Filed 8/19/26 In re Mateo V. CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re MATEO V., a Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
CONTRA COSTA COUNTY
CHILDREN & FAMLY SERVICES,
A175813
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. J25-00177)
M. M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
M.M. (mother) appeals from the order terminating her parental rights
to her now two-year-old son, Mateo. She contends the court erred by denying
her request for a bonding study and in failing to apply the sibling
relationship exception to the termination of parental rights. We find no error
and affirm.
BACKGROUND
In June 2024, shortly after Mateo’s birth, the Napa County Health and
Human Services Department filed a petition alleging under Welfare and
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Institutions Code1 section 300, subdivision (b)(1), that mother has
unmanaged mental illness that impairs her ability to provide adequate care,
supervision, and protection for Mateo, and on several occasions Mateo was
exposed, in utero, to acts of intimate partner violence. The petition also
alleged under section 300, subdivision (j), that Mateo’s older sibling
experienced emotional abuse and neglect in that he was exposed to multiple
instances of domestic violence involving mother and that Mateo was at
similar risk of neglect. Mateo was detained pending the jurisdiction hearing.
In August 2024, the Napa County Superior Court found the allegations
of the petition true, continued Mateo’s out-of-home placement, and ordered
reunification services for mother.2 At the six-month review hearing, the court
found that mother was making adequate progress on her case plan and
continued reunification services.
In February 2025, the case was transferred to Contra Costa County
after the court determined that mother had relocated there. In advance of
the 12-month review hearing, the Contra Costa County Children and Family
Services Bureau (the Bureau) filed a report recommending termination of
reunification services.
In November 2025, the court issued an order terminating reunification
services and setting a section 366.26 hearing. The court found that
reasonable services had been provided by the social services agency but that
mother had not made significant progress in resolving the domestic violence
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
2 Reunification services were also initially ordered for Mateo’s father
but were terminated at the first review hearing. Father is not a party to this
appeal.
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issues that brought her to court. At the conclusion of the review hearing,
mother requested a bonding study, which the court denied.
In February 2026, this court denied mother’s petition for extraordinary
writ. (M.M. v. Superior Ct. of Contra Costa County (Feb. 5, 2026, A174850)
nonpub. opn.) In doing so, we rejected mother’s argument that there was
insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that reasonable
reunification services were provided. (Ibid.) Mother’s petition did not
challenge the denial of her request for a bonding study.
In advance of the section 366.26 hearing, the Bureau submitted a
report recommending termination of parental rights. The report indicated
that Mateo had been placed in the home of his prospective adoptive parents
since July 2024. The minor remained developmentally on target and was
described as very comfortable and happy with his foster parents. He was
very affectionate with them and they were attentive and affectionate in
return.
The report characterized mother’s attendance at visits as consistent but
noted that she had cancelled approximately 20 visits within the last year.
The report indicates that mother was affectionate and attentive towards
Mateo during the visits.
The social worker opined that, despite the visitation, mother did not
appear to occupy a parental role in Mateo’s life, and thus that severing the
relationship would not interfere with an existing parent-child relationship
sufficient to support the beneficial-relationship exception. The social worker
described mother as a familiar person to Mateo rather than a parent. The
report also stated that Mateo sometimes wanted to leave visits and did not
show distress when visits ended and mother departed.
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As to his sibling relationships, the report indicated that Mateo has had
only limited visits with his paternal half-sisters, and concluded that there is
no sibling bond between Mateo and his two paternal half-sisters that would
outweigh the benefit of legal permanence for Mateo through adoption. The
report also indicated that, while Mateo does not reside with his maternal
half-brother, Andrew, he sees him “on a weekly basis when he goes over to
the maternal grandparents’ home.” The social worker reported that the
prospective adoptive parents have expressed their desire for Mateo to
maintain this sibling relationship after adoption.
