Filed 9/21/26 In re M.M. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
B352523
In re M.M., a Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP00830A)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
L.J. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEALS from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Safaan K. Ahmed, Judge. Affirmed.
Joseph T. Tavano, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant L.J.
Aida Aslanian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant Brittany M.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, Brian Mahler, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
L.J. (father) and Brittany M. (mother) appeal from an order
terminating dependency jurisdiction and placing their daughter
M. in a legal guardianship. The parents contend that the
juvenile court abused its discretion by denying their request to
continue the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26
hearing, and terminating juvenile court jurisdiction without
ensuring that visits with M. would take place.1 We find no abuse
of discretion and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Background
M. was born in February 2012. She has four younger
siblings who are not subjects of this appeal. Both parents are
deaf and communicate using American Sign Language (ASL); M.
and her siblings are hearing.
In February 2020, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a dependency petition
alleging the children were juvenile court dependents because
mother physically abused M.’s five-year-old brother L.J. by
striking him with a belt (counts a-1, b-1, j-1); the parents failed to
obtain appropriate services for L.J., who had been diagnosed with
1 All subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
autism (counts b-2, j-2); and the parents had a limited ability to
provide appropriate care and supervision of the children
(counts b-3, j-3). The court sustained an amended petition in
July 2020 and ordered reunification services for both parents.
M. was returned to the parents’ custody in July 2021, but
removed again in May 2022. In January 2023, the juvenile court
set a section 366.26 hearing for May 2023.
M. has significant special needs. She was diagnosed with
social, educational, cognitive processing, and speech delays in
2020, and in November 2020 she was placed on an involuntary
psychiatric hold after assaulting her brother and striking herself
with a lamp. Between 2021 and 2025, M. was psychiatrically
hospitalized at least five more times for disruptive behaviors and
suicidal ideation and she was placed in at least nine different
foster homes.
In early 2025, M. was diagnosed with a moderate
intellectual disability (with an estimated developmental age of
five to seven years) and with a trauma disorder. She continued
to struggle with emotional regulation and social interactions, and
she would punch walls, physically attack her caregivers, threaten
to hurt others, destroy property, and self-harm when
dysregulated. She received Applied Behavior Analysis (ABA)
therapy five days a week, and she was linked with wraparound
and crisis teams to help during emergencies. In January 2025,
DCFS reported that M.’s problematic behaviors had increased
and a crisis team had been called to her placement every week.
She had been prescribed antipsychotic medication to help control
her behavior.
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M.’s Placement With the O.’s
M. was placed with Mr. and Mrs. O. in February 2025.
Mr. O. was particularly skillful in managing M.’s challenging
behaviors, and her behavior improved markedly in the O.’s home.
She had monthly supervised visits with her parents, which she
enjoyed. She was receiving 22 hours of ABA therapy each week.
In July 2025, the O.’s said they would like to become M.’s
legal guardians and to have juvenile court jurisdiction terminate.
DCFS advised the parents that the O.’s were willing to assist
with monitoring visits, but “parents . . . need to start planning on
how they will secure interpreters after legal guardianship.”
DCFS encouraged the parents to contact the Regional Center for
help with an ASL interpreter, but father declined.
During an August 2025 visit, father told M. that she would
not be allowed to see her parents again if she were placed in legal
guardianship. He encouraged her to say she wanted to remain in
foster care forever.
In September 2025, DCFS requested a 60-day continuance
to finalize Kin-GAP funding.2 In October 2025, the court
continued the hearing to January 2026.
In December 2025 and January 2026, DCFS reported that
M. was doing exceptionally well in the O.’s home, noting that she
had not been admitted to a behavioral care hospital in nearly a
year and had transitioned to a lower level of therapy. She was
more willing to solve problems by talking about them, and she
2 The Kinship Guardianship Assistance Payment (Kin-GAP)
program is a state program that provides ongoing funding for
children who exit the dependency system to live with relative
legal guardians. (In re Priscilla D. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1207,
1211 & fn. 2.)
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was no longer engaging in many destructive behaviors such as
punching walls or causing damage to the home. The O.’s were
committed to supporting her into adulthood. DCFS opined that
legal guardianship “is crucial for M[.]’s mental health and
stability as it would provide her with the reassurance she needs
to continue thriving in the care of [the O.’s].” DCFS therefore
recommended that the court terminate its dependency
jurisdiction and place M. in a legal guardianship with the O.’s.
