Filed 7/22/26 In re M.G. CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
In re M.G. et al., Persons Coming B345764
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
______________________________ (Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No. 24CCJP03750)
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
M.C.,
Defendant and Appellant,
S.P.,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Craig S. Barnes, Judge. Affirmed.
David M. Yorton, Jr., under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant M.C.
Katie M. Curtis, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent S.P.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Veronica J. Randazzo, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
Mother M.C. appeals from dispositional orders removing
14-year-old M.G. and six-year-old J.P. from her custody and
placing J.P. with J.P.’s father, S.P. Mother contends placement
of both children with the maternal grandmother in Georgia under
the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC)
would have vitiated the need to remove the children from her
custody. And mother contends placement of J.P. with his father
was unsafe given his father’s history of domestic violence.
Placement with maternal grandmother without removal from
mother, however, had significant risks given mother’s unresolved
violence and instability and the need for Georgia officials to finish
analyzing the suitability of maternal grandmother’s home. In
contrast, J.P.’s father demonstrated improved conduct, which
included extended visitation with J.P. without issue, attendance
at domestic violence programming, and proactive efforts to
resolve his criminal case. Substantial evidence, then, supports
the juvenile court’s orders, and we affirm.
BACKGROUND
A. Children’s Detention and Failed Safety Plan
In November 2023, J.P.’s biological father (but not M.G.’s)
kicked down mother’s bedroom door, threw her to the ground,
and choked her. Father took a cellphone from M.G. to prevent
her from notifying law enforcement, but she left and alerted a
neighbor instead. Mother was bruised and suffered a spinal
compression fracture from the incident. Father did not hurt the
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children. Mother and father were separated at the time. The
Department of Children and Family Services substantiated the
referral but closed its investigation without initiating a
dependency proceeding because the situation stabilized. A
warrant was issued for father’s arrest.
A year later, in November 2024, mother, a traveling nurse
and Iraq-war veteran with a history of PTSD and bipolar
disorder, suffered suicidal ideations and made a plan to overdose
on medication. But mother aborted her plan and instead opted to
go to the Veterans Affairs hospital seeking help. After a medical
assessment, the hospital placed mother on an involuntary
psychiatric hold.
While mother arranged for a maternal aunt to watch her
children during the psychiatric hold, that aunt was in Georgia
and would not arrive for three days. Since no other family was
present, the department took protective custody of the children.
The department placed them with a resource parent, a caregiver
named Ms. G.
Four days after mother’s release, the department filed a
dependency petition alleging mother’s mental health and drug
abuse endangered the children. Mother, upset she could not visit
her children, accused the resource parent of stealing the children
and threatened to file criminal charges.
The court held a hearing on December 3, the day after the
petition was filed. Mother testified about her medication
compliance, including limited noncompliance after she fled from
father’s domestic violence the year before. Mother sought the
children’s release under the condition that she would stay in Los
Angeles while the maternal grandmother from Georgia would
take the children back to Georgia.
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Over the department’s objection, the court released the
children to mother in accordance with her proffered safety plan.
The court also required department-approved housing,
unannounced department visitation, drug testing, and
medication compliance. Mother’s counsel clarified this was a
release to a parent with an appropriate plan, not an out-of-state
placement under the ICPC. Maternal grandmother arrived from
Georgia on December 5, two days after the hearing.
On December 6, 2024, the department again sought
detention, arguing mother had not complied with the safety plan.
At the hearing, the court expressed concern “that mother might
not be medication compliant and was not willing to test, and she
had a lack of trust with the department.” Mother’s counsel
disputed these contentions. Children’s counsel described how
maternal grandmother had a calming effect on mother and
understood the challenges of her PTSD. The court again denied
the detention request. Separately, the court granted a temporary
restraining order protecting mother, the children, maternal
grandmother, and mother’s adult child from father.
Just days later, on December 10, a violent incident
transpired between mother, maternal grandmother, and the
children. According to maternal grandmother, mother was angry
in a way maternal grandmother had not seen before. While the
family was at a resource center, mother returned to her car, tried
to pull maternal grandmother out of the car, and threatened to
“bust [child M.G.] in the head.” Mother then took J.P. to the
mall, returned to the family’s Airbnb, hit M.G. in the head, and
attacked maternal grandmother. M.G. recounted a similar
version of events, stating mother “came up to me and was yelling
at me. My grandmother came out because she wanted to protect
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me. She started recording me. My mother got mad. Attacked
her. Snatched her phone. My grandmother got to pull her back
into the house and grabbed the phone. My mom broke my
grandmother’s nail[,] and it was bleeding. She went back out
there and then charged back in and hit me on the head. She
assaulted me and assaulted my grandmother. We did not feel
safe.”
