Filed 10/16/26 In re M.K. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re M.K., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY E087961
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
(Super.Ct.No. J300744)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
OPINION
v.
N.E. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Cara D. Hutson,
Judge. Affirmed.
Panda Kroll, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant, A.K.
Rich Pfeiffer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant, N.E.
1
Laura Feingold, County Counsel, and Helena C. Rho, Deputy County Counsel, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendants and Appellants A.K. (Father) and N.E. (Mother, collectively parents)
appeal from the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights over their son, M.K.,
under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26. Father contends the juvenile court
erred in its application of the beneficial parental relationship exception to the termination
of parental rights under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). Specifically, Father
contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by using an incorrect legal standard in its
analysis of the second element of the exception, whether the child has a substantial,
positive, emotional attachment to the parent. Mother joins in Father’s arguments2 and
requests reinstatement of her parental rights with Father’s, if he prevails.3 Finding no
abuse of discretion, we affirm.
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
otherwise indicated.
2 Mother filed an opening brief (MAOB) that included notice under California
Rules of Court, rule 8.200(a)(5) that she joins and adopts the entirety of Father’s opening
brief (FAOB).
3 Mother asserts that reversal of the order terminating Father’s parental rights
requires that order also be reversed as to her. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.725(a)(1)
[“The court may not terminate the rights of only one parent under section 366.26 unless
that parent is the only surviving parent; or unless the rights of the other parent have been
terminated by a California court of competent jurisdiction or by a court of competent
jurisdiction of another state under the statutes of that state; or unless the other parent has
relinquished custody of the child to the welfare department”].)
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND4
I. Facts from Father’s Prior Appeal
We take these facts as to Father from our unpublished opinion affirming the
juvenile court’s summary denial of Father’s section 388 petition to modify the order
bypassing reunification services. (In re M.K. (Aug. 24, 2026, E087315) [nonpub. opn.]
(In re M.K.).)
A. Initial Proceedings and Reunification Period
In April 2024, the San Bernardino County Department of Children and Family
Services (CFS) received a referral from a reporting party with safety concerns for M.K., a
10-day-old baby, due to his parents appearing to be under the influence while in a
vehicle. The San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department (Sheriff’s Department)
performed a welfare check observing an infant who “appeared to be pre-mature and in
poor health” and, upon examination, was reported to be “in poor health, malnourished
and lacked proper hygiene.”
M.K.’s mother (Mother) reported that she gave birth to the infant in the vehicle,
Father severed the umbilical cord with a pocketknife, and they sought no medical
attention for the infant. Sheriff’s Department requested medical aid to respond and
evaluate M.K., both Mother and M.K. were transported to the hospital, and M.K. was
admitted to the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU). Medical staff reported to Sheriff’s
4 On our own motion, we incorporated the record in case Nos. E087315 with the
record in case No. E087961. The record from Mother’s prior appeal in case No. E086851
was also incorporated with the record in case No. E087315.
3
Department that M.K. “displayed severe signs of neglect” and shared photographs that
“depicted severe rashes to [M.K.’s] penis, anus and buttocks” and showed “signs of
prolonged exposure to urine and other injuries caused by general neglect.”
Sheriff’s Department arrested Father and both parents were charged with felony
child endangerment under Penal Code section 273a, subdivision (a). Father’s drug screen
from the date of arrest was positive for fentanyl, amphetamines, and cannabinoids, and
Mother’s drug screen was positive for amphetamines, fentanyl, and 4-ANPP.
Shortly after the initial referral, M.K. was detained pursuant to a protective
custody warrant and CFS filed a petition under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (g),
alleging substantial risk of serious physical harm, abuse and/or neglect, and no provision
for support. At the detention hearing, after a prima facie finding, the court detained M.K.
from Mother and Father. The court set a jurisdiction and disposition (JD) hearing for
May 2024.
B. Jurisdiction/Disposition Report and Hearing
CFS filed a JD Report advising that M.K. underwent a pediatric forensics
consultation with findings of malnutrition, dehydration, and severe diaper rash with
excoriations of rectum. M.K. presented “in a significant state of malnutrition and
dehydration” inconsistent with the history provided. The doctor advised that M.K. had an
“excoriated diaper rash, consistent with being left in a soiled diaper for prolonged period
of time” and that “[h]is presentation was consistent with severe neglect.” The doctor
opined that if M.K. “not been brought in for medical attention, he would have been at
4
high risk for further neglect which could have been fatal.” M.K. was subject to
“intrauterine drug exposure.”
