Filed 7/23/26 In re L.H. CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re L.H., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN
SERVICES AGENCY, A174996
Plaintiff and Respondent, (San Francisco City & County
v. Super. Ct. No. JD223316)
M.H.,
Defendant and Appellant.
M.H. (the biological father of L.H.) appeals from the termination of his
parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26—a
course of action that respondent San Francisco Human Services Agency (the
Agency) had recommended to the juvenile court. According to M.H., the court
erred in concluding M.H. had failed to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that his son, L.H., “would benefit from continuing the relationship”
with M.H. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) We disagree and will affirm the
judgment accordingly.
1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
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I. BACKGROUND
As a single father, M.H. raised his developmentally delayed son, L.H.,
for ten years. This case is the third dependency arising from those years,
during which L.H. would often engage in the risky behavior of running away
from home. Upon removing L.H. in this third dependency case, the juvenile
court ordered supervised visitation for M.H. Next, the court sustained the
Agency’s amended dependency petition, declared dependency, and ordered
out-of-home placement for L.H. and reunification services for father. Some
18 months later, after finding that returning L.H. (then age 12) to his father’s
care would be detrimental, and that there was no substantial probability of
return, the court terminated reunification services, while maintaining
visitation.
At the section 366.26 hearing underlying this appeal, the Agency
recommended adoption as the permanent plan for L.H. M.H. objected to the
termination of his parental rights. Four reports prepared by the Agency were
entered into evidence,2 along with visitation logs documenting the visits
between M.H. and L.H. According to one of the reports, since returning from
a regional-center placement to the home of the family that would ultimately
seek to adopt him, “[t]here have been no reported runaway or other unsafe
behaviors.”
Additionally, three witnesses testified: a Protective Services Worker
(PSW), a family friend who was a deacon at M.H.’s church, and M.H. himself.
The PSW testified that M.H. had been “overall consistent” in attending the
visits, which went “overall well.” The father and son had a “friendly”
relationship, but L.H. did not regard M.H. as a father figure. In the PSW’s
2 Those documents comprised two section 366.26 reports, one
addendum report, and one ICWA progress report. The juvenile court also
took judicial notice of its prior findings, orders, and judgments in the case.
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opinion, there was no “significant secure attachment” between father and
son, and that it would not “have a significant impact” on L.H. if he were
never to see M.H. again. The PSW further testified there would be no benefit
to L.H. “that would outweigh the benefits of adoption, and furthermore,” L.H.
“ha[d] been pretty clear with his desire for adoption and the fact that he did
not feel safe in his father’s care.” On cross-examination, the PSW noted that
L.H. “hadn’t been resistant” to visits in general, but “had asked to no longer
have” visits at the church he would sometimes attend with M.H.
The deacon described the general tenor of the visits he witnessed
between M.H. and L.H. The father and son would greet each other, catch up
on what had been happening in L.H.’s life in the past week, discuss school,
and sometimes do schoolwork. The two would sometimes hug, and M.H.
would encourage L.H. to keep doing well. Often, they would play the card
game “Go Fish.” The deacon testified that the father and son enjoyed a
“loving relationship” that was “improving,” attributing previous difficulties to
the fact that M.H. “didn’t understand about the disability of his son.” The
deacon’s testimony was echoed in significant part by M.H., who testified to
the positive nature of the father-son-visits, in addition to noting the recent
deaths of L.H.’s mother and aunt. During the visits, M.H. would tell L.H.
that he misses him, and L.H. would reciprocate that sentiment. In M.H.’s
opinion, L.H. did not understand what adoption would mean for him.
Ultimately, the juvenile court concluded that M.H. had “not satisfied
his burden to establish the beneficial relationship exception” under
section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), and terminated parental rights.
II. DISCUSSION
Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), sets forth “the beneficial
relationship exception,” a “doctrine that allows the juvenile court, in
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appropriate circumstances, to deviate from the presumptively preferred
option of choosing adoption as a child’s permanent plan after reunification
has failed.” (In re J.R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 526, 530.) There are “three
elements the parent must prove to establish the exception: (1) regular
visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which would
benefit the child such that (3) the termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to the child.” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 631.)
