Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

In re L.R. CA4/1

Filed 11/10/26 In re L.R. CA4/1
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 11/10/26 In re L.R. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re L.R. et al., Persons Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH & D087982
HUMAN SERVICES,
(Super. Ct. No. J521759ABC)
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

A.R. et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Lilys McCoy, Judge. Affirmed.
Jack A. Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant A.R.
Nicole Kronberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant S.G.
Damon M. Brown, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy
County Counsel; and Katie Abajian, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and
Respondent
I.
INTRODUCTION
In January 2026, the San Diego County Health and Human Services
Agency (Agency) received a referral regarding then four-year-old L.R. and

one-year-old Pal.R. and Pau.R due to a domestic violence incident.1 During
the incident, individuals who did not know the parents observed S.G.
(Mother) throwing punches at A.R. (Father), as well as two of the children
attempting to intervene to separate the parents. When law enforcement
arrived, the parents were uncooperative. Mother was arrested and charged
with domestic violence and child endangerment. The Agency attempted to
interview the parents regarding the allegations, but the parents refused to
participate in the investigation. Eventually, the Agency obtained protective
custody warrants and detained the children.

In a petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code,2 section 300,
subdivision (b), in late January 2026, the Agency alleged that the children
had been exposed to multiple violent incidents between the parents between
March 2025 and January 2026. Eventually, after the filing of the petition,
the parents began to be more cooperative with the Agency. They began

1 The youngest children have different birthdates, but both were one
year old on the date of the referral. Less than a month after the January
2026 referral was made, Pal.R turned two.

2 Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code
unless otherwise indicated.

2
supervised visitation, began parenting services, and in March 2026 completed
intake assessments for domestic violence services.
At the contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing that took place in
early April 2026, the juvenile court determined the allegations in the petition
were true and made factual findings about the precipitating incident. In
making its disposition order, the court discussed the record in the case,
highlighting the fact that despite abundant evidence that demonstrated a
lengthy and significant history of domestic violence between the parents, in
their separate intake assessments for domestic violence services, both had
minimized the domestic violence between them and/or their own role in
perpetuating it. The court also expressed concern that the parents had only
very recently completed the intake for the domestic violence services and
thus had not yet had the chance to learn and demonstrate lasting change,
given their long history of domestic violence. The court therefore determined
that removal from the parents’ care was necessary for the children’s safety,
and there were no reasonable means available to avoid removal and still
ensure the children’s safety.

Both parents have appealed from the court’s dispositional findings.3
They argue the record lacks substantial evidence to support a finding by clear
and convincing evidence that the children should be removed from both
parents’ care and that there were no other reasonable means to prevent the
removal.
We conclude the record provides substantial evidence to support the
trial court’s findings under the clear and convincing evidence standard. We
therefore affirm the court’s order.

3 Neither challenges the court’s jurisdictional findings.

3
II.
BACKGROUND
A. Relevant Family History
The parents have prior referrals to the Agency. For example, Mother
has four prior referrals, three of which involved allegations of the children
being exposed to domestic violence between the parents. Three of the prior
investigations resulted in inconclusive determinations because social workers
were unable to locate the family and/or the family was unwilling to cooperate
with the investigation.
The earliest allegation, in 2021, involved Mother being transported to a
hospital after vomiting and being extremely anxious. She was alone and
unable to care for her baby. Hospital staff observed bruises on Mother’s
arms, but she refused to disclose their cause.
Then, in early March 2025, Mother disclosed an argument in which the
father grabbed her jacket, held her down by pulling her hair, and shoved her

into the car while driving. The children were present and were scared.4
Later that March, the Agency received another report of a domestic violence
incident involving the parents. Law enforcement arrived after the parents
got into a physical altercation outside of a pawn shop. While talking to
officers, Mother disclosed that earlier in the day, Father had put his hand
over her mouth to stop her from talking. The children were present for both
incidents that occurred that day. A few months later, in August 2025, law
enforcement was again called to the parents' home as a result of another
domestic violence incident. Father had become upset with Mother and they

4 According to a police report from the incident, witnesses saw Father hit
Mother in the head three times with a closed fist. All three children were in
the car during the incident.

