Filed 8/19/26 In re M.P. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
In re M.P., a Person Coming 2d Juv. No. B351262
Under the Juvenile Court (Super. Ct. No. J073069)
Law. (Ventura County)
VENTURA COUNTY HUMAN
SERVICES AGENCY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
T.F.,
Defendant and Appellant.
T.F. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order
terminating her parental rights to her four-year-old daughter,
M.P., and selecting adoption as the permanent plan. (Welf. &
Inst. Code,1 § 366.26.) Mother contends the court erred in finding
the parental benefit exception did not apply and selecting
adoption over guardianship as the permanent plan. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
At the time of M.P.’s April 2022 birth2, Mother and M.P.
tested positive for amphetamines. Mother’s four older children
were previously removed from her care due to allegations of
substance abuse and mental health issues. The juvenile court
sustained the petition filed by the Ventura County Human
Services Agency (Agency) on the allegations that M.P. would
suffer or there was a substantial risk she would suffer serious
physical harm or illness because of Mother’s mental illness and
substance abuse, Mother’s “failure to address . . . ongoing
domestic violence,” and M.P.’s siblings having been removed from
Mother for the same reasons. (§ 300, subds. (b)(1)(D) & (j).) In
September 2023, the petition was dismissed and Mother was
granted full legal and physical custody of M.P.
Four months later, the Agency filed a new petition alleging
M.P. would suffer or there was substantial risk she would suffer
serious physical harm or illness due to Mother’s mental illness
and substance abuse (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)). Law enforcement
responded to a domestic violence call and Mother was arrested
for being under the influence and leaving M.P. in the home
unattended. M.P. was removed from Mother’s custody and
placed with her maternal uncle (Uncle).
1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
2 M.P.’s father (Father) is not a party to this appeal.
2
At the contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the
juvenile court sustained the petition and adopted the Agency’s
recommendations to order reunification services and visitation
for Mother.
The Agency’s 12-month report recommended Mother’s
reunification services be terminated and a section 366.26 hearing
set for the purpose of implementing a permanent plan. The
Agency reported M.P. was doing well in Uncle’s care, attended
daycare, and appeared to have her needs met. The Agency also
reported that Mother continued to express her unhappiness with
the Agency, social workers, and/or supervisors. Mother exhibited
intense emotions and mood swings when interacting with a social
worker, accusing the worker of yelling at Mother, being a “ ‘baby
snatcher,’ ” and threatening her.
During a monitored visit, Mother requested to speak to an
Agency officer rather than focus on M.P. and became negative
and hostile with the officer. The Agency also noted potential
drug seeking behavior from Mother, including one positive test
for amphetamines, numerous missed drug tests, taking
medications not prescribed to her, and requesting opiates during
visits to the emergency room. The Agency noted Mother’s
apparent unwillingness to engage with counseling and mental
health services, including missing therapy appointments. The
Agency expressed concerns that Mother’s unaddressed mental
health issues, sobriety issues, “lack of natural support,” and her
“failure to address” domestic violence, including verbal and
physical abuse, would “compromise her ability to care for” M.P.
“which can lead to neglect and harm to the child.”
At a contested review hearing, the juvenile court heard
testimony from several witnesses, including Mother. Case aide
3
Earnest Armstrong testified that at the end of her visits, M.P.
had no difficulty separating from Mother, stated she wished to
return to Uncle’s house, and never stated she wanted to live with
Mother. The juvenile court found it would be detrimental to M.P.
if she were returned to Mother, based on Mother’s unaddressed
mental health and substance abuse issues. The court noted
Mother’s failure to show changes in her behavior and her
inconsistent engagement with services. The court terminated
Mother’s reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing.
In the section 366.26 report, the Agency recommended
termination of Mother’s parental rights so that M.P. could be
freed for adoption. The Agency reported that M.P. remained in
the care of Uncle, who demonstrated an ability to provide a loving
and stable home environment for M.P., had developed a strong
attachment with her, and wished to provide her with stability
and permanency through adoption. The Agency reported that
while Mother was loving and engaging during visits with M.P.,
Mother had difficulty maintaining sobriety, and her unresolved
substance abuse and mental health issues interfered with her
ability to provide the stability and permanency M.P. required.
At the section 366.26 hearing, Mother asserted the parental
benefit exception applied. The juvenile court found M.P.
generally adoptable and found the parental benefit exception did
not apply, adopted the Agency’s recommendations, and
terminated Mother’s parental rights.
DISCUSSION
Parental benefit exception
Mother contends the juvenile court erred in finding the
parental benefit exception did not apply. We disagree.
