Filed 8/5/26 In re M.G. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re M.G., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
D087638
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. EJ004470)
v.
C.G.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Lilys McCoy, Judge. Affirmed.
Paul A. Swiller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Damon M. Brown, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy
County Counsel, and Kristen M. Ojeil, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
Mother C.G. appeals an order terminating her parental rights to her
child, M.G. Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that the San Diego County
Health and Human Services Agency failed to conduct an adequate inquiry
into M.G.’s potential Native American ancestry as required under the Indian
Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), title 25 United States Code section 1901
et seq., and Welfare and Institutions Code section 224 et seq. Resolving this
matter by memorandum opinion (People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847,
851-854), we conclude the court did not err and therefore affirm.
I.
This is M.G.’s second dependency case resulting from Mother’s alcohol
use and inability to provide care for M.G. During the first case, Mother
denied having Native American ancestry and filed an ICWA-020 Parental
Notification of Indian Status form stating the same. Mother did not believe
that M.R. (Father), who remained an alleged father and whose whereabouts
were unknown, had such ancestry. The juvenile court found ICWA did not
apply. In May 2021, Mother and M.G. were reunified and the court
terminated dependency jurisdiction.
In September 2023, the Agency filed a petition under section 300(b)
after Mother failed to pick up M.G. from school and Agency workers observed
Mother under the influence of alcohol while caring for M.G., in violation of a
safety plan. In August 2025, the Agency located Father and a paternity test
confirmed he was M.G.’s biological father. After an inquiry into Father’s
potential Native American ancestry, the juvenile court found without
prejudice ICWA did not apply and terminated parental rights.
2
II.
Mother contends the Agency failed to fulfill its duty to inquire into
Native American ancestry because it did not inquire of or attempt to contact
Father’s extended family members. We disagree.
California’s statutory scheme contains “three distinct duties regarding
ICWA in dependency proceedings.” (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041,
1052.) First, the juvenile court and the Agency have an “affirmative and
continuing duty to inquire whether a child . . . is or may be an Indian child.”
(§ 224.2(a).) This duty of inquiry requires asking parents, legal guardians,
extended family members and others who have an interest in the child
whether they have Native American ancestry. (§ 224.2(b)(2).)
Second, if the initial inquiry creates a “reason to believe” the child has
Native American ancestry, the Agency is required to “make further inquiry
regarding the possible Indian status of the child . . . as soon as practicable”
(§ 224.2(e)) to “determine whether there is reason to know a child is an
Indian child” (§ 224.2(e)(2)). This requirement involves further interviews
with parents, Indian custodians, and extended family members to obtain
information about possible tribal affiliations (§ 224.2(e)(2)(A)); contact with
the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the State Department of Social Services for
assistance in identifying and contacting relevant tribes (§ 224.2(e)(2)(B)); and
contact with relevant tribes to permit them to determine the membership or
eligibility status of the child (§ 224.2(e)(2)(C)). (D.S., 46 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1052-1053.) “Third, if that further inquiry results in a reason to know the
child is an Indian child, then the formal notice requirements of section 224.3
apply.” (D.S., at p. 1052.)
3
Generally, we review ICWA findings for substantial evidence.
(§ 224.2(i)(2).) When the facts are undisputed, we independently determine
ICWA compliance. (D.S., 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1051.)
ICWA does not require the Agency to search for and inquire about
Indian ancestry with every conceivable family member. The duty of initial
inquiry “‘does not require the agency to “find” unknown relatives and others
who have an interest in the child, merely to make reasonable inquiries.’” (In
re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1140.) Nor is the Agency required to “‘cast
about’ for information or pursue unproductive investigative leads.” (D.S.,
46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1053.) “[T]he obligation is only one of inquiry and not an
absolute duty to ascertain or refute Native American ancestry.” (In re
Antoinette S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1413.)
Here, the Agency fulfilled its duty of inquiry. The parties do not
dispute the Agency sufficiently inquired into M.G.’s maternal ancestry. On
the paternal side, Father repeatedly denied to both the Agency and the
juvenile court that he had knowledge of any Native American ancestry.
Father also denied having any family members who were enrolled tribal
members, received tribal assistance (financial, medical, or educational), or
spoke a Native American language. Although Father believed that
individuals of Native American ancestry had married into the family, he was
unaware of any specific tribe and clarified that none were “‘blood related.’”
Thus, Father’s personal knowledge did not provide a reason to believe M.G.
had qualifying ancestry.
Father’s wife similarly denied any knowledge of Native American
ancestry on the paternal side. Father claimed that no other family members
were likely to have additional information because the family’s elders were
deceased. Consistent with that explanation, Father identified no paternal
4
relatives and indicated he was not aware of any other individuals who might
have relevant information. Under these circumstances, the Agency’s inquiry
created no reason to believe that M.G. had paternal Native American
ancestry.
We are unpersuaded by Mother’s argument that the Agency was
required to seek out undisclosed extended family members. The Agency was
not required to search for unidentified relatives or pursue speculative leads.
(See Dezi C., 16 Cal.5th at p. 1140.) While the better practice would have
been for the Agency to ask Father for contact information of additional
paternal relatives, section 224.2(b) does not mandate the Agency conduct an
exhaustive search for possible Indian ancestry without regard to other
practical limitations. (In re H.B. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 711, 720.) “Rather,
[section 224.2(b)] is intended to ensure social workers ‘ask an added question
of extended family members whom [they] often already are investigating in
their usual course of work.’” (Ibid.) While Father expressed reluctance to
provide contact information for relatives in Tennessee due to his “safety
concerns” with Mother, he ultimately identified his wife as an extended
relative and claimed no other living relative was likely to have additional
information. In finding ICWA did not apply, the court considered Father’s
wife’s denial of Native American ancestry as well as Father’s responses to
ICWA questions. Requiring the Agency to “track down” or otherwise “intuit”
names of undisclosed family members would impose an undue burden on the
Agency. (Ibid.)
“The juvenile court’s fact-specific determination that an inquiry is
adequate, proper, and duly diligent is a quintessentially discretionary
function subject to a deferential standard of review.” (Dezi C., 16 Cal.5th at
5
p. 1141 [cleaned up].) We thus conclude the court did not err by finding
ICWA did not apply.
III.
We affirm.
CASTILLO, J.
WE CONCUR:
DATO, Acting P. J.
KELETY, J.
6