Filed 9/21/26 In re M.M. CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re M.M. et al., Persons Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
TULARE COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN F091331
SERVICES AGENCY,
(Super. Ct. Nos. JJV076087B
Plaintiff and Respondent, & JJV076087C)
v.
J.P. et al., OPINION
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Gary M. Johnson,
Judge.
Janette Freeman Cochran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant, J.P.
Brian Bitker, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant, M.M.
Jennifer M. Flores, County Counsel, and Marit Erickson, Deputy County Counsel,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
J.P. (mother) and M.M., Jr. (father) (collectively, parents), who share two sons,
now nearly three-year-old M.M. and nearly two-year-old J.M. (collectively, the children),
appeal from the juvenile court’s orders issued at a Welfare and Institutions Code
section 366.261 hearing, which resulted in the termination of their parental rights.
Mother and father both contend the juvenile court erred when it declined to apply the
beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption. Finding no merit to their
contention, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Initial Removal and Jurisdiction/Disposition
In December 2024, Tulare County Health and Human Services/Child Welfare
Services (the agency) filed an original petition alleging the children, who were then
14- and 2-months old, came within the provisions of section 300, subdivision (b)(1)
based on domestic violence between mother and father.2 The petition alleged mother and
father failed or were unable to adequately protect the children from domestic violence.
The petition specifically alleged that on December 4, 2024, mother and father engaged in
domestic violence while the children were in their care and custody, and the children
could be heard crying during the incident. Mother and father had a history of domestic
violence which violated a peaceful contact criminal protective order. Agency efforts to
ameliorate the family’s circumstances with a safety plan were unsuccessful, and mother’s
and father’s conduct endangered the children’s health and safety and created a
detrimental home environment.
A combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing was held in February 2025. The
juvenile court found the petition’s allegations true, ordered the children, who had been
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2 The children’s then four-year-old half-brother, S.P., who has a different father,
also was a subject of the petition. Ultimately, S.P. was placed with his father, who was
given sole legal and physical custody of S.P., and his dependency case was dismissed.
Neither S.P. nor his father are subjects of this appeal.
2.
placed with their maternal grandmother, removed from mother’s and father’s custody,
and ordered that family reunification services be provided to mother and father. Mother’s
case plan consisted of participating in the domestic violence victim’s program, mental
health services, coparenting and nurturing parenting classes, and spot drug testing.
Father’s case plan consisted of participating in the batterer treatment program, mental
health services, nurturing parenting classes, alcohol and other drug assessments, and spot
drug testing. The juvenile court ordered supervised visitation of four hours per week for
each parent. A six-month review hearing was set for July 17, 2025.
The Family Reunification Period
At a continued contested six-month review hearing on August 28, 2025, the
juvenile court terminated family reunification services and set a section 366.26
permanency planning hearing for December 18, 2025. While mother and father were
attending their case plan services, they continued to make conflicting reports about their
relationship and engaged in domestic violence disputes. The children, who were stable in
their current placement, were placed at risk of harm because parents could not
demonstrate positive changes in their behavior. The agency reported that maternal
grandmother was willing to adopt the children and an adoption assessment was
completed which found the children to be adoptable.
The Agency’s Reports for the Selection and Implementation Hearing
In its report for the section 366.26 hearing the agency recommended termination
of parental rights and a permanent plan of adoption with maternal grandmother, who the
children had been living with since December 27, 2024. The agency reported parents’
history of contact with the children. At the detention hearing on January 16, 2025, the
juvenile court ordered mother and father to receive weekly supervised visits of four hours
per week, with the agency given discretion to increase the length and frequency of visits.
Their supervised visits were increased to six hours per week at the February 2025
jurisdiction/disposition hearing. Maternal grandmother supervised mother’s visits and
reported mother was appropriate with the children, changed their diapers, encouraged
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them to talk, read books, and demonstrated affection. Father’s visits were supervised by
a paternal aunt until July 1, 2025, when she was no longer willing to provide supervision
due to father’s ongoing relationship with mother and failure to make positive changes in
his life. Paternal aunt reported that father engaged with the children, changed their
diapers, played with toys to engage them, fed the baby, and demonstrated affection.
Father was referred to the agency to supervise visits.
