Filed 7/15/26 In re M.J. CA5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re M.J., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law.
KERN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN F090985
SERVICES,
(Super. Ct. No. JD145774-00)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. OPINION
M.E.,
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Christie
Canales Norres, Judge.
Monica Vogelmann, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Kendra L. Graham, County Counsel, and Judith M. Denny, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Levy, Acting P. J., Meehan, J. and Guerra, J.
M.E. (father) is the father of M.J. (the child), who is the subject of this dependency
case. Father challenges the juvenile court’s order issued at a Welfare and Institutions
Code1 section 366.26 hearing that resulted in his parental rights being terminated. Father
contends the court and the Kern County Department of Human Services (department)
failed to comply with their duty of inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)
and its state counterpart. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
In January 2025, the department filed a dependency petition alleging the child was
described by section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) (failure to protect) and (j) (abuse of sibling).
The allegations involved ongoing substance abuse by the child’s mother, B.J. (mother).
Father was incarcerated at a pre-trial facility at the time of the child’s initial removal.
At the initial detention hearing held on January 28, 2025, mother was present and
both parents were appointed counsel. Father was not transported for the hearing. Mother
denied having any knowledge of Indian ancestry in her family. The detention hearing
was continued at the request of father’s counsel. Father was present for the continued
detention hearing, and he also denied having Indian ancestry in his family. A Parental
Notification of Indian Status (form ICWA-020) was filed by father, which indicated he
had no Indian ancestry. The juvenile court detained the child from mother’s custody, and
a combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing was set for March 18, 2025.
The department’s jurisdiction report recommended that the allegations in the
original petition be found true. On March 20, 2025, the juvenile court sustained the
allegations in the original petition, and the disposition hearing was continued to April 29,
2025. The disposition report recommended that the child remain in out-of-home care and
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code unless otherwise indicated.
2 The sole issue on appeal concerns ICWA; therefore, we primarily restrict our facts
to those bearing on that issue.
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family reunification services not be provided to mother pursuant to section 361.5,
subdivision (b)(10). There were no family reunification services recommended for father
due to his incarcerated status. The ICWA section of the report noted ICWA may apply,
and additional information would be provided in a declaration.
The disposition report provided details of the family finding social worker’s
efforts to contact several extended family members in February 2025, March 2025, and
May 2025. Mother confirmed her previous denial of Indian ancestry. The social worker
made unsuccessful attempts to contact the child’s maternal grandmother, maternal great-
grandmother, and maternal aunt, V.T. A voicemail was left for the maternal grandmother,
which requested a return phone call. L.G., the child’s maternal aunt, reported Indian
ancestry through the maternal grandmother, but she was not aware of the tribe’s identity.
Maternal cousin, Jessica W., was unsure of her family’s Indian ancestry.
A letter was sent to father while he was incarcerated regarding family finding
efforts and ICWA inquiries. Father responded to the letter by asking for paternity testing.
Paternal uncle, Shannon E., indicated that he had no Indian ancestry, and he provided
minimal paternal family information. The paternal grandmother, Jennifer E., reported
possible Indian ancestry from her mother with an unknown tribe. Paternal cousins B.W.
and R.E. both denied having any Indian ancestry. Attempts were made to contact five
additional paternal cousins, three paternal great-uncles, and three paternal great-aunts, but
the family finding social worker was unable to reach them.
The paternal grandfather, Howard E., claimed Indian ancestry with the Choctaw
and “Blackfoot” tribes through his mother, F.E. Howard lived out of state, and he
provided minimal paternal family information. Paternal uncle, R.H.E., and paternal
great-aunt, Deborah E. also reported Choctaw and “Blackfoot” ancestry through the
child’s deceased paternal great-grandmother, F.E. The family finding social worker
located two disconnected phone numbers and an address for F.E. The family finding
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social worker sent letters to the paternal family members regarding placement
consideration and ICWA inquiry.
