Filed 10/23/26 In re Lorenzo L. CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re LORENZO L. et al., B352146
Persons Coming Under the (Los Angeles County
Juvenile Court Law. Super. Ct. No. 25CCJP03791)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
A.V.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the jurisdictional and dispositional orders
of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Georgia A. Huerta,
Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with
directions.
Cecelia E. Rutherford, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklynn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Sally Son, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
The juvenile court assumed jurisdiction over mother’s and
father’s two children and at the dispositional hearing, ordered
them placed into paternal aunt’s and paternal grandmother’s
custody. The dispositional order also ordered monitored
visitation for mother. On appeal, mother does not challenge the
court’s assumption of jurisdiction based on father’s physical
abuse. Instead, she argues no substantial evidence supports that
she failed to protect the children from father’s physical abuse.
Mother also argues the juvenile court should have granted her
request for a continuance of the dispositional hearing, placed the
children in her custody, and allowed her unmonitored visitation.
We conclude substantial evidence supports jurisdiction and
affirm the jurisdictional order. We reverse the dispositional
order only insofar as it required mother’s visits to be monitored.
Finally, mother does not show the trial court abused its
discretion in denying her requested continuance or that she was
prejudiced when, in denying her custody of the children, the court
enunciated the standard for removal from a custodial parent
instead of the standard for removal from a noncustodial parent.
BACKGROUND
Mother and father have two children, Lorenzo and
Alexander (children), ages eight and six when the dependency
proceeding began in December 2025. Prior to the dependency
2
proceedings, a family law court granted mother and father joint
legal custody and father sole physical custody.
The dependency proceedings commenced when Alexander
disclosed that father pinched and punched his neck. An
unidentified person alerted the Los Angeles County Department
of Children and Family Services (DCFS or the Department) after
Alexander said, “ ‘Dad always punches me’ ” and he was “ ‘scared
to death’ ” of father. (Italics omitted.)
On December 11, 2025, the juvenile court detained the
children. During the dependency proceedings, the children lived
in the home of their paternal grandmother and paternal aunt.
The children’s half sibling N.B. (born in 2022), who is not named
in these dependency proceedings, lived with mother and her
partner R.B. in a car. Mother was pregnant with another child
during the proceedings. DCFS provided mother with housing
referrals on December 19, 2025, including to LA Family Housing,
San Fernando Rescue Mision, and Home Again Los Angeles.
1. Petition
On December 12, 2025, DCFS filed a petition alleging
dependency jurisdiction over Lorenzo and Alexander based on
father’s physical abuse of Alexander, which also placed Lorenzo
at risk of physical abuse, and mother’s failure to provide the
children with the basic necessities of life. As noted in our
Background, part 3, post, an amended petition later superseded
this petition.
2. DCFS’s predetention reports
A social worker interviewed Alexander while he was at
school. Alexander reported he was “scared of father and [did] not
know what to do.” Alexander wanted to live with paternal aunt
3
(the aunt who had custody of him during the dependency
proceedings), to whom he referred as “mom.” Alexander told the
social worker that after he “ripped up” his homework, father
punched him 10 times on his back and then pinched his neck.
The social worker observed marks on Alexander’s back and neck.
Alexander further reported father physically disciplined him by
punching, slapping, and spanking him. According to Alexander,
father would make Alexander squat for 20 minutes as discipline.
Alexander could not remember when he last visited with mother.
The social worker also interviewed Lorenzo. Lorenzo
did not want to speak because he was afraid “something bad will
happen” and did not want officers to arrest father.
Paternal grandmother told the social worker she never
observed father use physical violence. She also said father was
not allowed in her home because of unidentified prior events.
Paternal grandmother allowed mother to live in her home after
mother and father ended their relationship. Mother, however,
would leave for “long hours” and eventually, “completely left.”
According to paternal grandmother, mother “abandoned” the
children. According to paternal grandmother, mother’s
whereabouts were unknown for three years.
Paternal aunt (“mom”) reported that for four years, she
mothered the children. Paternal aunt stated father was violent
and made unidentified “poor choices” that strained his
relationship with his family. Paternal aunt also stated father has
“severe anger issues and is unable to control his anger.” Paternal
aunt also told the social worker that when mother lived with the
paternal family, she would disappear for long hours and that
mother was not stable. Like paternal grandmother, paternal
aunt reported mother “abandoned” the children.
4
Father denied punching or pinching Alexander. Father
denied using physical discipline including spanking, slapping, or
requiring Alexander to squat for extended periods of time.
