Filed 9/23/26 In re Lily R. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re LILY R. et al., Persons B350573
Coming Under the Juvenile (Los Angeles County
Court Law. Super. Ct. No. 25CCJP02216)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
W.A.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Marguerite D. Downing, Judge. Affirmed.
W.A., in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Courtney Fisher, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
The Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS or the agency) filed a petition concerning
N.S.’s (mother’s) and W.A.’s (father’s) five children, alleging
dependency jurisdiction based on, inter alia, father’s repeated
acts of domestic violence against mother in the children’s
presence. 1 At a combined jurisdictional and dispositional
hearing, the juvenile court sustained the petition, removed the
children from father, released them to mother, ordered father to
complete a case plan, and issued a three-year restraining order
protecting mother from father. On appeal, father, in pro. per.,
argues the court erred in denying his request to continue the
hearing, and contests the jurisdictional findings, dispositional
rulings, and restraining order.
We reject father’s challenge to the denial of his motion for a
continuance because he acknowledges his trial counsel did not
show good cause warranting what would have been a fifth
continuance of the jurisdictional hearing. We also reject his
challenges to the juvenile court’s assertion of dependency
jurisdiction and issuance of the restraining order because there is
substantial evidence father repeatedly physically attacked
mother in the presence of the children. The court did not abuse
its discretion in ordering father to submit to a psychological
assessment and drug and alcohol testing because there was
1 Mother is not a party to this appeal.
2
evidence from which the court reasonably could have inferred
father’s aggression toward mother could have been caused by an
undiagnosed mental illness or substance abuse. Father forfeits
his contest to the evidentiary sufficiency of the removal order by
failing to address that issue in his opening brief, and his failure
to object below to the remainder of the court’s dispositional orders
precludes him from challenging them on appeal. Accordingly, we
affirm the court’s jurisdictional and dispositional rulings, as well
as the restraining order.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2
We summarize only those facts pertinent to our disposition
of this appeal. We describe additional facts relevant to our
analysis in our Discussion, post.
On July 28, 2025, DCFS filed a petition pursuant to
Welfare and Institutions Code 3 section 300, subdivisions (a) and
(b)(1) concerning mother’s and father’s five children: Lily R.
(born in September 2010), Lana R. (born in May 2013), Adam R.
(born in July 2015), Z.R. (born in February 2018), and Tara R.
2 In describing the procedural history and evidence
relevant to this appeal, we rely in part on admissions made by
the parties in their appellate briefing and assertions made by
DCFS that father does not dispute in his reply. (See Association
for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2023)
94 Cal.App.5th 764, 772, fn. 2, 773–774 [employing this
approach].)
3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
3
(born in August 2022). 4 The agency alleged dependency
jurisdiction based on father’s history of domestic violence against
mother in the presence of the children (counts a-1 & b-1) and his
“history of mental and emotional problems” that placed the
children at substantial risk of serious physical harm (count b-2).
At the initial hearing on August 11, 2025, the juvenile court
detained the children from father, released them to mother, and
authorized monitored visitation for father.
At the October 30, 2025 combined jurisdictional and
dispositional hearing, the juvenile court denied father’s trial
counsel’s request to continue that hearing to permit counsel to
obtain body camera and surveillance footage and unspecified
police reports. The court sustained counts a-1, b-1, and b-2 as
pleaded in the petition, ordered the children removed from
father’s custody and released them to mother, granted father
monitored visitation, and ordered him to comply with a case plan.
The case plan required father to participate in individual
counseling, complete a batterer’s intervention program, undergo
a psychological evaluation, take all prescribed psychotropic
medication, and submit to drug and alcohol testing. The court
also issued a permanent restraining order protecting mother from
father for three years.
Father timely appealed from the orders issued on
October 30, 2025.
On May 22, 2026, the juvenile court awarded mother sole
legal and physical custody of the children and granted father
monitored visitation. On June 18, 2026, the court terminated
4 Father contends the dependency case started after he
reported to law enforcement in July 2025 that mother left with
the children without telling him their whereabouts.