At the January 9, 2026 hearing, minor’s counsel asked to
continue the section 366.26 hearing for 30 days to give counsel an
opportunity to discuss legal guardianship with M. Father’s
counsel asked the court to order DCFS to speak to father about
“identifying interpreter resources for visitation after the case
closes.” Mother’s counsel joined in father’s request. The court
continued the hearing and ordered DCFS to provide the parents
with information about interpreter resources after the case
closed.
Section 366.26 Hearing
The juvenile court held a section 366.26 hearing on
February 11, 2026 to consider DCFS’s request to terminate
jurisdiction and place M. into a legal guardianship with the O.’s.
Mother’s counsel asked that the court either continue the hearing
and delay the establishment of the guardianship or keep the case
open to permit the parents regular visitation. Counsel noted that
the parents had spoken to the Greater Los Angeles Agency on
Deafness (GLAD), which had agreed to help them find an ASL
interpreter to assist with visits. Mother’s counsel asked that the
court “keep this case open until such time as we have confirmed
that the parents will actually be able to have any visits going
forward.” Alternatively, counsel asked that if a legal
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guardianship were issued, the parents be permitted more
frequent visits than DCFS was recommending.
Father’s counsel joined mother’s arguments, noting that M.
was bonded to her parents and wanted to have visits with them.
Counsel asked that if a guardianship were ordered that day, the
court should order more frequent visits than DCFS was
recommending.
Minor’s counsel asked the court to grant the legal
guardianship “today,” to close the case with Kin-GAP, and to
permit M. twice yearly visits with the parents. Counsel argued:
“M[.]’s been able to stabilize with these caregivers and has had to
undergo many, many different foster homes and placements, and
these caregivers are very committed to her care. She is in a
multitude of different services, and this may impact some of her
availability for visitation, as this regular schedule and her
attendance for school and extracurriculars is something she has
missed out on, often in the last few years . . . . [¶] So I do think
that it is in the best interest of M[.] to grant the legal
guardianship today, . . . as her case has been open since 2020,
and she’s been waiting for stability . . . this entire time. I have no
other concerns with her care by the caregivers, and I don’t believe
that there’s any child safety concerns needed to keep the case
open. So I would ask that the court grant the legal guardianship
today.”
The court asked minor’s counsel how frequently M. wished
to visit her parents. Counsel responded that although M. wanted
visits, counsel “[didn’t] want to put too much of an onus on the
legal guardians in case there are issues . . . . [As] noted that [M.]
has had previous hospitalizations, she has services that occur
daily, after school, as well as additional school supports. So I am
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hesitant to put it more than the minimum there just because of
all those different issues, as well as there were concerns raised
about M[.] being triggered by the parents during visitation. And
so I don’t want her progress to be impacted . . . .”
The court then asked the parents’ attorneys what they were
suggesting regarding an ASL interpreter: “[W]hat is your
suggestion[?] [I]f it’s not that the parents get their own
interpreter, what other interpreter could I order?” Mother’s
counsel responded that the court should maintain jurisdiction
“temporarily,” explaining: “As I discussed, [mother] is in
communication with the organization, GLAD, who has told [the
parents] that they are able to search for services that the parents
may be able to access, and . . . if it comes up that there are no
services that aren’t paid, you know, then the court has no
obligation to maintain the case forever. But I think right now
when there is nothing in place except what was being paid for by
the Department . . . [and] we have no idea what, if any, options
the parents have, . . . I think that’s a very dangerous position to
leave the case in.” Counsel added that “even a month would be
more time for GLAD to work with our clients.”
DCFS’s counsel responded that the case began in 2020, and
the section 366.26 hearing had been continued for several
months, thus giving the parents and their attorneys “ample time
[to raise] these issues.” Further, although DCFS had provided
resources to the parents, “there’s been no offers of what the
alternative could be. At some point, the parents are going to
have to find resources to allow them to communicate with the
child. . . . I believe, at this point, counsel has had ample
opportunity to look for alternatives . . . .”