Father described mother’s visits as “random[ ] and rare[ ]” and
claimed mother was unstable.
When the social worker called mother, mother said “she
[was] unable to meet and unable to schedule the appointment.”
Mother eventually agreed to meet with the social worker at a
DCFS office. Mother told the social worker, “[F]ather has always
had anger issues . . . .” Mother said father was emotionally
abusive towards mother, but she never observed father use
physical discipline on the children.
Mother told the social worker she could not take care of the
children. Mother said living with paternal grandmother and
paternal aunt was “best for the well-being of the children.” The
social worker wrote the following: “Mother reported she is not
stable and has struggled with stability for years. Mother
reported she is not able to keep the children as she cannot take
them in.” “Mother reported that the paternal side of the family is
very loving and caring and have [sic] gone above and beyond to
provide care for the children.” “Mother reported that the children
lived . . . in the paternal family home for several years and they
are so comfortable and cared for well there.” “Mother reported
that the paternal family would prioritize the needs of the
children first and always ensure they came first.” Mother also
told the social worker she worked at a restaurant and did not
know about the children’s medical examinations.
A forensic exam was consistent with the physical abuse
Alexander reported.
5
3. Amended petition
In January 2026, DCFS amended the petition. The
amended petition contained the same allegations as the original
petition but made additional claims. DCFS added allegations
that mother failed to protect Alexander from father’s physical
abuse and that failure to protect endangered Alexender and
placed both children at substantial risk of physical abuse. DCFS
further added that mother knew or reasonably should have
known that father was physically abusing Alexander.
Additionally, DCFS alleged mother and father have a
history of engaging in domestic violence in the presence of the
children. DCFS averred that on April 19, 2025, father hit R.B.
causing him to fall to the ground, and mother pushed father and
hit father’s face. Father then pushed mother’s shoulders. DCFS
further alleged that the children witnessed the altercation
between father and R.B.
DCFS added that Lorenzo was at risk of physical abuse
based on father’s abuse of Alexander and mother’s failure to
protect.
4. DCFS’s prejurisdiction reports
The interviews in DCFS’s prejurisdiction reports occurred
in November 2025 through January 2026. A social worker
interviewed Lorenzo, who stated father hit Alexander when
Alexander ripped up his homework. Lorenzo denied being afraid
of father. Lorenzo reported loving mother and described R.B. as
nice. Lorenzo denied witnessing mother and father arguing.
Lorenzo wanted to live “equally” with mother, father, and
paternal aunt.
6
Alexander reported father disciplined him by pinching his
neck and leg and punching his back and stomach. Alexander
described father hitting his stomach “ ‘very hard’ ” causing
Alexander to tell father, “ ‘I can’t breathe.’ ” Alexander reported
father would make him “squat” when Alexander did not listen to
father. Alexander saw father punch mother’s boyfriend in the
nose. Alexander denied witnessing mother and father fight.
Father denied hitting Alexander. Father admitted to
spanking the children with a “heavy hand.” Father reported
mother does not call the children and does not spend time with
them. Father expressed concern that when the children spent
time with mother in the past, she would allow “random people
around” them. Father stated mother argued with R.B. in front of
the children.
Father claimed he worked at a grocery store during the last
year and had other jobs before then. Father acknowledged he
did not take the children to school when they were “sad about
their mother,” when they were sick, when he had car trouble, or
when his work schedule interfered. Father stated he and mother
would argue but he never hit her. Father again described
mother’s visits with the children as “rare.”
Mother told the social worker she did not know anything
about father’s physical abuse. Mother said she knew father was
frequently angry, but “ ‘never thought he would do anything to
the boys.’ ” Mother said Alexander told her father was mean, but
Alexander did not explain further. Mother also told the social
worker the children had told her “ ‘they didn’t want to go with
their dad, and they wanted to stay with [her]’ ” but she told them
the court ordered them to go with father. Mother never saw
bruises on Lorenzo. Mother recalled an incident where Lorenzo
7
was crying because he could not find a charger and was
concerned about “what [f]ather would do.”
Mother said that when she saw bruises on Alexander, she
asked him about them, and he would say that “ ‘something . . .
happened at school.’ ” (Boldface omitted.) When mother asked
father about Alexander’s bruises, father said, “ ‘[T]hey’re
clumsy’ ” or “ ‘[t]hey tripped and fell at school.’ ”
Mother described father as a “ ‘ticking time bomb’ ” and
stated she “ ‘would have to be careful about what [she] would say
or do around him.’ ” Mother explained that father “ ‘sometimes’ ”
was “ ‘physical with’ ” her. According to mother, “ ‘One time
before Alex was born, he [father] threw me on the bed when I was
carrying Lorenzo in my hands.’ ”
Mother also reported she initially said she could not care
for the children because she did not have a place to live.