4
jurisdiction. On June 29, 2026, father appealed from these
orders. 5
DISCUSSION
“The juvenile court’s orders are ‘presumed to be correct,
and it is appellant’s burden to affirmatively show error[ ]’
[citations]” by supporting his or her appellate claims with
“ ‘ “reasoned argument and citations to authority . . . .” ’
[Citation].” (See In re J.F. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 70, 79–80.) The
rules of appellate procedure, including the obligation to rebut the
presumption of correctness, apply to father even though he is
self-represented. (See Scholes v. Lambirth Trucking Co. (2017)
10 Cal.App.5th 590, 595.) Accordingly, father “ ‘ “is entitled to
the same, but no greater[,] consideration than other litigants and
attorneys. [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
As explained below, father does not show the juvenile court
erred in denying his request to continue the October 30, 2025
hearing (Discussion, part C, post), asserting dependency
jurisdiction over the five children (Discussion, part D, post),
ordering him to submit to a psychological assessment and drug
and alcohol testing (Discussion, part F, post), and issuing the
permanent restraining order (Discussion, part H, post). Father
forfeits his challenge to removal of the children from his custody
(Discussion, part E, post), and father failed to object to, and
thereby forfeited his appellate claims contesting, the court’s
orders providing him only monitored visitation and requiring him
5 We, sua sponte, take judicial notice of the juvenile court’s
May 22 and June 18, 2026 orders, along with father’s notices of
appeal filed on June 29, 2026. (Evid. Code, §§ 452,
subd. (d), 459.)
5
to participate in a batterer’s intervention program, take
prescribed psychotropic medication, and attend individual
counseling (Discussion, part G, post). We thus affirm the
jurisdictional and dispositional rulings and the permanent
restraining order. 6
Before reaching these issues, we address father’s requests
to augment, correct, or clarify the record (Discussion, part A,
post), and decide whether father may challenge the admissibility
of the addendum to the jurisdictional and dispositional report
(Discussion, part B, post).
A. We Reject as Procedurally Improper Father’s
Requests To Augment, Clarify, or Correct the Record
In his appellate briefing, father asks us to “augment[ ],
correct[ ], or clarif[y]” three “concrete inaccuracies and
ambiguities” in the record pursuant to California Rules of Court,
rules 8.155 and 8.410. 7 First, according to father, although
volume five of the reporter’s transcript covers the hearing held on
October 9, 2025, “[i]ts cover and reporter’s certificate identify an
October 30 proceeding . . . .” Second, father claims a minute
6 In his reply brief, father argues for the first time the
record contains certain ambiguities as to his case plan for each
child (e.g., he claims “[c]ounseling is unchecked in the plan for
children A through D but checked in Tara R.’s plan”). Father
forfeited this contention by omitting it from his opening brief.
(See County of Los Angeles v. Niblett (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 454,
474–475 (Niblett).)
7 Although father initially sought “augmentation,
correction, or clarification” of five alleged “inaccuracies and
ambiguities,” father states in his reply brief that he “abandons”
two of them.
6
order for the October 30, 2025 hearing erroneously stated Tara R.
was born in August 2023, whereas her birth certificate reveals
she was born in August 2022. Lastly, father argues “the record is
unclear about what exhibits were actually admitted on
October 30.” (Boldface omitted.) Specifically, father contends the
minute orders for the hearing and the reporter’s transcript
“reflect admission of [three exhibits] by reference,” but an exhibit
list included in the clerk’s transcript “added an Exhibit 4,” which
is the addendum to the jurisdiction and disposition report.
In its appellate brief, DCFS admits that volume five of the
reporter’s transcript covers only the October 9, 2025 hearing and
not the proceeding held on October 30, 2025. DCFS also concedes
that Tara R. was born in August 2022. Additionally, we conclude
father is estopped from challenging the admissibility of the
addendum to the jurisdiction and disposition report. (See
Discussion, part B, post.)
We deny father’s requests for augmentation, clarification,
or correction because he seeks this relief in his appellate briefing
rather than in a properly noticed motion. (See Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.410(b)(1) [providing that in appeals in juvenile
cases, the record may be “augmented or corrected as provided in
rule 8.155(a) and (c)” “[o]n motion of a party or on [the reviewing
court’s] own motion”]; id., rule 8.155(a) & (c) [setting forth
procedures for augmentation and correction].)
B. Father Is Estopped From Contesting the
Admissibility of the Addendum to the Jurisdiction
and Disposition Report
“ ‘Under the doctrine of invited error, when a party by its
own conduct induces the commission of error, it may not claim on
appeal that the judgment should be reversed because of that
7
error.’ [Citations.]” (In re G.P. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1180,
1193.) Put differently, “ ‘ “Where a party by his conduct induces
the commission of error, he is estopped from asserting it as a
ground for reversal” on appeal.’ ” (Ibid.)