4
argued. After Mother went into a restroom to shower, Father followed her
and continued to yell at her. She tried to leave, but Father prevented her
from leaving by pushing her against a wall. Father left the home before
officers arrived. The children were home during the incident, but Mother
indicated they did not witness what happened. According to the police
report, Mother alleged Father assaulted her, including pushing her in her
chest area, causing her to hit the bathroom wall. Mother disclosed to officers
that the parents had a history of prior domestic violence.
Both parents also have a history of criminal arrests, although Father’s
criminal arrest background dates back to 2013, and Mother had only one
recorded arrest in 2020. In November 2025, a court issued a criminal
protective order protecting Mother, ordering Father to “ ‘[n]ot [a]buse’ ” her.
B. The Present Referral
On January 6, 2026, the Agency received a referral alleging general
neglect, physical abuse, and emotional abuse with respect to the three
children. The referral alleged a domestic violence altercation between
Mother and Father in which Mother threw punches at Father and at least
one of the children attempted to intervene. Law enforcement officer arrived
and observed that both parents appeared intoxicated. Officers described
Mother as “ ‘absolutely out of control,’ ” in that she was kicking, screaming,
and yelling at the time of her arrest. Father was also extremely
argumentative. He yelled at officers and refused to provide details regarding
the incident. Witnesses described seeing Mother push and punch Father and
indicated they saw the children attempting to get in between the parents in
an attempt to separate them.
The following day, an investigating social worker attempted to
interview both parents. They both declined to speak to the social worker.

5
Two days later, Chula Vista Police Department officers conducted a welfare
check at the family home and noted the house was well kept and nothing
alarming could be seen. However, at the Agency's request, an investigative
search warrant was granted and executed. There were no marks or injuries
observed on the children. L.R. participated in a forensic interview, and she
did not disclose any domestic violence in the home.
The social worker spoke with the children’s maternal grandparents.
They expressed concern about their strained and distant relationship with
Mother. The maternal grandmother viewed Mother as being codependent on
Father and explained that the maternal grandparents had provided financial
and logistical support to the parents in the past, but they now had limited
communication with Mother. The maternal grandmother was worried
Mother would not agree to have them be involved or provide support. The
maternal grandfather noted that his last meaningful interaction with Mother
was prior to her having children. He also indicated that he and the maternal
grandmother had made efforts to be part of their grandchildren’s lives, but
Mother had been unwilling to allow much involvement. They “tread
carefully” so as to avoid further alienating the parents.
On January 21, 2026, an Agency social worker spoke with a leasing
agent at the parents’ apartment complex. This individual confirmed the
parents had lived there since 2022 and stated that there had been “multiple”
complaints about the family regarding “ ‘heavy’ marijuana use” and adults
yelling at each other. Neighbors had expressed concerns about domestic
violence occurring in the home. The leasing agent thought it was of
particular concern that neighbors could hear distressing noise coming from
the apartment because the apartments were “ ‘relatively new and the walls
are thick.’ ” The leasing agent indicated the police had been to the home

6
multiple times, and the parents had been verbally aggressive with the
apartment’s maintenance team trying to do repairs.
The following day, January 22, 2026, the Agency requested a protective
custody warrant and filed a petition under section 300, subdivision (b),
alleging the children were in need of juvenile court protection due to periodic
exposure to violent confrontations between the parents involving physical
force, including the January incident in which two of the children attempted
to separate the parents during a physical altercation.
C. The Detention Phase
A detention hearing occurred on January 27, 2026. Father requested
placement with him in the family home and asserted that Mother was willing
to move out. Father asked the court to view him as the victim of the January
incident and thus aim to keep the children together with him. An alternative
arrangement Father offered would be to have the children stay with the
paternal great-grandmother.
Mother, however, requested that the children be detained with her in
the home of the paternal great-grandmother while Father remained in the
family home. As an alternative option, Mother suggested placement with
Father.
Minor’s counsel indicated she agreed with the Agency’s
recommendation that the children be detained together with the maternal
grandparents, and that the parents have liberal but separate supervised
visitation. Minor’s counsel noted that although the most recent incident
involved Father being the victim, there had been a history of domestic
violence where he was the aggressor. Counsel was concerned about
placement with Mother in the paternal great-grandmother’s home given the
paternal great-grandmother’s statements to law enforcement indicating she

