblings, and the relatives otherwise had no contact with the

court or DPSS, then they were not reasonably available to the agency. DPSS was “not

required to ‘cast about’ for investigative leads.” (In re K.L. (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 989,

996.)

The record shows that DPSS and the court inquired of all the relatives with whom

they had contact—Mother, Melanie’s adult half brother, Father, and the paternal

grandparents. All of them denied any Indian ancestry. In addition, the court in Elias’s

case found that ICWA did not apply, and there is no indication that ICWA applied in the

recent dependency proceedings involving Melanie’s other half siblings. On this record,

the court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that DPSS had conducted an adequate

and proper ICWA inquiry.

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DISPOSITION

The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORT

MENETREZ
J.

We concur:

McKINSTER
Acting P. J.

RAPHAEL
J.

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