Filed 9/15/26 In re M.R. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re M.R. et al., Persons Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
D087823
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES
AGENCY, (Super. Ct. No. J521339AB)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
R.R.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Alejandro Morales, Judge. Affirmed.
Jack A. Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Damon M. Brown, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy
County Counsel, and Kristen M. Ojeil, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
Konrad S. Lee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for minors.
M.R. and X.R. (Children) became dependents of the juvenile court after
being present for domestic violence between their parents, K.R. (Father) and
E.L. (Mother). The court placed Children with Mother’s aunt N.O.
(Caregiver) and her husband. During the dependency case, paternal
grandfather R.R. (Grandfather) made many blog posts identifying Caregiver
by name and photograph and accusing her of abusing, kidnapping, stealing,
and trafficking Children, who he also identified by name. The blog accused
the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) and the
juvenile court of engaging in kidnapping and child trafficking.
Caregiver sought a restraining order against Grandfather that would
also protect her husband and Children. After a hearing, the juvenile court
issued the restraining order protecting all parties requested, including a no-
contact order, a stay-away order, and an order not to abuse. The order not to
abuse contained language prohibiting Grandfather from publicly identifying
Caregiver or Children as participants in a juvenile court case, including
online. Grandfather appeals the court’s order as to Children, contending it is
unsupported by substantial evidence because he did not physically or
emotionally harm them and his posts did not qualify as stalking. We affirm
the order.
BACKGROUND
A. Dependency Proceedings
In November 2023, the Agency filed a juvenile dependency petition
under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 300, subdivision (b) on behalf of
Children after Father used physical force on Mother while she held infant
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
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X.R. and while two-year-old M.R. was present. The parents had a history of
domestic violence over a period of years. Children were detained and
eventually placed with Caregiver, sister of Mother’s adopted mother.
Children did well and were happy in the home.
The court held a contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing in
August 2024 and sustained the petition, ordering liberal supervised, separate
visitation for Mother. Although Grandfather sought placement of Children
with him, the court maintained Children’s placement with Caregiver, noting
Grandfather had not yet been approved for placement. Approval of
Grandfather for placement was delayed because his criminal history required
a waiver, which required obtaining information from other states.
Mother participated in domestic violence victim and parenting
education. She visited Children regularly, during which she was engaged,
affectionate, and positive. But she struggled with homelessness and
eventually moved in with Grandfather. Although Mother had previously
reported Grandfather had physically abused her, she then stated he had only
threatened her. After she moved in with Grandfather, her relationship with
Caregiver began to deteriorate.
Father refused to meet with or cooperate with the Agency,
communicating with the Agency in a hostile and threatening manner with
attacks on the Agency, the social worker, and Mother. He did not visit
Children and refused to engage in services.
Grandfather told the Agency he had been helping the parents with
Children for most of their lives. Grandfather expressed negative feelings
toward both parents and stated he did not believe they should have parental
rights. At times, Father had threatened to come to the home and harm the
paternal family, and the Agency was concerned he would abduct Children
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from Grandfather’s home. Grandfather also did not trust the Agency,
believing that its representatives lied to him and used him and that he
should already have had placement of Children. According to one Agency
report, Grandfather called the Agency and its workers “disgusting and vile”
and “barbaric criminals.” Nonetheless, in September 2024, Grandfather
received resource family approval for placement. The Agency initially
intended to move Children to Grandfather’s home when he received approval,
but Children’s counsel objected and requested a contested hearing.
In November 2024, Father made social media posts containing photos
of the social worker and photos of Children crying in a Child Welfare vehicle.
The Agency believed Father obtained those photographs from Grandfather.
At subsequent hearings in 2025, the court admonished those present,
including Father and Grandfather, regarding confidentiality of the
proceedings. Despite these repeated admonitions, Father made posts on a
website and social media that showed juvenile court records, identified
Children as dependents, and accused the Agency and the court of child abuse
and trafficking. In March 2025, Father posted a picture of him with
Grandfather at a protest against Child and Family Well Being, with both
displaying the middle finger while wearing a shirt showing the Agency social
worker’s face.
In May 2025, the Agency reported that the Grandfather posted
numerous blog entries about the Agency and court, also identifying Children.
