Filed 8/7/26 In re Manny M. CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
In re Manny M., a Person Coming B349444
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No. 24CCJP03732A)
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Virginia M. et al.,
Defendants and Respondents;
Maria M.,
Intervener and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Kristen Byrdsong, Commissioner. Affirmed
in part and dismissed in part.
Law Offices of Vincent W. Davis & Associates and Vincent
W. Davis for Intervener and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louis,
Assistant County Counsel, and Tracey Dodds, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
No appearance for Defendants and Respondents.
_________________________________
INTRODUCTION
On appeal, maternal grandmother, Maria M., argues that
the trial court erred by declining to place her grandchild,
Manny M., in the care of the maternal grandparents in a Welfare
and Institutions Code hearing under section 388.1 We find no
abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling declining to disturb
Manny M.’s placement with his paternal grandparents who cared
for him throughout the dependency proceeding and who were
declared his prospective adoptive parents.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Dependency proceedings
Manny M. was born in May 2022. At the outset of the
dependency case, Manny M. was placed with his paternal
grandparents when he was removed from his parents. On
May 27, 2025, Manny M.’s maternal grandparents filed a motion
under section 388 asking the trial court to order an Interstate
Compact Placement of Children (ICPC) investigation with the
goal of placing Manny M. with the maternal grandparents in
Arizona.
As exhibits to the motion, the maternal grandparents
attached: (1) a letter from a flight attendant who was a client
and friend to the maternal grandmother attesting to her
1 All further statutory citations are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
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character and “loving heart”; (2) a letter from maternal
grandmother’s employer explaining her “dedication and
commitment” to the job; (3) a letter from maternal grandfather’s
employer stating that he has “been very responsible, dependable,
and a hard working man”; and (4) pictures of the maternal
grandparents caring for Manny M. as a baby in various settings.
On May 28, 2025, the trial court ordered a section 388
hearing on the maternal grandparents’ motion. On
September 11, 2025, the trial court began the section 388
hearing, which it considered together with the pending
permanency planning hearing under section 366.26. The
maternal grandparents presented Walter M. (Father) and the
maternal grandmother as witnesses in support of their motion.
Father testified that Manny M. previously lived with the
maternal grandparents for two and one-half years, and they
shared an attachment. He also noted that Manny M. was on the
spectrum for autism and was diagnosed at three years old. He
expressed concern that there was an “issue” with bonding with
the paternal grandparents. Father also shared that the paternal
grandparents had insufficient time to dedicate to Manny M.
because they had custody over his other three children. He was
also worried because Manny M. developed a rash behind his ear
and sustained a bruise above one of his knees while under the
paternal grandparents’ care. Father noted that Manny M. had
tantrums with the paternal grandparents, but did not have any
when he lived with the maternal grandparents. In one instance,
Manny M. hit his head on the ground and cut his lip.
Father further explained the maternal grandparents had
successful FaceTime visits with Manny M. When asked to
summarize why he wanted Manny M. placed with the maternal
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grandparents, he said they shared a closer attachment, they had
fewer kids to look after, Manny M. would have his own bedroom,
and the maternal grandparents prepared more homecooked
meals.
During cross-examination, Father conceded that Manny M.
scratched, bit, and slammed his head while under the care of the
maternal grandparents. He also said that the paternal
grandparents were meeting all of the Manny M.’s needs.
The maternal grandmother also testified. She stated that
at the beginning of the case, she asked for Manny M. to be placed
with her because she would be able to provide a safe home for
Manny M. She stated that Manny M. lived with her for two and
one-half years and he had his own room. During that time,
Manny M. was never injured. The maternal grandmother played
with him, made him food, bathed him, and read books to him.
She stated that she and Manny M. had a close relationship, and
he hugged both her and the maternal grandfather when he saw
them. Manny M. was also attentive during their 30- to 45-
minute FaceTime visits.
The maternal grandmother said that Manny M. should live
with her instead of the paternal grandparents because he lived
with the maternal grandparents previously; he had a relationship
with the maternal grandparents; the cold, California climate did
not agree with Manny M.; Manny M. injured himself because of
stress while in the paternal grandparents’ care; and she loved
Manny M. The maternal grandmother also stated that she and
the maternal grandfather were of good moral character.
At the close of evidence, the maternal grandparents,
Father, and Manny M.’s mother argued in favor of the maternal
grandparents’ section 388 motion. The maternal grandparents
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did not reference section 361.3 in the hearing or in argument.
Manny M.’s counsel and DCFS asked the court to deny the
section 388 motion.
In denying the motion, the trial court found that
Manny M.’s tantrums were not a change in circumstances, “It
seems that he’s interacting this way with everyone; sometimes
it’s positive and sometimes he has tantrums as father testified.”
The trial court similarly discounted Manny M.’s bruises from
tantrums while in the paternal grandparents’ care because
Manny M. was prone to tantrums generally. The trial court did
not find it was in Manny M.’s best interest to be moved to
Arizona when he was doing well in the paternal grandparents’
care. In summary, the trial court ruled, “So as both prongs have
failed to be met, there’s no change in circumstance, and it
wouldn’t be in [Manny M.’s] best interest.”2
After terminating parental rights, the trial court found the
paternal grandparents to be Manny M.’s prospective adoptive
parents and found they expressed an interest in adopting
Manny M.