At the review hearing on August 28, 2025, the juvenile court ordered continued
supervised visits of six hours per week for mother and father. Maternal grandmother
supervised these visits at her home or a park. Mother had been visiting on Saturdays
since she and maternal grandmother worked during the week. Maternal grandmother
reported that mother continued to be appropriate with the children and would change
their diapers, play with them, cook for them, and attempt to interact with them. After the
review hearing, father did not attend any supervised visits, and he reportedly was
incarcerated. While the agency sent father a letter encouraging him to contact the agency
to initiate visits, father had not done so.
The agency did not believe that terminating mother’s or father’s parental rights
would be detrimental to the children as there was no significant bond and the children
had developed a bond with maternal grandmother and viewed her as their primary
maternal figure. The agency opined it was in the children’s best interest to be adopted by
maternal grandmother. The adoption assessment deemed the children adoptable based on
their characteristics of mental health, general good health, and age.
The agency filed an addendum report on December 11, 2025, in which it reported
that father called the social worker on December 8, 2025, and stated he wanted to initiate
visits as he had been released from jail. Father initially asked for weekend visits, which
would need to be supervised by another agency, but ultimately father received agency-
supervised visits. The agency needed to ensure visits were appropriate before a third
party designee could assist with them since father had not seen the children in over five
months. The social worker advised father that he needed to arrange the visits.
4.
Father had a supervised visit with the children on December 10, 2025. He was
observed to be appropriate with them and the children appeared comfortable with him.
Father carried the children, was playful with them, and hugged and kissed them. At a
visit the following day, father was very appropriate and comforted the children. Father
demonstrated at both visits that he was able to attend to the children’s needs.
The section 366.26 hearing was continued to February 5, 2026, since mother
requested a contested hearing. In a January 29, 2026 addendum report, the agency stated
that mother had been receiving supervised visits at the agency since December 18, 2025,
as maternal grandmother was no longer willing to supervise visits because mother
physically fought with maternal grandmother’s other adult daughter who lived in the
home where the visits took place. Maternal grandmother did not want the children to
witness any verbal or physical altercations between mother and maternal grandmother’s
adult daughter.
After the agency observed mother driving father to his visits, the agency asked
mother if she wanted to join her visits with father’s visits. Mother agreed and she and
father had joint visits on December 19 and 23, 2025. Mother did not show up or call to
cancel a visit scheduled for December 22, 2025. On December 31, 2025, mother and the
children had a visit, which father did not attend. On January 5, 2026, mother began
visiting the children separately. Mother attended all seven visits scheduled from
January 5 to January 26, 2026. Mother told the supervising social worker that she and
father were not on good terms. Mother was observed to be very attentive to the children
and interacted appropriately with them. The children appeared happy to see her, but they
did not cry or show other emotions when visits ended, and they appeared to be happy and
excited to see maternal grandmother after the visits. While no issues had been observed
during visits, the agency noted that mother did not redirect the children when needed.
Father continued to receive supervised visits at the agency. Father agreed to the
joint visits with mother on December 19 and 23, 2025, and he did not show up or call to
cancel the visit on December 22, 2025. A visit was scheduled for December 30, 2025,
which was rescheduled to December 31, 2025, but father cancelled the visit because he
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did not have a ride. Father contacted the social worker on January 5, 2026, and explained
he and mother were having issues and were not on good terms, and he no longer wanted
to visit at the same time as mother. Father began separate visits on January 6, 2026, and
he attended all seven visits between that date and January 26, 2026. Father was reported
to be very attentive to the children and interacted appropriately with them. The children
appeared happy to see father, but they did not cry or show other emotions when visits
ended, and the children were happy and excited to see maternal grandmother. No issues
had been observed during visits, but father did not redirect the children when needed.
The agency continued to believe that terminating parental rights would not be
detrimental to the children as there was no significant bond and the children were bonded
to maternal grandmother.
The Selection and Implementation Hearing
The contested section 366.26 hearing was held on February 5, 2026. Father
testified on his own behalf. He confirmed that before the dependency case started, the
children lived with him from their birth. During that time, he provided daily care for
them, which consisted of making sure they ate and had everything they needed. Since the
children had been out of his custody, he visited them twice a week with each visit lasting
three hours. Father stated he had been visiting six hours per week for the last four to five
months. There was a gap in his visits when he was in custody, which lasted about four
months from August 10, 2025, to December 2025.