CFS interviewed Father, who reported “using substances off and on throughout his
life,” using crystal methamphetamine daily for approximately a year, and prior use of
heroin. Father also stated, “his drug of choice is fentanyl.” Father reported he was
feeding M.K. formula because he could not breastfeed due to Mother’s fentanyl use.
Father reported M.K. was “kicking the fentanyl” and stated, “When I am sober, I am not
hungry or don’t eat much . . . [m]aybe that is why baby was not eating much.” When
asked why M.K. was not taken to the hospital when he was born, Father replied that “he
was waiting for 10 to 14 days to seek medical care by then the fentanyl would be out of
[M.K.’s] system.” Father stated, “[w]hat kind of parents we would be taking the baby
positive for drugs to a hospital.”
CFS filed a first amended petition including additional allegations against Father
and Mother under section 300, subdivision (e), for severe physical abuse of a child under
five years old, and allegations against Mother under section 300, subdivision (j), for
abuse of siblings.
At the contested JD hearing, the court sustained the section 300, subdivisions (b),
(e), and (g) allegations against Father and the section 300, subdivisions (b), (e), (g), and
(j) against Mother, declared M.K. a dependent, and removed him from his parents’
custody. The court denied reunification services under section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(5)
and (6), finding clear and convincing evidence it would not benefit M.K. to pursue
5
reunification services with his offending parents. Father and Mother were provided with
services under the permanency planning program and authorized visitation one time per
month subject to criminal protective orders. The court set a permanency planning review
(PPR) hearing for March 2025.
C. Permanency Planning Review Hearings
CFS filed a status review report in advance of the PPR hearing recommending the
permanent plan of adoption for M.K. At the March 2025 PPR hearing, the court ordered
a permanent plan of placement in foster care with a permanent plan of adoption and
authorized CFS to place M.K. in a concurrent planning home. The court set a continued
hearing for September 5, 2025.
Thereafter, in its September 5, 2025 status review report, CFS recommended the
court set a section 366.26 hearing for adoption of M.K. who was placed in a matched
adoptive home and reported its assessment that it is in M.K.’s best interest to consider the
termination of parental rights. The parents’ visitation had been limited by criminal
protective orders; however, the parents were allowed to visit M.K. on April 8, 2025, May
19, 2025, June 9, 2025, and July 21, 2025. The social worker reported that M.K. cried
throughout the April visit and that during the May visit M.K. ran to the social worker
when she entered the room.
At the further PPR hearing, Father’s counsel objected to the setting of the section
366.26 hearing and requested a lesser plan of legal guardianship. Mother’s counsel also
objected to the setting of section 366.26 hearing. After hearing argument, the court set a
6
section 366.26 hearing for January 2026 to make a permanent plan for M.K. The court
found it was in M.K.’s best interest to consider termination of parental rights at that
hearing.
D. Father and Mother’s Petitions Under Section 388
Six days later, Father filed a petition under section 388 seeking a change to the
order denying Father reunification services with M.K. that was issued a year prior in
September 2024. The court summarily denied Father’s petition under section 388,
finding that “the request does not state new evidence or a change of circumstances.”
Father filed a notice of appeal from the summary denial of his petition under section 388.
Father’s appeal was denied by opinion filed August 24, 2026.5 (In re M.K., supra,
E087315.)
Mother also filed a section 388 petition. The court summarily denied Mother’s
petition, finding “the request [did] not state new evidence or a change of circumstances.”
Mother filed a notice of intent to file a writ petition. Mother’s counsel advised this court
that after reviewing the record on appeal there were no legal or factual issues upon which
to base an extraordinary writ. Mother’s petition was therefore dismissed.
II. Additional Proceedings Related to the Termination of Parental Rights
5 At the time the parents filed their opening briefs, the appeal in case No. E087315
was pending. Father argues in his opening brief that if this court reversed the juvenile
court’s order summarily denying his section 388 petition, then it must also reverse the
orders terminating his parental rights. Given the opinion, In re M.K., supra, E087315,
affirmed the juvenile court’s summary denial of Father’s section 388 petition, this
argument is moot and need not be addressed.