At the October 30, 2025 hearing, the juvenile court
admitted into evidence all three exhibits listed on DCFS’s initial
exhibit list: (1) the “Detention and Addendum Reports e-filed
[on] 7-28-25” (DCFS ex. no. 1), (2) “Jurisdictional Disposition
Report e-filed [on] 8-28-25” (DCFS ex. no. 2), and (3) “Last
Minute Information for the Court e-filed [on] 9-22-25” (DCFS
ex. no. 3). Approximately 40 minutes after DCFS filed the initial
exhibit list (i.e., at 10:07 a.m. on October 30, 2025), the agency
filed an amended exhibit list that included DCFS exhibit
numbers 1, 2, and 3 and added DCFS exhibit number 4, which is
the addendum to the jurisdiction and disposition report.8
According to the agency, although the juvenile court did not
formally admit DCFS exhibit number 4, father’s trial counsel
“invited any alleged error” as to the court’s consideration of that
exhibit by “rel[ying] on evidence from the addendum report
attachments during his argument.” Indeed, all counsel, including
father’s attorney, referenced DCFS exhibit number 4 at the
October 30, 2025 hearing. 9 In particular, father’s counsel
claimed that medical reports attached to the addendum report
8 It is unclear whether DCFS filed this amended exhibit
list after the October 30, 2025 hearing concluded.
9 That all parties relied upon this exhibit is unsurprising,
given that on September 11, 2025, the juvenile court continued
the jurisdictional hearing that had previously been scheduled for
that date to give all counsel sufficient time to review the
addendum report.
8
showed mother “has . . . an unhealthy reliance on pain
management medication.” By asking the court to consider DCFS
exhibit number 4, father’s counsel led the court to believe the
exhibit was properly before it. Given these circumstances, father
is estopped from arguing to the contrary on appeal.
In his reply brief, father seems to argue his attorney’s
reliance on medical reports attached to the addendum report
“may foreclose” him from challenging the admissibility of only
those attachments and not the contents of the addendum report to
which they were attached. Yet, at the October 30, 2025 hearing,
father’s counsel did not take the position that only the medical
reports attached to the addendum report were properly before the
juvenile court. Furthermore, father does not cogently argue the
invited error doctrine should apply only to part of DCFS exhibit
number 4. Thus, we disregard that contention. (See Hernandez
v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277 (Hernandez)
[“We may and do ‘disregard conclusory arguments that . . . fail to
disclose the reasoning by which the appellant reached the
conclusions he wants us to adopt.’ ”].)
In sum, father is estopped from arguing the juvenile court
did not properly admit the addendum report and its attachments.
C. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In
Denying Father’s Request To Continue the
Jurisdictional Hearing
A juvenile court may continue a hearing, “provided that a
continuance shall not be granted that is contrary to the interest
of the minor. In considering the minor’s interests, the court shall
give substantial weight to a minor’s need for prompt resolution of
his or her custody status[ and] the need to provide children with
stable environments . . . .” (See § 352, subd. (a)(1).)
9
“Continuances shall be granted only upon a showing of good
cause and only for that period of time shown to be necessary by
the evidence presented at the hearing on the motion for the
continuance. Neither a stipulation between counsel nor the
convenience of the parties is in and of itself a good cause.” (Id.,
subd. (a)(2).) “[U]nless the court for good cause entertains an oral
motion for continuance,” the party seeking a continuance must
file a written motion supported “with affidavits or declarations
detailing specific facts showing that a continuance is
necessary . . . .” (See id., subd. (a)(3).)
“ ‘We review the juvenile court’s decision to deny a
continuance for abuse of discretion. [Citation.]’ . . . [Citation.]”
(In re D.N. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 741, 756.) “ ‘ “ ‘ “The
appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court
exceeded the bounds of reason.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (In re Juan A.
(2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1204, 1208 (Juan A.).)