7
believed Father was uniformly the victim of Mother and accusing Mother of
being controlling.
The juvenile court detained the children in the maternal grandparents’
home, as recommended by the Agency and minor’s counsel. In doing so, the
court noted that the domestic violence incident that initiated the latest
referral was “very concerning” and the children were present and at least one
of the children had become involved in it. The court also noted concern that
the parents had not cooperated with the Agency in the past, and then with
this referral they again failed to cooperate. This meant that the Agency had
not been able to provide the parents with services that could have made the
court comfortable placing the children with one or both parents. The court
ordered liberal but separate supervised visitation for the parents.
D. The Initial Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearing Phase
In advance of the initial jurisdiction and disposition hearing set for
February 18, 2026, the Agency recommended the court declare the children
dependents, continue to detain them out of their parents’ care, and order
supervised visitation and family reunification services for both parents. At
the initial hearing, the court retained most of its prior orders and asked the
Agency to “fully explore and report back . . . on reasonable alternatives to out-
of-home placement.” The court also declined to make an order directing that
the Agency conduct the supervision of visits despite the request from minor’s
counsel and Mother. Both parents requested a trial on the truth of the
allegations and issues regarding placement.
During the jurisdictional investigation, a social worker interviewed
Father. He denied allegations that domestic violence took place in the family
home. He framed the issue as one of Mother having mental health problems.
Mother also denied the allegations of domestic violence; she contended that

8
the first three incidents referred to the Agency occurred when the children
were not present and involved no physical force. According to Mother, during
the most recent January incident, she had a panic attack. She also denied
that any physical altercation occurred, although she claimed that she did not
recall anything from the incident. When asked whether anything about her
behavior or actions had ever placed the children at risk, Mother denied that
there had been any physical altercations between her and Father.
During this period, the social worker made referrals for both parents to
receive parenting and domestic violence services and provided them with
contact information for the domestic violence service provider. In late
February, the Agency undertook an emergency home assessment on the
paternal great-grandmother’s home. The Agency determined that the
paternal great-grandmother’s home was suitable for the children to be placed
with her but ultimately concluded that it would be in the children’s best
interest to remain placed in the care of the maternal grandparents. The
maternal grandparents had provided stability, structure and routine and had
ensured the children attended medical and service appointments, and the
children had positively adjusted to their home.
In March, Father indicated that he believed the Agency’s case should
be dropped because law enforcement had dropped criminal domestic violence
charges against Mother. He was informed that the criminal case is distinct
from a dependence case. After this, Father indicated that he had a domestic
violence intake assessment scheduled for a few days later.
On March 20, 2026, the social worker spoke with someone at Incredible
Families regarding the parents. Mother’s first parenting class session had
taken place on March 12, and the parents had an intake for family therapy
set to occur on April 10, 2026. The social worker obtained both parents’

9
domestic violence intake assessments for the program. Mother reported to
the program that the January 2026 incident involved her having a panic
attack at the park. She denied knowing what else occurred but claimed she
did not hurt anyone. Mother also stated that the January incident was the
“first DV incident,” and she denied having any alcohol or drug problems. A
mental status exam indicated that Mother did “not [have] symptoms that fall
in the severe range,” but she had stated she had a long history of panic
disorder and trauma and was receiving treatment.
During Father’s intake assessment, he had disclosed that he had been
arrested for domestic violence two years prior, but he stated that Mother had
a history of post-traumatic stress disorder and was the one who at various
times had hit him, thrown objects, tried to get out of a moving vehicle, and
made false allegations about him to law enforcement. He acknowledged that
he had pushed Mother on one occasion after she hit him, but he described his
actions as being attempts to calm or restrain Mother. Father did not identify
any of his own behaviors as problematic. He expressed frustration that he
has been held to account, given that he perceives himself as a victim of
Mother.
In an addendum report filed in anticipation of the contested jurisdiction
and disposition hearing, the Agency noted that the parents had been
cooperative with the Agency, and they had attended the scheduled visits with
their children. The Agency explained, however, that it planned to “continue
to monitor their progression in services” in order to “evaluate whether they
are learning and applying appropriate parenting and conflict resolution skills
during contact with the children.” While the Agency acknowledged that
Mother was attending scheduled parenting and domestic violence classes, it
also reported that she “continues to minimize her history of domestic violence