7
A. The Section 366.26 Report
In advance of the section 366.26 hearing, CFS filed its section 366.26 report
recommending termination of parental rights and implementation of the permanent plan
of adoption for M.K. At the time of the report, M.K. was one year old. M.K. had not
been in the care of his parents since he was approximately 10 days old and resided in a
prospective adoptive home since May 1, 2025. M.K. presented as a “happy child” who
“appears adjusted, comfortable, secure, and content in the [prospective adoptive] family
home.” CFS reported that there appeared to be a mutual bond between M.K. and the
prospective adoptive family.
The prospective adoptive father described having a loving relationship with M.K.
and called their relationship “great.” He reported that M.K. integrated well into the
family and that M.K. and his four-year-old daughter appear to love each other. The
prospective adoptive parents are “highly committed” and motivated to provide M.K.
“with a safe and loving home through permanency under Adoption.” They claim M.K. as
their son and M.K. calls them “mama” and “dada.” The prospective adoptive parents
have demonstrated their ability to provide M.K. with long term care. They ensured M.K.
was up to date on his well child visits, immunizations, attended appointments for ongoing
medical conditions, and was scheduled for an evaluation for developmental services
related to his speech.
CFS reported that M.K. is too young to understand the concept of adoption but is
“comfortable and adjusted” in the prospective adoptive home. M.K. seeks out his
8
prospective adoptive parents for comfort and affection and recognizes they can meet his
needs.
The parents were authorized to visit with M.K. one time per month for one hour.
M.K.’s parents visited him once a month, for one hour, from September through
December 2025. The social worker reported that during the September visit, M.K. ran
toward her. During the December 2025 visit, M.K. also ran to the social worker when
she entered the room. This happened twice during the December visit and the social
worker brought M.K. back into the room for the visit. The social worker reported that
she supervised exchanges after visitation and M.K. “is excited to see prospective adoptive
father.”
Paternal grandmother also had supervised visits once per month, for one hour.
Paternal grandmother may bring M.K.’s two half siblings with her to visits, but she
reported she had not brought them because they “have perfect attendance in school and
visitation occurs in the morning.”
CFS recommended the juvenile court find that M.K. was likely to be adopted,
termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to the child, and no exception to
section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) applied.
B. Section 366.26 Hearings
The initial section 366.26 hearing was held on January 5, 2026. Father requested
increased visitation with M.K., and Mother joined in the request. County counsel
objected, acknowledging that while “visits do appear to go well” reunification services
9
were bypassed and there was no indication that an increase in visits would be in M.K.’s
best interests. The court denied the request. A contested hearing under section 366.26
was set for March 2, 2026.
In the interim, Father filed a section 388 petition, renewing his request that the
court change its order bypassing reunification services. The court set a hearing on
whether to grant an evidentiary hearing on the petition for March 2, 2026, at the time of
the contested section 366.26 hearing.
CFS also filed an additional information report before the contested hearing. CFS
reported the parents had visits in January and February 2026. At the January 2026 visit, it
was reported M.K. was “slow to warm,” “distant” from his parents, and that he “was
unsure and put [his] head in foster mother’s shoulder.” M.K. hugged Father when he
asked but did not hug Mother when she asked. M.K. also fell off his bike while Father
was driving it fast and did not see M.K. was not holding on. During that visit, the parents
also colored with M.K., played with the kitchen set and food, played with the toys, and
fed him. At the February 2026 visit, the social worker reported that M.K. kept saying
“hi” to her. The social worker also reported concern that M.K. was close to the street
while parents were watching him. M.K.’s half siblings came to the December 2025 visit,
and the prospective adoptive parents reported that M.K. was going to them “frequently”
during the visit.
CFS recommended that Father’s renewed section 388 petition be denied because
“[t]he request is not in [M.K.’s] best interest.” M.K. was “healthy and thriving” and
10
“bonded and attached to [his] caregivers.” It also reported that M.K. has had many
medical procedures due to the severe neglect. CFS recommended that “[a]t this time it is
in [M.K.’s] best interest to terminate the parental rights of the parents.”
The court held the contested section 366.26 hearing on March 2, 2026. First, the
court accepted Father’s section 388 petition into evidence and then heard argument
thereon. The court indicated that it read and considered carefully Father’s petition and
noted his efforts with respect to controlled substances. The court denied the petition
finding it was not in M.K.’s best interest.
