Filed 10/21/26 In re Ke.P. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re Ke.P., a Person Coming B347983
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
20CCJP01590B)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
K.P.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of the County
of Los Angeles, Stephanie Davis, Judge. Affirmed.
Janelle B. Price, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn L. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Bryan Mercke, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
I. INTRODUCTION
K.P. (mother) appeals from a disposition order removing
her then nine-year-old son (the child), placing him with N.R.
(father), terminating jurisdiction, and issuing exit custody orders.
She contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by not
retaining jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 361.21 to allow her to participate in further reunification
services. She also claims the court failed to make a required
written or record finding of the basis for its termination order.
We affirm.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Prior Section 300 Petition
On February 18, 2022, the juvenile court sustained a
section 300 petition alleging that (1) mother had endangered the
child by allowing her partner to drive him without a proper child
restraint seat while the partner was under the influence of
marijuana; and (2) mother had a history of marijuana abuse that
rendered her incapable of providing care for the child and placed
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
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him at risk of harm. The court released the child to the parents
and ordered mother to participate in services, including a 12-step
program and random drug testing. On December 16, 2022, the
court terminated jurisdiction and issued an exit custody order
granting the parents joint custody with mother’s home as the
child’s primary residence.
B. Current Referral and Petition
On January 14, 2025, the Department received a referral
reporting that the child had been transported to an emergency
room (ER). Mother had called emergency medical services (EMS)
advising that the child was “off his psychotropic medication, she
could not handle his behavior, and needed him taken to the
[ER].” The child was alone in the ER, and mother advised that
she did not intend to pick him up that day.
The medical staff reported that this was not the first time
mother had sent the child to the ER because of his behaviors and
the child had been hospitalized on prior occasions when mother
advised that he was off his medication and became physically
abusive toward others, hit himself, and threated to kill family
members. His last hospitalization was December 19, 2024, for a
similar incident.
The child had been diagnosed with autism and attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and prescribed clonidine
and dextroamphetamine. But mother admitted she did not give
the child his prescribed medication and did not refill his
prescriptions. ER staff members were concerned her failure to
follow medical advice was causing the child’s recent
hospitalizations.
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On January 17, 2025, mother called the Department and
was “irate, yelling, [and] cussing about not wanting to care for
the child ... [anymore], reporting that the child was too much to
handle[,] and that [she] was going to drop the child off at the
[Department’s] office and give [up] her parental rights.”
On January 21, 2025, a social worker interviewed the
child’s therapist, Dr. Leigh Brooks, who advised that she was
seeing the child at school because mother failed to bring him to
scheduled appointments. Dr. Brooks believed the child’s
behaviors had “escalated as a result of” mother not giving him his
medication as prescribed by the psychiatrist. Dr. Brooks
explained that the child’s psychiatrist, Dr. Karstnoorthy, had
stopped giving mother prescriptions for the child until she sought
mental treatment for herself. Mother had gone to Dr.
Karstnoorthy’s office on several occasions irate and demanding
that the doctor increase the dosage of the medication. She had to
be escorted out of the office by security. Dr. Brooks believed that
mother’s own behavior and the home environment were
“contributors to the child’s significant and increasing mental
health issues.” (Bolded emphasis omitted.)
On January 21, 2025, the social worker also spoke to a
member of the mobile crisis outreach team who told her that he
responded to a call from mother’s home on January 14, 2025. But
by the time he arrived, the child had already been transferred to
the ER. The team member described mother as “irate and
emotional” and the member believed that the child “pick[ed] up
on … mother’s behavior, and this contribute[d] to [his] mental
health and behavioral issues.” (Bolded emphasis omitted.)
The child’s school counselor reported that he had poor
grades, excessive absences, and, based on reports from his prior
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schools, a history of behavioral issues. She described the child’s
classroom behaviors as “extreme and violent. [He had] bang[ed]
his head on the window, [had] stabbed himself with a pencil, [and
had] kicked a instructional aide.” (Bolded emphasis omitted.)
The counselor described mother as “confrontational” and
“combative” in her dealings with school staff. (Bolded emphasis
omitted.)
On January 24, 2025, the social worker interviewed father
who confirmed that he had not seen the child in two and a half
years despite a family law order granting him joint custody.
Father had tried to visit the child, but mother refused to
cooperate.
On February 18, 2025, the social worker interviewed the
child’s daycare provider who believed the child’s behavioral
issues were caused, in part, by mother’s erratic conduct. The
provider believed that the child mimicked mother’s actions.