After reunification services have been terminated, the court
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sets a section 366.26 hearing “ ‘to select and implement a
permanent plan for the child.’ ” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th
614, 630 (Caden C.).) The juvenile court may order one of three
alternatives: adoption, guardianship, or long-term foster care.
The statutory preference is for adoption. (In re Katherine J.
(2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303, 316; § 366.26, subd. (b)(1).) If the
juvenile court finds the child adoptable, it must terminate
parental rights unless a statutory exception applies. (§ 366.26,
subds. (b)(1) & (c)(1)(B).)
One exception, the parental benefit exception, exists if the
parent establishes by a preponderance of evidence: “(1) regular
visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of
which would benefit the child such that (3) the termination of
parental rights would be detrimental to the child.” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631, italics omitted; § 366.26, subd.
(c)(1)(B)(i).) “[T]he exception applies in situations where a child
cannot be in a parent’s custody but where severing the child’s
relationship with the parent, even when balanced against the
benefits of a new adoptive home, would be harmful for the child.”
(Caden C., at p. 630.) If the parent meets her burden, then the
exception applies because it would not be in the child’s best
interest to terminate parental rights, and the court must select a
permanent plan other than adoption. (Id. at pp. 636–637.) We
review for substantial evidence the first two elements. We review
the third element for abuse of discretion. (Id. at pp. 639–640.)
Here, it is undisputed Mother met the first element of
regular visitation and contact. The focus is on the second and
third elements.
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1. Beneficial relationship
In evaluating this element, the juvenile court determines
whether the child has a “substantial, positive, emotional
attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment implying that
the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (Caden
C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) Relevant factors include “ ‘[t]he
age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s
custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between
the parent and the child, and the child’s particular needs.’ ” (Id.
at p. 632.) The focus is on the child, and the courts “often
consider how children feel about, interact with, look to, and talk
about their parents.” (Ibid.)
Mother contends reversal is required because the juvenile
court improperly focused on whether Mother occupied a “parental
role.” At the section 366.26 hearing, the court stated, “I must
find that the parent, the mother in this case, occupies a parental
role in the child’s life, and I don’t see how I can make that finding
under these circumstances. So I’m not finding in favor of the
mother as to the second prong.” Although its use of this language
is concerning, the court analyzed the Caden C. factors. It
considered M.P.’s young age, the portion of her life spent with
Mother, “the positive or negative effect of interaction between
parent and child,” and “the child’s particular needs.” Ultimately,
the court found that Mother and M.P.’s visits did not
demonstrate more than “just friendly or affectionate visits.”
The juvenile court also considered the quality of Mother’s
visits with M.P. to determine whether a substantial, positive,
emotional attachment existed with M.P., noting that Mother
never moved beyond monitored visits. The court again found the
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evidence did not demonstrate anything “more than just friendly
or affectionate visits.”
In our view, the totality of the court’s ruling clarifies that
the underlying factors relied upon by the juvenile court included
M.P.’s. age, time in Mother’s care, and the quality of visitation—
all appropriate considerations. (See In re A.L. (2022) 73
Cal.App.5th 1131, 1149 [affirming even where juvenile court used
“ ‘parental role’ ” language]; In re Katherine J., supra, 75
Cal.App.5th at pp. 319–321 [court’s finding that father did not
occupy a parental role was not error where the court explained
what it meant with evidence establishing that a beneficial
relationship did not exist].) Read in context, the juvenile court
here did more than “summarily state that [Mother] ha[d] not
occupied a parental role in her child’s life.” (In re Katherine J., at
p. 319.) Reversible error has not been shown.
Substantial evidence supports the finding that Mother and
M.P. did not have a beneficial parental bond. M.P. was three and
a half years old and had been out of Mother’s care for nearly two
years by the time of the section 366.26 hearing. The juvenile
court heard Regina Prachyl, who monitored the visits, testify that
M.P. easily transitioned back to daycare after her visits with
Mother. Case aide Armstrong testified that at the end of her
visits, M.P. had no difficulty separating from Mother, stated she
wished to return to Uncle’s house, and never stated she wanted
to live with Mother. We cannot reweigh the evidence or resolve
evidentiary conflicts and must uphold the juvenile court’s
determination even where substantial evidence to the contrary
exists. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.)