10
with” Father, and this suggests that she has “a limited understanding of
broader safety issues beyond the criminal charges” and “lack[s] insight into
the impact domestic violence can have on children.”
The Agency similarly acknowledged Father’s participation in his case
plan, his attendance at his assigned parenting and domestic violence
programs, and the fact that he was “beginning to apply these skills in
observable ways.” However, the Agency remained concerned that Father,
like Mother, continued to minimize the history of domestic violence in the
family. The minimization “reflects limited insight into unsafe situations,
reduces accountability, and hinders [both parents’] ability to implement
protective measures to prevent future incidents.” Importantly, in the
Agency’s view, “[c]ontinued observation will be necessary” in order to
determine whether the parents’ continued to progress in their services and
whether that progress would “translate[ ] into long-term behavioral change”
of the type necessary to support a safe return of the children to their care.
Most importantly, the Agency wanted to see the parents demonstrate the
skills they were learning in their lives outside of the structure of those
services. As a result, the Agency continued to recommend that the court
sustain the petitions, declare the children dependents, and order Mother and
Father to participate in family reunification services.
E. The Contested Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearing
The contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing took place on April 3,
2026. The court took in evidence multiple Agency reports, including the
January 26 detention report, the February 18 jurisdiction and disposition
report, and the March 12 and April 3 addendum reports.
The Agency noted there had been five calls for service to the family
home between January 2024 and 2026 for domestic violence, and the children

11
had appeared to have been in the home for a majority of the incidents. The
Agency acknowledged that Mother’s mental health had “in some form” had a
role in the domestic violence.
Mother argued that the case involved “more of a mental health framing
rather than a typical domestic violence case.” She indicated she was already
seeing a therapist, participating in domestic violence services, and living
apart from Father by staying in the paternal great-grandmother’s home.
Mother requested that the court dismiss the case, or, alternatively, that the
children be placed with her in the paternal great-grandmother’s home or with
Father in the family home. Mother also expressed concern that the maternal
grandparents, who were acting as the children’s caregivers, were exerting “an
inappropriate level of control and potentially interfering with the parents’
ability to reunify.” Mother’s attorney referenced a quotation from the
Agency’s report from the caregivers asking the Agency to “confirm [to] the

parents that for this length of time we are the guardians.”5
Father also argued the framing of the issue should be around Mother’s
mental health, not domestic violence. Father’s attorney questioned whether
witnesses who were present during the January 2026 incident had provided
accurate information and argued the children were not currently at
substantial risk of harm.
Minors’ counsel adopted the arguments of the Agency as her own. She
noted that her understanding of the evidence in the reports was “very
different” from the views offered by the parents’ attorneys. Minors’ counsel
noted that the Agency had made reasonable efforts with the family, but the

5 County counsel later offered to the court that the context in which the
statement was made was the maternal grandmother reaching out to the
social worker about having someone who is pre-approved by the Agency to
stay with the children during a doctor’s appointment.