According to mother, if she had a place to live, she could “provide”
for the children. Mother stated she had been sleeping in a car
since October 2025. Mother claimed she worked 30 to 35 hours a
week in a restaurant. Mother stated she “distanced” herself from
the children because she was in the hospital for one month after
the birth of their half sibling, N.B. After that, she tried to make
arrangements to see the children, but father refused to allow her
to see them.
Paternal grandmother told the social worker father had
anger issues since he was a child. Paternal grandmother had
minimal contact with father for three or four years. Paternal
grandmother reported the children never told her father hit
them. Paternal grandmother acknowledged Alexander had
bruises when he was removed from father’s care. Alexander also
had a bruise on the back of his leg “that resembled knuckles.”
8
Paternal grandmother reported that neither Alexander nor
Lorenzo had expressed fear of father in the past.
Paternal grandmother stated when mother lived in their
home, mother would leave the children with paternal
grandmother and would not respond to phone calls or
communicate about them when she would return. Paternal
grandmother also said mother left for Texas with the children but
did not tell paternal grandmother. When mother returned from
Texas, she dropped the children off with father and never
returned for them. Paternal grandmother reported mother
had not called the children since the dependency proceedings
began and the children were living with paternal grandmother.
Paternal aunt confirmed that “after [m]other returned from
Texas and gave the boys to [f]ather, she has barely called or
visited the children.” Paternal aunt described mother as “not
stable.”
R.B. said mother tried to see the children but father
prevented her from seeing them. R.B. reported that the only
physical altercation he had with father was in April 2025.
According to R.B., father punched him in the face causing him to
fall to the ground. Mother told father to stop, and father pushed
her away. The children were present. R.B. reported that they
were living in a car and would shower at maternal grandfather’s
home.
Maternal uncle recalled an incident when father hit
maternal uncle’s cheek causing his “wisdom tooth” to break.
Father was upset that maternal uncle mistakenly sat in his seat
at a party. Maternal uncle denied any knowledge that father hit
the children. Maternal uncle said mother told him father would
not allow her to see the children.
9
DCFS recommended against placing the children in
mother’s care, noting that mother was homeless and caring for
her youngest child N.B. DCFS also noted mother’s work was a
substantial distance from the children’s school. DCFS reported,
“Mother previously acknowledged . . . that she did not have the
resources currently to care for her children . . . .” DCFS
acknowledged that mother may be able to demonstrate an ability
to provide a safe home, but she had not yet done so. DCFS stated
it “has significant concerns for [mother’s] ability to . . . protect
Lorenzo and Alexander. All parties interviewed . . . reported that
[m]other has not been a consistent presence in the boys’ life . . . .”
According to mother, father does not permit her visitation, and
according to father and paternal relatives, mother does not try to
visit.
5. Jurisdiction and disposition hearing
No witness testified at the jurisdictional or dispositional
hearing held January 26, 2026. As described in more detail in
the Discussion, post, the court denied mother’s request for a
continuance of the disposition hearing, which then immediately
followed the jurisdictional hearing.
At the jurisdictional hearing, mother’s counsel requested
that the allegations against mother be stricken from the petition.
Counsel argued that when mother saw bruises, she asked about
them but according to counsel, mother did not know father
inflicted the bruises. Mother had not seen father physically
abuse the children. Alexander’s counsel argued mother should
have known about father’s physical abuse. According to counsel,
Alexander told mother that father was mean. Mother saw
Alexander had bruises and mother knew that father had anger
issues. Lorenzo’s counsel also argued mother “could have known”
10
of the physical abuse given the injuries, but also argued mother
was protective after expressly learning about the injuries.
DCFS’s counsel argued mother knew father had anger issues and
should have known what was happening to Alexander.
With respect to disposition, mother’s counsel requested
custody of the children. Counsel argued there was no substantial
risk of physical harm in her care. According to counsel, mother
was willing to go to a shelter with the children.