The Agency reports also detailed that, during her visits
with M.P., Mother often required redirection as she focused on
7
the dependency case and her dissatisfaction with the Agency,
rather than M.P. During another visit in a public park, Mother
was preoccupied with a community member she perceived as
threatening, whereas the case aide present at the park described
the person as exercising and paying no attention to Mother or
M.P. And during another visit, Mother, visibly upset and crying,
stated she was not progressing towards having M.P. back in her
care and was not “bonding” with M.P. When an Agency employee
attempted to redirect Mother, she continued to cry and repeated
herself, rather than focus on M.P., who wanted to go outside and
play.
Mother contends the juvenile court ignored the emotional
bond between Mother and M.P. and failed to identify any
negative aspects of the visits between Mother and M.P. This is
unsupported by the record. There was evidence of mutual
affection between Mother and M.P. and evidence that M.P.
enjoyed her visits. But there were also negative aspects to the
visits.
Mother was often preoccupied with the status of M.P.’s
dependency case, and focused on her dissatisfaction with the
Agency rather than focusing on M.P. Mother also confessed to
feeling she was “not bonding” with M.P. The court must weigh
the evidence and draw reasonable inferences therefrom, rather
than ignore the evidence reflecting poorly on Mother. (In re
Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 450–451.) To the extent
Mother contends the juvenile court erred in not granting her
request for a bonding study, Mother did not appeal that order
and it may not be challenged in this appeal. (Sara M. v. Superior
Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 998, 1018.)
8
Mother additionally contends the court improperly focused
on the fact that M.P.’s visits with Mother remained monitored.
But the record reflects that the mention of monitored visits was
brief, with the court noting it was looking for “something more
than just friendly or affectionate visits.” Mother does not show
that this passing reference to monitored visits overrides the
substantial evidence supporting the court’s finding on the lack of
a beneficial parental bond between Mother and M.P.
2. Detriment
The juvenile court found that terminating Mother’s
parental rights would not be detrimental to the child. It stated,
“[I]t’s clear to this Court that it would not be detrimental to the
child. The security of a new adoptive home weighs heavily on
this Court.” We agree that terminating parental rights would not
deprive M.P. “of a substantial, positive emotional attachment
such that the child would be greatly harmed.” (In re G.H. (2022)
84 Cal.App.5th 15, 25.)
“ ‘A showing the child derives some benefit from the
relationship is not a sufficient ground to depart from the
statutory preference for adoption.’ ” (In re A.G. (2020) 58
Cal.App.5th 973, 995, italics omitted.) “Friendly or affectionate
visits are not enough.” (In re G.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at
p. 25.) To evaluate detriment, “courts need to determine . . . how
the child would be affected by losing the parental relationship—
in effect, what life would be like for the child in the adoptive
home without the parent in the child’s life.” (Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 633.) “In each case, then, the court acts in the
child’s best interest in a specific way: it decides whether the harm
9
of severing the relationship outweighs ‘the security and the sense
of belonging a new family would confer.’ ” (Id. at p. 633.)
By the time of the section 366.26 hearing, M.P. had been
living with Uncle for nearly two years. Uncle was aware of M.P.’s
daily and individual needs, developed a strong attachment with
her, and demonstrated that he could provide her with a loving
and stable home environment. “A court abuses its discretion only
when ‘ “ ‘the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion
by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd
determination.’ ” ’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 641.) The
juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it determined
that M.P.’s best interests were served by severing parental rights
to provide a safe and stable home through adoption by Uncle.
Adoption as the permanent plan
Mother contends the juvenile court erred when it failed to
consider guardianship as a permanent plan for M.P. We
disagree.
Once the court has determined that a child is likely to be
adopted and reunification services have been terminated,
parental rights “shall” be terminated to allow the adoption to
proceed, unless an exception applies. (Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 630, italics added; see § 366.26, subds. (b)(1),
(c)(1)(B) [exceptions].) Adoption, not guardianship, is the
preference. (§ 366.26, subd. (b)(1); In re T.S. (2009) 175
Cal.App.4th 1031, 1038.) That is what occurred here, and Mother
has not established an exception.
Mother contends that her tenuous relationship with Uncle,
her brother, and his statement that he wished to avoid future
dealings with her warrant guardianship as a permanent plan.
But Uncle’s statements are legally irrelevant to the court’s
10
inquiry. Mother’s argument also ignores the Agency’s findings
that Uncle desired to adopt M.P. to provide her stability and
permanency, and that M.P. was “healthy, content, happy and
comfortable in her current placement.”
DISPOSITION
The order terminating Mother’s parental rights is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
YEGAN, Acting P. J.
BAKER, J.*
* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellant
District, Division Five, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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Gilbert A. Romero, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Aida Aslanian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Tiffany N. North, County Counsel, Joseph J. Randazzo,
Assistant County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.