Filed 7/7/26 In re M.C. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
B350954
In re M.C., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23CCJP02936A)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
BRIANNA S.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Marguerite D. Downing, Judge. Affirmed.
Akila A. Shenoy, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Brianna S. (mother) challenges a juvenile custody order
awarding child M.C.’s father (C.C.) monitored visits once per
month, one hour per visit. We find no abuse of discretion and
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In December 2023, the juvenile court sustained a
dependency petition finding seven-year-old M.C. to be a person
described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,
subdivision (b).1 The petition alleged mother failed to protect
M.C. from mother’s male companion who abused substances and
physically abused mother and M.C. The petition also alleged that
father neglected M.C. by not providing any care for him in the
prior seven years and by failing to provide him with the basic
necessities of life. The petition further alleged that
“[r]eportedly,” in June 2016, father put a gun to mother’s head
and threatened her life while she was holding M.C.
Mother initially told the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) that she did not know the
identity of M.C.’s father. However, father had signed M.C.’s birth
certificate. The juvenile court found C.C. to be M.C.’s presumed
father. Social workers located him living in Nevada. Father told
a social worker he was confident he was M.C.’s biological father
and he was willing to submit to a DNA test. He denied any
domestic violence with mother. Father said “he has not had
contact with child since child was born. [Father] stated that he
has only had one telephonic contact.” He indicated he would
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
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have to talk to his girlfriend before “committing to anything,” and
he would let DCFS know “if he is willing to fully commit to take
care of the child.” Father did not request visits with M.C.
At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court ordered
reunification services for father, including monitored visits. In
the months that followed, social workers made appointments for
father to submit to paternity testing, as he said he wanted the
results before participating in services. Father did not submit to
the testing and stopped responding to social worker e-mails. His
phone number was disconnected. DCFS was unable to contact
him. At the six-month review hearing, the juvenile court
terminated father’s reunification services.
Mother successfully participated in reunification services.
The juvenile court returned M.C. to her custody. Eventually, in
September 2025, the juvenile court terminated dependency
jurisdiction and awarded mother sole physical and legal custody.
At the final hearing, mother asked that the court order no visits
for father in the juvenile custody order because he had no
relationship with M.C. Mother asked that if the court was not
inclined to “deny father’s visits,” that it instead allow father to
have only monitored visits, “minimum once a year for one hour,
either with a mutually agreed upon monitor, [or] a professional
monitor, paid for by father.” The juvenile court issued a juvenile
custody order allowing father one monthly visit, for one hour,
monitored by a mutually agreed upon monitor or a professional
monitor paid for by father. At the hearing, the court explained to
mother: “If [father] does not come around, does not take
advantage of it, it’s his loss, you don’t have to worry about it.”
Mother timely appealed.
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DISCUSSION
Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by
including visitation for father in the juvenile custody order. She
argues the juvenile court was required to make “affirmative
findings” that visitation with father would benefit M.C. and it
failed to do so; father’s presumed status did not entitle the court
to assume that visitation would be in M.C.’s best interest; there
was no indication M.C. would be comfortable with visits; and
there was evidence M.C. was generally anxious around men.
Mother further asserts the sustained allegation naming father in
the petition, father’s failure to participate in services or the
proceedings, and his failure to request visits with M.C. all
indicated that visitation with father would not be in M.C.’s best
interest.
“ ‘[T]he juvenile court has broad discretion to make custody
[and visitation] orders when it terminates jurisdiction in a
dependency case (§ 362.4).’ [Citation.] We review the juvenile
court’s exit orders for an abuse of that discretion. [Citations.]
We will not disturb the juvenile court’s decision ‘ “ ‘unless the
trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making
an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.’ ” ’
[Citation.]” (In re J.M. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 95, 112–113
(J.M.).)
We agree with mother that the juvenile court was not
required to apply family law presumptions regarding visitation.
It is also well established that the juvenile court must consider a
child’s best interest when issuing a visitation order under
section 362.4. (J.M., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 112.) Mother is
incorrect, however, to the extent she contends the juvenile court
was required to deny father all visitation unless it expressly found
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that such visits would be in M.C.’s best interest. Mother
identifies no legal authority for this argument, and we are aware
of none.2
Here, the juvenile court had very little evidence to consider
to determine whether visitation with father would be beneficial
or detrimental to M.C. As mother points out, father had no
relationship with M.C. and no contact with him. Yet, lack of past
contact did not necessarily demonstrate that any future contact
was not in M.C.’s best interest. The domestic violence between
father and mother was seven years earlier. Aside from a single
undated telephone call, there is no evidence that the parents had
any contact with each other after that time. The juvenile court
could only speculate as to whether M.C.’s worries about mother
being in a relationship with a man, or M.C.’s desire to protect
mother, would translate into distress if father visited him.
2 Elsewhere in her appellate briefing, mother primarily relies
on two cases. The court in In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th
1481, 1492, discussed only the “statutory directive mandating
parental visitation unless there exists substantial evidence of a
threat to the child’s safety” during the reunification period. J.M.
considered a father’s argument that the juvenile court could not
issue an order granting the mother sole physical custody without
finding by clear and convincing evidence that joint custody would
be detrimental to the children. In that context, the court
explained: “Section 362.4 does not require a finding of detriment
under any circumstances; as a result, courts have applied the
best interest standard in determining appropriate custody and
visitation exit orders at this stage.” (J.M., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th
at p. 113.) The court did not consider what standard applies
when a party asks the juvenile court to expressly deny a
noncustodial parent visitation in an “exit” order.
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Meanwhile, father had signed M.C.’s birth certificate and was
deemed presumed. His parental rights remained intact.
Under these circumstances, the juvenile court did not
abuse its discretion in issuing a juvenile custody order with
minimal visitation for father, under controlled circumstances.
The order provided father with only one monitored visit each
month, for one hour. As the court explained, the order provided
father with visits if he should seek them out. Mother was under
no obligation to attempt to make the visits happen.
The juvenile court could reasonably conclude that having a
visitation order in place that afforded father limited, monitored
visits was in M.C.’s best interest should father attempt contact in
the future. The juvenile court could reasonably determine that it
did not have sufficient evidence to deny father all visitation. And
leaving the order silent as to visitation would allow father to seek
visitation rights in the future from a family law court, without
any preexisting limitations or restrictions. (See Feist v. Feist
(1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 433, 436 [“In the absence of a provision
expressly denying the right of visitation in a custody order a
parent deprived of custody is entitled to reasonable visitation as a
matter of natural right.”].) The visitation order set distinct
boundaries on any contact between M.C. and father, while still
permitting the possibility of a relationship between them in the
future.
“ ‘ “A merely debatable ruling cannot be deemed an abuse of
discretion.” ’ [Citations.]” (Jones v. Solgen Construction, LLC
(2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1203.) The juvenile court’s visitation
order was not arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd. We find
no basis for reversal.
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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, J.
We concur:
EGERTON, Acting P. J.
HANASONO, J.
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