Alexander’s counsel represented that Alexander wanted to
live with both his parents, but counsel believed that was not in
his best interest. Counsel for Lorenzo stated Lorenzo wished to
remain in father’s custody. Lorenzo’s counsel argued that the
court could put in place a safety plan to allow Lorenzo to remain
in father’s custody. With respect to mother, Lorenzo’s counsel
expressed concern that it was unclear where mother would live if
she were awarded custody of the children.
Counsel for DCFS argued mother had periods of “complete
absence” from the children’s lives and mother did not follow up on
any housing referrals DCFS provided. DCFS added that the
children needed stability and they lived in Van Nuys, where their
school and doctors were, which were not near mother’s work.
6. Juvenile court’s orders
The court sustained the allegations that father physically
abused Alexander, which placed both children at risk of physical
abuse. The court also sustained allegations that father engaged
in a physical altercation with R.B. in the children’s presence,
again placing both children at risk of serious physical harm.
With respect to mother, the court sustained the allegations
mother failed to protect the children from father’s physical abuse
when she knew or reasonably should have known that father was
11
physically abusing Alexander. Her failure to protect placed both
children at risk of harm. The court added it “believes that it’s
enough in the sense that the mother noted some of the injuries or
marks on Alexander’s body.” When Alexader told mother that
father is “mean,” mother followed up with a question but “didn’t
say anything else.” Mother was “on notice” of the physical abuse
and did not “follow[ ] it through.”
As described in more detail below, the court found it was
necessary to remove the children from both parents’ custody
because a substantial danger to their physical health, safety, or
protection existed and it would be detrimental to the safety of the
children to place them with either parent. The children remained
placed with paternal aunt. The court ordered reunification
services for mother and father. The court also ordered monitored
visitation for both parents’ visits, and that parents’ visits could
not occur simultaneously.
DISCUSSION
A. Substantial Evidence Supports Jurisdiction on the
Ground that Mother Did Not Protect Alexander from
Physical Abuse, Thus Placing Both Children At Risk
of Harm
Mother argues no substantial evidence supports the
juvenile court’s finding that she failed to protect the children
from father’s physical abuse.1 According to mother, “No evidence
1 We exercise our discretion to consider the jurisdictional
finding against mother even though mother does not challenge
the jurisdictional findings against father. Father is not a party to
this appeal. (In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227, 238.)
12
supported a conclusion that mother knew or should have known
of father’s physical abuse of the children.” She argued she and
father were separated and although mother saw bruises on
Alexander, she received an innocuous explanation for them.
We review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings for
substantial evidence. (In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227, 238.)
“ ‘ “ ‘In making this determination, we draw all reasonable
inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of
the dependency court; we review the record in the light most
favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues
of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.’
[Citation.] ‘We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise
independent judgment, but merely determine if there are
sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.’ ” ’
[Citations.]” (Ibid.)
Our standard of review is dispositive here. Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s order,
substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s jurisdictional
order. Significantly, as the juvenile court found when mother
saw marks and bruises on Alexander, she accepted the innocuous
answer without further investigation. Further investigation was
warranted not only because of the bruises, but also because
Alexander expressly told mother that father was “mean.” Even
mother acknowledged the children said that “ ‘they didn’t want to
go with their dad, and they wanted to stay with me.’ ” When
Alexander reported the abuse, he could not recall the last time he
saw mother, thus indicating that she was not available to protect
him. The evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that
mother should have known of father’s abuse and should have
13
protected the children, rather than abandoning them, as paternal
grandmother and paternal aunt reported.
In seeking the reversal of the juvenile court’s jurisdictional
order, mother argues the circumstances when the dependency
proceedings started did not exist by the time of the jurisdictional
and dispositional hearing. The only evidence mother identifies in
support of this argument is her own statement that she was not
aware of the physical abuse father inflicted on Alexander. We
observe no change between the time the dependency proceedings
commenced and the time of the jurisdictional hearing. Mother
never acknowledged that she should have protected her children
by investigating the bruises on Alexander and probing into why
the children did not want to return to father’s home. Mother
did not testify at the jurisdictional hearing and no witness
testified mother had done anything to protect her children.
B. Mother Demonstrates No Abuse of Discretion in the
Denial of a Continuance for the Dispositional
Hearing
Mother’s counsel requested that the juvenile court continue
the dispositional hearing to allow mother to find housing. The
juvenile court denied that request. The court found “prior to the
adjudication,” DCFS “reached out and offered services to the
mother . . . .” In the month-and-a-half period from detention to
disposition mother made no progress in obtaining housing.
