Filed 11/10/26 In re L.V. CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re L.V., a Person Coming B351513
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No. 25CCJP00032C)
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
E.S.,
Defendant and Appellant.
In re L.V., a Person Coming B351523
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No. 25CCJP00032C)
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
J.V.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEALS from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Georgia A. Huerta, Judge. Affirmed.
Janette Freeman Cochran, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant E.S.
Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant J.V.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louis,
Assistant County Counsel, Aileen Wong, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________
Mother E.S. and Father J.V. each appeal the order of the
juvenile court exercising jurisdiction over their son L.V. under
Welfare and Institutions Code1 sections 300 and 360. As
substantial evidence supports the court’s decision, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
L.V. was born to Mother and Father in July 2024. Both
parents had a history with county welfare services before then.
Mother was twice subject to juvenile court jurisdiction as a
minor relating to abuse by her father.
From 2013 through 2019, Mother was the subject of not
fewer than five referrals relating to her treatment of her two
older children from a prior relationship (born in 2010 and 2012).
Allegations included physical abuse, neglect, and substance use
by Mother. Some of the referrals resulted in services for Mother
but none resulted in these children being subject to juvenile court
jurisdiction. Petitions filed at the same time as L.V.’s concerning
these children were dismissed by the court.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
Father was also the subject of a referral for his child from a
prior relationship (born around 2020). It alleged neglect by
Father and the child’s mother. The reporting party alleged
Father used illicit substances. The investigation also revealed a
history of domestic violence between Father and the child’s
mother. Father and the mother received services, and the referral
was closed without the child being subjected to juvenile court
jurisdiction.
L.V. came to the attention of the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) late in
December 2024 when Mother brought him to the hospital with a
nondisplaced leg fracture that was highly suspicious for child
abuse. At DCFS’s request, Father joined Mother at the hospital
to be interviewed by a social worker.
The parents offered no explanation of how L.V. might have
sustained his injury. They reported they were L.V.’s only
caregivers and that his siblings in the home—Mother’s older
children—did not roughhouse with him. There was a 30-minute
period when L.V. was in the care of paternal relatives at a family
Christmas party but, other than that, he was only ever in the
care of Mother or Father.
The parents declined to answer some of the social worker’s
questions and left the hospital with L.V. shortly after their
interviews ended. The social worker later found the three at a
different hospital. There, L.V. underwent a full skeletal survey
that revealed not only the first diagnosed fracture but two more
on his other leg that were of a different type. He also had a bruise
on the bridge of his nose. A fracture in one leg required a full leg
cast. Dr. Supriya Sharma opined that the fractures were
indicative of abuse. Because the fractures were of different types
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which occur in different ways, Dr. Sharma later testified it was
“very unlikely” they happened at the same time.
Based on these fractures and Dr. Sharma’s opinion about
their etiology, DCFS obtained a warrant to remove L.V. from the
parents. Once he was discharged from the hospital, he was
detained in a foster home.
On January 3, 2025, DCFS filed a petition under
section 300 alleging L.V. was medically examined and found to
have leg fractures consistent with nonaccidental trauma that the
parents failed to explain. On this basis, it claimed L.V. was
subject to juvenile court jurisdiction under section 300,
subdivisions (a), (b), and (e).
At the detention hearing on January 6, 2025, the juvenile
court ordered L.V. detained, ordered services for the parents, and
ordered DCFS to schedule monitored visitation.
DCFS’s investigation continued, and the parents visited
with L.V. No definitive explanation for L.V.’s injuries emerged.
He suffered no new fractures while out of parents’ care. His
fractures also healed completely and were no longer visible in X-
rays. Reports from initial monitored visits were that Father was
rough and aggressive with L.V., but his approach improved over
time. Both parents participated in monitored visits and
programs. Due to their progress, DCFS liberalized their visits to
unmonitored in July 2025.
However, less than two weeks later, DCFS reversed that
decision after it received a letter from Dr. Sharma concluding
L.V.’s fractures and facial bruising she observed in January 2025
were consistent with child abuse. Dr. Sharma noted Mother’s
explanations for the injuries were not plausible, and lab results,
including a genetic study, showed no predisposition to fractures.
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A second pediatrician concurred in Dr. Sharma’s conclusions. The
juvenile court validated DCFS’s decision in August 2025 when it
refused to order unmonitored visitation for the parents. It
explained: “We have a baby here that both his legs sustained
fractures, and we don’t know how. . . . There’s been no reasonable
explanation provided, except for [Dr. Sharma,] who stated that
it’s a result of child abuse.”
Following that hearing, parents filed with the juvenile
court a letter from Dr. Thomas Grogan, an expert they retained
to review L.V.’s medical records and respond to Dr. Sharma’s
analysis. Dr. Grogan concluded it was “[c]onceivabl[e] the
fractures could be accidental in nature, such as the child sliding
down off a couch or chair, landing with a relatively straight leg
on the right and hyper plantar flexing the ankle on the left. In
addition, the injuries could have come from some person hyper
flexing the right knee and hyper plantar flexing the left ankle.”