One blog entry was titled, “Monster Abomination in the System: [Social
Worker]’s Reign of Harm” and called the social worker cruel, manipulative, a
psychopath, and malicious. Other blog posts accused the Agency of
kidnapping, child trafficking, holding Children hostage, and causing Children
to have medical problems.
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The court held a contested six-month review hearing on April 25,
May 6, and May 27, 2025. Based on the Agency’s recommendation, the court
declined to place Children with Grandfather. The court terminated
reunification services for Father. Mother continued to have services and
unsupervised, separate visitation. Subsequently, however, due to concern
that Father was seeing Children during Mother’s visits, Mother’s visits
became supervised.
In July 2025, Grandfather posted videos on social media of a child and
family team meeting. When the Agency discussed confidentiality with him,
he accused the Agency of “retaliating like a criminal,” being a “sick system
that tears families apart,” and abuse. He also implied the Agency had
engaged in child torture, covering up possible child molestation, withholding
medical care, and fabricating reports. While accompanying Mother on visits,
Grandfather called the Agency evil and accused it of elder abuse.
At a special hearing, the court ordered Father to remove online posts
containing juvenile court records or identifying Children as dependents and
to refrain from making such posts. Both Father and Grandfather were
removed from the hearing due to their behavior during the hearing. Father
failed to remove the confidential information by the court ordered deadline.
The court issued an order to show cause for contempt and a bench warrant
for Father. As of mid-October, Father had not removed the confidential
information, and he failed to appear for the order to show cause hearing.
Grandfather and Mother attended San Diego County Board of
Supervisors meetings, expressing concerns about and distrust toward the
Agency. Grandfather spoke, including stating, “We’re exposing a predator,
[social worker] and [Caregiver] trying to steal our children” and that one
social worker was “toast” and they were “taking . . . down” another because
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the Agency “messed with the wrong family” and “sold the wrong children.”
Mother stated Children were kidnapped and the Agency are “monsters” who
traffic children and belong in prison.
On October 22 and 23, 2025, the court held a contested 12-month
review hearing. The court terminated Mother’s services and set a
section 366.26 hearing.
B. Restraining Order Proceedings
By August 2025, Grandfather’s blog had over 60 posts and 500 pages
criticizing Caregiver, the court, Children’s attorney, and Agency
representatives. Caregiver sought a restraining order against Grandfather
protecting her, her husband, and Children because of his posts about her.
The blog displayed Caregiver’s full name and photograph and accused her of
being a child abuser, kidnapper, predator, child thief, and a child trafficker.
The blog also included the names and photographs of Children. The
accusations made Caregiver fear for her physical safety and emotional well-
being. On August 12, 2025, the court granted a temporary restraining order.
In response to the restraining order request, Grandfather submitted a
declaration stating he never met or contacted Caregiver and the information
on his website “is factual, publicly observable, and not directed to her
personally.” He moved to strike the restraining order request, contending the
request was in retaliation for his protected speech.
The court held the restraining order hearing on February 10, 2026, and
granted the restraining order protecting Caregiver, her husband, and
Children under section 213.5. During the hearing, Caregiver testified that at
least 40 posts have her name on them. She explained her concern that being
labeled a child trafficker or thief might “trigger people to want to cause [her]
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harm while [she] car[ed] for the children.” The posts affected her day-to-day
thoughts and changed her behavior.
In granting the restraining order, the court first found that
Grandfather’s posts about Caregiver were false, defamatory, and harassing,
and thus they were not constitutionally protected. The court explained,
“[Grandfather] is identifying the minors by name . . . putting them on blast
that they’re being kidnapped, trafficked.” But, the court stated, “the public
shouldn’t know that there are children who are dependents of the juvenile
court or that they’re in foster care because that can cause embarrassment or
can cause distress to those children.” The court determined that this activity
constituted stalking under the broad definition from In re Brittany K. (2005)
127 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1512, justifying a restraining order protecting
Children. The court concluded stalking included making defamatory
statements that could result in emotional distress. While the court
announced its ruling, Grandfather frequently interrupted and accused the
court of child trafficking, resulting in verbal intervention by the bailiff.