Father believed the children were happy to see him, as M.M. would run to him and
J.M. had a big smile. The children would hug and kiss him and call him dad. Father
believed the visits went well. He brought the children food and fed them, played with
them, tried to be fair between them, and would calm them down when they were upset.
Sometimes the children became upset when visits ended, but father tried to leave in a way
so they would not cry. Father loved the children; he believed he had a strong bond with
the children, and they would benefit from having a relationship with him. Father
believed the children would be negatively impacted if his relationship with them were
terminated because the children knew him as their father and had a bond with him and
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mother. Father was opposed to the agency’s recommendation of adoption, and he was
open to the court ordering guardianship.
Mother testified on her own behalf. The children lived with mother from birth
until they went to live with maternal grandmother when they were 14 months and three
months old. Mother took care of the children when she wasn’t working, and father
helped her with them. Mother would make the children food, bathe them, put them to
bed, and take them to doctor’s appointments. Mother played with them and hugged and
kissed them.
After the children went to live with maternal grandmother, mother started visiting
them. She visited twice a week, three hours per visit. She tried to make every visit
unless the agency cancelled a visit. At the start of a visit, M.M. would run up to her and
give her a hug and kiss, while J.M. would crawl towards her and reach out so she could
hold him. Mother hugged and kissed the children, who called her “mom,” and she would
start playing with them. The children looked happy to see her. Mother brought the
children food and toys from “back home.” Mother felt bonded to the children and felt
love towards them. Mother believed the children felt bonded to her too, as M.M. liked to
spend a lot of time with her during visits; he would sit on her lap and want her to hold
him. Mother was against the recommendation of adoption and would accept legal
guardianship.
On cross-examination, mother admitted she missed a recent visit, but she claimed
it was because the agency cancelled it. Mother did not recall missing a visit on
December 22, 2025, as stated in the agency’s report. Mother confirmed her visits were at
the agency and while father testified the children had only been out of the home for a
year, they had been out of the home since December 23, 2024, which was more than a
year ago.
The attorneys presented their arguments. Father’s attorney argued that father did
not agree with the recommendation to terminate parental rights and asked the court to
consider applying the beneficial relationship exception based on father’s testimony. The
attorney argued that father had visited regularly, he believed the children would benefit
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from continuing their relationship with him based on his perceptions of the children, and
the children would be negatively impacted if the relationship were terminated.
Mother’s attorney joined in father’s attorney’s arguments and asked the court to
find the beneficial relationship exception applied. Her attorney argued that mother raised
the children, she remained in their lives following their removal and regularly and
consistently visited them, and the visits were meaningful as the children called her mom
and had bonding experiences with her. Her attorney asserted that taking that away from
the children would be detrimental to them and they would suffer without a relationship
with her and asked the court to order legal guardianship.
Children’s counsel noted the children were subjected to domestic violence when
they lived with their parents, the domestic violence continued after their removal, and
J.M. lived with maternal grandmother most of his life and it was unlikely that M.M.
recalled having another home. While children’s counsel acknowledged mother and father
had pleasant visits with the children and the children enjoyed spending time with them,
counsel asserted the children’s bond and relationship was with maternal grandmother and
parents’ relationship with the children was not enough to overcome the law. Children’s
counsel argued a guardianship was not appropriate as the children were adoptable and
maternal grandmother wished to proceed with adoption. Accordingly, children’s counsel
asked the court to follow the agency’s recommendation to terminate parental rights and
proceed with a plan of adoption.
County counsel agreed with the children’s counsel. County counsel argued that
since it was undisputed that the children were adoptable, it was parents’ burden of
showing the beneficial relationship exception applied. County counsel explained that to
establish the exception parents had to prove they maintained regular and consistent visits
and “that terminating parental rights would be detrimental to the children, because the
children would benefit from continuing the relationship with the parents.” County
counsel further explained that on “the second part, … the courts have interpreted the
phrase benefit from continuing the relationship to refer to a relationship that promotes the
wellbeing of the child to such an extent that it outweighs the benefits that the child would
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gain in a permanent home. And also as to the detriment, it has to be that the child would
be harmed or the child would suffer detriment if the adoption were ordered.”
