Filed 10/30/26 In re M.L. CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re M.L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law.
STANISLAUS COUNTY COMMUNITY F091254
SERVICES AGENCY,
(Super. Ct. No. 516823)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. OPINION
A.C.,
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Annette
Rees, Judge.
Jamie A. Moran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
* Before Franson, Acting P. J., Snauffer, J. and Harrell, J.
Thomas Boze, County Counsel, Jonathan Lee, Deputy County Counsel; Gordon-
Creed, Kelley, Holl & Sugerman, Jeremy Sugerman and Anne H. Nguyen for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
In this juvenile dependency case, A.C. (mother) appeals from orders made
following a contested post-permanency review hearing as to her minor dependent child
M.L. (Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 366.3). Mother’s sole argument on appeal is that the
juvenile court erred by denying her request to add therapeutic visits to the existing order
for monthly supervised visitation.
Finding no error, we affirm the juvenile court’s order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The underlying dependency case was initiated when M.L. was an infant. She is
now 14 years old and remains a dependent of the court and is placed in foster care. The
order at issue in this appeal was made at the most recent section 366.3 review hearing
conducted on February 26, 2026. We provide a relatively brief overview of the
proceedings for context.
Initial Petition to Section 366.26 Hearing: 2013 to 2017
In October 2013, the Stanislaus County Community Services Agency (agency)
filed a juvenile dependency petition on behalf of M.L., alleging she came within the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect) and
(g) (no provision for support). The petition alleged mother was unable to safely care for
M.L. due to ongoing substance abuse issues; lack of supervision; failure to provide a
sanitary, safe shelter; failure to provide adequate medical care for one of M.L.’s older
1 All further undesignated references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2.
siblings;2 and domestic violence and substance abuse issues by the maternal grandparents
who had access to M.L. Mother had initially accepted voluntary family maintenance
services; they were provided for six months prior to the filing of the petition but were not
effective. Additionally, M.L.’s presumed father J.L. (father) was unable to provide care
for her because his home had space limitations.
In January 2014, the juvenile court sustained the petition, adjudged M.L. a
dependent, removed her from the parents’ custody, and ordered both parents to
participate in reunification services. Reunification efforts eventually were terminated,
and a section 366.26 hearing was set.
The section 366.26 hearing was continued a number of times. In February 2016,
while the section 366.26 hearing was pending, the juvenile court granted the agency’s
request to suspend the parents’ visits because they were found to be detrimental.
In January 2017, it was determined M.L. was an Indian child within the meaning
of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA), and her tribe
began participating in the proceedings.
A section 366.26 hearing was ultimately conducted in March 2017. The agency
had not located a tribal adoptive home, and the juvenile court adopted the agency’s
recommendation of a permanent plan of continuance in foster care with a permanent plan
of return home, adoption, Tribal Customary Adoption, legal guardianship, or placement
with a fit and willing relative. The court ordered the agency to continue looking for an
ICWA preferred placement and set a section 366.3 review hearing.
Post-Permanency Proceedings: 2017 to 2025
Over the course of the next almost nine years, M.L. remained a dependent of the
juvenile court placed in foster care, with periodic review hearings held pursuant to
2 M.L.’s siblings were also subjects of the underlying dependency case at its outset
but are no longer dependents and are not subjects of this appeal. We omit facts
pertaining to them.
3.
section 366.3. Neither parent succeeded in any post-permanency efforts to reunify.
Multiple family or otherwise potentially permanent placements, including placement with
father, fell through, and M.L.’s most stable and long-term placement was unwilling to
take legal guardianship or adoption. A substantial barrier to finding an ICWA approved
placement or other permanent or adoptive home was M.L.’s aggressive and challenging
behaviors, which she started displaying at a very young age. M.L. worked on managing
her behaviors and mental health struggles through various types of mental health and
therapeutic services and, starting in 2019, the use of psychotropic medication, which the
court reviewed periodically.
As for mother’s contact with M.L., in September 2018, approximately two and a
half years after visits were initially suspended, the juvenile court reinstated visitation at
mother’s request with an order for a minimum of one supervised visit per month. Mother
generally visited consistently from then on over the years, and maternal family members
occasionally joined. Mother also had telephone calls with M.L. but, in 2024, it was
discovered that mother was inappropriately discussing reunification and instructing M.L.
to tell the court she wanted to be returned to mother’s care. The court thereafter
discontinued mother’s telephone calls.