12
“parents did not want to engage with the Agency.” She offered that
regardless of whether Mother’s mental health might be an issue, the “reality”
of the January 2026 domestic violence incident was that “multiple people had
to interject themselves that were strangers to this family,” indicating how
problematic and serious an event it was. Counsel also noted that this
incident was not a “one-off incident as the parents would like to lead you to
believe.” Instead, the apartment manager and police knew about the family
because of their domestic violence history. Of particular concern to minors’
counsel was that neither parent appeared to demonstrate “any insight [into]
the ongoing problem that led us to this position,” and instead of insight, what
she was hearing was “blame.”
The Agency joined in these additional arguments and also noted that
although the parents had both stated they separated and were no longer
living together, the Agency had not verified the truth of these assertions.
Both the Agency and minors’ counsel discussed the fact that the maternal
grandparent caregivers spent significant amounts of time driving the
children to visits with their parents, but the parents were often late,
sometimes as much as 40 minutes.
Finally, counsel for the Agency noted that the parents “literally just did
their intakes for domestic violence a couple of weeks ago and are making an
argument that, ‘We’ve been participating in services.[’] ” Counsel argued that
true insight into the domestic violence underlying this matter would have
allowed the parties to recognize the complexity inherent in addressing these
particular issues.
At the conclusion of the contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing,
the juvenile court found the allegations true by a preponderance of the
evidence. The court additionally found that removal of the children was

13
appropriate and that reasonable efforts had been made to prevent removal
and there were no reasonable means to protect the children without removal.
The court reflected on the fact that the initial call to the child abuse hotline
in connection with the present referral was because Mother was punching
Father in the face, and witnesses saw the children attempting to separate the
parents. The record also demonstrated the children had prior exposure to
multiple violent confrontations between the parents.
The juvenile court also relied on Father's intake assessment for
domestic violence services in which he acknowledged both that he had been
arrested for domestic violence in 2024 and that Mother had mental health
concerns and had been an aggressor against him multiple times. Mother's
domestic violence intake assessment indicated Mother asserted the incident
leading to this current referral was the first domestic violence incident in
which she had been involved. The court explained that the record indicated
otherwise, in that the domestic violence was engaged in by both parties and
occurred more often than they acknowledged. Father demonstrated a lack of
insight into the problem by viewing himself as merely a victim, and he did
not take accountability for his own role in the violence even with respect to
an incident in which he admitted he pushed Mother. And the court
considered that Mother’s domestic violence intake assessment noted her long
history of mental health concerns including panic disorder and trauma. But,
the court specifically highlighted that in that assessment, Mother’s mental
health was not considered to be in the “severe” range. In the court’s view,
this information was relevant and led the court to believe the case should be
framed primarily around the domestic violence issues, rather than as
primarily an issue of Mother’s mental health.

14
Finally, the court found that the Agency had made reasonable efforts to
prevent removal. In support of this finding, the court listed the Agency’s
domestic violence referrals, parenting referrals, and CFT meetings. The
court noted that despite these efforts, the parents had only begun domestic
violence services in March, 2026, so “[t]hey're quite new to the services.” In
the court’s view, because the parents were “quite new” to their services,
“there is a lack of full appreciation for the extent of and problematic nature of
the interpersonal violence and conflict between [the parents].” To the court it
was significant that the parents had struggled with the domestic violence for
a much longer period of time than they had been engaging with services. The
court also considered placement in the home of the paternal great-
grandmother, as opposed to the current placement with the maternal
grandparents. The court noted that both homes had been determined to be
safe, but the court believed that a change in placement at this point would
not be in the children’s best interest. At this point, the children had “settled
into the maternal grandparents’ home,” and given their young ages, a change
in placement would create more disruption in their lives.
The court continued to be so concerned about the parents’ lack of
insight into the nature and amount of domestic violence in which they
engaged that the court continued separate and supervised visitation for both
parents. However, the court wanted the Agency to encourage as many “safe
and appropriate visits [for the parents] as possible.”
III.
DISCUSSION
Mother and Father contend the juvenile court’s decision to remove the
children from their care was not supported by substantial evidence. Mother
asserts the record lacks the clear and convincing evidence needed to remove