On December 11, the court vacated its prior order, detained
the children from mother, and placed the children with maternal
grandmother, who would stay in California with the children
until the next court date. The children remained with maternal
grandmother in California until December 20 and then
accompanied her, with court permission, to Georgia on an
extended visit until January 9, 2025. When the children
returned, they were placed with the caregiver until the
adjudication hearing on February 27, 2025.
B. Pre-Adjudication Investigation and Report
The department conducted an investigation and prepared a
report for the adjudication hearing.
Mother denied that she was placed on a psychiatric hold at
the start of the case but advised she had a team managing her
mental health. Mother had moved to California to get away from
maternal grandmother, whom she called a narcissist that viewed
her as an enemy. Mother described how maternal grandmother
“saw an opportunity to take [the] children” and had been
insulting to mother. Mother had defended herself from maternal
grandmother and never hit M.G. Maternal grandmother just
wanted money, and both she and M.G. were liars. Mother
remained upset with the department and yelled at the social
worker who tried to set up visitation.
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Father lived with his current partner along with her
children and her mother. He worked as a truck driver; she was a
former behavioral therapist. The department had no safety
concerns with father’s home or his partner’s family. Father
attended domestic violence programming and provided character
references from his pastor and a friend.
Father had not seen or spoken with J.P. or mother since
November 2023. He confirmed mother had moved to California
because she did not get along with maternal grandmother. He
also expressed concern about J.P. going to Georgia because he
had heard that a cousin had molested M.G. before he had met
mother; M.G. later described to a social worker one incident when
she was six and a nine-year-old cousin touched her over her
clothes.
Father’s arrest warrant related to his 2023 assault of
mother had been outstanding. Father surrendered in Lancaster
in December 2024, and criminal proceedings began. After the
preliminary hearing, the criminal court issued a protective order
for mother and M.G. (apart from the juvenile court’s restraining
order), and father was held to answer but released on bond.
By mid-February 2025, mother had not had family time
with the children, but father’s visits with J.P. had gone well.
Father called often to speak to J.P. Mother, meanwhile, was
combative with the caregiver on the phone.
A social services specialist assessed maternal
grandmother’s Georgia home and found ample food, no home
repairs, appropriate sleeping arrangements, and no weapons.
The department nonetheless had received numerous law
enforcement and protective services reports involving not only
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maternal grandmother, but also mother and father while they
were present in her home.
The department obtained 12 law enforcement reports from
Georgia involving mother or maternal grandmother and dating
from 2018 to 2024. Reports of these visits described a domestic
disturbance between mother and maternal grandmother in 2019;
a simple battery between mother, maternal grandmother, and
mother’s now-adult son in 2019; a verbal domestic dispute
between mother and maternal grandmother in 2019; battery and
cruelty to a child when father, in 2020, punched in the face
mother’s then-16-year-old child (not a dependent in this
proceeding); a thrown chair during a 2022 incident involving
maternal grandmother and her other daughter; a verbal dispute
over money between maternal grandmother and her other
daughter in 2023; a simple assault involving maternal
grandmother and a coworker in 2023; and threats involving
allegations maternal grandmother inappropriately disciplined
her grandchildren in 2024.
The department also obtained two law enforcement reports
involving mother in California. The first report disclosed
mother’s arrest for driving under the influence in late 2023, just
after the domestic violence episode. The children had not wanted
to get into the car with mother because they believed she was too
drunk to drive, so a friend picked them up. Mother accused the
friend of kidnapping, but the officer determined mother was
under the influence of alcohol and no kidnapping had occurred.
The second report disclosed that six days before this case’s
inception, law enforcement evicted the mother from her house.
Officers arrived and called for mother to exit the house. One
retrieved a battering ram. As this happened, M.G. opened the
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door, and an officer saw mother holding J.P.’s hand. Mother was
handcuffed, detained, and released in the field. She told the
officers she was suffering from anxiety and PTSD, “which is why
she could not understand what was occurring.” The officers let
her gather some personal belongings before leaving the scene.
C. Adjudication
The adjudication hearing took place on February 27, 2025.
By then, the department had added two counts to the dependency
petition alleging mother’s physical abuse of M.G. and father’s
prior domestic violence. The court sustained the petition and
issued a year-long restraining order protecting mother and M.G.
from father. The court remarked that mother had not complied
with the initial safety plan, remained combative with the social
workers and caregiver, was resistant to complying with the
court’s orders, and had been self-medicating. Maternal
grandmother was not at fault and “had a measure of success in
controlling mother’s outbursts,” but they remained “unrelenting.”
The court stated it could not then order an ICPC because the
parties contested disposition. It then ordered J.P. on an extended
visit with father, and M.G. on an extended visit with maternal
grandmother in Georgia. These visits would last until the March
disposition hearing.
D. Pre-Disposition Investigation
Both extended visits went well, with no reported issues.