In early 2025, M.L. began cancelling visits with mother. She expressed that
mother had not done what she was supposed to do and that was the reason M.L. was
removed from her home and separated from her siblings. M.L. reported noticing a
positive difference in herself and her behaviors after she stopped seeing mother. She
ultimately did not visit with mother from February 2025 through June 2025. The juvenile
court subsequently approved a case plan providing for monthly supervised visitation with
mother “[i]f requested by” M.L.
Latest Section 366.3 Review Reporting and Hearing: July 2025 to February 2026
The agency prepared a section 366.3 status review report dated January 14, 2026.
The recommendation was for M.L., then 13-years-old, to continue in foster care with a
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permanent plan of placement with a fit and willing relative. M.L. had been in her then-
current placement since September 15, 2025. During the reporting period, no relatives
had come forward for placement of M.L., and M.L. identified no new relatives with
whom she wanted contact. A meeting had recently been held to discuss permanency with
M.L.’s current care provider, but due to M.L.’s ongoing behavior, the care provider was
not interested in adoption or legal guardianship at that time.
M.L. had no medical or dental issues to report. She was maintaining mostly As
and Bs in school and was having electronic devices monitored to avoid misuse and
accessing inappropriate content. M.L. identified her siblings, family, and a past foster
mother as individuals who were important to her, and the agency had made efforts to
maintain contact between M.L. and those individuals consistent with her best interest.
As for her mental and behavioral health, M.L. had begun participating in
wraparound services in April 2025. Her clinician reported he was continuing to build
rapport with her He was working on addressing behaviors that had an impact on
instability with placement, and M.L. was engaged and receptive in sessions. She was
also seeing an Intensive Services Foster Care Support Counselor weekly. It was reported
M.L.’s mental health team “continue[d] to work on boundaries, communication skills,
modeling respectful behavior and setting clear expectation.” The juvenile court held sole
authority regarding psychotropic medication, and M.L. was continuing three ongoing
medications and had started one new medication in July 2025.
Mother had maintained communication with the agency. She reported she had
maintained employment “off and on” and that her circumstances had not changed.
Although the agency had given her an application for the “Fresh Start Program” a year
prior, mother had not completed the program.
M.L. did not decline any visits with mother during the reporting period and
described the visits as “great.” She seemed happy and excited to see her family.
Attached to the report were visitation logs from visits between mother, maternal
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grandmother, M.L.’s adult sibling, and M.L. The logs indicated the visits generally went
well; the family ate, played board games, visited, and watched movies together.
It was also reported, however, that M.L. had an increase in behaviors such as
defiance, mood changes, and talking back, following some visits with the maternal
family. The agency noted it would “continue to closely monitor in person visits to ensure
that these visits are positive and not having [M.L.] re-experiencing trauma.”
The recommended case plan attached to the report provided for supervised
monthly visitation with mother if requested by M.L., which was the same as the most
recent case plan adopted by the juvenile court.
In a report prepared by M.L.’s Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA), who
also held M.L.’s educational decision-making rights, filed January 14, 2026, the CASA
opined that visits with mother and the maternal grandmother should be “heavily
monitored,” noting that the two had inappropriately promised M.L. she would reunify
with her family. The CASA opined that the promises were affecting M.L.’s behaviors in
placements. The CASA further reported that mother and the maternal grandmother had
also regularly brought unhealthy food items to visits despite being told not to, which had
a negative effect on M.L. and her behaviors.
The juvenile court set the section 366.3 hearing for contest based on mother’s
request to add therapeutic visits with M.L. to the case plan.
The agency prepared an addendum report dated February 25, 2026, to address
mother’s request. The report indicated the agency was opposed to therapeutic visits due
to mother’s lack of progress toward reunification and M.L. not requesting an increase in
visits. According to the agency, mother’s lack of progress contributed to M.L.’s mental
health regressing every time M.L. saw mother, and M.L. held on to the hope that she
would one day reunify with mother. The agency felt visits with mother caused emotional
instability and sense of loss and negatively affected M.L.’s ability to form secure healthy
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attachments with foster parents who might be able to provide permanency, overcome past
trauma, and break negative behavior patterns.
Additionally, the agency expressed concern with mother’s “continuous lack of
involvement related to [M.L.]’s mental health and medication services.” M.L. had
recently reported that mother was “always telling her she doesn’t need medication,”
which made M.L. uncomfortable because she felt she needed medication to help with
managing symptoms and sleep.