Mother would tell the child before school that he would not be
going to daycare that afternoon, only to later call the provider,
tell her to pick him up, and then scream and hang up the phone.
Following an incident—during which the child became upset
after she had picked him from school and jumped from her car—
the provider discontinued services until such time as mother
“could do better with the child’s mental health.” Mother told the
provider that she “did not care if the child went to foster care …
because she was tired.”
On March 4, 2025, the Department filed a section 300
petition, which, as amended and eventually sustained by the
juvenile court, alleged that “[t]he child … [was] diagnosed with
[ADHD] and has behavioral issues including suicidal ideations,
homicidal ideations, violent and assaultive behaviors and
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multiple psychiatric hospitalizations, which requires regular
mental health treatment. The child’s mother … failed to
consistently provide for the child’s mental health needs. On
[seven dates between August 26, 2024, and October 21, 2024] …
mother failed to ensure the child attended follow[-]up mental
health appointments. [M]other [had] failed to ensure that the
child take [his] psychotropic medication as prescribed. Further,
the child’s psychiatrist, Dr. Karstnoorthy, stopped providing
prescription refills for the child until … mother sought mental
health treatment for herself. Such medical neglect by the child’s
mother endangers the child’s physical health and safety, creates
a detrimental home environment and places the child at
substantial risk of serious physical harm, damage, danger and
medical neglect.”
C. Detention Hearing
On March 18, 2025, the juvenile court found that the child
was a person described in section 300, ordered the child detained,
removed him from mother’s home, and placed him in father’s
home. Following its pronouncement of the detention order, the
court, the child, and mother engaged in an exchange during
which the child stated that he did not want to leave mother or
live with father. The court noted that “mother was shaking her
head and making faces,” and that “the [child] soaked that up. He
was fully aware of what [mother was] doing, and [she] didn’t help
the matter at all.” After asking the bailiff to remove mother from
the courtroom, the court explained, “[M]other just stormed out
and slammed the door, and I think her actions just proved the
court’s decision.”
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D. April 21, 2025, Hearing
In an April 16, 2025, last minute information for the court,
the social worker reported that she met with the child on
March 21, 2025, and “he was doing well at his father’s home,” but
“missed his mother … .” Three weeks later, the child reported
that he “like[d] living with … father” and that “father’s wife and
stepsiblings [were] nice to him and he like[ed] them.”
The social worker also interviewed father on April 16, 2025,
who confirmed that the child was taking his psychotropic
medications daily as prescribed. He also said that there had been
no behavioral issues at home but added that there had been one
incident with another student at the child’s new school for which
the child had been disciplined.
At the April 21, 2025, progress hearing, the juvenile court
ordered monitored telephonic visits for mother twice a week for
15 minutes and continued the matter for adjudication.
E. Jurisdiction and Disposition
In a May 21, 2025, adjudication/disposition report, the
social worker reported that, during her follow-up interview with
the child, he said his behavior was better at father’s home and
added that he ate well, slept well, and did “‘fun stuff.’” The child
confirmed that he had been taking his medication but complained
it made him dizzy and he did not notice a difference in his
behavior when he took it. The child also discussed the difference
in his behavior when he lived with mother, explaining, “‘[M]y
mommy would worry me and stuff and she’s still trying to get her
stuff together so I can come back home.’”
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During her interview with the social worker, mother denied
the allegations of the petition. She blamed the ER and the child’s
former psychiatrist for taking the child off his medication and
then prescribing the wrong medication for him. When asked
about Dr. Karstnoorthy’s recommendation that she seek mental
health services, mother replied that she was not mentally ill.
Mother was “verbally aggressive” throughout the interview,
yelling at the social worker, cutting her off, and going off subject.
She repeatedly asked the social worker how father could be
considered a better parent to the child and suggested that he was
a “‘low key pedophile’” without providing any further details.
When the social worker advised her about the Department’s
recommendations, mother ended the interview saying, “‘I don’t
care’” and walked away.
When the social worker interviewed father in May 2025, he
said he had been unaware of the child’s mental health issues as
mother had prevented him from seeing the child for several
years. Although the court in the prior dependency proceeding
had ordered joint custody, mother would not provide him with
her address or phone number, and she was often unhoused or
living in hotels.
The child moved in with father in March 2025, and from
March to early April 2025, the child took “no medication and had
no major behavioral outbursts, suicidal ideations, or violent
interactions with others.” The child began taking medication in
April 2025, but after a month, the child’s new psychiatrist,
Dr. Rohanni, advised father to discontinue the medication based
on father’s report that he did not see any difference in the child’s
behavior. Father explained that “they were able to minimize the
child’s negative behaviors at school with the school providing
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[one-on-one] staff [support]. The child [was] followed throughout
the day by a staff member and redirected when needed which
[had] helped a lot.”