Mother had a positive, monitored telephonic visit with J.P. in
early March of 2025. Afterwards, though, mother phoned the
social worker, yelled at her, called her a liar, and claimed she
recorded their conversations over the social worker’s objection.
The record does not disclose visitation between mother and M.G.
after the violent December 2024 incident.
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On March 12, a social worker met mother at the VA
hospital, mother’s requested location. The social worker provided
mother with resources and offered to make calls together.
Mother was angry and yelled “4 months bitch!” and “stupid bitch!
I don’t want no resources.” The social worker started to leave
and saw mother charging at her with the folder containing the
department’s resource materials in her hand, as if she would hit
the social worker. Two nearby police officers intervened. Mother
continued to call the social worker a “stupid bitch” and advanced
on the social worker despite the officers’ presence. One officer
blocked mother while the other shielded the social worker. One
of the officers said he knew mother because he had received prior
calls to restrain mother at the VA. He recommended future
interactions occur at a police station. The department
determined that all future interactions with mother would occur
at the department or a police station.
On March 26, 2025, the date of the scheduled disposition
hearing, mother’s counsel advised the court that mother had
moved to Georgia. This prompted a continuance. M.G. was
placed with the caregiver while the court extended J.P.’s visit
with father.
Mother refused to provide the department with an address
in Georgia, fearing the department would tell father, and texted
the department she did “not trust that you all are the least bit
concerned for my safety and wellbeing whatsoever. You all took
my kids from me and left me in the streets to die. Why would I
ever trust anything that you all say or do as it pertains to what’s
being in my best interest.” The maternal grandmother told the
department she thought mother was “not coming back to
Georgia,” and a case manager at an organization called US Vets
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told the department she had seen mother in California as late as
March 21. The department came to believe mother might not
have actually relocated back to Georgia.
Father’s criminal case had not completed by disposition.
E. Disposition
At the continued disposition hearing, mother’s counsel
objected to J.P.’s release to father and requested “an ICPC for
both minors to be placed with maternal grandmother in Georgia.”
Mother also objected to the court ordering a case plan for her.
Father presented attendance, enrollment, and proof of completion
of a domestic violence program. The court declared the children
dependents of the court and removed them from mother. The
court ordered the department to expedite review of maternal
grandmother in Georgia for M.G.’s placement under the ICPC,
and released J.P. to father under the department’s supervision.
M.G. remained with the caregiver under the department’s
custody.
Mother timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
The removal and placement orders that mother challenges
are both supported.
I.
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding
that no reasonable means short of removal would adequately
protect the children’s safety.
A court may remove a child from a parent’s physical
custody only if clear and convincing evidence establishes (1)
“[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical
health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being” of
the child if “returned home,” and (2) “there are no reasonable
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means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected
without removing the minor” from the parent’s custody. (Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 361, subd. (c)(1); In re Hailey T. (2012)
212 Cal.App.4th 139, 145–146.) Mother’s conduct, current
circumstances, and response to conditions underlying the
dependency allegations are relevant considerations. (See In re
D.B. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 320, 332; see also In re V.L. (2020)
54 Cal.App.5th 147, 156.)
We review a removal order for substantial evidence, but we
“attune” that standard to account for the heightened burden of
proof. (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 997; see
also In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227, 245.) Accordingly, we
determine “whether the record as a whole contains substantial
evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it
highly probable that the fact was true.” (Conservatorship of O.B.,
at p. 1011.) Mother has the burden to show the record lacks that
substantial evidence. (In re E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195, 206.)
The department correctly points out that substantial
evidence supports, and indeed there is no dispute, that mother’s
unresolved violent tendencies posed a substantial danger of harm
to the children. Within days of the children’s release to mother at
the case’s inception, under a plan that included maternal
grandmother’s presence with the family, mother attacked
maternal grandmother and hit M.G. in the head, all in the
presence of J.P. Mother’s combative behavior continued. She
yelled and cursed at the social workers and the children’s
caregiver, culminating in law enforcement having to intervene at
the VA hospital to physically block mother from harming a social
worker. Mother’s conduct led the department to insist that
future meetings occur at the department or a police office.
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Meanwhile, mother repeatedly denied she struck M.G. and
grandmother and believed each had lied about the events. Even
at disposition, mother continued to shift the blame for her violent
conduct to maternal grandmother and her child.
Mother’s assertion, then, is that the court erred in
removing her children because she had developed a plan for their
care — entrustment to the maternal grandmother in Georgia
under the ICPC — that was a “reasonable means” to protect them
and avoid removal. According to mother, the court even
implemented her proposed plan when it agreed, at disposition
and in tandem with removal, to an expedited review of maternal
grandmother in Georgia under the ICPC. The court’s agreement
to this plan, argues mother, shows the plan was a reasonable
alternative to removal. But the court’s removal order did not
implement mother’s precise plan.