Before father moved for a continuance of the
October 30, 2025 hearing, the juvenile court had continued the
jurisdictional hearing four times. At the initial hearing held on
August 11, 2025, the juvenile court scheduled the jurisdictional
hearing for September 10, 2025. On September 10, 2025, the
court continued the hearing for one day to secure an Arabic
interpreter for father, and, on September 11, 2025, the court
continued the hearing to September 24, 2025 because the agency
had filed its lengthy addendum to the jurisdiction and disposition
report three days earlier. On September 24, 2025, the court
continued the hearing for one day to allow father’s new counsel to
10
attend. 10 On September 25, 2025, the court continued the matter
to October 30, 2025.
On October 21, 2025, father’s counsel filed a motion seeking
“a short continuance” of unspecified duration of the hearing
scheduled for October 30, 2025. According to father’s counsel’s
supporting declaration, “the police department need[ed]
additional time to produce” certain “subpoenaed reports” that
counsel did not further describe. Counsel did not specify when he
had subpoenaed these reports or when the police anticipated
producing them.
At the October 30, 2025 hearing, father’s counsel asserted
his office had (1) “attempted to subpoena body cam[era] footage”
and (2) “issued a subpoena for video footage from a park where
there was an alleged incident of domestic violence.” Father’s
counsel argued, “Without this footage, . . . [counsel] would not be
able to . . . present to the court discovery that would potentially
absolve [his] client of any wrongdoing.” The juvenile court denied
the motion, reasoning the court was unable to determine whether
the subpoenas were timely because father’s counsel did not
specify when he issued them, the attorney had more than thirty
days since the matter was last continued on September 25, 2025
to subpoena any relevant materials, the motion was “just a
delay,” and “what is on the body cam[era] is referenced” in one of
DCFS’s reports.
On appeal, father acknowledges in his reply brief his
counsel did not make “a sufficient statutory showing” of good
cause to continue the hearing. Indeed, he notes the juvenile court
10 Two days earlier, father filed a notice of substitution of
attorney indicating he had retained private counsel.
11
“relied on elapsed time, inadequate diligence [on the part of
father’s counsel], and [the lack of] proof of when records were
requested” in denying the motion, and that these “grounds . . .
could independently sustain [the] denial.” Father further
concedes in his reply the “defects” in his written and oral
continuance requests were “substantial,” including (1) failing to
attach or quote the subpoena, identify the custodian, or document
the response, and (2) failing to demonstrate “established
retention or present availability” of the subpoenaed materials or
to provide a “production estimate.” He also acknowledges the
written motion did not refer to the body camera footage or the
surveillance video from the park where there was an alleged
incident of domestic violence; instead, father’s counsel mentioned
this potential discovery in his oral request for a continuance at
the October 30, 2025 hearing. He further acknowledges that in
defending the court’s denial of his request for a continuance,
DCFS could “properly rel[y] on those omissions and the matter’s
age.”
These concessions notwithstanding, father argues we may
reverse the order denying his continuance request on the ground
the court erred in finding “ ‘what is on the body cam[era] is
referenced in the report.’ ” According to father, the record
contains only a “ ‘synopsis’ ” of the police’s interviews with
mother and the children, whereas the body worn camera footage
contains the “witnesses’ ‘complete statements.’ ”
The juvenile court did not find that a transcript of the body
camera footage is in the record. Rather, as we noted above, the
court merely remarked that “what is on the body cam[era] is
referenced in” one of the agency’s reports. Importantly, father’s
concession that his counsel did not show good cause is fatal to his
12
claim the court exceeded the bounds of reason in denying a
continuance of the hearing. (See § 352, subd. (a)(2)
[“Continuances shall be granted only upon a showing of good
cause . . . .”]; Juan A., supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 1208
[describing the abuse of discretion standard].)
D. We Reject Father’s Challenge to the Juvenile Court’s
Assumption of Dependency Jurisdiction Over the
Children
1. Applicable law and standard of review
Section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(A) authorizes dependency
jurisdiction if: “The child has suffered, or there is a substantial
risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as
a result of . . . : [¶] . . . The failure or inability of the child’s
parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child.” (See
§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(A).) “Exposure to domestic violence may serve
as the basis of a jurisdictional finding under section 300,
subdivision (b)” because “ ‘ “[d]omestic violence in the same
household where children are living . . . is a failure to protect [the
children] from the substantial risk of encountering the violence
and suffering serious physical harm or illness from it.”
[Citation.]’ . . . [Citation.]” (See In re R.C. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th
930, 941 (R.C.).)