On appeal, mother argues the juvenile court abused its
discretion in denying her requested continuance but also
recognizes that a juvenile court “exceeds the limits of its
discretion” only “if it makes an arbitrary, capricious, or patently
absurd determination.” (In re Raymundo B. (1988)
203 Cal.App.3d 1447, 1456 [“ ‘ “ ‘[w]here a trial court has
14
discretionary power to decide an issue, a reviewing court will not
disturb that decision unless the trial court has exceeded the
limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or
patently absurd determination’ ” ’ ”].) According to mother, “With
additional time, impediments regarding mother’s housing issues
and the creation of a formal safety plan would have been resolved
and the removal of custody from mother avoided.”2 Mother
further argues, “There was no risk in this case of damage to the
children from a prolonged temporary placement if the disposition
hearing had been continued for a brief period, because [Welfare
and Institutions Code] section 358, subdivision (a)(1) limits the
court’s authority to continue a case beyond 10 days.”3
2 The argument is technically incorrect because the
children were not removed from mother’s custody. They were not
living with mother at the time the dependency proceedings
commenced.
3 Undesignated references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code. Section 358, subdivision (a) provides in
pertinent part: “(a) After finding that a child is a person
described in Section 300, the court shall hear evidence on the
question of the proper disposition to be made of the child. Prior
to making a finding required by this section, the court may
continue the hearing on its own motion, the motion of the parent
or guardian, or the motion of the child, as follows:
“(1) If the child is detained during the continuance,
and the social worker is not alleging that subdivision (b) of
Section 361.5 is applicable, the continuance shall not
exceed 10 judicial days. The court may make an order for
detention of the child or for the child’s release from
detention, during the period of continuance, as is
appropriate.”
15
Mother cites no evidence in the record supporting that she
would have resolved her housing issue or would have avoided the
children’s removal from her custody if granted a 10-day
continuance. Mother did not testify and no witness testified
mother had taken any steps to secure permanent housing
notwithstanding mother’s receipt of referrals on December 19,
2025. Further, as explained above, mother did not testify and no
witness testified mother acknowledged her failure to protect her
children in the past and would ensure their safety in the future.
Mother demonstrates no abuse of discretion in the denial of a
continuance of the dispositional hearing.
C. Mother Shows No Prejudicial Error In Denying Her
Request To Place the Children in Her Custody
The court found “by clear and convincing evidence that
there is [a] substantial danger to the health — physical health,
safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of these
children and that there are no reasonable means to protect these
children’s physical or emotional health without removing them
from the physical custody of both parents in this case.” (Italics
added.)4 The court further found DCFS had made reasonable
efforts to prevent removal. The court stated that the children
“have suffered a great amount of trauma” and needed stability
especially given that the children had not been living with
mother for “a period of time.” The court’s finding tracks
section 361, subdivision (c)(1), which prohibits the juvenile court
4 Contrary to mother’s argument, the juvenile court did not
apply the best interest of the child test. It found by clear and
convincing evidence that removal of custody from both parents
was required.
16
from removing a dependent child from the physical custody of a
custodial parent unless there “would be a substantial danger to
the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional
well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home.” (§ 361,
subd. (c)(1).)
Mother argues, and we agree, that the juvenile court
should have based its analysis on section 361.2, subdivision (a) as
to whether it would be detrimental to place the children in
mother’s custody.5 Section 361.2, subdivision (a) requires a
finding of detriment where, as here, the juvenile court rejects a
noncustodial parent’s request for custody of a dependent child.
Specifically, section 361.2, subdivision (a) provides in pertinent
part: If a court orders removal of a child pursuant to section 361,
“[T]he court shall first determine whether there is a parent of the
child, with whom the child was not residing at the time that the
events or conditions arose that brought the child within the
provisions of Section 300, who desires to assume custody of the
child. If that parent requests custody, the court shall place the
child with the parent unless it finds that placement with that
parent would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical
or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 361.2, subd. (a), italics
added.)
5 Respondent argues mother forfeited the issue because
she did not raise it in the juvenile court. Mother’s counsel
argued, “There is no clear and convincing evidence that she
cannot provide or that they would be at substantial risk of
physical harm in her care, which is the standard.” Assuming
arguendo forfeiture, we nonetheless exercise our discretion to
consider the argument on the merits. (People v. Williams (1998)
17 Cal.4th 148, 161–162, fn. 6.)
17
The substantial danger finding required to remove a child
from a custodial parent and the detriment finding required to
deny custody to a noncustodial parent are fundamentally similar
in that the same conduct can support findings under both
standards — and either finding must be made by clear and
convincing evidence. (In re D’Anthony D. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th
292, 303 [“Nevertheless, in assessing whether this error was
prejudicial, we can neither ignore the similarity between these
statutes’ mandatory findings, nor disregard the evidence
supporting the court’s ‘substantial danger’ finding concerning
placement with father.”].)
