Filed 7/14/26 In re Lillie K. CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
In re Lillie K., a Person Coming B344178
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No. 24CCJP03905A)
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
EDWARD K. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Mary E. Kelly, Judge. Reversed.
Benjamin Ekenes, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Edward K.
Joseph D. Mackenzie, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Candace C.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Aileen Wong, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Edward K. (Father) and Candace C. (Mother) appeal from
the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding and dispositional order,
declaring their daughter, Lillie K., a dependent of the court under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b).1 On
appeal, the parents argue that jurisdiction was not warranted
because the juvenile court orally pronounced that it was striking
the language in the section 300 petition stating that Lillie was at
risk of serious physical harm, damage, and danger. The parents
further assert that the evidence was insufficient to establish that
their alleged inability to provide Lillie with appropriate care and
supervision placed her at substantial risk of serious physical
harm. We conclude that the juvenile court erred in exercising
jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b), after striking the
allegation Lillie was at risk of serious physical harm, damage,
and danger. We accordingly reverse.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Section 300 petition
In October 2024, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral alleging
that then 12-year-old Lillie was a victim of emotional abuse.
According to the reporting party, the parents often had loud
verbal confrontations, and at times, they could be heard cursing
at Lillie and making the child cry. When DCFS first interviewed
the family, both parents denied the allegations, and indicated
that the neighbors likely heard them yelling at their dogs.
Mother did, however, acknowledge that Lillie was very
1 Unless otherwise stated, all further undesignated statutory
references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2
hyperactive due to Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder
(ADHD), and that Mother recently yelled at the child when she
accidentally threw away her ADHD medication. Mother also
explained that she withdrew Lillie from school in July 2024, and
was in the process of trying to enroll the child in an online
program. In her interview, Lillie likewise denied any physical or
verbal abuse, and stated she felt safe in her parents’ care. The
social worker observed that Lillie had marks on her arms, legs,
and face, which the child indicated were bug bites from playing
outside.
DCFS also spoke with several of the family’s neighbors,
who reported that they often heard the parents screaming at
Lillie and calling her names, which caused the child to cry. One
neighbor shared some audio recordings with DCFS in which both
parents could be heard yelling at Lillie and referring to her as
“stupid” and “retard.”
Over the next few weeks, DCFS followed up with the family
about Lillie’s lack of enrollment in school. As described by
Mother, she withdrew Lillie from school because the child was
failing her classes and being bullied by other students. Mother
was instructing Lillie with packets that she found on the
internet, but she acknowledged that she was “ ‘not a teacher’ ”
and could not “make the child do much” because of Lillie’s ADHD.
Mother confirmed that she planned to enroll Lillie in a K–12
online program and would provide proof of enrollment to DCFS.
Mother also reported that Lillie used to see a therapist but had
not done so for several years, and that Mother was open to
restarting therapy for the child. Lillie’s former school counselor
advised DCFS that the child had an Individualized Education
Program (IEP) due to her ADHD diagnosis, and that Lillie did
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fine in a classroom setting but failed to complete any homework.
DCFS also consulted with its education specialist who
recommended that Lillie attend in-person school to receive
appropriate services related to her IEP.
On December 13, 2024, DCFS filed a dependency petition
for Lillie under section 300, subdivision (b). The petition alleged
a single count as follows: “The child Lillie [K.’s] mother, Candace
[C.], and her father, Edward [K.], have a limited ability to provide
the child with appropriate parental care and supervision. The
parents are unable to handle the child’s behavior due to the
child’s diagnosis of ADHD and have failed to ensure she receives
mental health and behavioral services to address her needs. The
mother and father’s limited ability to provide the child with
appropriate parental care and supervision endangers the child’s
physical health and safety, creates a detrimental home
environment and places the child at risk of serious physical
harm, damage and danger.”
At an initial hearing held on December 30, 2024, the
juvenile court denied DCFS’s request to detain Lillie from her
parents. The court ordered that Lillie remain released to the
parents under DCFS’s supervision pending adjudication of the
petition.