The contested section 366.3 hearing was conducted on February 26, 2026. Present
at the hearing were county counsel; M.L.’s attorney; mother’s attorney; father’s attorney;
the social worker; M.L.’s CASA, who prepared the report for the hearing; a supervising
CASA case worker; and M.L.’s tribal representative. Mother was not present because
she could not get the time off work, but her attorney waived mother’s presence and
indicated the hearing could proceed in her absence. The juvenile court noted it had
reviewed the agency’s and the CASA’s reports. The agency submitted on its reports, and
the court admitted them into evidence.
No party, nor M.L.’s CASA, nor the tribal representative sought to cross-examine
the social worker or offer additional evidence, and all proceeded by way of argument.
Mother’s attorney argued that mother was specifically requesting a minimum of
two therapeutic visits per month in addition to mother’s current visitation order. She
asserted that M.L.’s visits had been positive, and therapeutic visits would strengthen their
relationship. Mother’s intention was to increase contact with M.L., and she thought
therapeutic visits provided a setting that other parties would be comfortable with. She
argued that mother not wanting M.L. to take medication appeared to be “textbook
miscommunication,” which could be explored during therapeutic visits. She argued that
therapeutic visits would improve communication and pave the way for more liberal
contact. She dismissed concerns about mother not making progress toward reunification
by pointing out the reunification period had ended.
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All others present opposed mother’s request, with the exception of father’s
attorney, who submitted on the reports and made no comment on the request.
County counsel argued that additional contact with mother was not in M.L.’s best
interest and would not “alleviate the underlying issue in this case, which is not their
relationship, but rather the lack of progress that mother has made in her case plan.”
Counsel went on to characterize mother’s behavior as triggering to M.L. She concluded
by suggesting therapeutic visits might be detrimental, but “we may not be to that point
yet with the evidence to argue that” and asked the juvenile court to approve the
recommended case plan.
M.L.’s attorney asserted that M.L.’s instability with placements was due in part to
M.L. believing in the back of her mind she would reunify with mother, and mother
inappropriately perpetuated that belief. Though M.L. “vacillate[d] between wanting
contact and not wanting contact” with mother, her attorney had been “open to the idea of
therapeutic visits” until M.L.’s recent indication that mother told her she did not need
medication. Counsel added that at that point in time, it did not appear “any increased
contact between [mother] and [M.L.] has any value to [M.L.]”
M.L.’s tribal representative stated that she would support visits if they were in
M.L.’s best interest, but mother and M.L.’s visits “continue[d] to be a disruption” for
M.L. The tribal representative added she was concerned that M.L. felt the need to
advocate for necessities such as her medication against mother.
M.L.’s CASA noted he had been on the case for over 10 years and over that
period, mother had had ample opportunities to reunify with M.L., and she “ha[d] never
followed through.” He stated that mother’s statements to M.L. gave her false hope she
would be returned to mother were “not only detrimental to [M.L.]’s psychological well-
being,” but “devastating for her placements.” M.L. had shared with the CASA that one
of M.L.’s prospective adoptive placements fell through as a result of conversations she
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had with mother. The CASA added that the idea of therapeutic visits with mother was
“somewhat ludicrous,” given that mother had not made efforts to reunify with M.L.
When given the opportunity for rebuttal, county counsel emphasized that the
CASA had worked very closely with M.L. for many years and he “rel[ied] on his
comments heavily.”
In ruling, the juvenile court indicated it had reviewed the reports, considered
counsel’s comments, and took judicial notice of the fact that in July of the previous year,
mother filed a JV-222 form that indicated M.L. did not need psychotropic medication
because M.L. just missed her family. The court concluded mother’s position on
medication was not “in any way” a “miscommunication.” The court added that mother
telling M.L. she did not need or should not take medication was “really detrimental to
[M.L.]’s mental health and betterment.” The court further noted that M.L. struggled with
emotional instability after visits and “[a]dding additional stress” of therapeutic visits
would not be beneficial nor advance her interest in stability and permanence.
The juvenile court adopted the agency’s recommended findings and orders,
maintaining the visitation order at one monthly supervised visitation per month at M.L.’s
request, and set a section 366.3 hearing.