At the section 366.26 hearing, when asked about whether she had been
able to evaluate Mateo’s bond with Andrew, the social worker testified, “In
this situation, the siblings are not residing together, so I can—as a social
worker, I am basing it on Mateo, because he is our dependent. But what we
do discuss with the family is the relationship with half-siblings, and I know
that he goes and sees the half-siblings, his brother, weekly. They do also go
out and do other functions together outside of the maternal great-
grandparents’ home, but—and that relationship we talk about with the
prospective adoptive family is that they will maintain that relationship. But
I can’t base it because they are not residing together, but they can still
maintain that sibling relationship.”
In her closing argument, mother’s counsel renewed her request for a
bonding study to evaluate mother’s relationship with Mateo. She also
requested that the Bureau be ordered to conduct an evaluation of the bond
between Mateo and Andrew. She argued that the sibling relationship “has
not even been considered and it’s not addressed in the report. No opinion is
in the report about the bond between Mateo and Andrew, but it is noted both
in the report and in the caregiver’s information that they’ve had regular
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visits. And so, the Court doesn’t have enough information to decide whether
termination would be against Mateo’s interest because it would sever that
bond.”
The court denied both requests. With respect to the parental bonding
study, the court explained, “I find that it is not proper to continue this case
any longer for there to be a bonding study between the mother and the child.
I don’t want to repeat all the reasons why I denied the bonding study to begin
with, but a significant one was that this baby has been outside the mother’s
custody and care since day one of—or day two of his life. And so I don’t think
that a bonding study is appropriate or helpful in this case. And it’s certainly
not appropriate to ask for on[e] . . . in the middle of a .26 hearing. So, the
request by mother’s counsel to continue this matter for a bonding study with
mother is denied.”
With respect to Mateo’s relationship with Andrew, the court found it
had “sufficient information” regarding their relationship based on “the
information from the caregivers about the visits with Andrew, as well as the
information in [the Bureau’s] report.” The court noted that Andrew is only
five and Mateo was 20 months at the time of the hearing. The court also
noted that they only lived in the same home briefly when Mateo was one
month old.
Ultimately, the court found Mateo to be adoptable by clear and
convincing evidence both generally and specifically and that Mateo would not
suffer detriment if the parents’ rights were terminated. The court found that
the parental relationship exception did not apply because even if mother had
regularly visited, she did not have a quality parent-child relationship. The
court also found that mother had not met her burden of proving that the bond
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between Mateo and Andrew was sufficient to support application of the
sibling relationship exception.
DISCUSSION
I.
Mother contends the court abused its discretion in denying her request
for a parental bonding study. She argues that in light of her “substantial
visitation history coupled with evidence of warm and nurturing interactions,
the refusal to permit an independent expert assessment deprived [her] of a
fair opportunity to develop the very evidence most probative of her statutory
defense.”
The juvenile court has discretion under Evidence Code section 730 to
appoint an expert to study the strength and nature of the relationship
between a minor and the minor’s parents. In In re Caden C. (2021)
11 Cal.5th 614, at page 633, footnote 4, the court advised courts to “seriously
consider, where requested and appropriate, allowing for a bonding study or
other relevant expert testimony” when deciding on the beneficial parental
relationship exception to termination of parental rights. There is, however,
“no requirement in statutory or case law that a court must secure a bonding
study as a condition precedent” to terminating parental rights.
(In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1339.)
The Bureau contends that the juvenile court reasonably concluded that
mother’s request for a bonding study was untimely and unnecessary. We
agree. The trial court reasonably found that mother’s belated request would
have resulted in a significant delay in the proceedings and that further study
was not warranted in this case. As the court noted, Mateo was essentially
removed from his mother’s care at birth. Because mother had supervised
visitation throughout these proceedings, the observations and opinions
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contained in the Bureau’s report provide an ample basis on which to evaluate
Mateo’s relationship with his mother.
II.
Mother contends that the Bureau’s report was deficient insofar as it
failed to meaningfully describe Mateo’s relationship with his brother, and
thus, she argues that the juvenile court did not have sufficient information
before it to reject application of the sibling relationship exception.