2. Jurisdictional and dispositional report
In January 2025, DCFS conducted additional interviews
with the family for its jurisdiction/disposition report. In her
interview, Lillie indicated that she was attending an online
homeschooling program, but only spent about two hours per week
on school work. She maintained that her parents never called
her names, and that the neighbors were mistaken because the
parents were talking about their dogs. Lillie once got into trouble
4
when Mother found out that she was talking to a 17-year-old boy
on her phone. Lillie denied that the boy ever said anything
inappropriate to her, and confirmed that she was no longer in
contact with him. Lillie stated that Mother disciplined her by
taking away her phone or making her do chores.
In her interview, Mother indicated that Lillie’s behaviors
were sometimes difficult due to her ADHD, but insisted that she
was capable of caring for the child. Mother reported that Lillie
had been under the care of Dr. Posner, a behavioral specialist,
since she was five years old. Although the child was not
currently attending therapy, Mother scheduled an upcoming
appointment for her with the Department of Mental Health.
Mother also enrolled Lillie in an online homeschooling program,
but she was not scheduled to start the program until later that
month. In his interview, Father stated that Lillie’s ADHD
symptoms included staying up late, sneaking out of bed after the
parents went to sleep, and acting hyper at times. Father did not
believe Lillie needed any services to address her ADHD apart
from medication. Both Mother and Father continued to deny that
they were ever verbally abusive to the child.
For its report, DCFS confirmed that Lillie was a patient of
Dr. Posner at Olive View UCLA. Lillie had followup
appointments with Dr. Posner every three months regarding her
ADHD, and she was last seen in January 2025. Dr. Posner
prescribed Lillie medication for her ADHD.
DCFS recommended that the juvenile court sustain the
section 300 petition and order that Lillie remain placed with her
parents with family maintenance services. In its report, DCFS
expressed concern that the parents were verbally abusing Lillie
based on the statements of various neighbors. DCFS also was
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concerned that the parents were neglecting Lillie’s educational
needs given that they had not provided proof of enrollment in a
homeschooling program and Lillie indicated that she was only
spending about two hours per week on school work. DCFS asked
the juvenile court to order that Lillie be assessed for mental
health services and enrolled in a formal schooling program.
In a last minute information report filed on February 7,
2025, DCFS stated that Mother provided proof of Lillie’s
enrollment in an online homeschooling program, and that during
a recent home visit, the social worker observed Lillie doing her
school work. However, in late January 2025, Mother contacted
the social worker for assistance in transitioning Lillie back to in-
person schooling because Mother was having a hard time
navigating the online program. DCFS also reported that, as of
January 21, 2025, Lillie was enrolled in mental health services
and would be attending therapy once a week.
3. Jurisdictional and dispositional hearing
On February 10, 2025, the juvenile court held a combined
jurisdictional and dispositional hearing. Mother objected to the
hearsay statements of the neighbors contained in DCFS’s reports
under section 355. Counsel for Mother and counsel for Father
joined in requesting that the court dismiss the section 300
petition. Mother’s counsel argued that the allegations of verbal
abuse were made by anonymous neighbors who misinterpreted
the parents’ yelling at their dogs, and even if the parents yelled
at Lillie, there was no evidence that such conduct placed the child
at risk of physical harm. Mother’s counsel also noted that DCFS
had been provided with proof of Lillie’s enrollment in a formal
homeschooling program, and in any event, Mother was in the
process of returning the child to in-person schooling. In addition,
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Mother’s counsel asserted that the parents had been addressing
Lillie’s ADHD diagnosis through the care provided by Dr. Posner,
which included prescribed medication, and that Lillie recently
resumed therapy as well.
Counsel for Lillie and counsel for DCFS joined in asking
that the juvenile court sustain the petition as pled. Lillie’s
counsel argued that there was evidence that “at times Mother
may not know how to respond to some of the child’s behaviors,
which results in yelling and sort of a chaotic home environment.”
Lillie’s counsel also expressed concern that the child was not
enrolled in a formal schooling program for at least six months,
and that the parents previously discontinued therapy for her.
