Filed 9/9/26 In re M.J. CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re M.J., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, F090770
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. JV8403)
v.
M.J., OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Tuolumne County. Laura L.
Krieg, Judge.
Robert McLaughlin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Ian Whitney and Christina
Hitomi Simpson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
The People allege that M.J. and his co-perpetrators created a fictitious profile on
an online dating platform for gay men to lure the victim to M.J.’s apartment complex,
where they falsely accused him of seeking sexual contact with a minor and assaulted him,
causing multiple facial fractures. Based on these allegations, the Tuolumne County
District Attorney’s Office filed a juvenile wardship petition alleging M.J. committed
assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) and assault by means of
force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)).
The juvenile court granted the People’s motion to transfer M.J. to a court of
criminal jurisdiction pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 707,
subdivision (a)(1).1 This appeal is taken from the transfer order. (See § 801, subd. (a).)
We reject M.J.’s arguments that the court’s findings in support of the order were not
supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Factual Allegations2
The alleged offenses occurred on January 28, 2025, one week before M.J.’s
18th birthday. At approximately 7:00 p.m., officers were dispatched to an apartment
complex after receiving a report of an assault. There, the victim reported that several
individuals had assaulted him. The assailants were later identified as M.J., M.J.’s father,
and another minor, B.C. The victim had blood on his face and shirt, a laceration to his
head, and swelling on the left side of his face and around his eye.
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
otherwise indicated.
2 This summary is drawn from the testimony of numerous law enforcement officers,
the probation report addressing M.J.’s behavioral patterns and social history, and other
evidence admitted at the transfer hearing.
2.
In a subsequent interview, the victim explained that earlier that day he logged into
his account on “Sniffies,” an online dating platform for gay men. He exchanged
messages with a profile belonging to someone he believed was an adult male. Both the
profile photograph and additional photographs sent to the victim depicted an adult. The
victim agreed to meet the person at the apartment complex and was directed to a specific
apartment. When he arrived, he knocked on the apartment door, but no one answered.
While the victim was standing outside the apartment, B.C. approached and asked
whether he was looking for his brother. B.C. stated that his brother lived there and had
just walked toward the complex office. The victim followed B.C.’s direction to the office
but found no one there, prompting him to send a message to the profile that he was about
to leave. B.C. then approached the victim again and accused him of trying to have sex
with a minor. The victim denied the allegation and asked B.C. why he would say that.
While the two argued, the victim felt someone shove him from behind, causing him to
fall down a short flight of steps. M.J.’s father, who was wearing a mask over his face,
approached the victim, accused him of attempting to have sex with a minor, and punched
him in the face, knocking him to the ground. M.J. approached with a phone in his hand
as his father stood over the victim. While the victim remained on the ground, he was
struck again but could not determine which of the individuals delivered the blow.
Following the assault, the victim called the police. He suffered lacerations to his
scalp, shoulder, and neck and was hospitalized for multiple fractures to the area
surrounding his eye socket, cheekbone, and jaw.
When initially contacted by law enforcement, the victim attempted to access the
Sniffies profile of the person he had arranged to meet at the apartment complex, but
discovered the profile had been deleted. He nevertheless was able to provide law
enforcement with a screenshot from Sniffies depicting the person he believed he was
meeting. The photograph depicts an unknown male with facial hair who appears to be an
adult.
3.
Responding officers went to the apartment to which the victim had initially been
directed by the profile user. They contacted a man and woman who stated that their
grandmother lived there, that they had been at the apartment for dinner, and that they
knew nothing about the assault.
The officers next went to another apartment after a witness stated that one of the
attackers resembled a person who lived there. At the apartment, they contacted M.J. and
his father, both of whom denied involvement in the assault. The officers also observed a
red substance, consistent with blood, on the exterior wall of the apartment.
Officers obtained surveillance footage from the apartment complex, which was
admitted into evidence at the transfer hearing. The footage showed M.J., his father, and
B.C. entering and exiting the apartment where M.J. and his father resided. It also showed
the three moving together through the complex while appearing to monitor the victim.
An investigating officer described the footage as showing the three “actively engaged in
plotting” something.