In the restraining order, the court included an order not to abuse, a no-
contact order, and a stay-away order. In addition to the standard language of
the order not to abuse, the court checked the box prohibiting disturbing the
peace and wrote in language prohibiting Grandfather from “disclos[ing] and
identify[ing] minors or caregivers by name, as dependents or caregivers
involved in a juvenile proceeding, on any blogs, internet, social media or
public forum.”
DISCUSSION
Grandfather appeals the inclusion of Children in the restraining order,
arguing he never caused actual physical or emotional harm to them and his
conduct was not stalking. The Agency responds that past harm is not
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required for issuance of a restraining order under section 213.5; restraining
orders may be issued to protect emotional and psychological safety; and
Grandfather’s actions constituted stalking based on his attendance at Board
of Supervisors meetings, maintenance of the website, and attending
supervised visits, which “threatened to interfere with the children’s
placement and stability.” Children join the Agency’s letter.
Section 213.5, subdivision (a) provides the juvenile court exclusive
jurisdiction to issue restraining orders “enjoining a person from molesting,
attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering,
harassing, telephoning, . . . destroying the personal property, contacting,
either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, coming within a specified
distance of, or disturbing the peace of the child or any other child in the
household” or of the current caretaker, either “upon application in the
manner provided by Section 527 of the Code of Civil Procedure or in the
manner provided by Section 6300 of the Family Code, if related to domestic
violence.”
This statute does not require evidence that the enjoined acts occurred
previously or “evidence of a reasonable apprehension of future abuse.”
(In re C.Q. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 355, 363.) Rather, juvenile courts may
issue a restraining order under section 213.5, subdivision (a) “ ‘if “failure to
make [the order] may jeopardize the safety of the petitioner.” ’ ” (In re C.Q.,
at p. 363.) This includes “emotional and psychological safety.” (In re A.M.
(2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 614, 619.) Indeed, “disturbing the peace means
‘ “conduct that destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party.” ’ ”
(In re Bruno M. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 990, 997; Judicial Council Forms, form
JV-265 [“ ‘Disturb the peace’ means to destroy someone’s mental or emotional
calm,” either “directly or indirectly” and “in any way,” including online].)
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When a restraining order “arises in a dependency proceeding, we must keep
in mind that the ‘purpose of a dependency hearing is to determine the best
interests of the child and to protect those interests. [Citations.]’ ”
(In re A.M., at p. 619.)
“With regard to the issuance of a restraining order by the juvenile court
pursuant to section 213.5, appellate courts apply the substantial evidence
standard to determine whether sufficient facts supported the factual findings
in support of a restraining order and the abuse of discretion standard to
determine whether the court properly issued the order.”2 (In re Carlos H.
(2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 861, 866.) “We independently review the dependency
court’s statutory interpretations and legal conclusions.” (In re D.B. (2025)
111 Cal.App.5th 592, 603.)
Here, there was substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s
finding that Grandfather’s public blog posts identifying Children as juvenile
dependents who had been kidnapped and/or trafficked could cause the
children embarrassment or distress and thus threatened their mental and
emotional safety. In addition, these accusations threatened to destabilize
Children’s placement, and their feelings of safety in it. (See In re Brittany K.,
supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 1512.) There is a strong public policy of
confidentiality in juvenile proceedings, and sharing confidential information
may “undermine the court’s efforts to protect the children and promote their
best interests.” (See In re Tiffany G. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 443, 450–452.)
Courts have authority to issue orders restricting the circulation of
2 Some courts do not apply this mixed standard, but only substantial
evidence. (See, e.g., In re Cassandra B. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 199, 210–
211.) We would reach the same result under either standard.
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confidential information to protect children. (Ibid.) Particularly considering
the importance of Children’s best interests in juvenile proceedings, the court
did not abuse its discretion by including Children in the restraining order
along with Caregiver.
