Filed 9/9/26 In re M.A. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
In re M.A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court C105842
Law.
(Super. Ct. No.
SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES STK-JD-DP-2024-0000113)
AGENCY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
A.W.,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appellant A.W. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s supplemental
dispositional order following this court’s previous opinion reversing the bypass of
mother’s reunification services and directing the juvenile court to conduct “further
proceedings consistent with th[e] opinion including the provision of reunification
services.” (In re M.A. (Dec. 17, 2025, C103159) [nonpub. opn.] (M.A.).) Mother
complains (1) the juvenile court’s orders on remand exceeded the scope of the remand
order and (2) she received inadequate notice of the nature of the March 4, 2026 hearing.
We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Given the limited issues in this appeal, we will not recount the facts and
procedural history set out at length in this court’s previous opinion. (M.A., supra,
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C103159.) It is sufficient to note that mother lost custody of infant I.H. in 2018 because
of injuries sustained from repeated, intentional abuse incurred over time, including over
20 broken ribs and at least one broken leg. (Ibid.) Mother was convicted of child
endangerment and failed to reunify with I.H., who was adopted by a relative. (Ibid.)
Mother tested positive for cannabis at M.A.’s premature birth in 2024, and the
juvenile court took jurisdiction over her due to concerns surrounding mother’s drug use,
as well as the danger presented by unresolved issues from I.H.’s case. (M.A., supra,
C103159.) Mother diligently participated in services, despite the recommendation of the
San Joaquin County Human Services Agency (Agency) to bypass her for reunification.
(Ibid.) Mother presented evidence of her progress and participation in services at a
contested disposition hearing, but the juvenile court formally removed M.A. and
bypassed mother for reunification. (Ibid.)
Mother appealed, and on December 17, 2025, another panel of this court upheld
the removal order but reversed the juvenile court’s order bypassing mother for
reunification services. (M.A., supra, C103159.) The disposition from this unpublished
opinion stated, “We reverse the juvenile court’s order bypassing mother’s reunification
services pursuant to [Welfare and Institutions Code,1] section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6)
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion including the provision
of reunification services. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.” (M.A., supra, C103159.)
A copy of this opinion was received by the juvenile court on December 17, 2025, and
transmitted to the parties.
On June 17, 2025, during the pendency of mother’s prior appeal, father’s
reunification services were terminated, and the matter was set for a section 366.26
selection and implementation hearing. The section 366.26 hearing was ultimately
1 Undesignated section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
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continued in light of this court’s previous appellate opinion, and the juvenile court set a
hearing for March 4, 2026, “for [r]eview; [a]ppellate [i]ssue.” Notice of this hearing was
sent to mother and her counsel on January 21, 2026.
On February 25, 2026, the Agency filed an Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978
(25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; § 224.2) compliance report and the next day the Agency filed a
second supplemental disposition report, which was served by mail the same day on
mother and her counsel. These reports stated the next hearing on March 4, 2026, was for
disposition and was needed in light of the reversal. The second supplemental disposition
report stated mother recently moved back to California and was regularly visiting M.A.
twice weekly. The report also detailed the recommended reunification services
developed in consultation with mother, including a dependency drug court assessment,
individual counseling, and parenting classes. The Agency recommended maintaining
M.A.’s current placement with her two other siblings during the provision of
reunification services. The Agency attached proposed findings and orders.
On March 3, 3026, the juvenile court received and filed the remittitur associated
with this court’s December 17, 2025 opinion.
At the March 4, 2026 hearing, the juvenile court first determined M.A. was not an
Indian child. The parties then submitted on the second supplemental disposition report,
and the juvenile court ordered the recommended reunification services. The court also
adopted the remaining findings and orders recommended in the second supplemental
disposition report. Finally, the court granted the Agency discretion for unsupervised,
community, and overnight visits with mother. Mother did not object that any of the
orders entered exceeded the scope of the juvenile court’s authority on remand or
complain that she received insufficient notice of the purpose of the hearing.
Mother appeals.
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DISCUSSION
Mother challenges the juvenile court’s dispositional findings and orders on two
grounds: (1) The court’s findings and orders on remand exceeded the scope of this
court’s remand order; and (2) she received inadequate notice of the nature of the March 4,
2026 hearing. Because mother failed to object on either basis in the juvenile court, these
issues were not preserved for appeal. (In re T.G. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 976, 984.)