The surveillance footage also captured the events immediately preceding and
during the assault. After B.C.’s initial interaction with the victim, the three approached
him together. M.J.’s father pushed the victim while M.J. took out his phone and appeared
to begin recording. The victim stumbled but remained on his feet. M.J.’s father then
punched the victim in the head with a closed fist. At the same time, M.J. swung his left
arm and struck the victim in the head with an object held in his left hand. The
investigating officer described the object as straight and dark in color, with less than a
foot extending from M.J.’s fist. After the victim fell to the ground, M.J. stepped back,
lunged forward, and kicked him in the head or face with his right foot.
Law enforcement arrested M.J.’s father and interviewed him. After initially
denying any involvement, he admitted to participating in the assault and stated that M.J.
struck the victim with a metal bar. He further stated M.J. and B.C. recruited him to
participate by telling him the victim had come to the apartment complex to have sex with
4.
a minor. He explained that M.J. and B.C. ran an Instagram account called “209 Pedo
Control,” and claimed they had previously confronted a man who came to the apartment
complex to have sex with a minor. He showed the officers several screenshots of Sniffies
conversations that he claimed led him to believe the instant victim was also there to have
sex with a minor. Officers subsequently determined that the conversations pertained to
the prior incident referenced by M.J.’s father—an assault on a person identified as C.H.
occurring three days before the present assault—and did not involve the victim.
Officers obtained a search warrant for the “209 Pedo Control” Instagram account
and were able to access it even though it had been deleted. The account contained a
video of the assault on the victim.3 The video appeared to have been recorded on a cell
phone. M.J.’s father and B.C. were visible in the video, and M.J.’s voice could be heard.
The video showed M.J.’s father standing over the victim and throwing a punch. M.J.’s
father also accused the victim of “ ‘trying to [f***] a kid.’ ” The video also contained
superimposed text stating, in substance, “ ‘Bro really had to call the cops and get
ambulances and fire trucks.’ ”
Officers also discovered a video of the assault on C.H. on the Instagram account.
The footage showed several juveniles approach C.H. across the street from the apartment
complex and accuse him of wanting to have sex with a minor. During the encounter,
M.J. kicked C.H. in the back, causing him to fall to the ground. Text superimposed on
the video stated, in substance, “ ‘Bro really tried to meet up with a juvenile and then get
away.’ ”4
3 Law enforcement also received a copy of the video of the assault from the victim’s
brother, who located it online.
4 C.H. was interviewed by law enforcement and admitted to going to the apartment
complex after having a sexualized conversation on Sniffies with a person who
represented they were under the age of 18. C.H. was arrested for violations of Penal
Code sections 288.3 (contacting a minor with intent to commit certain sexual offenses)
and 288.4 (meeting with a minor for lewd purposes).
5.
The account also contained a screenshot from “Grindr,” an online dating platform
for gay men. The screenshot reflected that the Grindr account had been banned and
included superimposed text stating, in substance, “ ‘Pedos got my account banned.’ ”
Officers identified the account number for the Grindr account shown in the screenshot
and obtained a search warrant for its records. According to an investigating officer, the
only evidence of significance produced in the return consisted of photographs of
five unidentified adult males.
A forensic examination of M.J.’s cell phone disclosed a message he sent to
another juvenile on the night of the C.H. assault stating, “ ‘[w]e caught him.’ ” The
juvenile responded by asking if M.J. had a video, and M.J. sent a media file that law
enforcement was unable to access. Another message, sent to a different juvenile the day
after the C.H. assault, stated, “ ‘I was trying to see if you wanted to catch a predator, but
we already did it.’ ” The examination further uncovered screenshots of multiple Sniffies
conversation threads, a video depicting the C.H. assault, and evidence that the Grindr
application had previously been downloaded and deleted. The phone also contained
videos taken inside B.C.’s room depicting a desktop computer with the Sniffies webpage
open on the screen.5
A forensic examination of M.J.’s father’s cell phone revealed that, the day after
the assault on the instant victim, M.J. sent him a screenshot of a social media post asking
the public for information about the attack. M.J.’s father responded, “ ‘You and [B.C.]
are really f[***]ing me over right now. The screenshots are no good. Your post is still
running on Instagram.’ ” M.J. replied that he had “ ‘deleted the whole account.’ ”
5 B.C. resided at the same apartment complex as M.J. and his father, but in a
different unit.