DCFS’s counsel similarly argued that the parents were failing to
meet Lillie’s mental health and educational needs. DCFS’s
counsel noted that the parents had not sought therapy for the
child for several years, and that they did not pursue a formal
homeschooling program until DCFS became involved. DCFS’s
counsel asserted that “it’s a step in the right direction that
Mother contacted the social worker asking for help to enroll the
child in an in-person school, but this is further reflection of her
limited ability to provide care for the child.”
After hearing the argument of counsel, the juvenile court
sustained the section 300 petition as amended by interlineation.
In announcing its ruling, the court stated in relevant part: “I am
not relying on the statements of the neighbors. The [section] 355
objections, I think, are well-founded. … [¶] However, I do agree
that minor[ ] being removed from school for that amount of time
was problematic. [¶] … [T]he reason why, from the court’s
perspective, that I believe that there is limited abilities is
because the child wasn’t in school. And that’s very concerning to
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the court, because you don’t want someone to get behind, and
especially with an I.E.P., being home schooled, and the packets
weren’t even geared towards courses that would allow the child to
get credit. So I do believe that there is a limited ability. [¶] I am
modifying the petition to say that the parents have difficulty
handling the child’s … behavior due to the child’s diagnosis and
failed to ensure mental health and behavioral services. [¶] I am
striking ‘as to physical harm and damage and danger’ and so
with that modification, I do sustain the (b) count. [¶] … [O]n that
basis, the court finds that the child is a person described by
section 300, subdivision (b). I declare the child a dependent of
the court under section 300.”
Although the juvenile court stated that it was striking the
phrase “ ‘physical harm and damage and danger’ ” from the
section 300 petition, the handwritten modifications only struck
the words “damage and danger,” while leaving in place the words
“serious physical harm.” The sustained petition as amended by
the court’s interlineations read as follows: “The child Lillie [K.’s]
mother, Candace [C.], and her father, Edward [K.], have a limited
ability to provide the child with appropriate parental care and
supervision. The parents have difficulty handling the child’s
behavior due to the child’s diagnosis of ADHD and have failed to
ensure she receives mental health and behavioral services to
address her needs. The mother and father’s limited ability to
provide the child with appropriate parental care and supervision
endangers the child’s physical health and safety, creates a
detrimental home environment and places the child at risk of
serious physical harm.”
With respect to disposition, the juvenile court ordered that
Lillie remain placed with her parents under the supervision of
8
DCFS. The court also ordered family maintenance services,
including individual counseling for the parents and mental
health services for Lillie.
Both parents filed a timely appeal from the jurisdictional
finding and dispositional order.
4. Postappeal orders
DCFS requests this court take judicial notice of an order
issued by the juvenile court during the pendency of the parents’
appeal. We grant DCFS’s request. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d),
459, subd. (a).) This order reflects that, at a review hearing held
on October 13, 2025, the juvenile court found that the conditions
justifying the initial assumption of jurisdiction no longer existed.
The court terminated jurisdiction over Lillie and released the
child to both parents.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, the parents challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction
under section 300, subdivision (b). They specifically contend that
the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that Lillie was
at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness.
Father also asserts that jurisdiction was unwarranted because
the juvenile court struck the allegation that Lillie was at risk of
serious physical harm, damage, and danger, which rendered the
petition facially insufficient or internally contradictory.
DCFS argues that the parents’ appeal is moot because
jurisdiction has since been terminated with Lillie released to
parental custody. In support of this argument, DCFS filed a
motion to dismiss the appeal concurrently with its request for
judicial notice. Alternatively, DCFS asserts that the juvenile
court’s jurisdictional finding was proper because its written
9
order, which left in place the phrase “at risk of serious physical
harm,” controls over its ambiguous oral ruling. DCFS further
contends that there was substantial evidence to support a finding
that the parents’ inability to appropriately care for Lillie placed
the child at a substantial risk of serious physical harm.
Although the parents’ appeal is moot, we exercise our
discretion to consider the merits of the appeal. We conclude the
juvenile court’s oral pronouncement of its ruling controls over the
handwritten modifications to the section 300 petition, and that
its decision to strike the allegation that Lillie was at risk of
serious physical harm, damage, or danger did not support the
assertion of jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b).
