Filed 9/1/26 In re Marilyn M. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re MARILYN M., et al., Persons B352114
Coming Under the Juvenile Court
Law.
(Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No. 23CCJP02556)
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
BRYAN M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Stephen C. Marpet, Judge Pro Tempore. Affirmed.
Donna Balderston Kaiser, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel and Peter Ferrera, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Bryan M. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court’s
jurisdictional and custody orders, contending they are
unsupported by substantial evidence and the court applied
an improper legal standard. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
The family includes Father, minors Marilyn and Matthew,
now ages 10 and 6, respectively, and D.V. (Mother), who is not a
party to this appeal. Father and Mother did not live together but
shared joint legal and physical custody of the children.
Father and Mother had a history of domestic violence,
and in October 2023 the juvenile court sustained a dependency
petition alleging several instances of domestic violence that
endangered Marilyn and Matthew, including that Father twice
pulled Mother out of her vehicle and slammed her head against
the door frame while one of the minors was in the backseat;
Mother struck Father with a fist and scratched him while
the children sat in the backseat; Father grabbed and yelled
at Mother in the presence of one of the children; Father struck
Mother while she held one of the children; and Father slapped,
pushed and forcefully grabbed Mother and berated, demeaned
and called her derogatory names in the presence of the children.
The court removed the children from Fathers’ custody,
released them to Mother, and ordered Father to complete a
52-week domestic violence program, individual counseling, and
parenting instruction. Although the record does not indicate
whether Father participated in or completed any programs, he
eventually reunified with the children, and the court terminated
jurisdiction in August 2024, issuing a family law order granting
Mother and Father joint legal and physical custody of the
children.
2
In October 2025, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral after
law enforcement responded to a radio call that Father had raped
A.V., age 20, in the front seat of his car while the minors were
asleep in the backseat. Father was arrested after the incident
but the charges were ultimately dropped.
A.V. reported to police and social workers that although she
fought and kicked Father, he forcibly raped her in the front seat
of his vehicle while the minors were asleep in the back.
Father admitted engaging in a sexual encounter with
A.V. but claimed it was consensual. He admitted that she cried
during the incident but reported that she told him she missed her
boyfriend.
Father’s sister, Katherine, reported that A.V. called her
and said that Father had assaulted her. She advised A.V. to call
911.
No other evidence supported A.V.’s reports: The children
reported they heard and saw nothing during the ride home;
Katherine did not believe that Father raped A.V.; DCFS
presented no physical evidence of an assault; and the minors
were healthy and well adjusted.
DCFS filed a Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 300
petition alleging that Father physically endangered Marilyn and
Matthew when he sexually assaulted a woman in the front seat
of his vehicle while the children slept in the back. The petition
alleged that Father forcefully digitally penetrated the woman’s
vagina, pulled down her pants, pinned her down, and penetrated
her vagina with his erect penis.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
3
At the detention hearing on November 17, 2025, the court,
expressly quoting section 319, found there were “no reasonable
means by which the children’s physical or emotional health may
be protected without removing [them] from the father’s custody.”
The court considered jurisdiction and placement on
January 21, 2026. It rejected Father’s claim that the encounter
with A.V. was consensual, sustained DCFS’s petition, and
declared the children dependents.
The court found that Father posed a substantial danger
to the minors’ physical and mental well-being, reasonable efforts
had been made to prevent removal, and there were no reasonable
means to protect the minors absent removal. The court granted
Mother sole physical custody and the parents joint legal custody
and ordered monitored visitation for Father. The court
terminated jurisdiction with a family law order.
Father appealed.
In his opening brief on appeal, Father represents that he
has not yet participated in the latest court ordered programs.
DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
Father contends the juvenile court asserted jurisdiction
under an incorrect legal standard. We disagree.
We independently review whether the juvenile court
applied the correct legal standard. (In re Anthony Q. (2016)
5 Cal.App.5th 336, 344.)
The court asserted jurisdiction under subdivision (b)
of section 300, which states that a child comes within the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court if the child has suffered or there
is a substantial risk the child will suffer serious “physical harm
or illness” as a result of a parent’s failure to adequately supervise
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or protect the child. (See § 300, subd. (b)(1).) The court found
the minors were physically endangered when Father sexually
assaulted a woman in his car while the children slept in the
backseat and that Father continued to be a danger based on
his recent conduct and history.