6.
Officers also performed a forensic examination of B.C.’s mother’s phone, which
they determined B.C. had access to. The examination showed the phone had been used to
access both Sniffies and Grindr.
II. Procedural History
In February 2025, The Tuolumne County District Attorney’s Office filed an
amended juvenile wardship petition under section 602, subdivision (a), alleging M.J.
committed assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) and assault by
means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)), both
with enhancements for the personal infliction of great bodily injury (Pen. Code,
§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). The People also moved to transfer M.J. to a court of criminal
jurisdiction under section 707, subdivision (a)(1).
III. Transfer Hearing Proceedings
A. Probation report and testimony
At the hearing on the transfer motion, the People called numerous witnesses from
probation, including the author of the report on the behavioral patterns and social history
of M.J. (the probation report). (See § 707, subd. (a)(1).) A copy of the report, along with
other documentary evidence concerning M.J.’s delinquent history, was admitted into
evidence.
The testimony of the probation witnesses focused primarily on providing a
detailed account of M.J.’s delinquent history and the juvenile court’s prior efforts to
rehabilitate him. M.J.’s first involvement with the juvenile justice system occurred in
2021, when he was 14 years old. He was placed on informal, nonwardship probation for
unlawful possession of fireworks. He complied with the terms of probation, which
included a juvenile work program, journaling, and drug testing. After six months of
successful performance, his informal probation was terminated.
In July 2023, when M.J. was 16 years old, the People filed a wardship petition
alleging felony battery with injury against a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (c)(2))
7.
and misdemeanor resisting, obstructing, or delaying a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 148,
subd. (a)(1)). According to the probation report, M.J. was intoxicated and involved in an
altercation at the county fairgrounds, during which he injured an officer by digging his
fingernails into the officer’s forearm while resisting detention. Pending disposition, M.J.
was released from custody subject to electronic monitoring and participation in the
“Secure Continuous Remote Alcohol Monitoring” program.
M.J. admitted the allegations in the petition and was granted deferred entry of
judgment (DEJ). (See § 790 et seq.) While on DEJ, he made “minimal” efforts to
comply with the terms and conditions, which included community service, journaling,
drug testing, and counseling. He tested positive for alcohol and marijuana but resisted
going to substance abuse counseling.
Approximately one year after M.J. was placed on DEJ, at age 17, the juvenile
court placed him on wardship probation after finding him noncompliant with DEJ based
on an arrest for public intoxication (Pen. Code, § 647, subd. (f)) and a positive alcohol
test. M.J. had no further positive drug or alcohol tests, but he did not meaningfully
participate in substance abuse counseling despite probation’s repeated efforts to
encourage and remind both M.J. and his mother of the need for his participation in
behavioral health services. According to his supervising probation officer, M.J.’s
performance reflected a “lack of engagement, minimal effort, indifferent attitude, [and]
disinterest[] in complying” with wardship probation requirements.
In August 2024, the Amador County District Attorney’s Office filed a wardship
petition alleging M.J. committed misdemeanor vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594,
subd. (a)(1)). In December 2024, a second wardship petition, filed in Tuolumne County,
alleged M.J. resisted, obstructed, or delayed a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 148,
subd. (a)(1)). Neither petition had been adjudicated by the time the probation report was
filed.
8.
M.J. was detained in juvenile hall after his arrest in the present case. Despite some
initial behavioral difficulties and minor rule violations, M.J. subsequently demonstrated
marked improvement, which his supervising probation officer characterized as a
“full 180.” According to the officer, M.J. began taking accountability for his conduct,
recognized his struggles with substance abuse and mental health issues, attained “honor
status” for good behavior, and participated in educational and counseling programs.
A deputy probation officer explained that if M.J. remained under the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court, and the allegations in the wardship petitioner were found true, he
could be committed to Tuolumne County’s secure youth treatment facility (SYTF).
Based on the nature of the alleged offenses, M.J.’s baseline confinement term would be
two to four years, and he could remain under juvenile probation supervision until age 25.6
(See §§ 607, subd. (c), 1769, subd. (b).) While confined in the SYTF, M.J. would
continue to receive behavioral health services, education, counseling, and other
rehabilitative programming. Following his release, he would likely remain subject to
“intensive supervision” by probation, including regular meetings and other supportive
services.