County counsel asserted that while the evidence showed parents maintained
regular visits, except when father was in custody, there was no evidence that the children
would be harmed or suffer any detriment if parental rights were terminated; rather, the
children had spent the majority of their lives being raised by maternal grandmother who
provided their day-to-day needs and care. County counsel asserted that a parent who
simply maintained contact with the child was insufficient and asked the court to order
adoption as the children’s plan.
The juvenile court, noting it was undisputed that the children were adoptable,
found the children had spent most of their lives in maternal grandmother’s care and stated
it was parents’ burden to establish the beneficial parent-child relationship exception. The
court understood parents were advocating for a plan of guardianship, but as county
counsel pointed out, when looking at detriment, the issue is not detriment to parents, but
whether detriment to the children had been proven. The court stated it had not read or
heard any evidence to prove that “if the plan of adoption with maternal grandmother was
what the Court ordered that in fact it would be detrimental to the children.” The court
further stated there must be proof of detriment to the children, and it did not believe there
was any evidence to show that. Accordingly, the court found that adoption was the
appropriate plan for the children and it would follow the agency’s recommendation. The
court stated it would terminate parental rights based on that recommendation and the
evidence that had been presented, and “[f]ind that a permanent plan of adoption with the
maternal grandmother is in the best interest of the children.” The court subsequently
entered orders terminating parental rights to the children and designating adoption as the
children’s permanent plan.
DISCUSSION
Father, joined by mother, claims the juvenile court erred when it found the
beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption did not apply. They argue the
court failed to conduct the analysis required by In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614
9.
(Caden C.) and considered improper factors in making its determination. Both contend
they met their burden of proving that the exception applied to each of them.
Legal Principles of the Beneficial Parent-Child Relationship Exception
At a section 366.26 hearing, when the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing
evidence the child is adoptable, it is generally required to terminate parental rights and
order the child be placed for adoption unless a statutory exception applies. (§ 366.26,
subd. (c)(1).) One of the statutory exceptions is the beneficial parent-child relationship
exception, which applies when “[t]he court finds a compelling reason for determining
that termination would be detrimental to the child” where “[t]he parents have maintained
regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing
the relationship.” (Id., subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
A parent claiming an exception to adoption has the burden of proof to establish by
a preponderance of evidence that the exception applies. (In re Melvin A. (2000)
82 Cal.App.4th 1243, 1252.) The parent must prove three elements to prevail under the
beneficial relationship exception: “(1) regular visitation and contact, and (2) a
relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child such that (3) the
termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.” (In re Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 631.)
The first element of the beneficial relationship determination asks the
“straightforward” question of whether the parent visited consistently, considering the
extent permitted by court orders. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The focus is
on the best interest of the child as opposed to punishing or rewarding parents for good
behavior in maintaining contact. (Ibid.)
The second element of the exception asks whether the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The parent-child
relationship “may be shaped by a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child, the
portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect
of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’ ” (Ibid.,
quoting In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) The juvenile court’s focus
10.
should again be on the child, and it “must remain mindful that rarely do ‘[p]arent-child
relationships’ conform to an entirely consistent pattern.” (Caden C., at p. 632.)
When considering the third element, courts must determine “how the child would
be affected by losing the parental relationship—in effect, what life would be like for the
child in an adoptive home without the parent in the child’s life.” (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) Potential negative effects from severance of the relationship might
include “emotional instability and preoccupation leading to acting out, difficulties in
school, insomnia, anxiety, or depression.” (Ibid.) An adoptive home might provide a
new source of stability that alleviates emotional instability and preoccupation leading to
those problems, making the loss “not, at least on balance, detrimental.” (Ibid.) Under
this element, the court is again guided by the child’s best interest, but in a “specific way:
it decides whether the harm of severing the relationship outweighs ‘the security and the
sense of belonging a new family would confer.’ ” (Ibid.)
In Caden C., the Court of Appeal had held “that because the parent continued to
struggle with substance abuse and mental health issues and because of the risks of foster
care and benefits of the potential adoptive home, no reasonable court could find the
child’s relationship with his parent outweighed the benefits of adoption.” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 625–626.) Our Supreme Court rejected that conclusion as “[t]he
Court of Appeal did not explain how the parent’s struggles related to the specific
elements of the statutory exception: the importance of the child’s relationship with the
parent or the detriment of losing that relationship.” (Id. at p. 626.) A parent’s struggles
with issues that led to dependency were determined to be relevant only to the extent they
inform whether the child would “benefit from continuing the relationship and be harmed,
on balance, by losing it.” (Id. at p. 638.)