The error in applying the test regarding a custodial parent
did not prejudice mother because it is not reasonably probable a
result more favorable to mother would have been reached absent
that error. (In re D’Anthony D., supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at
p. 303.) The juvenile court’s finding that placing the children in
mother’s care would substantially impair their physical and
emotional health is tantamount to a finding of detriment. The
court made this finding by clear and convincing evidence and it is
supported by the evidence that the children suffered trauma,
needed stability, and would be emotionally harmed by moving
into mother’s care after she abandoned them and they grew
attached to paternal aunt to whom they referred as “mom.”
In seeking a contrary holding, mother asserts without
citation to the record that she “had a bond with her children and
the children were comfortable in her care.” The record does not
support this assertion. Instead, it shows that the children
referred to paternal aunt as “mom” because mother abandoned
them, leaving them with an abusive father. There is no
description of the children’s level of comfort in mother’s care
18
because the children did not live with mother and when the
dependency proceedings commenced, Alexander could not recall
the last time he saw mother. There is no evidence to support
mother’s assertion that the children were attached to her or
comfortable living with her, and although DCFS provided mother
with housing referrals, mother did not testify and no witness
testified that mother followed up on any referral in the month
before the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing.
D. The Juvenile Court Abused its Discretion In
Ordering Monitored Visitation
The juvenile court stated, “As it relates to the prior
visitation schedule, the court’s going to leave that prior visitation
schedule in place because I’m going to set an appearance progress
report probably about in 60 days where the court can get an
update regarding the housing, the visitations, and see whether or
not it’s appropriate at that time to make some adjustments.” The
court asked mother, “[Y]our visits are unmonitored right now, are
they?” and mother responded, “No.” The court continued:
“They’re not? Okay. Well, we’re going to address that too. But
[waiting until the next hearing] . . . gives both of you [mother and
father] an opportunity to get involved in the programs and
services that this court is ordering to show your progress. And
that’s essential in this as well.” “The court is leaving the existing
visitation schedule in place . . . however, the court is giving the
Department the discretion to liberalize those visits . . . to either
unmonitored or overnight or extended or whatever the
Department . . . feel[s] is appropriate. The court is giving them
that discretion to do that today.”
Mother argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion
in ordering monitored visitation because there was no evidence
19
the children would be unsafe if mother’s visits were unmonitored.
Respondent argues the trial court’s requirement of monitored
visitation was “reasonable.”
A dispositional order granting reunification services must
provide for visitation. (§ 362.1, subd. (a); In re T.M. (2016)
4 Cal.App.5th 1214, 1218.) Section 362.1, subdivision (a)(1)(A)
provides, “Visitation shall be as frequent as possible, consistent
with the well-being of the child.” Section 362.1 mandates “[n]o
visitation order shall jeopardize the safety of the child.” (§ 362.1,
subd. (a)(1)(B).) A juvenile court has broad discretion in
fashioning a visitation order. (In re D.P. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th
1058, 1070.)
Here the court abused its discretion in requiring monitored
visitation because it identified no basis for that requirement. (Cf.
In re Jennifer G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 752, 757.) The court’s
rationale for ordering mother’s visits monitored did not focus on
the safety of the children but instead, on mother’s ability in the
future to demonstrate progress with her case plan. The fact that
in the future, mother would have the opportunity to show
progress, does not support an order of monitored visitation
because it does not demonstrate any need for a monitor.
Respondent argues the juvenile court’s order should be
affirmed but identifies no record evidence that unmonitored visits
posed any risk to the children. Respondent asserts (1) mother
showed “no insight into her failure to protect the children” from
father’s abuse; (2) mother had not visited the children in the past;
and (3) mother “was caring for N.B. and pregnant.” The juvenile
court did not rely on these facts to order monitored visitation and,
in any event, they do not show that the children would be unsafe
during visits with mother absent a monitor.
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DISPOSITION
The dispositional order is reversed insofar as it requires
mother’s visits to be monitored. In all other respects, the
jurisdictional and dispositional orders are affirmed. Upon
remand, the juvenile court shall reconsider its visitation order in
light of current circumstances.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
M. KIM, J.
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