The probation department ultimately recommended that M.J. be transferred to
criminal court, concluding that each of the five statutory criteria set forth in section 707,
subdivision (a)(3), favor transfer. The author of the probation report reasoned that prior
“appropriate and suitable treatment and intervention efforts have been ineffective” in
reducing M.J.’s criminal conduct and expressed the view that additional rehabilitative
services available within the juvenile justice system were unlikely to be successful. The
6 The baseline term is set by the juvenile court when it orders a minor committed to
a SYTF, and “represent[s] the time in custody necessary to meet the developmental and
treatment needs of the ward and to prepare the ward for discharge.” (§ 875, subd. (b)(1).)
The baseline term must fall within the range set forth in California Rules of Court,
rule 5.806(d). For “assault by any means of force likely to produce great bodily injury,”
the range is two to four years. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.806(d).)
9.
report concluded: “Based on the information provided in this report and the previous
efforts of the Probation Department to circumvent [M.J.]’s further involvement in the
delinquency system, it is the belief of this officer a seventeen-year-old who commits a
violent offense just days before reaching the age of majority, particularly one who has
been offered opportunities and services provided by the Juvenile Court and probation,
should not be granted the leniency of juvenile services simply due to timing. The
severity of the crime, not an arbitrary date, should dictate the consequences.”
B. M.J.’s evidence
In opposition to transfer, M.J. presented testimony from a licensed psychologist
who interviewed him and reviewed reports and other materials relating to his
developmental history and the allegations in the present case. The juvenile court
recognized the psychologist as an expert in child psychology and admitted her written
report into evidence.
The psychologist testified M.J. had a “horrific family background.” Among other
circumstances, M.J.’s mother acknowledged using cannabis and methamphetamine
during her pregnancy with him. Child welfare services received numerous reports
concerning neglect, including reports that M.J. lacked adequate food and water, went to
school in dirty clothing, and suffered from poor hygiene. The family home was also
affected by domestic violence, and both parents had extensive histories of substance
abuse and criminal conduct. M.J. was temporarily removed from the home at age five
after his mother tested positive for methamphetamine when she gave birth to his younger
sibling.
The psychologist diagnosed M.J. with disruptive mood dysregulation disorder,
posttraumatic stress disorder, attention deficit hyperactive disorder, alcohol use disorder,
and cannabis use disorder. She testified that M.J. also struggles with impulsivity, anger,
anxiety, and depression. In addition, psychological and educational testing revealed
several reading disabilities and intellectual functioning within the borderline range.
10.
The psychologist concluded that M.J. was amenable to rehabilitation within the
juvenile justice system and recommended against transfer. While recognizing that the
alleged offenses were “heinous,” she emphasized that M.J. suffers from psychological
conditions and learning deficits that are susceptible to treatment. She highlighted M.J.’s
demonstrated progress in juvenile hall, his potential for continued growth and maturation,
the rehabilitative programming available within the juvenile system, and the amount of
time remaining before juvenile court jurisdiction would expire. The psychologist
criticized probation’s transfer recommendation for failing to adequately consider M.J.’s
extensive history of childhood maltreatment. She also opined that M.J. had been
significantly influenced by his father’s participation in the present offense.
C. Statements by M.J. and the victim
In a statement to the juvenile court, M.J. expressed remorse for his prior poor
choices, described the progress he made in juvenile hall and the resources he utilized, and
asked the court for an opportunity to demonstrate that he could be rehabilitated within the
juvenile justice system.
The victim also addressed the juvenile court regarding the physical and
psychological effects of the alleged assault on himself and his family. He described
sustaining multiple facial fractures that required hospitalization and treatment at a trauma
center. Although he ultimately did not require surgery, his injuries caused substantial
pain, required him to follow a liquid diet, impaired his ability to speak and sleep, and
resulted in ongoing anxiety and depression. He further described the psychological
trauma caused by the dissemination of the assault video online under the false narrative
that he intended to have sexual contact with a minor.
D. The juvenile court’s ruling
At the conclusion of the transfer hearing, the juvenile court granted the People’s
transfer motion and made detailed findings on the record as to the statutory transfer
criteria.
11.