Accordingly, because the juvenile court erred in sustaining the
amended petition, we reverse the jurisdictional finding.
1. Mootness
We first address DCFS’s argument that the parents’ appeal
has been rendered moot by the juvenile court’s termination of
dependency jurisdiction over Lillie. “A case becomes moot when
events ‘ “render[] it impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the
case in favor of plaintiff, to grant him any effect[ive] relief.” ’ ”
(In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276 (D.P.).) “For relief to be
‘effective,’ two requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff
must complain of an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be
redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome the
plaintiff seeks.” (Ibid.) “ ‘As a general rule, an order terminating
… jurisdiction renders an appeal from a previous order in the
dependency proceedings moot. [Citation.] However, dismissal for
mootness in such circumstances is not automatic.’ ” (In re T.R.
(2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 206, 214.) Rather, “[a] reviewing court
must ‘ “decide on a case-by-case basis whether subsequent events
10
in a juvenile dependency matter make a case moot and whether
[its] decision would affect the outcome in a subsequent
proceeding.” ’ ” (D.P., at p. 276.)
“Even when a case is moot, courts may exercise their
‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the dispute.” (D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) In determining whether to exercise
such discretion, “[c]ourts may consider whether the challenged
jurisdictional finding ‘could be prejudicial to the appellant or
could potentially impact the current or future dependency
proceedings.’ ” (Id. at p. 285.) Courts also may consider the
reason why the appeal has been rendered moot. (Id. at p. 286.)
For example, “where … the case becomes moot due to prompt
compliance by parents with their case plan, discretionary review
may be especially appropriate.” (Ibid.) Otherwise, “[i]t would
perversely incentivize noncompliance if mootness doctrine
resulted in the availability of appeals from jurisdictional findings
only for parents who are less compliant or for whom the court has
issued additional orders.” (Ibid.)
Here, the issue of whether the juvenile court properly
asserted jurisdiction over Lillie has been rendered moot by its
subsequent order terminating jurisdiction. Lillie was never
removed from parental custody during the proceedings, and when
the court terminated jurisdiction, the child remained placed with
both parents. Moreover, neither parent is challenging any aspect
of the dispositional order on appeal. However, it appears that the
reason that jurisdiction was terminated was because the parents
promptly complied with their case plans, and thus, the juvenile
court found that the conditions justifying the assumption of
jurisdiction no longer existed. Under these circumstances, we
exercise our discretion to consider the merits of the appeal.
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2. The juvenile court’s oral pronouncement prevails
over its conflicting written order
Both Mother and Father contend that the juvenile court
erred in exercising jurisdiction over Lillie under section 300,
subdivision (b), because there was no evidence that the parents’
alleged conduct placed the child at substantial risk of serious
physical harm. In adjudicating the section 300 petition, the
juvenile court orally pronounced that it was “striking ‘as to
physical harm and damage and danger’ ” from the language of
the petition and sustaining the petition “with that modification.”
However, in the handwritten modifications to the petition, the
court or its staff only struck the words “damage” and “danger,”
and left in place the words “at risk of serious physical harm.”
Given this conflict between the court’s oral and written orders,
the parties dispute which one controls.
California Courts of Appeal have reached differing
conclusions as to which ruling controls when a juvenile court’s
oral pronouncement conflicts with its written order. (See, e.g.,
In re Karla C. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1259, fn. 9 [oral
pronouncement placing child with father under dependency
jurisdiction prevailed over written order granting father sole
custody]; In re Aryanna C. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1241,
fn. 5 [orders regarding reunification services as stated at
dispositional hearing prevailed over conflicting order in clerk’s
transcript]; In re Jerred H. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 793, 798, fn. 3
[written order terminating parental rights of unknown fathers
controlled over oral pronouncement referencing alleged father
only]; In re Jennifer G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 752, 756, fn. 1
[written order granting parents visitation controlled over oral
statement that children would not benefit from continuing
12
relationship with parents].) Our Supreme Court has prescribed
the following approach for resolving conflicts between a clerk’s
and reporter’s transcripts: “ ‘[W]hen … the record is in conflict it
will be harmonized if possible; but where this is not possible that
part of the record will prevail, which, because of its origin and
nature or otherwise, is entitled to greater credence [citation].