2 The record on appeal consists of the maternal
grandparents’ section 388 motion with its exhibits, the reporter’s
transcript of the combined section 388 and section 366.26
hearings, and related minute orders for the section 388 and
section 366.26 hearings. Thus, our review is limited to the
maternal grandmother’s evidence because the trial court limited
the maternal grandmother’s access to those parts of the record to
make this appeal. Even without the benefit of DCFS’s evidence
below, we conclude the appeal is without merit.
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DISCUSSION
On appeal, the maternal grandmother argues the trial
court abused its discretion in denying the maternal grandparents’
section 388 motion. We disagree and see no abuse of discretion in
the trial court’s decision to continue Manny M.’s successful
placement with his paternal grandparents.
1. Governing section 388 standards
Section 388 permits the juvenile court, “upon grounds of
change of circumstance or new evidence, ... to change, modify, or
set aside any order of court previously made.” (§ 388,
subd. (a)(1).) This statute allows an order to be modified only
when a parent or other person with an interest in a dependent
child establishes that (1) changed circumstances or new evidence
exists; and (2) the proposed modification would promote the best
interest of the child. (In re Christopher L. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1063,
1080.) “The change of circumstances or new evidence ‘must be of
such significant nature that it requires ... modification of the
challenged prior order.’ ” (In re Mickel O. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th
586, 615.) “In assessing the best interests of the child, ‘a primary
consideration ... is the goal of assuring stability and continuity.’ ”
(Id. at p. 616.) Furthermore, the petitioner “must make a prima
facie showing of entitlement to relief in order to trigger the right
to an evidentiary hearing on the petition.” (In re R.F. (2023)
94 Cal.App.5th 718, 728.) “ ‘In determining whether the petition
makes the necessary showing, the court may consider the entire
factual and procedural history of the case.’ ” (In re Damari Y.
(2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 699, 708.)
We review the trial court’s ruling on a section 388 petition
for abuse of discretion. (In re Mia M. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 792,
806.) “ “Under this standard of review, we will not disturb the
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decision of the [juvenile] court unless [it] exceeded the limits of
legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious or patently
absurd determination.’ ” (In re R.M. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 119,
137.)
2. The maternal grandmother fails to establish any
abuse of discretion
The maternal grandmother makes four arguments on
appeal in her opening brief. We address each one.
First, the maternal grandmother argues that the trial court
erred in failing to set an evidentiary hearing under section 388.
This argument fails because the trial court conducted an
extensive evidentiary hearing with both documentary evidence
and live testimony. As a result, there is no order denying the
maternal grandparents’ request for an evidentiary hearing.
Because the maternal grandmother challenges a nonexistent
order, her appeal to the order refusing to set an evidentiary
hearing is dismissed. (See People v. Burnham (1961)
194 Cal.App.2d 836, 838 [appeal from nonexistent order denying
motion for new trial dismissed].)
Second, to the extent that the maternal grandmother
argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the
section 388 motion on the merits, that argument also fails. (In re
R.M., supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 137.) Here, while the
maternal grandmother pointed to bruises and rashes on
Manny M. to support her view that the paternal grandparents
were not appropriately caring for Manny M., the trial court
rejected that evidence. Instead, the trial court concluded that
Manny M. would tantrum and harm himself in the care of both
the paternal and maternal grandparents. Moreover, evidence at
trial established that the paternal grandparents met Manny M.’s
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needs, and they also cared for Manny M.’s siblings. Finally, the
trial court declared the paternal grandparents to be Manny M.’s
prospective adoptive parents during the section 366.26 hearing
on the same day, establishing the paternal grandparents’ plan to
offer Manny M. permanence. In summary, the trial court was
presented with evidence that both maternal grandparents and
paternal grandparents sought to have Manny M. live with them
and both had a history of caring for him. We find no abuse of
discretion in the trial court’s conclusion that Manny M. should
remain in the care of his paternal grandparents who had met all
of his needs while under court jurisdiction, and who the court
named prospective adoptive parents. In assessing section 388
motion, “ ‘a primary consideration ... is the goal of assuring
stability and continuity.’ ” (In re Mickel O., supra,
197 Cal.App.4th at p. 616.) Here, that goal is served with
continuing placement with the paternal grandparents.
Third, the maternal grandmother argues that the trial
court erred in failing to place Manny M. with the maternal
grandparents under section 361.3, which defines a relative
preference and factors governing these hearings. (§361.3,
subd. (a)(1)–(8).) Here, however, the maternal grandparents
made no reference to section 361.3 in the evidentiary hearing or
in argument, and they only made a single, passing reference to
section 361.3 in their initial moving papers without any
explanation or analysis. In the hearing itself, the maternal
grandparents did not address section 361.3 at all. Rather, the
maternal grandparents solely argued the matter under the legal
standard for section 388, the “[m]aternal grandparents are
asking that the 388 is granted.” By failing to make any
argument on section 361.3 at the evidentiary hearing below, the
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maternal grandmother forfeited the issue. (In re R.Q. (2023)
96 Cal.App.5th 462, 470.)
Fourth, the maternal grandmother argues that the trial
court should have ordered an ICPC investigation into the
maternal grandparents’ home in Arizona to assess placement for
Manny M. However, this argument fails as the trial court
concluded it was in Manny M.’s best interests to remain placed
with his paternal grandparents. We see no error in the trial
court’s decision to decline to order an ICPC investigation.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying the maternal grandparents’
section 388 motion is affirmed in part and dismissed in part.
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J.
SCHERB, J.
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