Standard of Review
Appellate courts review a juvenile court’s ruling on the application of the
beneficial parent-child relationship exception using a “hybrid” standard. (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 641.) The substantial evidence standard applies to the first two
elements of regular visitation and existence of a beneficial relationship. (Id. at pp. 639–
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640.) The juvenile court’s decision as to the third element—whether termination of
parental rights would be detrimental to the child—is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
(Id. at p. 640.) “Review for abuse of discretion is subtly different, focused not primarily
on the evidence but the application of a legal standard. A court abuses its discretion only
when ‘ “ ‘the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an
arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 641.)
The standard of review of a court’s determination that a parent did not meet his or
her burden to prove an exception to termination of parental rights is “whether the
evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law.” (In re I.W.
(2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528, disapproved on other grounds by Conservatorship of
O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7.) Specifically, the question is “whether the
appellant’s evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a
character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was
insufficient to support a finding.’ ” (In re I.W., at p. 1528.)
Analysis
In the present case, the juvenile court determined that mother and father did not
meet their burden of proof on the application of the beneficial parent-child exception. As
parents point out, the juvenile court did not address the first two elements of the Caden C.
test when announcing its ruling. Parents assert reversal is required not only on this basis,
but also because the juvenile court applied a two-element articulation of the Caden C.
test, framed the detriment inquiry as a comparison between parents and maternal
grandmother, and defaulted to a generalized best interest analysis.
We reject parents’ contention that reversal is required because the juvenile court
failed to fully state its reasonings and findings on the record when it denied application of
the beneficial parent-child relationship exception. While section 366.26, subdivision
(c)(1)(D) requires the juvenile court to “ ‘state its reasons in writing or on the record’ ” in
concluding that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child, the
juvenile court is not required to recite specific findings when it concludes that
terminating parental rights would not be detrimental to the child. (In re A.L. (2022)
12.
73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1156.) Although a juvenile court’s statement of its findings or an
explanation of the reasons for its decision may be helpful in conducting appellate review,
it is not a legal requirement. (Ibid.)
The remaining arguments are based on a misinterpretation of the juvenile court’s
ruling. Parents contend county counsel misrepresented what they were required to prove,
as counsel advocated for comparing their “attributes as custodial caregiver relative to
those of any potential adoptive parent(s)” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634), and
improperly conflated the second element of whether the children would benefit from
continuing the parental relationship with the third element of whether termination of
parental rights would be detrimental to the children (id. at pp. 632–633). Parents contend
the juvenile court adopted this articulation by referring to county counsel on the issue of
detriment, and by failing to separately identify the three elements or correct county
counsel’s statements.
But in the absence of any evidence that the court misunderstood the law, the court
is presumed to know and follow the law. (Wilson v. Sunshine Meat & Liquor Co. (1983)
34 Cal.3d 554, 563; accord, Guillory v. Hill (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 802, 812–813.) Even
if county counsel’s statements were incorrect, there is nothing in the record to suggest the
juvenile court misunderstood the law. The juvenile court did not conflate the two
elements but rather relied on the third element, namely, whether termination of parental
rights would be detrimental to the children, to support its rejection of the exception.
Contrary to parents’ assertion, the juvenile court did not look to whether parents could
provide a home for the children or decide “who would be the better custodial caregiver,”
which our Supreme Court stated was improper. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634.)
Rather, the juvenile court looked at whether there was evidence of detriment to the
children should parental rights be terminated and found there was none. This is the
precise test articulated by our Supreme Court in Caden C., namely, “whether it would be
harmful to the child to sever the relationship and choose adoption.” (Id. at p. 633.)
Parents also contend the juvenile court engaged in an improper comparison
analysis when it stated that there was no proof “that if the plan of adoption with maternal
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grandmother was what the Court ordered that in fact it would be detrimental to the
children.” Parents assert the court was asking whether the children would be worse off if
adoption were ordered, rather than determining whether losing the parental relationship
would harm the children to the extent not outweighed by the security of a new, adoptive
home. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634.) Parents assert this interpretation is
bolstered by earlier statements the court, county counsel, and children’s counsel made
that the children had spent the majority of their lives with maternal grandmother.