Therefore whether the recitals in the clerk’s minutes should
prevail as against contrary statements in the reporter’s
transcript, must depend upon the circumstances of each
particular case.’ ” (People v. Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 599;
accord, People v. Anzalone (2013) 56 Cal.4th 545, 552, fn. 6;
People v. Harrison (2005) 35 Cal.4th 208, 226.)
Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the
juvenile court’s oral pronouncement that it was “striking ‘as to
physical harm and damage and danger’ ” from the language of
the section 300 petition is entitled to greater credence.
Consistent with its oral ruling, the court or its staff crossed out
the words “damage” and “danger” from the petition filed by
DCFS. The most reasonable explanation for the failure to cross
out the remainder of the phrase “places the child at risk of
serious physical harm” is a clerical error. There is nothing in the
record to suggest that the court sought to draw a distinction
between the words “harm,” “damage,” and “danger” in modifying
the petition, or intended to make a finding that the parents’
conduct placed Lillie at risk of physical harm, but not at risk of
physical damage or danger. Instead, it appears that the court
decided to assert jurisdiction based on the parents’ failure to
enroll Lillie in school for an extended period of time, even though
it did not believe that such conduct posed a risk of serious
physical harm, damage, or danger to the child.
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This interpretation of the juvenile court’s ruling is
consistent with the totality of its remarks at the adjudication
hearing. In sustaining an amended version of the petition, the
court stated that Lillie “being removed from school … was
problematic,” that it “believe[d] that there is limited abilities …
because the child wasn’t in school,” and that this was “very
concerning to the court, because you don’t want someone to get
behind … especially with an I.E.P.” Yet the court never indicated
that the parents’ “limited abilities” to provide Lillie with
appropriate schooling in any way placed the child at risk of
suffering serious physical harm. (See In re Janet T. (2001)
93 Cal.App.4th 377, 388–389 [failure to attend school regularly
does not in and of itself pose a substantial risk of serious physical
harm to child].) Moreover, while the record does not indicate
whether the handwritten modifications to the petition were made
by the judge or the judicial assistant, there is no question that
the judge delivered the oral ruling of the court from the bench.
On this record, the court’s oral pronouncement that it was
striking the language regarding Lillie being at risk of physical
harm, damage, and danger prevails over its conflicting written
modification to the section 300 petition.
3. The juvenile court erred in asserting jurisdiction
under section 300, subdivision (b)
Given that the juvenile court rejected the allegation that
Lillie was at substantial risk of serious physical harm based on
her parents’ limited abilities, it was error for the court to exercise
jurisdiction over the child under section 300, subdivision (b).
Subdivision (b) of the statute provides, in relevant part, that a
child comes within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court if “[t]he
child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will
14
suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of … [¶] …
[t]he failure or inability of the child’s parent … to adequately
supervise or protect the child.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(A).) “ ‘[T]o
obtain a jurisdictional determination under section 300,
subdivision (b)(1), an agency must “prove three elements: (1) the
parent’s … neglectful conduct or failure or inability to protect the
child; (2) causation; and (3) serious physical harm or illness or a
substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.” ’ ” (In re
Gilberto G. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 52, 61–62.) “ ‘ “The third
element ‘effectively requires a showing that at the time of the
jurisdictional hearing the child is at substantial risk of serious
physical harm in the future.’ ” ’ ” (In re Jesus M. (2015)
235 Cal.App.4th 104, 111.) As appellate courts repeatedly have
recognized, “ ‘section 300, subdivision (b) … “ ‘means what it says.
Before courts and agencies can exert jurisdiction under section
300, subdivision (b), there must be evidence indicating that the
child is exposed to a substantial risk of serious physical harm or
illness.’ ” ’ ” (In re Israel T. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 47, 52 (Israel
T.); accord, In re Jesus M., at p. 111; In re Noe F. (2013)
213 Cal.App.4th 358, 366; In re Alysha S. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th
393, 399; In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820.)