DISCUSSION
When a dependent child is in a placement other than the home of a legal guardian,
a post-permanency status review hearing must be conducted at least every six months.
(§ 366.3, subd. (d)(1).) At the hearing, the juvenile court must inquire about progress
being made to provide a permanent home for the child, consider the safety of the child,
and make numerous findings about the child’s circumstances and progress toward a
permanent plan, including the adequacy of services provided to the child. (§ 366.3,
subd. (e).)
Where, as here, the permanent plan selected at the section 366.26 hearing is to
remain in foster care with a permanent plan of return home, adoption, legal guardianship,
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or placement with a fit and willing relative, the court shall order visitation with the
parents unless it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that visitation would be
detrimental to the physical or emotional well-being of the child. (§ 366.26, subd.
(c)(4)(B)(ii) & (c)(4)(C).) “The court may, of course, impose any other conditions or
requirements to further define the right to visitation in light of the particular
circumstances of the case before it.” (In re Jennifer G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 752, 757.)
“[D]ependency law affords the juvenile court great discretion in deciding issues
relating to parent-child visitation.” (In re S.H. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1542, 1557.) We
review a juvenile court’s visitation order for abuse of discretion. (In re Emmanuel R.
(2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 452, 456.)3 The standard warrants “a very high degree of
deference” to the juvenile court’s decision. (In re J.N. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 450, 459.)
The appropriate test is whether the court “ ‘ “exceeded the bounds of reason. When two
or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no
authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.” ’ ” (In re Stephanie M.
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318–319.)
In reviewing the juvenile court’s determination, we bear in mind the “Legislature
has mandated that the juvenile courts consider ‘the best interests of the minors in all
deliberations.’ ” (In re J.C. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 984, 992–993, quoting § 202,
subd. (d).) Further, as the California Supreme Court has recognized, “after a child has
3 In her opening brief, mother asserts the substantial evidence standard of review
applies. To support this assertion, she cites In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th
1394. In re Yvonne W. does not support mother’s contention, as it deals with a juvenile
court’s finding of detriment made at an 18-month review hearing, not the determination
of whether limitations or conditions should be placed on a post-reunification visitation
order. (See id. at pp. 1400–1401.)
In any event, in her reply brief, mother does not appear to dispute the agency’s
assertion that the abuse of discretion standard applies but points out the practical
difference between the two standards are not significant and restates her substantive
arguments.
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spent a substantial period in foster care and attempts at reunification have proved
fruitless, the child’s interest in stability outweighs the parent’s interest in asserting the
right to the … companionship of the child.” (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 419–
420.)
The burden is on the appellant to overcome the presumption of correctness and to
demonstrate reversible error. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608‒609.)
Mother argues the juvenile court’s order should be reversed because mother and
M.L.’s visits had been going well during the preceding reporting period, and because
therapeutic visits would help alleviate M.L.’s behaviors that were connected with visits
with mother. Mother contends “it was beyond the bounds of reason for the juvenile court
to deny the requested therapeutic visits to address the agency’s own concerns.”
Mother has not carried her burden of demonstrating the juvenile court abused its
discretion in determining that adding increased visits with mother in a therapeutic setting
would not be in M.L.’s best interests.
We recognize that at the time of the section 366.3 hearing, a primary source of
instability for M.L. appeared to be her relationship with mother. She had recently started
visiting with mother again after a self-initiated period of not having contact with her. By
all accounts, she was enjoying visits, but resuming visitation brought challenges,
including M.L.’s negative behaviors following visits, which were opined to be the result
of emotions surrounding her not reunifying with her family, and mother’s harmful
statements regarding M.L.’s medication. We appreciate mother’s general premise that
M.L. might benefit from services to help her cope with these challenges, but the evidence
before the juvenile court did not support the conclusion that therapeutic visitation was the
proper service to address them.
Mother was the only proponent of therapeutic visits and offered no evidence
below in support of her request, only her attorney’s conclusory assertion that therapeutic
visitation would strengthen M.L.’s and mother’s relationship and improve their
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communication. On the other hand, there was substantial opposition to her request,
including objections by M.L.’s own attorney and CASA, who are tasked with advocating
for M.L.’s best interests. (See § 317, subd. (c)(2); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.655(e)(1).)
As the agency points out, mother does not, on appeal, address the others’ opposition.