“We review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and
orders for substantial evidence.” (R.C., supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 940–941.) This appellate standard imposes an “ ‘ “enormous
burden” ’ ” on father. (See Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020)
44 Cal.App.5th 570, 581–582 (Schmidt).) “When reviewing for
substantial evidence, ‘ “ ‘we draw all reasonable inferences from
the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency
13
court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the
court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and
credibility are the province of the trial court.’ [Citation.] ‘We
do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment,
but merely determine if there are sufficient facts to support the
findings of the trial court. [Citations.]” . . . [Citation.]’
[Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re A.P. (2024)
103 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1142 (A.P.).) “[W]e [also] completely
disregard” evidence that is “contrary” to the order sustaining the
petition. (See Schmidt, supra, at pp. 581–582.)
Additionally, “[t]o warrant rejection of the statements of a
witness who has been believed by the trier of fact, it must be
physically impossible for the statements to be true, or their
falsity must be apparent without resorting to inferences or
deductions.” (In re Jordan R. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 111,
136 (Jordan R.).)
2. Father fails to show count b-1 is not supported
by substantial evidence
As set forth below, father’s arguments misconceive our
standard of review, which does not permit us to reweigh evidence
or determine credibility, and requires us to affirm if substantial
evidence supports the juvenile court’s rulings.
In sustaining count b-1, the juvenile court found that
“mother . . . and father . . . have a history of engaging in violent
physical altercations in the presence of the children,” and that
“[t]he violent conduct by . . . father against . . . mother endangers
the children’s physical health and safety, creates a detrimental
home environment, and places the children at risk of serious
physical harm, damage, and danger.” Several examples of
father’s acts of violence against mother appear in count b-1,
14
including occasions in which father: choked mother; “placed [his]
hand over . . . mother’s mouth and pinched . . . mother’s nose
closed, causing . . . mother to be unable to breathe”; “repeatedly
closed [a] door on . . . mother’s head” “while . . . mother was on
the ground”; and “struck . . . mother with a guitar.”
The record contains evidence father committed multiple
acts of violence against mother, several in the presence of the
children. For instance, in the addendum to the jurisdiction and
disposition report, DCFS informed the juvenile court that during
an August 2025 interview, Lana R. told the agency she and her
siblings observed father push mother up against a wall and choke
her. According to that report, mother stated in an August 2025
interview that father began to hit her when the couple married in
2009, and she indicated father’s violent behavior toward her
intensified when the family moved from New Jersey to California
in 2016. Also included in the report is a statement from a police
detective to the effect mother told the detective that father had
subjected her to domestic violence for 20 years. Per the
addendum to the jurisdiction and disposition report, mother
indicated that on at least one occasion while the children were
present, father got on top of mother and closed her mouth and
nose so she could not breathe.
Additionally, in a police report attached to DCFS’s
jurisdiction and disposition report, a detective noted Lily R.
stated during a July 2025 interview that father “ha[d] always
been a violent person” and Lily saw father give mother “a black
eye in the past.” (Boldface omitted.)
The above examples establish a pattern of violent behavior
from which the juvenile court reasonably could have inferred
father would again assault mother in the children’s presence.
15
(See R.C., supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 942 [“ ‘ “[P]ast violent
behavior in a relationship is ‘the best predictor of future
violence.’ ” ’ ”].) In addition, the detention report and the
jurisdiction and disposition report indicate father denied the
allegations of domestic violence against him. Father’s failure to
acknowledge his past violent behavior, let alone express remorse
or show any insight regarding it, is substantial evidence that in
the absence of juvenile court supervision, he would again attack
mother in the children’s presence. (See In re A.F. (2016)
3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293 [“ ‘[D]enial is a factor often relevant to
determining whether persons are likely to modify their behavior
in the future without court supervision.’ ”].)
Father’s arguments do not dissuade us from these
conclusions. Father contests the sufficiency of the evidence of the
incidents in which he allegedly struck mother with a guitar and
closed the door on mother’s head while she was on the ground.