The court then heard testimony from Father and Mother supporting their request
that parental rights not be terminated and that the court instead adopt a lesser plan of legal
guardianship. Mother testified that she consistently visited M.K. Mother reported that
M.K. was usually happy when he sees Mother and Father and runs up to them and calls
her “Mommy.” M.K. knows they bring food, snacks, new toys, and sometimes clothes.
She testified “he’s a little sad” when the visits end. M.K. also sought comfort from her
once when he bumped his head.
Father testified he also has supervised visits with M.K. once a month. Father
testified that during visits M.K. walks straight up to him, wants Father to pick him up,
and calls him “Dat-ti.” Father reported that M.K. “has no problem with [the parents]
holding him.” Father and Mother make M.K. smile and laugh, feed him, and play with
toys together. Father’s opinion is that M.K. is “pretty calm, maybe a little upset” when
visits are over, but M.K.’s also excited for his visit with paternal grandmother, which
11
occurs right after the parents’ visit. Father believes he has a bond with M.K. and he
would like to raise him.
Counsel then argued over whether the court should apply the beneficial parental
relationship exception to termination of parental rights under In re Caden C. (2021)
11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.). Mother’s counsel argued that Mother consistently visited and
that the child would benefit from a continued relationship with her. She further argued
that it would be detrimental to M.K. to sever Mother’s parental rights because M.K. is
happy to see her during visits, he sought comfort from her once when he got hurt, and he
is a little sad when the visit ends.
Father’s counsel argued that Father regularly visited M.K., that visits have gone
well, M.K. responds to Father, and calls him “da-da.” Father’s counsel argued that “it is
beneficial for the father to continue that relationship so they can maintain the bond with
the minor.” He also argued that terminating Father’s parental rights would be detrimental
to M.K. because the bond would be broken.
Minor’s counsel and county counsel agreed that Mother and Father had maintained
regular visitation but argued that they failed to establish the remaining elements of the
beneficial parental relationship exception. Minor’s counsel argued that the parents
testified the minor gets a “little upset” but does not show “great distress” when visits end.
Similarly, county counsel argued the parents did not meet their burden of proof to show
M.K. has a “substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent, the kind of
attachment implying that [M.K.] would benefit from continuing the relationship.”
12
Although parents testified that M.K. enjoyed monthly visits and the food and toys they
brought him, county counsel argued there was nothing in their testimony to evidence a
substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parents or that it would be detrimental
to M.K. to terminate parental rights.
After considering the evidence and argument, the court found by clear and
convincing evidence that M.K. was likely to be adopted and that M.K. is “generally and
specifically adoptable.” The court found that Mother and Father maintained consistent
visitation but failed to establish the remaining elements of the beneficial parental
relationship exception. The court determined that no exception to adoption applied,
terminated parental rights, and selected adoption as M.K.’s permanent plan.
The parents timely appealed the termination of parental rights.
DISCUSSION
Father and Mother contend the juvenile court erred in its analysis of the second
element of the beneficial parental relationship exception. They point out three specific
areas of the analysis they believe were in error and allege that the court used M.K.’s bond
with the caregiver to discount their bond with M.K. thereby conflating the second and
third elements of the exception; the court did not evaluate the specific features of M.K.’s
relationship with his parents or his particular needs; and the court’s “friendly visitor”
reasoning was ambiguous making it unclear whether the court used improper “parental
role” reasoning. The parents seek reversal because based on these alleged errors they
13
believe the court could not and did not conduct an appropriate detriment weighing under
the third element.
I. Applicable Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“At the permanency stage, the court ‘either terminates parental rights and places
the child up for adoption or it selects another permanent plan, such as placement with a
guardian or in long-term foster care.’ ” (In re Z.G. (2026) 19 Cal.5th 373, 378, citing
Michael G. v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 609, 624.) “By the time of a section
366.26 hearing, the parent’s interest in reunification is no longer an issue and the child’s
interest in a stable and permanent placement is paramount.” (In re Jasmine D. (2000)
78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1348.) “Adoption, where possible, is the permanent plan preferred
by the Legislature.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573 (Autumn H.).)