In Israel T., for instance, the juvenile court “found true
under section 300, subdivision (b)(1) that there was ‘a … risk that
the child[ren] will suffer … physical harm,’ and that [the parents]
‘created an endangering home environment for the children in
that trace amounts of methamphetamine were found in the
children’s home within access of the children.’ ” (Israel T., supra,
30 Cal.App.5th at p. 50.) However, in making its findings, the
juvenile court “struck the word ‘substantial’ before the word
‘risk,’ and struck the word ‘serious’ before the word ‘physical
15
harm’ ” from the section 300 petition. (Ibid.) The Court of
Appeal held that these findings did not support the assertion of
jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b). (Id. at pp. 52–53.)
As the Isreal T. court explained: “By striking the language that
stated the children were at substantial risk of serious harm, the
[juvenile] court made clear that it did not believe the parents
posed the level of risk to the children that must be found to
warrant assertion of jurisdiction under subdivision (b) of section
300. This was confirmed by the court’s comment moments later,
when it stated it did not believe [the parents] posed ‘any … risk’
to the children. Accordingly, its finding that jurisdiction was
warranted must be reversed.” (Id. at p. 52, fn. omitted.)
Here, the juvenile court announced that it was striking the
language in the section 300 petition pertaining to Lillie being at
risk of physical harm, damage, and danger. As in Isreal T., by
striking that specific language, the court made clear that it did
not believe that Mother or Father posed the level of risk to Lillie
that is required to warrant jurisdiction under subdivision (b) of
the statute. Because the court decided that Lillie was not at risk
of serious physical harm from her parents’ conduct in sustaining
the amended petition, it could not properly assert jurisdiction
over the child under section 300, subdivision (b).
DCFS contends that the parents forfeited any challenge to
the facial sufficiency of the section 300 petition by failing to object
in the juvenile court. We disagree. The petition filed by DCFS
was not facially deficient. It contained the allegation that the
parents’ “limited ability to provide [Lillie] with appropriate
parental care and supervision … places the child at risk of
serious physical harm, damage, and danger.” At the adjudication
hearing, the parents argued the petition should be dismissed
16
because DCFS failed to prove that their conduct posed a
substantial risk of serious physical harm to Lillie. In finding that
Lillie came within the jurisdiction of the court under section 300,
subdivision (b), the court amended the petition by striking the
“physical harm, damage, and danger” language and then
sustained the petition as amended by interlineation. Thus, the
issue before this court is not whether the amended petition was
deficient on its face, but whether the juvenile court made the
requisite findings to warrant the assertion of jurisdiction under
section 300, subdivision (b). (Israel T., supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at
p. 51 [no forfeiture where parent was “not challenging the
sufficiency of the petition, but the court’s failure to make the
findings required by statute”].) We decline to find forfeiture
under these circumstances.
DCFS also asserts that we should review the ruling of the
juvenile court rather than its reasoning by determining only if
substantial evidence supported a finding of jurisdiction under
section 300, subdivision (b). However, as the Court of Appeal
explained in Israel T., “[i]f the record does not show that the
[juvenile] court did, in fact, make the requisite findings, it is
immaterial whether the evidence might have supported such
findings. The test for substantial evidence is applied to the
court’s actual finding.” (Israel T., supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 53.)
In this case, the juvenile court found true the allegation that the
parents had a limited ability to provide Lillie with appropriate
care and supervision, but did not find true the allegation that
Lillie suffered, or was at substantial risk of suffering, serious
physical harm or illness. Because the court failed to make the
requisite findings to warrant jurisdiction under section 300,
subdivision (b), it is immaterial whether the evidence might have
17
supported those findings if they had been made. On this record,
the juvenile court erred in exercising dependency jurisdiction
over Lillie under section 300, subdivision (b).
DISPOSITION
The motion to dismiss the appeal is denied. The
jurisdictional finding is reversed, and the juvenile court is
directed to dismiss the dependency petition.
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
WILEY, Acting P. J.
SCHERB, J.
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