The juvenile court’s findings in these respects are subject to a hybrid
standard of review. (In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 641.) “The first
two elements involve factual determinations to which the substantial
evidence standard of review applies. (Id. at pp. 639–640.) The final step,
determining whether termination of parental rights would be detrimental to
the child, is reviewed for abuse of discretion.”3 (In re G.H. (2022)
84 Cal.App.5th 15, 26.) Where, as here, “the party with the burden of proof
did not carry the burden, ‘the question for a reviewing court becomes whether
the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law.’ ”
(In re M.V. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 486, 508.) “ ‘Specifically, the question
becomes whether the appellant’s evidence was (1) “uncontradicted and
unimpeached” and (2) “of such a character and weight as to leave no room for
3 Relying on In re M.V. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1155, 1185, M.H. argues
for the first time in his reply brief that the abuse-of-discretion standard
should not apply because the juvenile court erred in its analysis of the second
element (benefit), and therefore was unable to exercise its informed
discretion in conducting the related inquiry contemplated by the third
element (detriment). We decline to consider this argument because it was
raised belatedly. (See In re R.Q. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 462, 470.) Still, we
note in passing that M.H. has acknowledged the applicability of the abuse-of-
discretion standard in his own opening brief, and that the juvenile court
expressly noted that it would reach the same conclusion with respect to the
third element “[e]ven if [M.H.] had satisfied the second” element.
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a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.” ’ ”
(Ibid.)
Accordingly, we turn to M.H.’s evidence, as cited in support of the
argument in his opening brief. In so doing, we pass over the undisputed
evidence of M.H.’s regular visitation with L.H. which satisfies the first
element. “As to the second element, courts assess whether ‘the child would
benefit from continuing the relationship.’ (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)” (In re
Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) To this end, M.H. marshals the
following evidence: L.H. was thirteen years old and had spent the first ten
years of his life in M.H.’s care; L.H. recognizes M.H. as his biological father;
M.H. loves L.H.; M.H. is L.H.’s last living family member and connection to
the community in which he was raised (and remaining so connected would
“undoubtedly” benefit L.H.); M.H. encouraged L.H.’s ties to that larger social
network; M.H. was cooperative in signing medical consent forms and
frequently attended medical visits for L.H.; and various lines of evidence
related to the content and quality of their visits, which were characterized by
a “friendly” attachment, with laughing, joking, and fun.
But none of these lines of evidence require a finding of benefit “ ‘as a
matter of law.’ ” (In re M.V., supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 508.) The inference
of benefit that might ordinarily arise from L.H.’s age and years spent in
M.H.’s care is undermined in part by the fact that L.H. had been out of M.H.’s
care for three years and now wished to be adopted. The warmth and quality
of the parental visits are contextualized by a Protective Services Worker’s
testimony that L.H. “is incredibly friendly just in his general engagement
with everyone, and that definitely extends into the father’s visits.” (Italics
added.) There is no reason to believe that M.H.’s signing of consent forms or
presence at medical appointments is something L.H. would continue to
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benefit from, given the role of L.H.’s future adoptive parents. And L.H.
seems to assign somewhat less value to family or community connection: He
remained confident in his desire to be adopted, and after planned visits to
church and the library left him frustrated, L.H. said he wanted to discontinue
those visits. For those reasons, we cannot conclude that M.H.’s evidence is
“ ‘(1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of such a character and
weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was
insufficient to support a finding.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
We are mindful of the unique features of this case, especially the age of
M.H., the portion of L.H.’s life spent in his custody, and the cognitive
challenges affecting both of them. These issues were presented to the
juvenile court and expressly considered in its rulings. Here, the juvenile
court considered the many positive aspects of the father-son relationship and
concluded, notwithstanding them, that “the relationship is more like a friend
or extended family member rather than one who provides a positive
substantial emotional attachment.” It is the juvenile court’s role to assess
the credibility of witnesses, weigh evidence, and resolve conflicts. (In re
Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) This responsibility was discharged by
the juvenile court. On appeal, we have no power to reweigh the evidence.
Thus, as there was no error in the juvenile court’s finding that M.H. did
not carry his burden to prove the second element of the beneficial-
relationship exception by a preponderance of the evidence, he cannot adduce
any abuse of discretion in the court’s conclusion that terminating M.H.’s
parental rights would not be detrimental to L.H.4
4 As for M.H.’s contention that he is himself disabled and therefore
“cannot be held to the same standard as a similarly situated, non-disabled
parent,” we must simply observe that our inquiry is not focused on holding
him to any standard of conduct; instead, we are concerned with benefit to
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III. DISPOSITION
We affirm.
L.H.: “[O]nce reunification efforts end, the court looks toward the child’s
interest in permanence and stability, not the parent’s interest in maintaining
family ties.” (In re O.S. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1412.)
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_________________________
SMILEY, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
HUMES, P. J.
_________________________
LANGHORNE WILSON, J.
In re L.H. / A174996
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