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The court responded that it was going to proceed because
“I don’t know if there are any real orders I could do once a case is
closed regarding an interpreter. . . . I don’t really see what orders
I can do because once I close the case, I don’t have any orders I
can give for . . . funding for an interpreter. That’s out of my
jurisdiction.” Mother’s counsel said: “I understand that, Your
Honor, and that was not my request. My request was merely
that we don’t cut this case loose until we at least have an idea of
whether or not . . . there are interpreters available. We can at
least know that if that pans out, and, if not, the court is well
within [its] rights to cut it loose and say ‘the parents are on their
own[.]’ But given that this case has been open for a long time . . .
I don’t see how there is a necessity to close this case today. [¶]
I’m not asking the court to make any orders going forward. I’m
just asking that we at least have some idea of whether or not the
parents will even be able to visit with their child once DCFS is
not involved.”
The court found that it would be detrimental to M. to
return her to the parents’ physical custody, and a guardianship
was in M.’s best interest. It therefore appointed the O.’s as M.’s
legal guardians. The parents were permitted a three-hour
monitored visit each month, with the parents to obtain an ASL
interpreter. The court found that DCFS supervision was not
necessary and terminated jurisdiction with Kin-GAP funding in
place.
Mother and father timely appealed from the section 366.26
order.
DISCUSSION
The parents contend the juvenile court abused its
discretion by denying their request to continue the section 366.26
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hearing and by terminating dependency jurisdiction. We find no
error.
I. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by
Denying the Parents’ Request for a Continuance
Continuances in dependency cases are governed by
section 352. That section provides that on a showing of good
cause, a court may continue a hearing unless doing so is contrary
to the child’s interests. (§ 352, subd. (a)(1), (2).) In considering
the child’s interests, the court “shall give substantial weight to a
minor’s need for prompt resolution of his or her custody status,
the need to provide children with stable environments, and the
damage to a minor of prolonged temporary placements.” (Id.,
subd. (a)(1).) A continuance shall be granted “only for that period
of time shown to be necessary by the evidence presented at the
hearing on the motion for the continuance.” (Id., subd. (a)(2).)
We review an order denying a request for a continuance for abuse
of discretion. (Michael G. v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th
609, 637.)
The parents contend the juvenile court abused its
discretion by denying their request to continue the section 366.26
hearing “to determine whether or not an ASL interpreter was
available to assist in visitation with M[.] going forward.” We
disagree. The parents were advised in July 2025—seven months
before the section 366.26 hearing—that they would need to
provide an interpreter for visits after the guardianship was
established. DCFS encouraged the parents to contact the
Regional Center for help with an interpreter, but father refused
to do so. The section 366.26 hearing was continued from
October 2025 to January 2026, and then to February 2026. When
the juvenile court ordered the final continuance on January 9,
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2026, the parents’ attorneys asked the court to direct DCFS to
provide the parents with information about interpreter resources
for visitation after the case closed. The court did so, and the
social worker met with the parents and provided them with
resources regarding interpreter services. Nonetheless, as of
February 11, 2026, the parents still had not obtained information
about interpreter services. In view of the parents’ seven-month
delay in identifying an interpreter, the juvenile court was not
required to conclude that there was good cause to continue the
section 366.26 hearing yet again.
The evidence before the juvenile court also did not compel
the conclusion that continuing the section 366.26 hearing was in
M.’s best interests. As minor’s counsel noted, by the time the
guardianship was ordered in February 2026, the case had been
open for six years. During that time, M. had been in at least nine
different foster homes and had been psychiatrically hospitalized
at least five times. Her current placement was stable and
positive, and the O.’s were willing to support her into adulthood.
The juvenile court therefore was well within its discretion in
concluding that delaying permanency was not in M.’s best
interest. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by
denying the parents’ request to continue the section 366.26
hearing.
II. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by
Terminating Dependency Jurisdiction
Section 366.3, subdivision (a)(1) provides that if a juvenile
court orders a permanent plan of guardianship, it shall retain
jurisdiction over the child until the guardianship is established.
After the legal guardianship is established, the court “may
continue jurisdiction over the child as a dependent child of the
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juvenile court or may terminate its dependency jurisdiction and
retain jurisdiction over the child as a ward of the legal
guardianship.” (§ 366.3, subd. (a)(3).) Alternatively, if a relative
or nonrelative extended family member is appointed the child’s
legal guardian and the guardian’s home has been approved for at
least six months, “the court shall, except if the relative or
nonrelative extended family member guardian objects, or upon a
finding of exceptional circumstances, terminate its dependency
jurisdiction and retain jurisdiction over the child as a ward of the
guardianship as authorized.” (Ibid.) We review the juvenile
court’s decision to terminate dependency jurisdiction for abuse of
discretion. (In re J.M. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 707, 718; In re
Ethan J. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 654, 660.)