That said, we believe the court’s finding that Grandfather’s actions
could cause Children embarrassment or distress falls under the definition of
disturbing the peace rather than stalking. (In re Bruno M., supra,
28 Cal.App.5th at p. 997.) In In re Brittany K., the grandmother’s
“defamatory accusations about the foster parents” were just one aspect of the
course of conduct deemed stalking. (In re Brittany K., supra, 127 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1512.) During this course of conduct, the grandmother also “concealed
herself at a scheduled visitation between the minors and their birth mother
so as to obtain unauthorized access to them; surreptitiously searched out and
located the confidential location of the foster residence, in violation of their
intended privacy; hired a private detective to spy on the minors’ comings and
goings at their foster home; and showed up unannounced at each of the
minors’ schools.” (Ibid.) We cannot say that Grandfather engaged in conduct
of the same character. But “[w]e review the result the trial court reached, not
its legal reasoning, and we may affirm on any ground supported by the
record, unconstrained by the route the trial court took in getting there.”
(Apex Solutions, Inc. v. Falls Lake National Ins. Co. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th
1249, 1257.)
In addition, Grandfather’s demonstration of complete disdain for the
proceedings based on his belief that the Children should have been placed
with him or returned to Mother created a realistic concern for Children’s
physical safety while in Caregiver’s care, justifying the court including
Children in the no-contact and stay-away orders. By calling the Agency evil
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during Mother’s visits with Children and interrupting court proceedings with
false accusations against the court, Grandfather demonstrated his inability to
modulate his behavior, a failure that could pose a threat to Children and
their emotional and physical safety, as well as a threat to the stability of
their placement with Caregiver.
Contrary to Grandfather’s assertion, the fact that he had not already
caused harm to Children does not prevent the issuance of a restraining order
protecting them. (In re Bruno M., supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 997; In re C.Q.,
supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at pp. 363–364; In re B.S. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 183,
193.) The court need not wait to act to protect its dependents until Children
are old enough to understand and become aware that confidential, potentially
embarrassing information was shared online. Nothing in section 213.5,
subdivision (a) requires past incidents.
Grandfather cites cases in which appellate courts concluded there
was insufficient evidence of a threat to a child’s safety to include them
in the restraining order despite violence or threats of violence between the
parents. (See In re C.Q., supra, 219 Cal.App.4th 355, In re N.L. (2015)
236 Cal.App.4th 1460.) He fails to explain how they show the restraining
order was improper here. In In re C.Q., the court found there was insufficient
evidence of risk of harm to the children to support a restraining order against
the father based on a single incident of domestic violence toward the mother
that the children witnessed. (In re C.Q., at p. 364.) Citing that case, the
court in In re N.L. concluded there was insufficient evidence of potential
harm to the child to support a restraining order against the mother based on
her violent conduct or threats outside the child’s presence and her contacting
the child’s school when she was an educational rights holder. (In re N.L., at
p. 1468.)
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In this case, the court did not rely on Grandfather’s actions toward
Caregiver as a basis for the restraining order, but issued the restraining
order based on Grandfather’s actions that directly threatened Children’s
mental and emotional safety on an ongoing basis. And, as a grandparent,
Grandfather did not have the same rights as parents in juvenile cases. (See
In re R.M. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 119, 130–131 [grandparents do not have
constitutional rights protecting their relationship with grandchildren and do
not have absolute statutory rights to visitation].)
Grandfather notes he had financially supported Children and their
parents and initially assisted the Agency. He fails to explain the relevance of
this conduct, which occurred before the dependency case and early in the
case, well before Grandfather started his blog targeting Caregiver, the
Agency, and the court, and disclosing confidential information about
Children. Grandfather also notes he testified at the 12-month review hearing
that he would cooperate with the Agency if Children were returned to Mother
and lived in his home. Such cooperation, apparently offered only upon the
Agency’s willingness to agree with Grandfather’s positions, does nothing to
mitigate Grandfather’s conduct and actions in connection with Children’s
placement and their emotional and physical well-being.
Finally, Grandfather notes that it is “concerning” that the judge
declined to consider Grandfather’s visitation at the hearing or as part of the
restraining order, leaving the matter to the judge presiding over the
dependency case. He fails to explain why this was error, and we thus decline
to consider whether it was. (See, e.g., Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v.
Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657, 701, fn. 15 [failure to develop an argument
forfeits that point]; Niko v. Foreman (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 344, 368 [“One
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cannot simply say the court erred, and leave it up to the appellate court to
figure out why.”].)
DISPOSITION
We affirm the order.
KELETY, J.
WE CONCUR:
BUCHANAN, Acting P. J.
BERMÚDEZ, J.
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