“But if the parent shows that termination would be detrimental to the child for at
least one specifically enumerated reason, the court should decline to terminate parental
rights and select another permanent plan.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 630-631;
see § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)–(vi), (4)(A).) The “ ‘statutory exceptions merely permit
the court, in exceptional circumstances [citation], to choose an option other than the
norm, which remains adoption.’ ” (Caden C., 11 Cal.5th at p. 631, citing In re Celine R.
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.)
Under the beneficial parental relationship exception, the parent bears the burden of
proving three elements by a preponderance of the evidence: “(1) regular visitation and
contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child such
14
that (3) the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 631, 636; § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); In re I.E. (2023)
91 Cal.App.5th 683, 690-691 [“The parent carries the burden of establishing the
exception by a preponderance of the evidence [citation], meaning the parent must prove it
is ‘ “more likely than not” ’ the exception applies”].) The second and third elements of
the exception “significantly overlap.” (In re Katherine J. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303,
317, fn. 7 (Katherine J.).)
We review for substantial evidence the juvenile court’s findings on whether the
parents have regularly visited and whether a beneficial relationship exists. (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-640.) Whether termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to the child because of the beneficial parental relationship is reviewed for
abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 640.) We review the factual findings underlying that
decision for substantial evidence. (Ibid.)
“A court abuses its discretion only when ‘ “ ‘the trial court has exceeded the limits
of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.’ ”
’ [Citation.] But ‘ “ ‘[w]hen two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the
facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial
court.’ ” ’ ” (Caden, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 641.) This hybrid standard ensures the
reviewing court does not “ ‘substitute its own judgment as to what is in the child’s best
interests for the trial court’s determination in that regard, reached pursuant to the statutory
scheme’s comprehensive and controlling provisions.’ ” (Ibid.)
15
Here, the juvenile court found, and it was uncontested, that the parents maintained
consistent visitation with M.K. With respect to the second element, the parents contend
the juvenile court committed three legal errors requiring reversing the trial court’s finding
that the beneficial parental relationship exception does not apply.
II. Beneficial Relationship
The second element of the exception requires courts to “ assess whether ‘the child
would benefit from continuing the relationship.’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632;
§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) In other words, “[t]he parent must show that the child has a
substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment
implying that the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (Id. at p. 636.)
“Again here, the focus is the child. And the relationship may be shaped by a slew of
factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s
custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between parent and child, and
the child’s particular needs.’ ” (Id. at p. 632, citing Autumn H., 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.)
In making this assessment, “courts often consider how children feel about, interact
with, look to, or talk about their parents. [Citations.] Doing so properly focuses the
inquiry on the child, even as courts must remain mindful that rarely do ‘[p]arent-child
relationships’ conform to an entirely consistent pattern.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 632.) “[O]ften expert psychologists who have observed the child and parent and can
synthesize others’ observations will be an important source of information about the
psychological importance of the relationship for the child.” (Id. at pp. 632-633.) “[I]t is
16
not necessary—even if it were possible—to calibrate a precise ‘quantitative measurement
of the specific amount of “comfort, nourishment or physical care” [the parent] provided
during [the] weekly visits.’ ” (Ibid.) “Whether a parent or parents’ regular visitation and
contact (the first prong) builds a relationship that is beneficial to the child (the second
prong) depends on the nature and quality of the visits.” (In re G.H. (2022) 84
Cal.App.5th 15, 26.)
The beneficial parental relationship exception “demands something more than the
incidental benefit a child gains from any amount of positive contact with [their] natural
parent.” (Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 318; accord In re M.V. (2025)
109 Cal.App.5th 486, 515; In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 229 (Dakota H.)
[a parent must demonstrate something “ ‘more than frequent and loving contact, an
emotional bond with the child, or pleasant visits’ ”].)
A. Caregiver Bond
First, the parents contend the court used M.K.’s bond with the caregiver to
discount M.K.’s bond with the parents, thereby conflating the second and third elements
of the exception. To support this contention, the parents argue that the court’s statement
that M.K.’s conduct “shows a bond with [prospective adoptive mother] as well” is
evidence that the court applied the wrong legal standard in evaluating the second element.
We are not persuaded.
“Error on appeal must be affirmatively shown by the record, and ‘[w]e presume
the trial court knew and properly applied the law absent evidence to the contrary.’ ”
17
(J.H. v. G.H. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 633, 644.) Contrary to the parents’ claims, the
record does not show that the juvenile court relied on M.K.’s bond with his caregiver to
discount the existence of a bond with his parents. There is also no language within the
court’s ruling to evidence a conflation between the second and third elements of the
exception.