15
the children from her care based on concerns about domestic violence. She
relies on the evidence of her cooperation with the Agency and willingness to
engage in services to suggest the evidence does not support the court’s
determination. She also contends the Agency did not explore other
reasonable alternatives to removal from her care. Father similarly argues
the court’s dispositional order removing the children from his care was not
supported by clear and convincing evidence, and he contends there were
reasonable means to protect the children without removing them from his
care.
A. Applicable legal authority and standard of review
Before a juvenile court may order a child removed from his or her
parent's physical custody, the court must find there is clear and convincing
evidence that there is or would be a substantial danger to the child's physical
health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being if returned
home, and there are no reasonable means to protect the child without
removal. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) “In determining whether a child may be safely
maintained in the parent's physical custody, the juvenile court may consider
the parent's past conduct and current circumstances, and the parent's
response to the conditions that gave rise to juvenile court intervention.”
(In re D.B. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 320, 332 (D.B.).) The court must also make
a finding that reasonable efforts were made to eliminate the need for removal
and it is to “state the facts on which the decision to remove the minor is
based.” (§ 361, subd. (e).)
On appeal, we review a juvenile court's removal order for substantial
evidence. (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633.) Under this standard, we
construe the evidence in favor of the prevailing party and resolve doubts in
favor of the trial court's order. (B.D. v. Superior Court (2025)

16
110 Cal.App.5th 1132, 1150; In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394,
1401.) Where a finding must be based on clear and convincing evidence, as a
removal finding does, the question is whether “the record as a whole contains
substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it
highly probable that the fact was true.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020)
9 Cal.5th 989, 1011 (O.B.).) Substantial evidence is “evidence that is
reasonable, credible and of solid value; it must actually be substantial proof
of the essentials that the law requires in a particular case.” (Yvonne W., at
p. 1401.) In our review for substantial evidence, “ ‘[w]e do not reweigh the
evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely determine if there are
sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.’ ” (Kevin R. v.
Superior Court (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 676, 689.)
B. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings and
orders regarding removal of the children from both parents’ care

Mother asserts that there is insufficient evidence to support the court’s
finding that the children could not be placed in her care, subject to ongoing
supervision. She highlights that the initiating domestic violence incident
occurred three months before the jurisdiction hearing with no additional
incidents, and she points out that she had not only moved out of the family
home where Father was living, but she was participating in services. She
contends that all of this means that there was “insufficient evidence that the
children would be at substantial risk if released to [her] care.”
Similarly, Father argues that the Agency’s assessment that he
demonstrated a strong level of participation in the domestic violence and
parenting programs indicate that the children were not in substantial danger
if returned to his custody. He also relies on the fact that the “children were
not injured in any incident between father and mother,” that “there was no

17
anger or abuse directed at the children,” and that “they had no marks or
bruises when assessed by the social worker.”
“In determining whether a child may be safely maintained in the
parent's physical custody, the juvenile court may consider the parent's past
conduct and current circumstances, and the parent's response to the
conditions that gave rise to juvenile court intervention.” (D.B., supra,
26 Cal.App.5th at p. 332.) There is no requirement that the parent be
dangerous or that the child has suffered harm; the focus is on averting harm
to the child. (Id. at p. 328.) Additionally, even one past instance of harmful
conduct may be sufficient to establish an ongoing risk of harm, depending on
the circumstances of that single incident and whether a risk of harm
remains. (See In re J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1025 (J.N.) [“In
evaluating risk based upon a single episode of endangering conduct, a
juvenile court should consider the nature of the conduct and all surrounding
circumstances.”].) Thus, the evidence must show that the problem leading to
the dependency proceeding is likely to reoccur and to place the child at
“substantial risk” of “serious physical harm. ” (§ 300, subds. (a) & (b); see
In re C.V. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 566, 572 (C.V.).)
As a result, the court must also “consider the present circumstances,
which might include, among other things, evidence of the parent's current
understanding of and attitude toward the past conduct that endangered a
child, or participation in educational programs, or other steps taken, by the
parent to address the problematic conduct in the interim . . . that would help
a parent avoid a recurrence of such an incident.” (J.N., supra,
181 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1025–1026.) A parent's lack of insight into the issues
leading to the dependency case may support a finding that there remains an
ongoing risk of harm. (See, e.g., In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293