We acknowledge that a child’s relationship with his or her caregiver should not be
considered in evaluating the second element of the Caden C. test. (See In re J.D. (2021)
70 Cal.App.5th 833, 864 [noting the minor’s attachment to his caregiver was irrelevant to
evaluating the nature of his relationship with his mother].) Viewed in context, however,
it appears that the juvenile court considered the children’s relationship with maternal
grandmother in ascertaining the third element of the Caden C. test, which requires the
court to “decide[] whether the harm of severing the [parent-child] relationship outweighs
‘the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer.’ ” (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) The children’s relationship with maternal grandmother and her
willingness to provide them with permanency were certainly relevant to that inquiry.
In our view, the juvenile court’s statement that there was no proof presented that it
would be detrimental to the children “if the plan of adoption with maternal grandmother”
was ordered was a shorthand way to state that the children would not suffer detriment if
their relationship with mother and father were terminated and adoption ordered. This is
the precise issue the court must consider when addressing the third element, namely,
“how the child would be affected by losing the parental relationship—in effect, what life
would be like for the child in an adoptive home without the parent in the child’s life.”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.)
Finally, parents contend the court used the best interest framework as the
dispositive question when it announced, “that a permanent plan of adoption with the
maternal grandmother is in the best interest of the children.” Examined in context,
however, it appears the court made this finding after finding that parents had not met
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their burden of proving detriment to the children and it would terminate parental rights
based on the evidence presented. Instead, it appears the juvenile court’s best interest
statement was in reference to the parents’ request for a plan of guardianship. Based on
this context, and the court’s prior comments, we conclude the record does not indicate the
juvenile court considered any improper factors in declining to apply the beneficial parent-
child exception.
In any event, any error was harmless. While there was evidence to show parents
visited regularly and consistently and the children had a positive, emotional attachment to
them, parents presented almost no evidence that terminating their relationship with the
children, however positive it might be, would be detrimental. (See In re J.R. (2022)
82 Cal.App.5th 526, 533 [when “the proper legal standard is already established and a
party has had a full and fair opportunity to present all of their evidence on a contested
issue, and yet in the end there is simply no evidence that could support a favorable
finding for them, then any legal error in the court’s reasoning or basis for its decision
quite obviously is harmless”].) It is not appropriate to remand for a factual finding “when
there are no factual issues to resolve due to a failure of proof by the party who has the
burden of proof.” (Ibid.)
Mother and father argue that terminating their parental rights would be detrimental
to the children because detriment is a foreseeable consequence of terminating the positive
bond each parent has with the children. Mother asserts the children’s positive bond with
her is shown by the following evidence: they lived with her until their removal, when
they were 14 months and three months old; the children knew who she was; and they had
consistent, positive visits with her. Father asserts that the children will be harmed by
removing him from their lives as they identify him as their father, they greet him with
affection, they have enjoyable visits of six hours per week, and the children have
demonstrated attachment since infancy. Father further points out his trial testimony that
the children would be negatively affected if their relationship with him were terminated
because they “already know who their dad [is,] they have that bond with their father and
the mother.”
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While the evidence showed that the children had positive relationships with both
mother and father, there was no evidence that the children would be negatively impacted
if they never saw either parent again. Instead, the evidence showed the children
separated easily from father and mother when visits ended. Although father and mother
had the opportunity to call witnesses and offer evidence, they did not present any
evidence that the children experienced any harm when apart from them. There was no
evidence that the children exhibited emotional distress or had problems adjusting in their
placement. While it is undoubtedly difficult for children as young as these to express
emotional attachment and desires, and it was undisputed that the children enjoyed the
visits, the evidence did not show that ending the visits would cause them detriment. (Cf.
In re D.M. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 261, 271 [children had lived with their father for two to
eight years, wanted to return to him, and cried when visits with him concluded]; In re
J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 857–858 [child frequently expressed a desire to go to
his mother’s house, told her he loved her, sought her attention during visits, and shared
intimate moments and exchanges with her].)
On this record, we conclude the juvenile court did not err in finding the beneficial
parental relationship exception to adoption did not apply.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders terminating mother’s and father’s parental rights are
affirmed.
DE SANTOS, J.
WE CONCUR:
FRANSON, Acting P. J.
SNAUFFER, J.
16.