Specifically, he argues the former occasion (which he dubs “the
guitar incident”) (boldface omitted) — “if it occurred at all — was
remote, out of state, and not remembered firsthand by the
younger children” or by mother. He further maintains that Lily
and Adam “admitt[ed] they did not recall” the incident in which
he closed the door on mother’s head and “knew of it because
mother told them.” (Boldface omitted.) Assuming arguendo no
rational factfinder could conclude these two alleged instances of
domestic violence occurred, there remains the other evidence
described above that father had assaulted mother on a number of
other occasions (e.g., Lana and her siblings witnessed father
choke mother). Although father insists the so-called guitar
incident “was . . . treated as a major [count] . . . B-1 credibility
anchor in the petition,” the text of count b-1 does not indicate
16
that the incident was essential to DCFS’s invocation of
dependency jurisdiction, and father does not support this
assertion with reasoned argument. (See Hernandez, supra,
37 Cal.App.5th at p. 277.)
Father maintains he “presented DCFS with concrete media
evidence bearing on mother’s aggression, medication use,
household conditions, and child distress.” Yet, father supports
this assertion with a citation to the entirety of the 29-page
jurisdiction and disposition report (along with its attachments)
and the 58-page addendum to that report (along with its
attachments). We disregard this argument because father
does not support it with adequate citations to the record. (See
Graham v. Bank of America, N.A. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 594,
611 [noting that “block [record] citations do not comply with” the
rules governing appellate briefing].)
Father asserts that DCFS reported he “appeared to display
appropriate concern” for the children, and, during his monitored
visits with them, the agency observed that (1) “the children and
father had a good relationship and enjoyed their visits” and
(2) one such monitored visit “ ‘went great.’ ” (Boldface omitted.)
Father also asserts DCFS had an interpreter translate from
Arabic to English video footage mother had given to the agency
but did not do the same for clips father had provided to the
agency. He deduces from this disparity that DCFS “was not
neutrally evaluating competing evidence” but was instead
“selecting which evidence to treat as serious and which to
downplay.” He further intimates, without any supporting
analysis, that mother must have “coach[ed]” the children to
report to DCFS that he committed acts of violence against her.
(Boldface & capitalization omitted.)
17
In essence, father challenges the weight or credibility of
mother’s and children’s accounts of his violent behavior based on
his suspicion that mother coached the children and his assertions
he had a positive relationship with the children and the agency
was biased against him. These challenges fall short of
establishing error under the deferential standard that governs
our review of the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding. (See
Jordan R., supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 136 [holding that an
appellate court may reject the statements of a witness credited by
the factfinder only if it is physically impossible for the statements
to be true or their falsity is apparent without resort to inferences
or deductions].)
Finally, in his reply brief, father raises new arguments
disputing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting count b-1.
For instance, he complains, “No identified medical-treatment
record, obstetric report, or dated injury photograph corroborated”
reports that father assaulted mother. Another example is
father’s assertion that a police officer’s description of a video
showing father “ ‘smack[ing]’ [mother’s] head while Tara R. was
next to [m]other” is of limited weight because “the raw file was
not independently admitted” and the officer’s description “did not
establish the date, full prelude, [or] Tara R.’s precise
location . . . .” We disregard father’s belatedly raised evidentiary
challenges to count b-1. (Niblett, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at
p. 475.)
In sum, father fails to overcome the presumption that
substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that
father committed violent acts against mother in the children’s
presence, thereby warranting assertion of dependency
jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(A).
18
3. Our affirmance of the juvenile court’s ruling
sustaining count b-1 moots father’s challenges
to counts a-1 and b-2
“As a general rule, a single jurisdictional finding supported
by substantial evidence is sufficient to support jurisdiction and
render moot a challenge to the other [jurisdictional] findings.”
(See In re M.W. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1452.) In light of
our affirmance of the juvenile court’s ruling sustaining count b-1,
we need not determine whether substantial evidence supports
count a-1 (which alleged jurisdiction under section 300,
subdivision (a) based on father’s acts of domestic violence) or
count b-2 (which alleged jurisdiction under subdivision (b)(1)
based on father’s mental and emotional problems).
Father argues in his reply that we “should reach
[count] B-2 even if another finding could sustain dependency
jurisdiction” because count “B-2 supplies a distinct psychiatric
predicate for the psychological-assessment and medication-
related terms, bears on visitation and future decisionmaking, and
carries consequences separate from [counts] A-1 or B-1.” Father
overlooks the fact that we may affirm the juvenile court’s
dispositional rulings, including the order requiring him to submit
to a psychological assessment even if arguendo the court erred in
sustaining count b-2.11 Additionally, as explained in our
11 (See In re Briana V. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 297, 311
(Briana V.) [“At disposition, the juvenile court is not limited to
the content of the sustained petition when it considers what
dispositional orders would be in the best interests of the
children.”].)