The disposition hearing was continued to August 12, 2025, for the department to
perform inquiries of the tribes. On August 6, 2025, a Notice of Child Custody
Proceedings for Indian Child (form ICWA-030) was sent to the three bands of the
Choctaw tribe and the Blackfeet tribe. The information gathered by the department
regarding the child’s potential Indian ancestry was included in the notice form.
The notice form included the full name and date of birth for mother, father,
maternal grandmother, paternal grandparents, and paternal great-grandparents. The
biographical information for F.E., the child’s paternal great-grandmother, included her
first and last name without a maiden name, former name, or alias listed. A current
address was provided for F.E., and date and place of death was listed as not applicable.
At the continued disposition hearing held on August 12, 2025, the juvenile court
ordered the child removed from mother’s custody, and no family reunification services
were provided to mother or father. A section 366.26 hearing was set for December 10,
2025.
The department’s section 366.26 report, filed November 24, 2025, recommended
that the juvenile court terminate the parental rights of mother and father and order a
permanent plan of adoption for the child. The child was placed in the home of a relative,
who was committed to a plan of adoption.
On December 9, 2025, the department filed a declaration of its paralegal regarding
its ongoing ICWA inquiry. An additional notice form was sent to the Bureau of Indian
Affairs and California Department of Social Services by email on December 9, 2025.
Letters from the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma, Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians,
Jena Band of Choctaw Indians, and Blackfeet tribe informed the department the child was
not an Indian child based on the information provided. None of the tribes requested
additional information to make a determination on the child’s Indian status.
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At the section 366.26 hearing held on December 10, 2025, the juvenile court
terminated the parental rights of mother and father and selected a permanent plan of
adoption for the child. The court found that there was no reason to know the child was an
Indian child.
DISCUSSION
Father claims the juvenile court and department failed to adequately discharge
their duty of inquiry because the paternal great-grandmother’s maiden name was not
listed on the ICWA-030 form provided to the tribes. The department contends that its
inquiry was adequate.
A. Applicable Law
Under ICWA’s state analogue, Cal-ICWA (§ 224 et seq.), the court and county
child welfare department “have an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a
child,” who is the subject of a juvenile dependency petition, “is or may be an Indian
child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a); see In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 9; Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 5.481(a).) The agency’s initial duty of inquiry includes “asking the child, parents,
legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest
in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may
be, an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(2).)
When initial inquiry gives rise to a “reason to believe” (but not sufficient evidence
to determine there is a “reason to know”) that an Indian child is involved in a proceeding,
“further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child” is required, which
includes gathering additional biographical information from family members and
contacting relevant tribes. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(A)–(C).) “Contact with a tribe shall
include sharing information identified by the tribe as necessary for the tribe to make a
membership or citizenship eligibility determination, as well as information on the current
status of the child and the case.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(C).)
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The final duty component arises when the juvenile court or department has
“ ‘reason to know’ ” the child is an Indian child. (In re D.F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 558,
567.) A “reason to know” exists if one of the following circumstances is present: “(1) A
person having an interest in the child … informs the court that the child is an Indian
child[;] [¶] (2) The residence … of the child [or] the child’s parents … is on a reservation
or in an Alaska Native village[;] [¶] (3) Any participant in the proceeding … informs the
court that it has discovered information indicating that the child is an Indian child[;] [¶]
(4) The child … gives the court reason to know that the child is an Indian child[;] [¶]
(5) The court is informed that the child is or has been a ward of a tribal court[; or] [¶]
(6) The court is informed that either parent or the child possess[es] an identification card
indicating membership or citizenship in an Indian tribe.” (§ 224.2, subd. (d)(1)–(6).)
The agency “must on an ongoing basis include in its filings a detailed description
of all inquiries, and further inquiries it has undertaken, and all information received
pertaining to the child’s Indian status, as well as evidence of how and when this
information was provided to the relevant tribes.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(5).)
Before finding ICWA inapplicable, the juvenile court must make a finding that the
department conducted “proper and adequate further inquiry” and exercised “due
diligence” in doing so, and that “there is no reason to know whether the child is an Indian
child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)
B. Standard of Review
We review the juvenile court’s finding that there is no reason to know whether a
child is an Indian child under a substantial evidence standard, and the court’s finding that
the department has conducted a proper and adequate inquiry and due diligence for abuse
of discretion. (In re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566, 600–601; In re Ezequiel G. (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 984, 1004–1005.)