The court’s reference to M.K.’s bond with his caretaker, when read in context,
could reasonably be construed as part of the court’s assessment of how M.K. “feel[s]
about, interact[s] with, [and] look[s] to” his parents during visits. (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) As part of that analysis, the court considered evidence that M.K.
vacillated during visits, was at times unsure about his parents, and put his head on the
caregiver’s shoulder. The court’s acknowledgment of M.K.’s bond with his caregiver
does not, in and of itself, support a finding that the juvenile court applied an improper
legal standard on the second element.
“ ‘We must indulge in every presumption to uphold a judgment, and it is
[appellants’] burden on appeal to affirmatively demonstrate error —it will not be
presumed. [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Tang (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 669, 677.) Parents have
not demonstrated error, and it will not be presumed here.
B. Specific Features and Particular Needs
Second, Father contends that the court did not evaluate the specific features of
M.K.’s relationship with the Father or his particular needs.
18
With respect to the specific features of the relationship, Father contends that the
court did not acknowledge that at the December 8, 2025 visit, “M.K. immediately
approached Father and hugged his leg” as evidence of an unprompted, child initiated
affection. On the contrary, the record demonstrates that the juvenile court considered the
evidence regarding Father’s relationship with M.K., credited Father’s testimony that
M.K. “will come up, raise his hand, [and] calls him ‘daddy’ ” and found that the existence
of a beneficial relationship was a “close call.”
On reply, Father argues the “court acknowledged evidence within [the Caden C.]
formulation but did not explain why it was insufficient under the correct second-element
standard.” However, the juvenile court “is not required to make findings when it
concludes that parental rights termination would not be detrimental.” (In re A.L. (2022)
73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1156.) Here, the record shows that the court concluded the parents
did not meet their burden of proof as to the second and third elements, therefore, the
exception to termination of parental rights under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i),
was not applied. Given its conclusion that the termination of parental rights would not be
detrimental, the court was not required to make detailed findings on any element.
Further, we presume, in the absence of contrary evidence, that the juvenile court “ ‘knows
and applies the correct statutory and case law.’ ” (People v. Jones (2017) 3 Cal.5th 583,
616.)
With respect to M.K.’s particular needs, the parents contend that the court
committed reversible legal error by making no findings about M.K.’s visitation with his
19
half siblings. The parents do not specifically invoke the sibling relationship exception
but argue that the juvenile court erred in its analysis of M.K.’s “particular needs” by not
considering his relationship with his half siblings prior to terminating parental rights.
The parents cite no authority supporting their contention that a sibling relationship is a
“particular need” to be considered by the juvenile court in evaluating whether a child’s
relationship with his parents is beneficial.
“The issues before the court at a section 366.26 hearing are limited to the
questions of whether the child is adoptable and whether there is a statutory exception to
adoption.” (In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 401 fn. 2.) Given “the sibling
relationship has no bearing on the question of adoptability . . . [t]here is no other vehicle
by which the [parents] can raise the sibling relationship to argue that the juvenile court
erred in terminating parental rights [other than the sibling relationship exception].”
(Ibid.) Further, a parent must raise an exception to the termination of parental rights at
the section 366.26 hearing; otherwise, the issue is waived on appeal. (Id., at pp. 402-
403.) To the extent the parents are now claiming a sibling relationship exception, this
issue has been forfeited as it was not raised in the trial court.
C. Parental Role Reasoning
The parents contend the juvenile court’s “friendly visitor” reasoning was
ambiguous; therefore, the court may have adopted improper “parental role” reasoning.
Courts acknowledge that “the words ‘parental role,’ standing alone, can have
several different meanings. They can mean being the person whom the child regards as
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his or her parent (or at least as more his or her parent than any other caregiver).” (In re
L.A.-O. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 197, 210 (L.A.-O.).) These words can also “mean being a
good parent-nurturing, supportive, and guiding,” “giving parental care, such as changing
diapers, providing toys and food, and helping with homework.” (Ibid.) In assessing
whether there is a beneficial relationship courts must “do more than summarily state that
a parent has not occupied a parental role in his child’s life.” (Katherine J., supra,
75 Cal.App.5th at p. 319; see In re D.M. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 261, 270 [the trial court
erred by “focusing on whether father occupied a ‘parental role’ in the children’s lives,
equating that role with attendance at medical appointments, and understanding their
medical needs” without addressing attachment between father and his children]; see also
In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833 [reversing termination of parental rights when the
juvenile court’s analysis amounted to a comparison of the “ ‘parent’s attributes as
custodial caregiver relative to those of any potential adoptive parent(s)’ ”]; In re B.D.