Under section 366.26, if the court finds that the child is adoptable, it
must terminate parental rights unless it finds that termination would be
detrimental to the child because, among other “compelling” reasons, “[t]here
would be substantial interference with a child’s sibling relationship, taking
into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but
not limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home,
whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing
close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the
child’s best interest, including the child’s long-term emotional interest, as
compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption.” (§ 366.26,
subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).)
“The required reports in dependency proceedings vary by hearing, but
in general they are all designed to make sure the court has the evidence
before it to make the necessary findings at each stage of the proceeding.”
(In re B.D. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 803, 821.) “The purpose of the section
366.26 report is to provide the juvenile court with the information necessary
to determine the permanent plan for the children.” (In re Mary C. (2020)
48 Cal.App.5th 793, 800 (Mary C.).) Accordingly, reports for the section
366.26 hearing must contain an assessment of “the amount of and nature of”
any contact between the child and extended family, including siblings.
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(§ 366.21(i)(1)(B).) “ ‘ “Deficiencies in an assessment report . . . go to the
weight of the evidence, and if sufficiently egregious may impair the basis of a
court’s decision to terminate parental rights.” ’ [Citations.] But we consider
the evidence in the whole record in determining whether substantial evidence
supports the termination of parental rights” including the applicability of any
section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B) exception. (Mary C., at p. 801.)
As set forth above, the Bureau’s report indicated that Mateo sees his
older brother on a weekly basis when he goes to his grandmother’s home.
The report also indicated that Mateo lived with his grandmother for a month
when he was first detained. Mother concedes that the report provides the
necessary information about the amount of their contact but suggests that it
failed to include information about the nature of that contact. She faults the
report for failing to describe how the brothers interact, whether Andrew
displays affection or caretaking toward Mateo, whether Mateo recognizes and
responds to his brother, whether the relationship has deepened over time, or
what its loss would mean to Mateo. Assuming, without deciding, that this
type of information should have been included, any deficiency in this regard
is harmless in light of the full record.
The record also contains the following information from the July 2025
status review report: “Mateo has visited with Andrew and the maternal
family on the following dates for approximately 4 hours each: 07/24/24,
08/11/24, 09/15/24, 10/12/24, 10/31/24, 11/14/24, 12/18/24, 01/22/25, 03/12/25,
04/23/25. 06/28/25. It is reported that Andrew is extremely excited to see
Mateo. He is learning how to play gently with his younger sibling. [¶] The
06/28/25 visit was a birthday party for Mateo which included Andrew and his
father, maternal great grandparents and variety of maternal family
members. Mateo maintaining a connection to healthy, consistent and
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supportive family members continue[s] to be fostered by the current
caregivers.”
As a whole, the record reflects that Mateo lived with Andrew as a
newborn for approximately a month. For the first year of his life, he visited
once a month for approximately four hours at a time. From 12 to 20 months,
he visited Andrew’s home weekly. Accordingly, the siblings did not live
together for any significant amount of time and did not have an existing
“close and strong bond” prior to the dependency proceeding. As some courts
have observed, “application of the sibling relationship exception will be rare,
particularly when the proceedings concern a young child . . . whose need for a
competent, attentive and caring parent is paramount.” (In re Michael G.
(2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 580, 593; see also In re Isaiah S. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th
428, 437 [“The sibling relationship exception contains ‘strong language
creating a heavy burden for the party opposing adoption’ ”].) Given the
relevant criteria for evaluation of the sibling relationship exception, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the bond between 20-
month-old Mateo and his five-year-old brother was not sufficient to establish
“exceptional circumstances” warranting departure from “ ‘the norm’ ” of
adoption. (In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631 [“ ‘[t]he statutory
exceptions merely permit the court, in exceptional circumstances [citation], to
choose an option other than the norm, which remains adoption’ ”].)
DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.
GOLDMAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
BROWN, P. J.
STREETER, J.
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