He conceded it was “impossible to rule out intentionally inflicted
injury . . . .”
Dr. Sharma wrote a letter of rebuttal. In it, she cast doubt
on Dr. Grogan’s theories of accidental injury. She first noted they
were unsupported by any corroboration by L.V.’s parents. She
further noted they were incompatible with a child of L.V.’s age
when the injuries occurred. As to the fracture Dr. Grogan said
could have been from landing on a straight leg from a fall, a child
that age is not expected to “land on a straight extremity as they
are non-weight-bearing and non-ambulatory. In addition, when
infants fall, they generally impact their head as it is the largest
part of their body, so it would not be expected that [L.V.] would
have landed in such a position as to reasonably sustain this
injury even if there was a fall history provided.” Regarding the
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other fracture, Dr. Sharma explained it was of the type with “the
highest specificity for child physical abuse and is almost
exclusively seen in physical abuse cases in infants under
12 months old.” She specifically disagreed with Dr. Grogan’s
statements that the injuries could have been accidental.
The juvenile court held an adjudication hearing in
October 2025 to consider the petition. In advance of the hearing,
DCFS reported to the court that monitored visits were going well
and parents were continuing to participate in services, albeit
with mixed success. Father was continuing to view himself as a
victim of DCFS and denied understanding why it was involved.
The parents still denied knowing how L.V. was injured, with
Mother continuing to offer implausible explanations contrary to
the medical evidence. Mother had also recently given birth to
Santiago V.2
The adjudication hearing spanned several days.
Drs. Sharma and Grogan each testified at length. In Dr. Grogan’s
testimony, he acknowledged L.V. had a fracture he had never
seen in a child under one year old. He also backtracked from the
description in his letter of how L.V. could “[c]onceivably” have
sustained the fractures in both legs accidentally by landing
awkwardly after sliding from a couch. In testimony, he said the
injuries could not have occurred from a single incident because
“there’s two different legs, two different mechanisms of injury.”
2 DCFS filed a petition concerning Santiago approximately
two weeks after his birth. The juvenile court eventually sustained
that petition under section 300, subdivision (j) based on the
findings it made as to L.V. that parents challenge in this appeal.
The court’s findings as to Santiago are the subject of a separate
appeal by Mother (B353164) that we dismiss as moot based on
our disposition here.
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At the conclusion of the hearing, on October 23, 2025, the
juvenile court denied the parents’ requests to dismiss the petition
in its entirety. Instead, it sustained the petition under
section 300, subdivisions (b) and (e). As to subdivision (e), the
court credited Dr. Sharma’s testimony that L.V.’s fractures were
a result of separate acts of abuse that caused the fractures at
different times. The court also sustained one count under
subdivision (b) based on its finding of abuse. As to how the
fractures occurred, the court ruled out any act by a relative at the
family Christmas party because no one said an injury occurred
there. The court also cast doubt on the theory that one of L.V.’s
siblings caused the fractures but concluded it did not matter
whether the parents or siblings caused them because the parents
were ultimately responsible for L.V.’s safety. The court found
L.V. was still currently at risk “because the underlying issues . . .
ha[d] not been addressed.” While it was true that L.V. had not
suffered any recent injuries, it was also true that he had been
detained from the parents and had not since spent a full day in
their care.
Mother and Father each appealed. We ordered their
appeals consolidated. DCFS filed a cross-appeal but voluntarily
dismissed it.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
Jurisdiction over a minor is established by a preponderance
of the evidence that allegations the minor is a person described
under section 300 are true. (§ 355, subd. (a).)
We review a juvenile court’s finding that a minor is a
person described under section 300 for substantial evidence. (In
re M.D. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 836, 851.) In conducting this
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review, our task “ ‘begins and ends with the determination as to
whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted, which will support the finding of fact.’ [Citation.]
In so doing, we accept all evidence that supports the [judicial
action], disregard contrary evidence, and draw all reasonable
inferences to uphold the [judicial action]. [Citation.] ‘It is not our
role to reweigh the evidence, redetermine the credibility of the
witnesses, or resolve conflicts in the testimony, and we will not
disturb the [judicial action] if there is evidence to support it.’ ”
(Slone v. El Centro Regional Medical Center (2024) 106
Cal.App.5th 1160, 1173.)
When a section 300 petition alleges multiple grounds
supporting the juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a
minor, we “ ‘can affirm the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction
. . . if any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are
enumerated in the petition is supported by substantial evidence.
In such a case, [we] need not consider whether any or all of the
other alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by
the evidence.’ ” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)
Because we affirm the juvenile court’s determination it has
jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (e), we need not
consider its determination it also has jurisdiction under
subdivision (b).