The juvenile court found that the first statutory criterion, the “degree of criminal
sophistication exhibited by the minor” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(i)), favored transfer. The
court reasoned that the alleged offense was not the product of a “random encounter,” but
instead constituted a “premeditated and planned violent assault.” The court cited
evidence that M.J. created multiple accounts on online dating platforms, used
photographs of adult males to lure individuals into meeting, participated in assaults on
those individuals, and then posted videos of the assaults online accompanied by a
narrative portraying the victims as pedophiles. The court contrasted that narrative with
its finding that the victim in this case “100 percent believed he was meeting an adult.” In
the court’s view, these circumstances demonstrated sophistication in M.J.’s efforts to
“lure, assault, and then post a false narrative to the public to back up [his] actions.” The
court also cited M.J.’s deletion of the account following the assault and his subsequent
denials to law enforcement. Although another minor participated in the alleged scheme,
the court found that the evidence clearly demonstrated M.J.’s involvement. The court
further considered that M.J. was one week shy of his 18th birthday when the assault
occurred, as well as his child welfare history, which included parental substance abuse,
domestic violence, and neglect, but no reported physical or sexual abuse.
The juvenile court found that the second criterion, “[w]hether the minor can be
rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction” (§ 707,
subd. (a)(3)(B)(i)), weighed against transfer. The court observed that M.J. had performed
well while detained in juvenile hall, utilized available services while in custody, and
remained respectful toward staff and the court. Based on that evidence, the court
concluded that M.J. had the ability to grow and mature before juvenile court jurisdiction
expired when he reached age 25. The court expressly declined to follow the probation
department’s contrary recommendation on this criterion because it was primarily based
on prior unsuccessful attempts to rehabilitate M.J., which the court regarded as relevant
to a separate statutory factor.
12.
The juvenile court found that M.J.’s “previous delinquent history” (§ 707,
subd. (a)(3)(C)(i)), the third statutory criterion, favored transfer. The court characterized
M.J.’s prior offenses and supervision history as reflecting a “steady delinquent history.”
While acknowledging that the offenses were not individually among the most serious, the
court emphasized both their number and their escalating seriousness.
The juvenile court also found that the fourth criterion, the “[s]uccess of previous
attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(D)(i)),
favored transfer. The court noted that M.J. had been involved with juvenile probation
since the age of 14 and had been provided numerous rehabilitative services, including
counseling, community service, electronic monitoring, and other programming. Despite
those opportunities, the court found that M.J.’s engagement had been limited and that
considerable prompting and repeated court intervention were necessary to secure his
compliance. The court also took into account M.J.’s lack of substantial support at home
but observed that his mother would assist with appointments and communicate with
probation when sufficiently prompted. In addition, the court credited probation’s
assessment that M.J. had been “offered most services that the juvenile court has
available,” supporting the conclusion that additional efforts under juvenile court
jurisdiction were unlikely to succeed.
Lastly, the juvenile court found that the fifth criterion, the “circumstances and
gravity of the offense” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(E)(i)), weighed “very heav[ily]” in favor of
transfer. The court highlighted the violent and unprovoked nature of the attack, the
victim’s very serious injuries, and the significant psychological harm caused by M.J.’s
false portrayal of the victim as a pedophile. It further characterized M.J.’s conduct as
self-styled vigilantism containing “elements of a hate crime.”
Based on its consideration of the five statutory criteria, the juvenile court
concluded that the “cumulative weight of the factors” demonstrated M.J. was a “suitable
candidate to be transferred to adult court,” and granted the transfer motion.
13.
DISCUSSION
I. Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile Court’s Order Transferring
M.J. to a Court of Criminal Jurisdiction
M.J. contends the juvenile court’s order granting transfer was unsupported by
substantial evidence. Among other considerations, he emphasizes his relatively minor
delinquency history, his unresolved mental health issues, the influence of his
co-perpetrators, and his marked improvement in juvenile hall as evidence of his
amenability for rehabilitation under juvenile court jurisdiction.
Although these considerations are relevant to the transfer determination, our role
on appeal is not to rehear the transfer motion or reweigh the evidence. (In re J.S. (2024)
105 Cal.App.5th 205, 208.) Rather, in conducting substantial evidence review, we
examine the entire record to determine “whether any reasonable trier of fact could have
made the [findings] now challenged on appeal.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020)
9 Cal.5th 989, 1005 (O.B.).) Applying that standard, we conclude substantial evidence
supported the juvenile court’s findings.