Regarding the juvenile court’s discretion in evaluating the department’s inquiry
efforts, this court explained in K.H., “so long as the [department] conducts a reasonable
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inquiry and documents its results, the juvenile court will have the room to exercise its
discretion in determining whether the [department's] efforts are sufficient to satisfy the
mandates of ICWA and related California law.” (In re K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p.
604.) “The [department’s] inquiry must extend far enough to reasonably ensure that if
there is information the child is or may be an Indian child, that information is gathered.”
(Ibid.)
An inadequate inquiry requires conditional reversal of the juvenile court’s order
terminating parental rights with directions to the child welfare department to conduct an
adequate inquiry, supported by record documentation. (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th
1112, 1136.)
C. Analysis
Father contends the department’s inquiry was inadequate because the department
did not provide the tribes with the maiden name of the paternal great-grandmother. The
agency’s further inquiry obligation included contacting relevant tribes and providing
information “identified by the tribe as necessary for the tribe to make a membership or
eligibility determination.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(C).)
In the ICWA-030 forms sent to the tribes, the department provided the complete
biographical information for the child, mother, father, and paternal grandparents. The
department also shared the paternal great-grandmother’s first and last names, address, and
birthdate. The paternal great-grandmother’s date and place of death were listed as “does
not apply.” After receiving the notice forms provided by the department, the responses
from the tribes did not indicate that there was insufficient information to determine the
child’s tribal citizenship or eligibility for citizenship. Thus, the juvenile court could find
the department met its obligation of further inquiry of the tribes as required under
section 224.2, subdivision (e)(2)(C).
Finally, to the extent that father argues that the department failed to provide
adequate formal notice pursuant to ICWA and section 224.3, we would reject such a
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claim. This inquiry was sufficient where there was reason to believe the child might be
an Indian child, but not reason to know he was. The department is required to give
formal ICWA notice to the tribes only if after initial and further inquiries there is a
“reason to know” that an Indian child is involved in the proceeding. (§ 224.2, subd. (f).)
There is “reason to know” a child is an Indian child if any one of the statutory criteria is
met: if the court is advised that the child is a member or eligible for membership in an
Indian tribe, the child’s or parent’s residence is on a reservation, the child is or has been a
ward of a tribal court, or either parent or the child possess an identification card
indicating membership or citizenship in an Indian tribe. (Id., subd. (d).)
Section 224.3, subdivision (a), specifies the form, recipients, and content of formal
notices, where required. It must include, among other things, the names, birthdates,
places of birth and death, and addresses of the biological parents, grandparents, and
great-grandparents, as well as a copy of the dependency petition, the child’s birth
certificate, and specified information about the dependency proceedings. (§ 224.3,
subd. (a)(1), (3)(A)−(C).) Judicial Council ICWA-030 form, entitled Notice of Child
Custody Proceeding for Indian Child, has fields for this required information.
In the present case, none of the statutory criteria to establish a “reason to know”
the child was an Indian child was met. Thus, compliance with formal ICWA notice
procedures was not required. Any insufficiencies in the forms sent to tribes, such as
omitting the maiden name of the paternal great-grandmother, were “legally irrelevant.”
(In re Q.M. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1084; see also In re D.F., supra, 55 Cal.App.5th
at p. 572 [where formal ICWA notice to tribes is not required, the court need not address
any deficiencies in notices sent to the tribes].)
In sum, we conclude father has failed to demonstrate the juvenile court and
department failed to comply with their duty to inquire. The department’s efforts were
sufficient under the circumstances of this case, where there was no evidence that the
paternal great-grandmother’s maiden name was either known or provided by the family.
8.
The department documented its inquiry of several paternal family members, and it shared
the biographical family information with the relevant tribes. We therefore conclude the
department’s efforts were sufficient to fulfill the duty of inquiry, and its documentation
gave the court an adequate basis for finding it had done so and that ICWA does not apply.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
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