18
(A.F.); In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 170; J.N., supra, at pp. 1025–
1026.)
Ultimately, “ ‘[t]he trial court is in the best position to determine the
degree to which a child is at risk based on an assessment of all the relevant
factors in each case.’ ” (In re E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195, 217.)
We conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's findings
by clear and convincing evidence that the children would have been at
substantial risk of harm if returned to either parent’s custody. The evidence
demonstrated that the children had been exposed to repeated domestic
violence between the parents during all or most of their young lives.
“Exposure to domestic violence may serve as the basis for dependency
jurisdiction. [Citation.] ‘ “ ‘Both common sense and expert opinion indicate
spousal abuse is detrimental to children.’ ” ’ [Citations.]” (In re Cole L.
(2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 602–603.) Although past violence alone is not
sufficient to support jurisdiction, evidence that the domestic violence is likely
to reoccur and to place the child at “substantial risk” of “serious physical
harm” will support the removal. (§ 300, subds. (a) & (b); see C.V., supra,
15 Cal.App.5th at p. 572.)
Here, it was not simply the history of domestic violence that led the
court to its conclusion. Rather, the court was most concerned with the
parents’ lack of insight into that violence and its effect on their young
children. The parents continued to deny to the Agency that they were
dealing with domestic violence in their relationship or, even when they would
acknowledge some past violence, both parents would significantly minimize
the history of violence. This pattern continued when the parents did their
assessments for services. For example, Father asserted in his domestic
violence program assessment that he was merely the victim of Mother, while

19
the record reflected the contrary. Mother similarly appeared to minimize the
problem throughout the proceedings and up until asserting in her domestic
violence program assessment that the January 2026 incident was the first
time she had been involved in an incident of domestic violence. The parents’
failure to take personal responsibility and their inability to acknowledge the
length and severity of the problem reflects that the parents continued to lack
insight at the time of the hearing. And even where they might acknowledge
some violence, their minimization of the violence also indicated they did not
understand or appreciate the harm domestic violence causes to young
children. A parent who lacks insight into the problem will necessarily have
trouble addressing it and preventing its recurrence. (See, e.g., In re Gabriel
K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197 [“One cannot correct a problem one fails
to acknowledge.”]; A.F., supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 293 [“ ‘[D]enial is a factor
often relevant to determining whether persons are likely to modify their
behavior in the future without court supervision.’ ”].)
And, while the parents emphasize on appeal that they were
participating in parenting and domestic violence services, the court was
concerned that they had only recently begun to participate in those services.
The record supports the trial court’s assessment; the parents did not initially
cooperate with the Agency and thus had not been participating in services
from initiation of the case. It was only a couple of weeks before the hearing
that the parents were completing their intake assessments for a domestic
violence program, and at that time, as described above, both parents
demonstrated a lack of insight into the problem. The juvenile court was thus
rightly worried that these parents had only just begun to participate in the
services. As a result, at the time of the hearing, it was too early to tell
whether, and to what extent, they might come to appreciate the severity of

20
the problem and work to address it. Further, while Mother indicated that the
parents were living separately, the Agency had not been able to verify this.
In sum, the constellation of circumstances presented to the court persuasively
demonstrated a continuing substantial risk of harm to the children at the
time of the jurisdiction and disposition hearing.
C. Substantial evidence also supports the finding that there were no
other reasonable means to protect the children without removal

Both parents also argue the trial court’s finding that there were no
reasonable means available to prevent removal is not supported by
substantial evidence sufficient to meet the clear and convincing standard.
Mother argues, for example, the Agency did not sufficiently investigate
possible alternatives to removal. She suggests that she “could have resided
with the maternal grandparents [and the children] as part of a safety plan,”
or the Agency could have explored whether she could have resided with the
paternal great-grandmother and have the children placed in that home.
Father contends the children could have been placed in his home with
supports such as Family Preservation Program services, unannounced
inspections, and conditional custody orders.
We disagree with the parents’ view of this record and conclude that “a
reasonable trier of fact could have regarded the evidence as satisfying [the
clear and convincing] standard of proof” (O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1009),
that there were no reasonable means by which the children’s physical health
could be protected without removing them from the parents’ custody. The
efforts the Agency noted included various referrals to services for the parents
and children. The court noted these referrals, but also acknowledged the
record demonstrated other efforts by the Agency to avoid the children’s
removal. But the court was specifically concerned with the fact that the