“[A] reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an
objection could have been but was not made in the [juvenile] court.” (In re S.B. (2004)
32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in In re S.J.
(2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 953, 962.) The purpose of the forfeiture rule is to encourage
parties to bring errors to the juvenile court’s attention so they can be corrected. (S.B., at
p. 1293.) A second purpose is to create a record that permits review of the juvenile
court’s ruling to determine if it was erroneous. (In re A.E. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1, 5.)
The forfeiture rule has been applied to claims of defective notice in dependency
proceedings. (In re B.G. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 679, 689 [absence of notice of jurisdictional
hearing in violation of the mother’s due process rights was forfeited on appeal where the
mother appeared with counsel at subsequent hearings and failed to raise the issue];
Marlene M. v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1149 [the mother’s failure to
object to proceeding with dispositional hearing waived defective notice claim on
appeal].) Nonetheless, “application of the forfeiture rule is not automatic,” and we retain
discretion to review mother’s claims. (In re S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293.)
Exercising our discretion to do so here (ibid.), we conclude mother has not demonstrated
error.
I
The Juvenile Court Acted Within Its Jurisdiction On Remand
“When an appellate court’s reversal is accompanied by directions requiring
specific proceedings on remand, those directions are binding on the [juvenile] court and
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must be followed.” (In re Justin S. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1434-1435.) “Where
the directions to the [juvenile] court are ambiguous, they are interpreted in accordance
with the views, reasoning, and holdings expressed in the opinion as a whole.” (Id. at
p. 1435.) Moreover, the successive juvenile court proceedings must take into account the
current circumstances and developments that have transpired while the appeal was
pending. (In re Ryan K. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 591, 597.) As such, the juvenile court
retains authority to enter orders in the best interests of the child. (Id. at pp. 597-599.)
Mother asserts the juvenile court findings exceeded the court’s remand authority
as defined by this court’s remittitur. She posits the court’s remand jurisdiction was
limited only to the provision of reunification services given our affirmance of the original
jurisdiction and disposition orders. The plain language from the disposition in our prior
opinion does not support her position.
The disposition stated, “We reverse the juvenile court’s order bypassing mother’s
reunification services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6) and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion including the provision of reunification services.
The judgment is otherwise affirmed.” (M.A., supra, C103159.) This disposition
expressly contemplated further proceedings that included but were not limited to
reunification services. The only limit was that the juvenile court conduct “proceedings
consistent with th[e] opinion.” (Ibid.) Mother has not shown inconsistent juvenile court
action, and accordingly, this claim is without merit.
II
Mother Has Not Shown Her Due Process Rights Were Violated
We also reject mother’s contention that she received inadequate notice of the
nature of the March 4, 2026 hearing, specifically, that she was not informed the March
hearing would be a full disposition hearing. We understand this claim to invoke her right
to due process.
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“In juvenile dependency, ‘[d]ue process includes the right to be heard, adduce
testimony from witnesses, and to cross-examine and confront witnesses’ [citation];
specifically, due process ‘focuses on [a parent’s] right to notice and the right to be heard’
before a child is removed from [the parent’s] care.” (In re A.V. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th
949, 957.)
Here, on January 21, 2026, the juvenile court sent mother a notice advising her of
a “[r]eview” hearing scheduled for March 4, 2026. On February 26, 2026, the Agency’s
second supplemental disposition report identifying March 4, 2026, as a “disposition”
hearing was served by mail on mother as well as her counsel. As set out, ante, this report
noted a new disposition was required in light of the reversal and made a number of
recommendations, including proposed disposition findings and orders. There is no
evidence in the record showing that mother and her counsel did not receive this report
prior to the March 4, 2026 hearing.
Thereafter, mother appeared with her counsel at the March 4, 2026 hearing,
submitted on the recommended reunification services, and requested unsupervised
visitation—all without raising any complaint or concern regarding notice. Had mother
needed additional time to review the second supplemental disposition report and
associated recommended findings and orders, it was incumbent upon her to say so.
Under these circumstances, mother has not shown her notice was inadequate or that she
was deprived of an opportunity to heard. (In re A.V., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 957.)
Finally, we note mother’s failure to show she was prejudiced in any way by the alleged
deficient notice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) Accordingly, this claim is without merit.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.
We concur:
/s/
MESIWALA, J.
/s/
WISEMAN, J. *
* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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