Mother did not offer any testimony or point to evidence on the record showing that
therapeutic visits would alleviate the specific negative effects of contact with mother or
that M.L.’s interest in stability would be advanced by them. There is no evidence that
any of M.L.’s multiple mental health service providers were recommending or in support
of therapeutic visits. Given the lack of evidence that therapeutic visits would have any
benefit to M.L.’s stability, and the fact that M.L. was already participating in intensive
individual services, the juvenile court reasonably determined adding therapeutic visitation
to her case plan may have caused harm by placing unnecessary additional stress on M.L.
We are not persuaded by mother’s suggestion on appeal that a comment from the
agency’s report was compelling evidence to support an order for therapeutic visits. The
statement referred to by mother reads, in its entirety:
“The agency will evaluate if [M.L.]’s current home is the most appropriate
for permanency, as at this time, our focus is stabilizing [M.L.] and ensuring
she has/knows what coping skills to use. Recently it has been reported that
[M.L.] appears to have an increase in behaviors following her visits.
[M.L.] appears to be confused that if she continues to visit with [mother]
then her chances of reunifying are higher. [M.L.] appears to struggle with
moving forward in healing, as every time some progress is made, she has
another visit, and appears to be triggered causing her to regress after visits
with family. It is the hope that with more consistency, stabilization and
increased mental health services that [M.L.] gain the necessary tools to
help her have more successful placements/visits.” (Italics added.)
Contrary to mother’s suggestion, this comment did not compel the juvenile court to
determine that therapeutic visits were the type of “increased mental health services” that
M.L. might have required. The agency expressly opposed therapeutic visits, and, in
context, the comment indicates to us that the agency was primarily concerned with
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enabling M.L. to better process the fact she was not on track to be reunified with mother
and to work on stabilizing behaviors in her placements and was not a tacit endorsement
of therapeutic visits or increased contact with mother.
Even if mother had shown therapeutic visits would have alleviated some of the
negative effects of mother’s visits on M.L., there was not strong evidence that increasing
contact or strengthening M.L.’s relationship with mother, in general, was in M.L.’s best
interest, given that, as was pointed out below, mother had not made any demonstrable
efforts to reunify with M.L., not during the reporting period preceding the hearing, nor
over the course of M.L.’s dependency.4 Mother had not completed any services designed
to alleviate the reasons for the initial removal or demonstrated any effort to improve her
4 The parties do not address this in any detail, but it is relevant to note that at a
review hearing conducted in August 2024, the juvenile court granted the social worker
discretion to increase visitation with mother and directed the agency to submit an
amended case plan to include family counseling. The reporter’s transcript for this review
hearing was not included in the record on appeal. This court is not privy to who
requested this order, the reasons behind it, or any other details, as none of that was set
forth in the minute order.
The case plan subsequently filed included a general counseling component that
read: “Upon request the agency will help facilitate or provide resources if needed to
another program approved by the social worker such as family visits with … mother with
focus on healthy relationships and communication.” The subsequent status review report
indicated mother had maintained communication with the agency and expressed interest
in reunifying with M.L. There was no mention in any report, however, of any requests
for family counseling in accordance with the case plan. At the review hearing conducted
in January 2025, the court amended the case plan on the record, and the subsequently
filed case plan excluded the family counseling component. Again, the reporter’s
transcript for this hearing was not included in the record on appeal, so we do not know
the reason for the amendment.
This is all to say that relatively close in time to mother’s request for therapeutic
visits, there was a period of time when the case plan provided for a very similar service
upon request, and mother did not make such a request. This evidence supports
particularly the CASA’s comments that mother did not take advantage of the
opportunities offered to her to move towards increased contact with M.L. or
reunification.
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ability to communicate with M.L. that did not involve placing the extra burden on M.L.
to participate in an additional therapeutic service. By most accounts, one of the barriers
to M.L.’s stability and permanence was her belief that she might be returned to mother.
It was reasonable to conclude that increased contact, in a therapeutic setting or otherwise,
without mother making any other effort to reunify, could further upset M.L.’s chances at
permanence.5
For the above reasons, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion
by declining mother’s request for therapeutic visits. Accordingly, we find no error.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order from which mother appeals is affirmed.
5 We note mother offered no evidence that reunification was in M.L.’s best
interests. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.740(b)(7) [at a § 366.3 hearing, it is presumed
that continuance in foster care is the appropriate plan, and parents bear the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that further efforts at reunification are the
best alternative for the child].)
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