21
parents’ participation in these services, and cooperation with the Agency, was
“still quite new.” Again, the parents had only completed their domestic
violence assessments a couple of weeks prior to the hearing. And these
assessments demonstrated their “lack of full appreciation for the extent of
and problematic natures of the interpersonal violence and conflict between
them,” which was particularly worrisome given the length of time the
violence and conflict had been occurring. Given the lengthy history of the
domestic violence here, as well as the parents’ lack of candor and/or lack of
insight about that history and the relative newness of their participation in
services, the juvenile court “could reasonably infer . . . that a combination of
services and monitoring that might, under different circumstances, provide a
viable alternative to removal, would not sufficiently protect the children in
this case.” (In re Nathan E. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 114, 124.)
Mother’s suggestions of alternatives to removal that Agency could have
considered do not convince us differently. For example, Mother offers on
appeal that “it would not have been far-fetched to contemplate whether
Mother could have resided with the maternal grandparents as part of a
safety plan.” It is noteworthy that no one, not even Mother, suggested this as
a possibility in the trial court, and the lack of anyone in this matter seriously
considering this as an option is not surprising if one considers the full history
of the case. The evidence in the record demonstrates that Mother and her
parents were effectively estranged at the initiation of these proceedings. In
addition, at the very hearing where the court had to make the jurisdictional
and dispositional determinations, Mother raised issues of concern about
conflict between the parents and the maternal grandparents regarding
shared decision making authority regarding the children. And, most
significantly, Mother and Father had both indicated that they did not want

22
the children to live in the maternal grandparents’ home at all. We cannot
conclude that the Agency’s consideration of “reasonable means” to avoid
removal had to include asking relative caregivers to invite an adult parent,
even if that individual is their daughter, to live in their home, particularly
where domestic violence between that parent and the other parent has been
an issue and that same parent has opposed placement of the children with
the relative caregivers. It is not “reasonable” to require an Agency or the
court to “contemplate” creating a living situation for the children that could
exacerbate tension in a family that has already exhibited high-conflict
tendencies.
Mother also suggests that the Agency and court should have permitted
her to “reside[ ] with paternal great[-]grandmother,” and this scenario “would
have posed a reasonable alternative to removal.” First, the Agency did an
assessment of the paternal great-grandmother’s home for placement of the
children and weighed the benefits and detriments to placing the children
there. But Mother’s suggestion that she could have lived in the home, too, in
order to avoid removal ignores the evidence that the parents’ lack of insight—
including Mother’s lack of insight—about the domestic violence that placed
the children in danger. Mother living in the paternal great-grandmother’s
home would not ensure either parent’s insight into the domestic violence
problems would increase, and this would be particularly problematic since
there was evidence the paternal great-grandmother relied on Father for
transportation needs. Mother living where Father frequently visited could
not have ensured the children’s safety in light of the parents’ only very recent
engagement in services and demonstrated lack of insight into the true danger
of their domestic violence to the children. Also concerning was the paternal
great-grandmother’s stated view that Father was merely the victim of

23
Mother’s aggression and domestic violence, and that Mother wanted Father
“dead in jail.” One could have reasonably determined from these statements
that the paternal great-grandmother could not have provided a neutral, let
alone supportive, home for Mother to live along with the children. We
therefore conclude the trial court could have found by clear and convincing
evidence that allowing the children to live with Mother in the paternal great-
grandmother’s home was not a viable and reasonable alternative to removal.
Father separately argues that the court should have permitted the
children to live with him and provided Family Preservation services while
ordering unannounced home inspections or conditional custody orders. But
this suggestion also does not fully acknowledge the concern of the Agency and
the trial court about the safety of the children. The parents’ minimization of
the violence and their own roles in it was problematic. Father lacked insight
into his role in the domestic violence, and he continued to blame Mother’s
behaviors and mental state for the violence. Unannounced visits and in-home
services could not have ensured the children’s safety where Father did not
see his own actions as part of the problem.
In sum, the court’s determination that there were no reasonable means
to prevent the need for removal is supported by substantial evidence to meet
the clear and convincing evidentiary standard.

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IV.
DISPOSITION
The April 3, 2026, order of the juvenile court is affirmed.

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DO, J.

BUCHANAN, J.

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