A. Applicable law and standard of review
“Section 707 sets forth the procedures for transferring a minor from juvenile court
to criminal court. It provides that whenever a minor aged 16 years or older is alleged to
have committed a felony, the prosecutor may move ‘to transfer the minor from juvenile
court to a court of criminal jurisdiction.’ (§ 707, subd. (a)(1).)” (In re Miguel R. (2024)
100 Cal.App.5th 152, 164 (Miguel R.).)
“Upon receiving a transfer motion, the juvenile court is required to ‘order the
probation officer to submit a report on the behavioral patterns and social history of the
minor.’ (§ 707, subd. (a)(1).) In addition to the transfer report, the court may consider
‘any other relevant evidence that the [prosecutor] or the minor may wish to submit.’
(§ 707, subd. (a)(3).)” (Kevin P. v. Superior Court (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173, 186.)
The burden is on the People to establish “by clear and convincing evidence that
14.
the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3); see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.770(a); In re E.P. (2023)
89 Cal.App.5th 409, 416.) In determining whether transfer is warranted, the juvenile
court must consider the five criteria set forth in section 707, subdivision (a)(3): (1) the
“degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(i));
(2) “[w]hether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(B)(i)); (3) the “minor’s previous delinquent history”
(§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(C)(i)); (4) “[s]uccess of previous attempts by the juvenile court to
rehabilitate the minor” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(D)(i)); and (5) the “circumstances and gravity
of the offense alleged in the petition to have been committed by the minor” (§ 707,
subd. (a)(3)(E)(i)). Section 707 also “sets forth a nonexhaustive list of relevant factors
for the court to consider with respect to each of the five criteria. (§ 707,
subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii), (B)(ii), (C)(ii), (D)(ii), (E)(ii).)” (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th
at p. 164.) The weight given to each of the five criteria is within the court’s discretion.
(C.S. v. Superior Court (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1034–1035.)
We review a juvenile court’s order transferring a minor to criminal court for abuse
of discretion. (Kevin P. v. Superior Court, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 187.) “The
court’s factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence, and its legal conclusions
are reviewed de novo.” (Ibid.) Substantial evidence review applies to the court’s
findings as to each of section 707’s five transfer criteria, as well as its ultimate finding
that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation under juvenile court jurisdiction.
(Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) Because the latter finding must be made
by clear and convincing evidence, we “ ‘determine whether the record, viewed as a
whole, contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have
made the finding of high probability demanded by’ the clear and convincing evidence
standard.” (Ibid., quoting O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1005.)
“Substantial evidence is evidence that is ‘of ponderable legal significance,’
15.
‘reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value,’ and ‘ “substantial” proof of the
essentials which the law requires in a particular case.’ ” (O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at
p. 1006.) In reviewing for substantial evidence, we draw all reasonable inferences in
support of the court’s findings. (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) We do
not reweigh the evidence and “must accept the fact finder’s resolution of conflicting
evidence.” (O.B., at p. 1008; see In re J.S., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 208.)
B. The juvenile court’s findings as to each criterion favoring transfer were
supported by substantial evidence
1. “The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor.”
(§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(i).)
The record amply supported the juvenile court’s determination that M.J. exhibited
a high degree of criminal sophistication. The court reasonably characterized the alleged
assault as “premeditated and planned.” M.J. and B.C., his 13-year-old co-participant,
devised a scheme involving fictitious profiles on dating platforms for gay men, which
they used to lure individuals to their apartment complex for the purpose of assaulting
them and later disseminating recordings of the assaults through an Instagram account
they maintained. The execution of that scheme in this case further demonstrated
planning. M.J. and B.C. first directed the victim to an apartment unconnected to either of
them and then, under false pretenses, induced him to move to another area of the complex
where the assault was carried out. The use of fictitious identities, a predetermined
location, coordinated movement of the victim, and subsequent online publication
provided substantial evidence of a significant degree of criminal sophistication. (See
People v. Superior Court (Jones) (1998) 18 Cal.4th 667, 684 [“The minors planned the
offense in considerable detail”].)