Father argues that during the detention hearing, the
court observed that Father’s actions endangered the emotional
health of the minors, which would support a finding only under
subdivision (c) of section 300, not under subdivision (b)(1).
The argument is meritless because the court’s comments at the
detention hearing do not demonstrate that, two months later, at
the jurisdiction hearing, the court applied the same standard as
at the detention hearing.
B. Jurisdictional Finding
Father argues the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings
are unsupported by substantial evidence. We disagree.
Physical violence between a child’s parent and another in
the presence of a minor may support the exercise of jurisdiction
under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), if there is evidence that the
violence is ongoing or likely to continue and that it placed the
child at substantial risk of serious physical harm. (In re Janet T.
(2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 377, 391.) Evidence from a single witness
can support a trial court’s findings. (In re Alexis E. (2009) 171
Cal.App.4th 438, 450–451.)
We review a juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings for
substantial evidence. (In re E.B. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 568,
574–575, overruled on another ground by Conservatorship of O.B.
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7.) Substantial evidence is not
synonymous with any evidence. (In re Savannah M. (2005) 131
Cal.App.4th 1387, 1393 [a juvenile court’s decision supported by a
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“mere scintilla” of evidence need not be affirmed].) We draw all
reasonable inferences in support of the juvenile court’s findings
and affirm its orders even if other evidence supports a different
finding. (In re M.D. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 836, 851.) We do not
consider the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence.
(Ibid.)
Here, A.V. reported that while the minors slept in
the backseat of Father’s car, he sexually assaulted her in the
front seat despite her fighting and kicking him. This evidence
supported that Father’s conduct physically endangered the
minors.
Father argues the evidence was insubstantial because
(1) A.V.’s report was uncorroborated; (2) no physical evidence
supported her version of events; (3) contravening evidence
suggested Father’s encounter with A.V. was consensual;
(4) DCFS’s investigation was inadequate; and (5) his “version
of the incident is the more credible one.” Although these matters
might have supported a different finding, they do not undermine
the court’s finding.
Father argues that no evidence supported that the sexual
assault in the front seat of his vehicle endangered the children
in the backseat. We disagree. A.V. reported that she fought and
kicked Father during the assault. Because the cabin of a vehicle
is a small, enclosed space, a reasonable factfinder could conclude
that a fight occurring in the front seat endangers people in the
back.
Father argues no evidence supports that he will engage
in violence in the children’s presence in the future because he
“has taken this incident and its consequences very seriously.”
On the contrary, the current incident, paired with Father’s prior
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dependency history involving domestic violence, support
the court’s implicit finding that Father does not take domestic
violence seriously enough to prevent its recurrence.
C. Custody Order
Father argues that no substantial evidence supports
removing the children from his custody because no evidence
suggests he poses an ongoing danger to them. A court may
remove a child from a parent’s physical custody where it finds
there is a “substantial danger to the physical health, safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the
minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means
by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without
removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s [or] guardian’s . . .
physical custody.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) A child need not have
been actually harmed before DCFS and the juvenile court may
intervene. (In re Eric B. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 996, 1002–1003.)
“In determining whether a child may be safely maintained in
the parent’s physical custody, the juvenile court may consider
the parent’s past conduct and current circumstances, and the
parent’s response to the conditions that gave rise to juvenile court
intervention.” (In re D.B. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 320, 332.)
Here, Father engaged in sexual violence in the minors’
presence only a year after having regained custody that he lost
as a result of domestic violence against Mother. The court could
reasonably conclude from this fact alone that Father would pose
a substantial danger to the children’s physical or emotional well-
being if they were returned to him, and there were no reasonable
means by which they could be protected without removal.
Father’s failure to complete court ordered counseling underlines
the danger.
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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:
BENDIX, J.
M. KIM, J.
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