Father also advised that he had “been providing the child
with structure and that [had] been helping the child sleep[ ] and
get on a stable routine.” Dr. Rohanni told father that the child
had “negative and aggressive behaviors,” but according to father,
“those behaviors [had not] presented themselves yet.” Father’s
training and experience as a public transportation bus driver
gave him the ability “to deal with people who [had] mental health
conditions” and “to de-escalate negative behaviors.” He
understood that he needed to be patient with the child and
ensure that he received mental health services routinely.
Father’s wife provided similar information about the child,
confirming that he been in their home since March 2025 and was
“adjusting well.” She believed they had “a positive relationship”
with the child as he had “been more open to her and talk[ed] to
her more.” Father’s other child visited their home during the
week and on some weekends and both children got “along very
well and [were] happy to see each other … .”
Father’s wife also confirmed that the child had lived in
their home for about three weeks before he received medication
and that, when he started medication, “she did not see a
difference in how the child acted at home.” She perceived that
“the child’s main issue was hyperactivity and the medication
didn’t slow him down ‘bouncing on the couches’ and being hyper.”
The child stopped taking medication on May 7, 2025, based on
the psychiatrist’s recommendation, following which the wife
observed that he had “the same behaviors.”
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The vice principal at the child’s current school was aware of
the child’s prior behaviors from his individualized education
program but said he had not engaged in any “extreme behavioral
problems” at his current school. He also reported the child was
receiving one-on-one staff support that seemed to help with the
child’s behaviors and that he had “no major concerns … for the
child.”
Dr. Rohanni replied to the social worker’s inquiries about
the child’s medication, e-mailing: “‘The medications did not seem
to have any effect when he took it. His parents also reported that
his behavior had been manageable even without medication, and
they felt he may not need it anyway. [¶] He should continue
therapy and may follow up with a psychiatrist as needed for new
or worsening symptoms.” (Italics omitted.)
The counselor at the child’s prior school confirmed that
“[d]uring his time at their school[,] the child would have severe
behavioral problems most days,” “was late to school most days,”
and “it was a regular occurrence that … mother would come to
the school and curse school staff out.” On one occasion, “mother
got upset and then peeled out of the parking lot driving fast” near
students and parents. And, when the juvenile court detained the
child in March 2025, “mother came to the school and cursed,
screamed, and banged on the doors,” looking for the counselor
because she was “upset with the statements the staff provided to
the [D]epartment … .”
The counselor believed the child “was constantly in survival
mode,” arriving at school “already emotionally unstable” and his
“emotions escalated throughout the day.” He would “do things
like throw items, physically fight his teacher, and get into fights
with other students.” His “outbursts didn’t need a trigger as he
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was always on high defense.” She believed the child “mimicked
his mother’s behaviors and his home environment played a role
in his negative behaviors.” Mother was “constantly blaming
others or the child for the child missing school, being late to
school, or being extremely tired at school.”
The counselor suggested that mother struggled with some
form of mental illness and did not know how to regulate her
emotions. According to the counselor, the child’s hospitalizations
and “extreme violent behaviors” seemed to occur when mother
was not “doing well mentally.” The counselor added that during
most of their conversations, mother screamed and had cursing
fits.
During his follow-up interview, the child’s former teacher
reiterated that the child “struggled with cursing, throwing
objects, and physically assaulting other[s] when upset,” noting he
“was attacked numerous times by the child … .” The former
teacher opined that the child mimicked mother’s aggressive
behavior toward staff and should not be returned to her care.
On May 15, 2025, a social worker who met with mother
reported that she may have an underlying “mental health
condition or learning disability as [she did] not appear to
completely understand the [child’s] diagnosis and medication
issues.” The social worker believed that mother’s outbursts were
not intentional. When mother was informed of the Department’s
recommendation, she called the social worker “upset and said she
was no longer going to participate in services or have visits.” The
social worker recommended that the juvenile court close the case
and place the child with father.
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At the initial June 9, 2025, adjudication/disposition
hearing, father’s counsel noted that the child was experiencing
outbursts after visits with mother.
At the July 8, 2025, continued adjudication/disposition
hearing, mother submitted documentary evidence, including
letters from her pastors, a letter from her therapist, an
enrollment letter from a parenting program, and an enrollment
letter from a domestic violence program. The juvenile court
admitted all exhibits offered by the parties.