M.J. asserts that his conduct should be viewed in light of his purported belief that
the victim had come to the apartment complex intending to engage in sexual activity with
a minor. He notes that, three days before the present offense, he assaulted C.H. under
16.
similar circumstances, who was later arrested for child sex offenses. This argument finds
little support in the record with respect to the present victim. There was no evidence that
the victim believed he was communicating with or meeting a minor, nor any evidence
that M.J. had reason to believe otherwise. Rather, the evidence supported the inference
that M.J. sought to lure the victim to the apartment complex, and to create content for his
Instagram account by assaulting the victim and portraying him as a pedophile regardless
of whether the accusation was true.
Next, M.J. asserts that B.C. was solely responsible for creating the false dating
profiles used to lure potential victims. The record does not support this characterization.
Although there was evidence that B.C. had access to his mother’s cell phone, which had
been used to access the applicable dating platforms, the evidence also demonstrated that
M.J. played a central role in the scheme. Among other things, M.J. exercised control
over the “209 Pedo Control” Instagram account, accessed the dating platforms on his own
cell phone, and sent messages to other minors concerning their intended targets.
M.J. further contends that he was unduly influenced by his father’s involvement in
the assault. The evidence, however, showed that M.J. induced his father to participate by
falsely representing that the victim expressed the intent to have sexual contact with a
minor. Thus, although his father’s participation was relevant, the trial court could
reasonably accord it limited weight because M.J. recruited his father to participate in the
assault, rather than being drawn into the offense by him.
Lastly, M.J. argues the juvenile court failed to afford sufficient weight to his
mental health issues, learning disabilities, and history of substance abuse. We agree these
considerations weigh against a finding that M.J. exhibited criminal sophistication.
Nevertheless, the evidence of M.J.’s detailed planning and premeditation, together with
the steps he took to carry out and record the assault for publication online, clearly
supported the court’s conclusion that this criterion favored transfer notwithstanding those
mitigating considerations.
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2. “The minor’s previous delinquent history.” (§ 707,
subd. (a)(3)(C)(i).)
The juvenile court characterized M.J. as having a “steady delinquent history”
marked by increasingly frequent and serious offenses, and concluded this criterion
favored transfer. Substantial evidence supported that determination. M.J. first entered
the juvenile justice system at age 14 for the relatively minor offense of unlawful
possession of fireworks. Despite successfully completing informal probation, his
subsequent delinquent conduct escalated in both frequency and seriousness. At age 16,
M.J. was granted DEJ following his admission to felony battery upon a peace officer
causing injury. While on DEJ, he was arrested for public intoxication and tested positive
for alcohol and marijuana. Thereafter, while on wardship probation and before the
instant alleged offenses, M.J. was arrested for misdemeanor vandalism, and later, for
resisting, obstructing, or delaying a peace officer.
M.J. characterizes his delinquency history as “minimal,” noting that the juvenile
court described it as not “the most serious previous delinquent history.” He argues that
his prior conduct consisted of “impulsive, defiant[] behavior” reflecting his struggles with
anger, substance abuse, and mental health. We recognize that M.J.’s prior delinquent
conduct consisted primarily of misdemeanor offenses. But as the juvenile court
observed, his delinquent behavior escalated in both frequency and seriousness. That
progression, culminating in the violent conduct alleged here, constituted substantial
evidence supporting the court’s conclusion that the increasingly negative trajectory of
M.J.’s behavior weighed in favor of transfer.
3. “Success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to
rehabilitate the minor.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(D)(i).)
The juvenile court concluded this criterion weighed in favor of transfer based on
M.J.’s history of unsuccessful rehabilitation efforts since entering the juvenile justice
system at age 14. Substantial evidence supports that conclusion. M.J. received repeated
referrals to rehabilitative services, including counseling and other behavioral health
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programs, but consistently exhibited limited motivation, engagement, and interest in
those services. Despite these opportunities, his delinquent conduct continued,
culminating in the instant assault allegations.
M.J. principally relies on his recent improvement in juvenile hall as evidence of
his amenability to rehabilitation in a custodial setting. We agree that this progress
weighed in his favor. Nevertheless, given his lengthy involvement in the juvenile justice
system and repeated failure to meaningfully engage with prior rehabilitative
opportunities, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude that his recent improvement
did not outweigh his prior history of unsuccessful rehabilitation.