The parents suggest that the juvenile court erroneously
believed it was required to terminate dependency jurisdiction
after ordering a legal guardianship. This was error, the parents
urge, because there is case law suggesting that a juvenile court
has discretion to maintain dependency jurisdiction even after
placing a child in a Kin-GAP guardianship, and section 366.3
permits dependency jurisdiction to be ordered in exceptional
circumstances. The parents thus ask that the section 366.26
order be reversed with directions to the juvenile court to exercise
its discretion to continue dependency jurisdiction with the legal
guardianship in place.
The parents’ claim lacks merit. As an initial matter,
nothing in the transcript of the February 11, 2026 transcript
suggests that the juvenile court believed it was required to
terminate dependency jurisdiction when it placed M. in a legal
guardianship. DCFS did not make that argument, and the
juvenile court did not say the law compelled that result. There is
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no indication that the juvenile court misapprehended the scope of
its discretion.
Moreover, to the extent that the law permitted the juvenile
court to maintain dependency jurisdiction after ordering a legal
guardianship, neither party asked it to do so in this case, thus
forfeiting the issue. As a general rule, a reviewing court “will not
consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been
but was not made in the trial court.” (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th
1287, 1293.) The purpose of this rule “is to encourage parties to
bring errors to the trial court’s attention so they can be
corrected.” (In re P.L. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 406, 409; see also
In re H.D. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 814, 817 [“ ‘A party forfeits the
right to claim error as grounds for reversal on appeal when he or
she fails to raise the objection in the trial court.’ ”].) Forfeiture
“ ‘applies in juvenile dependency litigation and is intended to
prevent a party from standing by silently until the conclusion of
the proceedings.’ ” (In re H.D., at p. 817.)
In the present case, neither parent asked the juvenile court
to maintain dependency jurisdiction after ordering the legal
guardianship. While mother’s counsel asked the court at the
outset of the hearing to either continue the hearing and delay the
establishment of the guardianship or keep the case open, counsel
did not suggest that the court order a guardianship and keep the
case open. Counsel conceded, moreover, that “the court has no
obligation to maintain the case forever.” Further, when counsel
for DCFS noted that “there’s been no offers of what the
alternative [to terminating dependency jurisdiction and ordering
a legal guardianship] could be,” mother’s counsel clarified that he
was “not asking the court to make any orders going forward,” but
was asking only that the court not “cut this case loose” until “we
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at least have some idea of whether or not the parents will even be
able to visit with their child once DCFS is not involved.” (Italics
added.) Father’s counsel joined mother’s argument and asked
that if a guardianship were ordered, the juvenile court should
permit the parents more frequent visits—not that it should
continue dependency jurisdiction.
Had either parent asked the juvenile court to maintain
dependency jurisdiction after ordering a legal guardianship, the
court could have considered the request and made appropriate
findings. Neither parent did so. We therefore conclude that they
forfeited these contentions.3
3 We decline mother’s request to consider this issue for the
first time on appeal. “ ‘Although appellate courts have discretion
to consider an issue in the first instance if it raises a question of
law on undisputed facts, our Supreme Court has cautioned that
such discretion should be exercised rarely and only in cases
presenting an important legal issue.’ [Citation.] Put another
way, ‘An exception to the general rule may be presented . . .
where the theory presented for the first time on appeal involves
only a legal question determinable from facts which not only are
uncontroverted in the record, but which could not be altered by
the presentation of additional evidence.’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Ingram (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1242, 1264–1265.) The parents’
request to continue dependency jurisdiction does not raise a pure
legal issue, but rather requires the exercise of discretion by the
juvenile court. (In re J.M., supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 718; In re
Ethan J., supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 660.) It therefore is not
appropriately considered for the first time on appeal.
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DISPOSITION
The February 11, 2026 order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, P. J.
We concur:
HANASONO, J.
DELGADO, J.*
* Judge of the Santa Clara Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
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