Mother then testified as follows: She was currently
enrolled in domestic violence counseling, parenting, anger
management, and individual counseling programs. She provided
examples of lessons she had learned from her programs. Mother
had a negative view of the Department from her childhood, but
believed that by detaining the child, the Department had helped
her realize that she “wasn’t being the best parent that [she] could
to him.” But she was trying to change her behavior. She also
recognized a positive change in the child’s behavior since
detention, remarking that, in March 2025, he was a “Tasmanian
devil,” but had recently become a “sunny delight.”
Mother believed she would benefit from an order that kept
the case open because the Department would “be able to keep
eyes on [her] and [her] progress to make sure [the child was] still
being taken care of or provided for the way that he need[ed] to be
… .” She was also willing to participate in any further services
the juvenile court might order for her. She denied, however, that
the child’s past behaviors were a reflection of how she had
behaved.
The juvenile court continued the matter to July 22, 2025.
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F. Ruling
At the continued July 22, 2025, hearing, mother moved to
dismiss the petition or, in the alternative, for joint custody and
an order that would keep the case open for her to have a chance
to reunify and liberalize visits.
The juvenile court sustained the petition and then
terminated jurisdiction, awarded joint legal custody to the
parents with father having “tie breaking authority,” and awarded
sole physical custody to father.
The juvenile court explained its disposition ruling as
follows: “[T]his … is a case that involves two different
environments and the effect that two different environments will
have on a child’s mental health. [The child] is a completely
different child than the child who was in this court [at the initial
hearing]. The court remembers [the child’s] behavior and
reactions on that day and … mother’s behavior and reactions on
that day.
“And the fact that [the child] is now thriving in … father’s
home is all the evidence that this court needs to demonstrate that
his mother’s home was so detrimental to his emotional well-
being, and it’s a demonstration that what consistency and
patience and … an emotionally stable environment can have on
changing a child’s behavior, so much so that medication is not
even required now. That speaks volumes.
“And what it also speaks volumes about was the …
emotional detriment that existed for [the child] in … mother’s
home. And so the issue really becomes does the court need to
keep this case open, and that’s basically where most counsels’
arguments lie.
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“And the court is not required to keep a case open in this
particular case because … father’s home has been determined to
be exactly what [the child] needs and … father is able to satisfy
all of his needs … without [Department] or court intervention.
“And when the court is assessing keeping a case open—and
in this particular case when a child is with one parent, the issue
is whether or not it would be in the child’s best interest and/or
whether it’s necessary for the child to keep the case open. In this
particular instance, the court does not find that continued court
intervention or [Department] supervision is necessary.”
The juvenile court added, “[P]ursuant to section 361.2, the
court finds [father] is a previously non-custodial parent who
desires placement of the child with him. The court finds that
placement of [the child] with his father would not be detrimental
to the safety, protection, physical or emotional well-being of the
child, and he is ordered released home of parent father. And for
the reasons stated, the court does not believe that continued
jurisdiction is necessary.”
Mother filed a timely notice of appeal from the juvenile
court’s jurisdictional and dispositional findings.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Termination of Jurisdiction Under Section 361.2
Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion
when it terminated jurisdiction under section 361.2, subdivision
(b)(1), arguing “it was not in the child’s best interests to
terminate juvenile court supervision after uprooting the child
from the only home he has ever known, releasing him to a parent
who did not have a history of parenting this special needs child,
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and not allowing [m]other to participate in services to allow for
[m]other to regain custody or move to more liberalized visitation.”
1. Legal Principles
“Section 361.2, subdivision (a) requires a court ordering
removal of a child first to determine whether there is a
noncustodial parent who wants to assume custody. The court
shall place the child with that parent, unless that placement
would be detrimental to the child’s safety, protection, or physical
or emotional well-being.” (In re A.C. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 38,
42.) If the juvenile court makes the required finding of no
detriment and places the child with the former noncustodial
parent, section 361.2, subdivision (b) provides the court with two
options: (1) grant the noncustodial parent legal and physical
custody of the child and terminate dependency jurisdiction;2 or
(2) maintain supervision over the child and order reunification
services to either or both the offending and noncustodial parent.
(§ 361.2, subd. (b)(1)–(3).)
“When deciding whether to terminate jurisdiction, the court
must determine whether there is a need for continued
supervision, not whether the conditions that justified taking
jurisdiction in the first place still exist … .” (In re Janee W.