M.J. also criticizes the probation report’s emphasis on the fact that the alleged
offenses were committed one week before he reached the age of 18, arguing that
proximity to the age of majority is not among the factors listed in section 707,
subdivision (a)(3). He relies on the report’s statement that “a seventeen-year-old who
commits a violent offense just days before reaching the age of majority, particularly one
who has been offered opportunities and services provided by the Juvenile Court and
probation, should not be granted the leniency of juvenile services simply due to timing.”
Nothing in the record, however, indicates that the juvenile court adopted or relied on this
rationale in granting transfer. Rather, the court considered M.J.’s age at the time of the
offense only in assessing his degree of criminal sophistication, a consideration expressly
required under that criterion. (See § 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii) [“the juvenile court shall
give weight to any relevant factor, including … the minor’s age”].) Accordingly, to the
extent M.J. contends the court committed an abuse of discretion by improperly relying on
his proximity to the age of majority, the claim is unsupported by the record.
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4. “The circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the
petition to have been committed by the minor.” (§ 707,
subd. (a)(3)(E)(i).)
M.J. acknowledges that the juvenile court gave significant weigh to this criterion,
and concedes that the alleged offenses were “deplorable” and caused considerable harm
to the victim. He argues, however, that the weight of this criterion was mitigated by
other considerations, such as his “mental and emotional deficits,” his co-perpetrator’s
participation in the offenses, and his “misguided worldview [that] led him to believe he
was performing a public service by exposing and punishing child predators.”
As noted, the weight afforded to any particular criterion lies within the juvenile
court’s discretion. (C.S. v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1034–1035.)
Under the circumstances, the court reasonably afforded considerable weight to this
criterion. M.J. played a central role in planning and carrying out the scheme to assault
the victim. He operated the Instagram account associated with the assaults, created false
dating profiles to attract potential victims, enlisted others to participate, recorded the
assaults, and published the recordings online. He also personally assaulted the victim,
striking him in the face with an object consistent with a metal bar and kicking him in the
head after he had fallen to the ground. Further, while M.J. characterized the scheme as an
effort to expose pedophiles, there was no evidence the victim indicated an intention to
meet a minor. From this evidence, the court could reasonably question M.J.’s asserted
justification for the attack and infer that the accusation of pedophilia served as a pretext
for targeting the victim.
M.J. also suggests that the alleged offenses, though transfer eligible, were less
serious than crimes such as murder, attempted murder, and sexual assault. That
comparison does not establish that the offenses here lacked gravity. The assault inflicted
severe physical injuries and significant psychological harm, impairing the victim’s ability
to perform basic functions such as eating, drinking, and sleeping. Substantial evidence
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therefore supported the juvenile court’s determination that this criterion weighed heavily
in favor of transfer.
C. Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s ultimate finding that
M.J. “is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3).)
Based on the four statutory criteria discussed above, the juvenile court found by
clear and convincing evidence that M.J. is not amenable to rehabilitation while under
juvenile court jurisdiction. Having concluded that substantial evidence supported the
court’s findings as to each of those four criteria, we likewise conclude that substantial
evidence supported its ultimate determination. The evidence showed that M.J. occupied
a central role in the planning and execution of the charged assault. He helped devise and
implement the scheme, personally participated in the violent attack that caused the victim
severe and lasting injuries, and then published a recording of the assault online falsely
portraying the victim as a pedophile. The circumstances of the alleged offenses thus
demonstrated both a high degree of criminal sophistication and considerable gravity.
M.J.’s escalating delinquent conduct and his repeated failure to meaningfully engage with
rehabilitative services further supported the court’s amenability determination. Although
some evidence favored retention in juvenile court, including the time remaining for
rehabilitation, M.J.’s mental health issues and difficult upbringing, his father’s
involvement, and his recent progress in juvenile hall, that countervailing evidence does
not render the court’s factual findings unsupported by substantial evidence. Accordingly,
M.J.’s substantial evidence challenge to the transfer order is without merit.
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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order transferring M.J. to a court of criminal jurisdiction is
affirmed.
HARRELL, J.
WE CONCUR:
MEEHAN, Acting P. J.
GUERRA, J.
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