At the disposition hearing, mother’s counsel sought “an
ICPC for both minors to be placed with maternal grandmother in
Georgia.” The court ordered the department to conduct an
expedited review of maternal grandmother under ICPC and for
M.G. to remain in suitable placement with the caregiver under
the department’s supervision in the meantime. It did not order a
review of maternal grandmother as to J.P.
That the court agreed a future placement with maternal
grandmother could be in M.G.’s best interest does not undermine
the court’s removal order. While M.G. had positive extended
visits with maternal grandmother and the department had
assessed maternal grandmother’s home, the ICPC review process
had not been completed. There was extensive police and child
protective services activity at maternal grandmother’s Georgia
home, supporting the need to conduct the ICPC review.
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Moreover, placement with maternal grandmother without
removal from mother had failed before, leading M.G. to suffer
physical harm. Mother’s relationship with maternal
grandmother was unstable, combative, and elicited violence.
Mother viewed maternal grandmother as antagonistic and out to
take her children. Throughout the proceedings, mother
repeatedly requested foster care placement rather than
placement with maternal grandmother. And mother had left
Georgia to get away from maternal grandmother. With mother
indicating a desire to move back to Georgia, the children
remained at risk in a placement in maternal grandmother’s care
without removal from mother.
Mother’s attempt to liken her case to our decision In re
A.M. (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 627 is unavailing. There, we held
the juvenile court improperly “remove[d] a child from her father
simply because her father [was] in prison.” (A.M., at p. 629.)
Father had made suitable arrangements for his child’s care
during his incarceration, and there was no evidence the child had
been affected by father’s criminal conduct. (Id. at pp. 633–634.)
Our facts are different. The evidence supports a finding that
mother’s plans were not suitable.
II.
Substantial evidence also supports the court’s decision to
place J.P. with father.
If a noncustodial parent requests custody, “the court shall
place the child with the parent unless it finds that placement
with that parent would be detrimental to the safety, protection,
or physical or emotional well-being of the child.” (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 361.2, subd. (a).) Mother does not challenge the
applicability of the legislative preference for placement with a
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noncustodial parent, but asserts the court erred in finding the
placement suitable. Since the department objected to J.P.’s
placement with father, we appointed father counsel to defend the
court’s decision on appeal.
Ample evidence supports the lack of a detriment finding.
(In re K.B. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 972, 979.)
Mother asserts the court had to find detriment because
father assaulted mother in November 2023, father had no contact
with J.P. for the following year until the dependency proceedings
began, and placement with maternal grandmother would have
allowed for a continued sibling relationship with M.G.
We certainly do not condone father’s violent conduct. But
the court was permitted to look beyond the earlier domestic
violence incident and analyze father’s current status. (Cf. In re
Nickolas T. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1492, 1506 [noncustodial
parent’s history and circumstances may remedy conditions that
could otherwise lead to detriment finding].) In the time between
the assault and the department’s involvement, father did not
harass or further harm mother. Mother faults father for not
having contact with J.P. after the incident, but it was mother
who kept the children from him.
Upon learning about the instant proceedings, father was
proactive and responsive. Within 10 days of the department
telling him a warrant had been issued for the earlier domestic
violence incident, father self-surrendered to law enforcement.
The department interviewed father’s girlfriend, her children, and
her mother, and none feared or expressed concerns about father.
They each described him lovingly, denied any abusive behaviors,
and wanted to care for J.P. in their home. Father, for his part,
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began attending domestic violence programming and submitted
character references to the department and court.
Finally, J.P. and father had developed a strong relationship
during the dependency proceedings. After removing J.P. from the
temporary restraining order in December 2024, father began
visits with J.P. The visitation went well, and father
communicated with J.P. often. J.P. had three extended visits
with father totaling 39 days, and the department reported no
incidents. The two had developed a bonded relationship by
disposition, and father sought opportunities to develop that
relationship throughout the proceedings. Further, while not
determinative, J.P.’s wish to be placed with father after
successful visitation was relevant. (In re C.M. (2014)
232 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1402.)
Lastly, while, as mother notes, a juvenile court may
consider the benefits of maintaining a sibling relationship when
placing a child under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.2
(see In re Luke M. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1423), that
consideration is not determinative. Here, the children had two
different fathers and had been on different extended visits
between adjudication and disposition, which each went well. The
court considered the benefits of a sibling relationship and ordered
the department to facilitate sibling visitation notwithstanding
the different placements. Mother points to no evidence in the
record compelling a finding that J.P.’s placement with father
would be so detrimental to either child as to risk their well-being.
In sum, the juvenile court could reasonably have found that
placement with father would not be detrimental to J.P. given his
significant progress and the stable, positive environment he could
offer.
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DISPOSITION
We affirm the juvenile court’s dispositional orders.
SCHERB, J.
We concur:
STRATTON, P. J.
VIRAMONTES, J.
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