19
Discussion, part G, post, father has forfeited his appellate
challenges to the orders requiring him to take prescribed
psychotropic medication and authorizing him to have only
monitored visits with the children. Lastly, father does not
develop his contention that count b-2 “bears on . . . [the juvenile
court’s] future decisionmaking, and carries [other]
consequences . . . .” Accordingly, we adhere to the general rule
that affirmance of one jurisdictional finding renders moot
challenges to other jurisdictional findings.
E. Father Forfeits His Challenge to the Orders
Removing the Children from His Custody
In his opening brief, father argues the orders removing the
children from his custody should be vacated if we conclude the
jurisdictional findings lacked sufficient evidentiary support.
Father does not argue in that brief that even if we were to affirm
one or more of the jurisdictional findings, the removal orders
should nonetheless be vacated for insufficient evidence.
In its respondent’s brief, DCFS argues the orders removing
the children from father should be affirmed because father
“makes no independent challenge to those orders” in his opening
brief.
In his reply brief, father raises new arguments to support
his position the juvenile court erred in issuing the removal
orders. For instance, he maintains removal was improper
because DCFS and the court “did not explain why enforceable
separation, . . . approved monitors, unannounced checks, [or
We address father’s claim of error as to the order requiring
him to undergo a psychological assessment in Discussion, part F,
post.
20
other] services . . . could not manage the asserted risk” of harm to
the children. Father forfeited these arguments by not raising
them in his opening brief, thereby depriving DCFS of an
opportunity to respond to them. (See Niblett, supra,
116 Cal.App.5th at p. 475 [“ ‘ “ ‘ “To withhold a point until the
closing brief would deprive the respondent of his opportunity to
answer it or require the effort and delay of an additional brief by
permission.” ’ ” ’ ”].)
F. Father Does Not Show the Juvenile Court Abused Its
Discretion In Ordering Him To Submit to a
Psychological Assessment and Drug and Alcohol
Testing
“ ‘The juvenile court has broad discretion to determine
what would best serve and protect the child’s interests and to
fashion a dispositional order accordingly. On appeal, this
determination cannot be reversed absent a clear abuse of
discretion. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Briana V., supra,
236 Cal.App.4th at pp. 311–312 [applying this standard in
reviewing an order requiring a father to attend counseling].)
“ ‘When applying the deferential abuse of discretion standard,
“the trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial
evidence . . . .” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Maya L. (2014)
232 Cal.App.4th 81, 102.)
As for the juvenile court’s order requiring father to undergo
a psychological assessment, there was evidence from which the
juvenile court reasonably could have inferred father may have an
undiagnosed mental health condition that caused him to attack
mother. For example, DCFS noted in its detention report that in
July 2025, mother told the agency: (1) Mother “observed father’s
mental health . . . decline over the last 1.5 years”; (2) “[f]ather
21
ha[d] stated to her and the children that the Egyptian
Intelligence [was] ‘out to get him’ and [he] believe[d] mother
[was] connected to them”; (3) “[f]ather ha[d] also stated that
mother . . . ‘d[id] something’ to him and the children to get them
to sleep so she c[ould] bring men home and perform sexual acts
with them”; (4) father had “hear[d] things and see[n] things that
no one else c[ould] and w[ould] tell these things to mother and
[the] children”; and (5) “[f]ather has made inappropriate
comments about mother in front of the children, calling her a
whore and accus[ing] her of bringing men into the home and
performing sexual acts and being a prostitute.”
The detention report shows that in July 2025, Lana R.
relayed to the agency that “father has physically harmed mother
when angry” and, “as father [had] become more paranoid and
accusatory [toward] mother,” he became angered by her more
easily. Similarly, according to the addendum to the jurisdiction
and disposition report, Adam R. indicated during an August 2025
interview that his parents argued every day, father has
repeatedly accused mother of “do[ing] bad stuff with . . . men,”
and Adam saw father grab mother by the neck and “sometimes
he grabbed her from behind like a choke hold.”
The juvenile court was entitled to credit this evidence of
father’s angry and paranoid behavior. (See Discussion, part D.1,
ante [noting that issues of fact and credibility are the province of
the juvenile court].) Based on that evidence, the court did not
exceed the bounds of reason in ordering a psychological
assessment to determine whether a mental health condition
caused father to perpetrate violent acts against mother.