(2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1229 [juvenile court relied on improper considerations
including whether the parents occupied a “ ‘parental role’ ” in their children’s lives and
whether a “ ‘parental relationship’ ” existed].)
“[T]he parental-benefit exception does not require being a good parent; it does not
require that the parent have overcome the struggles that led to the dependency, and it does
not require that the parent be capable of resuming custody.” (L.A.-O., supra,
73 Cal.App.5th at p. 210.)
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Here, the parents take issue with the juvenile court’s agreement with county
counsel’s argument that a child’s positive reaction to toys and food at a visit may not
evidence a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parents. The parents label
this as a “friendly visitor” rationale and argues that such reasoning is similarly ambiguous
and improper as the “parental role” reasoning. This argument, however, is out of context.
The court’s agreement with county counsel’s argument, in context, cannot
reasonably be interpreted to adopt “parental role” reasoning. Instead, the record reflects
the court’s consideration of whether M.K.’s positive response to the parents’ bringing
toys and food to visits was enough to demonstrate the substantial, positive, emotional
attachment required by the beneficial parental relationship exception. Moreover, the
record does not demonstrate the juvenile court relied on factors that Caden C. deems
irrelevant. The juvenile court did not use the term “parental role” nor did its analysis
hinge on factors associated with “parental role” reasoning. The court’s ruling does not
imply that it considered whether the parents had acted as good parents providing M.K.
with support and guidance, whether they met M.K.’s daily needs, attended medical
appointments or understood M.K.’s ongoing medical needs. The court’s ruling also does
not evidence that it considered whether the parents have overcome the struggles that led
to the dependency, could resume custody, or provided necessary parental care. Thus, we
find that the record does not support the parents’ contention that the court adopted
improper “parental role” reasoning.
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Therefore, we find that the parents have not demonstrated any legal error in the
juvenile court’s assessment of the beneficial relationship element of the beneficial
parental relationship exception.
III. The Juvenile Court Acted Within its Discretion in Concluding the Beneficial
Parental Relationship Exception Did Not Apply
The parents argue that because the juvenile court committed legal error in
assessing the beneficial relationship element, it could not and did not properly conduct
the detriment weighing required by Caden C. As set forth above, we find no legal error
in the juvenile court’s assessment of the beneficial relationship element. We also find
that the juvenile court acted within its discretion in concluding the beneficial parental
relationship exception did not apply.
A. Beneficial Relationship
As set forth above, a substantial evidence standard applies to the second element.
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-640.) In reviewing the juvenile court’s factual
determinations for substantial evidence, “a reviewing court should ‘not reweigh the
evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.’ ” (Id. at
p. 640.) The determinations should “ ‘be upheld if . . . supported by substantial evidence,
even though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the trial court might have
reached a different result had it believed other evidence.’ ” (Ibid.)
We find that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the
parents did not meet their burden of proving the existence of a beneficial relationship. In
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support of the exception, the parents proffered their own testimony consisting of their
opinions about their relationship with M.K. The parents testified that the visits were
positive and appropriate, M.K. was happy to see them, wanted Father to pick him up, and
knew that they brought him food, snacks, and new toys. M.K. calls the parents
“mommy” and “dat-ti.” They make M.K. smile and laugh, and they play with him and
feed him. Mother opines that M.K. was a “little sad” when the visit ends, and Father’s
opinion was that M.K. is “pretty calm, maybe a little upset” when the visit ends.