2 Subdivision (b)(1) of section 361.2 provides in pertinent
part: “(b) If the court places the child with [the noncustodial]
parent, the court may do any of the following: [¶] (1) Order that
the parent become legal and physical custodian of the child …
[and] may also provide reasonable visitation by the noncustodial
parent. The court shall then terminate its jurisdiction over the
child. The custody order shall continue unless modified by a
subsequent order of the superior court.”
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(2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1451.) “The question is whether
juvenile court services and ongoing supervision were necessary to
protect the child from harm. [Citation.] … Statutes grant the
juvenile court broad authority to enter orders to protect a
dependent child and to reunite the family and terminate
jurisdiction as quickly as possible. [Citation.] That authority
includes discretion to terminate dependency jurisdiction when
the child is in parental custody and no protective issue remains.
[Citation.]” (In re D.B. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 613, 624.)
“[U]nder subdivision (b)(3) of section 361.2, ‘[t]he decision
whether to provide services and to which parent is discretionary
to the court because the child is not out of the home, but in
placement with a parent.’ [Citations.] We will therefore uphold
the juvenile court’s decision to terminate … reunification services
… unless that decision amount[s] to an abuse of discretion. …
[W]hen we review a juvenile court order for abuse of discretion,
the ‘“appropriate test … is whether the trial court exceeded the
bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably
be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to
substitute its decision for that of the trial court.” [Citation.]’
[Citations.] Accordingly, we will not reverse the juvenile court’s
decision unless that court ‘“has exceeded the limits of legal
discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd
determination … .” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (In re Jaden E.
(2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1288.)
2. Analysis
Here, substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s
finding that mother had consistently failed to ensure that the
child took prescribed psychotropic medication and to take him to
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scheduled follow-up visits with mental health care providers.
The record also supports the court’s finding that the child’s
extreme behavioral issues while living with mother—as described
by his teacher, his counselor, his caregiver, and ER staff—were
caused, at least in part, by mother’s own erratic behavior.
Indeed, the court observed firsthand at the initial hearing an
example of such behavior on mother’s part and its immediate
effect upon the child. Finally, following detention, the child
“experienced outbursts” after visiting with mother.
When, however, the child was removed from mother’s care
and placed with father, his behaviors immediately began to
improve, both in the home and at school. Between the initial
March 18, 2025, hearing and early April 2025, the child’s first
month in father’s home, he was not on any medication, yet his
behavior improved noticeably. And, after receiving
approximately a month of medication, the psychiatrist was able
to discontinue drug therapy in May 2025 without any adverse
consequences on the child’s behavior. The reported improvement
in the child’s behavior—as described by the child, father, his wife,
the child’s new psychiatrist, and his new school vice principal—
continued through the time of the July 22, 2025, disposition
hearing, that is, four months from detention. The court
attributed the child’s marked improvement to the secure and
stable environment being provided to the child in father’s home,
which finding is supported by substantial evidence. On this
record, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it
concluded that continued supervision and services for mother
were thus unnecessary and would not in the best interest of the
child.
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B. Failure to Make Findings
Mother also maintains that the juvenile court failed to
make the written or oral findings required under section 361.2.
She asserts that “the court made conclusory statements that [it]
was not obligated to provide services and that it was not in the
best interests of the child to do so because [it] did not know when
the child might safely return to [m]other’s care.” We disagree.
Section 361.2, subdivision (c) provides: “The court shall
make a finding, either in writing or on the record, of the basis for
its determination under subdivisions (a) and (b).”
As we describe above, the juvenile court made specific
findings on the record of the basis for its decision to terminate
jurisdiction. The court expressly identified the applicable
standard under which to analyze the issue of continued
jurisdiction and found that, “when a child is with one parent, the
issue is whether or not it would be in the child’s best interest
and/or whether it’s necessary for the child to keep the case open.
In this particular instance, the court does not find that continued
court intervention or [Department] supervision is necessary.”
Among other specific findings in support of that determination,
the court found that it was “not required to keep a case open in
this particular case because … father’s home has been
determined to be exactly what [the child] needs and … father is
able to satisfy all of his needs and, as has been stated, to satisfy
his needs without [Department] or court intervention.”
Those findings by the juvenile court were sufficient to
satisfy the requirement under section 361.2, subdivision (c) to
place on the record “the basis for its determination” under
subdivision (a) that continued supervision was unnecessary. The
court therefore did not err as contended.
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IV. DISPOSITION
The order terminating jurisdiction is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
KIM (D.), J.
We concur:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
MOOR, J.
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