(Juan A., supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 1208 [describing the abuse
of discretion standard].)
22
Turning to father’s obligation to submit to drug and alcohol
testing, father argues we should reverse that ruling because
“[t]here was no sustained father-substance-abuse count.”
(Boldface omitted.) The absence of a jurisdictional finding that
father abused substances does not undermine the validity of the
drug and alcohol testing requirement. (See Briana V., supra,
236 Cal.App.4th at p. 311 [“The problem that the juvenile court
seeks to address need not be described in the sustained
section 300 petition.”].) Furthermore, according to the addendum
to the jurisdiction and disposition report, a police detective, who
spoke with father several months before the October 30, 2025
hearing, told the agency, “[Father] may . . . be under the
influence of a stimulant given how he presents as manic.” We
acknowledge the detective’s observation that father’s behavior is
consistent with being under the influence of a stimulant, by itself,
does not show substance abuse. Nevertheless, because this
evidence suggests father’s paranoia and belligerence could be
attributable to an illicit substance, the juvenile court did not
abuse its discretion in ordering testing to ascertain whether that
was the case.
We further note that in his reply brief, father levels several
new arguments as to the drug and alcohol testing order,
including his assertions the detective did not find any drugs in
father’s vehicle and no positive drug test result for father is in the
record. We disregard father’s belated evidentiary challenges to
this order. (See Niblett, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 475.)
In sum, we conclude father does not show the juvenile court
clearly abused its discretion in ordering him to submit to a
psychological evaluation and drug and alcohol testing.
23
G. Father Forfeited His Challenges to the Monitored
Visitation Order and the Orders Requiring Him To
Participate in a Batterer’s Intervention Program,
Take All Prescribed Psychotropic Medication, and
Attend Individual Counseling
On appeal, father maintains the juvenile court erred in
ordering only monitored visitation and requiring him to complete
a batterer’s intervention program, take all prescribed
psychotropic medication, and participate in individual
counseling. He acknowledges in his reply brief, however, he did
not object to these orders at the combined jurisdictional and
dispositional hearing. Consequently, father forfeited these
challenges. (See In re A.E. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1, 4–5
[holding that a parent forfeits an appellate challenge to a
dispositional ruling by failing to object to the order during the
juvenile court proceedings].)
H. Father Fails To Demonstrate the Juvenile Court
Erred By Issuing a Permanent Restraining Order
Protecting Mother From Father
“ ‘Under section 213.5, . . . a juvenile court has the
authority to issue a restraining order lasting up to three years
that protects . . . “any parent . . . of the [dependent] child” from
harassment by a parent. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (A.P., supra,
103 Cal.App.5th at p. 1143.) A restraining order may be issued
under the statute if “ ‘ “failure to make [the order] may jeopardize
the safety of the [protected person].” ’ [Citation.]” (See In re
S.G. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 654, 673, second bracketed insertion
added.) “ ‘[A]ppellate courts apply the substantial evidence
standard to determine whether sufficient facts supported the
24
factual findings in support of a [section 213.5] restraining order
and the abuse of discretion standard to determine whether the
court properly issued the order.’ [Citation.]” (S.G., supra, at
p. 670.)
Father argues the juvenile court’s issuance of the
permanent restraining order “was procedurally irregular.”
(Boldface & capitalization omitted.) In support of this contention,
father lists certain events preceding the order (e.g., the court
issued a prior temporary restraining order on September 11, 2025
and reissued it 14 days later). He, however, provides no legal
analysis or citation to authority demonstrating the court failed to
comply with procedures governing issuance of the permanent
restraining order. We thus decline to address this argument
further.
Father also complains the restraining order “rested on the
same unreliable and insufficient record as the jurisdictional
findings.” (Boldface & capitalization omitted.) As explained in
our Discussion, part D.2, ante, substantial evidence supports the
juvenile court’s finding that father had committed multiple acts
of domestic violence against mother. Accordingly, we reject
father’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
the restraining order.
25
DISPOSITION
We affirm the juvenile court’s (1) assumption of dependency
jurisdiction over Lily R., Lana R., Adam R., Z.R., and Tara R.;
(2) dispositional orders; and (3) permanent restraining order
protecting mother from father.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
M. KIM, J.
26