II. Applicable Law
A child under five years of age is subject to the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court if he “has suffered severe physical abuse by a
parent, or by any person known by the parent, if the parent knew
or reasonably should have known that the person was physically
abusing the child.” (§ 300, subd. (e).) For these purposes, “severe
physical abuse” is defined to include “more than one act of
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physical abuse, each of which causes bleeding, deep bruising,
significant external or internal swelling, bone fracture, or
unconsciousness.” (Ibid.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s
conclusion that L.V. suffered more than one act of physical abuse
when he was about five months old, each of which resulted in one
or more fractures, and the physical abuse was perpetrated either
by one of the parents or one of Mother’s two eldest children under
circumstances where the parents reasonably should have been
aware of such abuse.
A. Father Fails to Show Error
Father’s sole contention regarding the juvenile court’s
section 300, subdivision (e) finding is that it was unsupported by
evidence of present risk of further abuse.
For the proposition that dependency jurisdiction must be
predicated on a defined and current risk of harm, Father cites In
re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 824, In re Savannah M.
(2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1397, In re Lana S. (2012) 207
Cal.App.4th 94, 103, and In re Maria R. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th
48, 60. These cases are inapposite as none involved section 300,
subdivision (e). Rather, each involved one or more of
subdivisions (b), (d) and (j), in which the risk of future harm is an
express basis for juvenile court jurisdiction. (See § 300,
subd. (b)(1) [jurisdiction exists if “there is a substantial risk that
the child will suffer[] serious physical harm or illness” as a result
of enumerated parental shortcomings]; § 300, subd. (d)
[jurisdiction exists if “there is a substantial risk that the child
will be sexually abused . . . by the child’s parent or guardian or a
member of the child’s household”]; § 300, subd. (j) [jurisdiction
9
exists if “there is a substantial risk that the child will be abused
or neglected” as the child’s sibling was].)
Section 300, subdivision (e) offers no basis for jurisdiction
based on an independent risk of future harm. Indeed, the absence
of the “substantial risk” language appearing in subdivisions (a),
(b), (c), (d) and (j) suggests the Legislature considered a history of
severe physical abuse, under the circumstances described in
subdivision (e), to establish a per se risk justifying the exercise of
jurisdiction. Accordingly, courts have long interpreted
subdivision (e) to support jurisdiction on the limited showing
that: “(1) there is a minor under the age of five; [¶] (2) who has
suffered severe physical abuse as defined in section 300,
subdivision (e); [¶] (3) by a parent or any person known to the
parent or any person known to the parent if the parent knew or
reasonably should have known that the person was physically
abusing the minor.” (In re Joshua H. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1718,
1727.)
DCFS specifically asserted this point in its brief:
“section 300, subdivision (e), does not require any showing that
the child remains at risk of harm in the parents’ care.” On reply,
Father did not address subdivision (e) at all, limiting his rebuttal
to DCFS’s subdivision (b) arguments. This amounts to a
concession of merit in DCFS’s point. (See In re Ramone R. (2005)
132 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351 [failure to respond to argument is
implicit concession].) In any event, without some direct argument
or authority that subdivision (e) has more requirements than
stated in section 300, or in cases like Joshua H. interpreting it,
Father fails to satisfy his burden on appeal to show the juvenile
court erred in sustaining the petition on this ground.
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B. Mother Fails to Show Error
Mother’s sole contention regarding the juvenile court’s
section 300, subdivision (e) finding is that there was no
substantial evidence L.V.’s fractures resulted from “more than
one act of physical trauma.” Mother is mistaken.
Mother’s argument ignores our standard of review and
instead asks that we reweigh the evidence. To affirm, it is
sufficient that Dr. Sharma testified it was “very unlikely” the
injuries occurred at the same time, explaining that “[t]he fracture
types that [L.V.] had have different mechanisms. So that means
that they occur in different ways. And I cannot think of a
mechanism that could cause all of these fractures to occur . . . at
the same time.”
Ignoring this testimony from Dr. Sharma, Mother points to
Dr. Grogan’s letter claiming the injuries could have happened at
the same time and offers an incomplete statement by Dr. Sharma
that “it would be impossible and irresponsible to say whether the
injuries could have happened at the same time or different
times.”
Even if we could reweigh the evidence, the evidence Mother
points to does not support her position. Dr. Grogan did not even
say in his letter it was at least as likely as not that the injuries
occurred at the same time. He said only that it was
“[c]onceivabl[e].” But by the hearing he had changed his mind,
conceding the injuries could not have been the result of a single
incident because “there’s two different legs, two different
mechanisms of injury.”
And Dr. Sharma said it was irresponsible for Dr. Grogan to
surmise the fractures happened simultaneously based on his
review of X-rays “because there is no radiological method to
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dating fractures that specifically.” (Italics added.) Because of this,
she relied on other information—i.e., the distinct mechanisms
causing the fractures—to conclude the fractures were
asynchronous. Dr. Grogan ultimately agreed they were
asynchronous for the same reason.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order asserting jurisdiction over L.V. is
affirmed.
RICHARDSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
LUI, P. J.
CHAVEZ, J.
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