At the contested hearing, the court took “judicial notice of all prior findings and
orders” including the order denying reunification services to Mother and Father. The
court also read and considered all prior CFS reports, including attachments, and received
those reports into evidence. Given M.K.’s young age and limited verbal skills, CFS
reports provided the court with information about M.K.’s interactions with his parents
during visits. The parents’ visitation was limited by a criminal protective order and their
first supervised visit occurred after M.K. turned one year old. At the time of the section
366.26 hearing, M.K. had approximately 10 one-hour supervised visits with his parents.6
CFS reports reflected that during visits M.K. sought comfort and attention from social
workers and his prospective adoptive parents. In January 2026, two months before the
contested hearing, M.K. was reportedly “slow to warm,” “distant” and “unsure” at the
start of the visit, putting his head on his prospective adoptive mother’s shoulder.
6 The record does not reflect a visit in August 2025, but this may be an oversight
in CFS’ documentation.
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After hearing the parents’ testimony and argument from counsel, the court
indicated that it was persuaded by county counsel’s argument that M.K.’s positive
response to new toys and food brought by the parents to visits may not rise to the level of
an emotional bond. The court considered that M.K. was almost two years old and had
only been in his parents’ custody for approximately 12 days. (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 632 [when assessing the relationship courts consider factors like “ ‘[t]he
age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody’ ”].) Further,
the court found that M.K. vacillated during visits; sometimes going to Mother but other
times being unsure and seeking comfort from his prospective adoptive mother. (Caden
C., at p. 632 [courts consider how children interact with or look to their parents].)
Although the court credited the parents’ testimony and acknowledged it was a
“close call”, the court ultimately determined that the parents failed to meet their burden
of proving that M.K. had a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parents such
that M.K. would benefit from continuing the relationship. (See Dakota H., supra,
132 Cal.App.4th at p. 229 [a parent must demonstrate something “more than frequent and
loving contact, an emotional bond with the child, or pleasant visits’”].) We do “ ‘not
reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary
conflicts.’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.)
Based on the record before us, we find that substantial evidence supports the
juvenile court’s determination that the parents did not meet their burden of proof as to the
second element.
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B. Detriment
When “assessing whether termination would be detrimental, the trial court must
decide whether the harm from severing the child’s relationship with the parent outweighs
the benefit to the child of placement in a new adoptive home.” (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 632, citing Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) The parent must
show that his or her relationship with the child “promotes the well-being of the child to
such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home
with new, adoptive parents.” (Autumn H., at p. 575.) Courts need to determine “how the
child would be affected by losing the parental relationship—in effect, what life would be
like for the child in an adoptive home without the parent in the child’s life.” (Caden C.,
at p. 633.) “[T]he question is just whether losing the relationship with the parent would
harm the child to an extent not outweighed, on balance, by the security of a new, adoptive
home.” (Id. at p. 634.) “The court must also determine, for the particular child, how a
prospective adoptive placement may offset and even counterbalance those harms.” (Id. at
p. 640.)
We find the court acted within its discretion in concluding that any benefits from
M.K.’s relationship with Father and Mother did not outweigh the benefit of stability
through adoption. The record reflects that the 10 visits between M.K. and his parents
generally went well, however, the court concluded that parents’ testimony regarding their
interactions with M.K. was insufficient to support a finding that they had a “substantial,
positive emotional attachment such that [M.K] would be greatly harmed” if the
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parent/child relationship was severed. (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.)
Although Mother and Father opined that M.K. was a “little sad” or a “little upset” when
visits were over, there is no evidence that such responses had significant or lasting effects
on M.K.’s behavior or general well-being. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636 [no
evidence of emotional instability or preoccupation].)
The parents did not demonstrate that “terminating that attachment would be
detrimental to [M.K.] when balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new,
adoptive home.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) The record demonstrates that
M.K. was bonded with his caregivers, who were his prospective adoptive parents. At the
time of the section 366.26 hearing, M.K. resided in a prospective adoptive home for ten
months and was observed to be happy, adjusted, comfortable, secure, and content. The
caregivers demonstrated their ability to provide M.K. with long term care and handle his
ongoing health care needs. They claim M.K. as their son and M.K. calls them “mama”
and “dada.” The prospective adoptive parents were “highly committed” and motivated to
provide M.K. “with a safe and loving home through permanency under Adoption.”
Based on the record, the juvenile court’s conclusion that Father and Mother failed
to show detriment that would support an exception to the termination of parental rights
was not arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its
discretion by declining to apply the parental-benefit exception under section 366.26,
subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), and reversal is not warranted.
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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order terminating Father and Mother’s parental rights is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
LEE
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
P. J.
RAPHAEL
J.
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