Filed 9/22/26 In re K.T. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re K.T. et al., Persons Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E087190
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. DPSW2500238)
v. OPINION
B.T.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Sean P. Crandell, Judge.
Affirmed.
Clare M. Lemon, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Jamila T. Purnell, Chief Assistant County
Counsel, and Catherine E. Rupp, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
B.T. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court’s disposition order and exit orders to
family court terminating the dependency action after vesting custody of his toddler
children, C.T. and K.T. (collectively, Minors), with R.K. (Mother). Father challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 (all further statutory references are to this
code) and its order under section 361, subdivision (c), removing Minors from his custody.
Father’s challenges are without merit, and we therefore affirm the juvenile court’s
rulings.
BACKGROUND
The Children’s Services Division of the Riverside County Department of Public
Social Services (DPSS) responded in late July 2025 to an emergency response referral for
C.T., a girl, then almost 20 months old, and K.T., a boy, then almost five months old,
based on Father’s suicidal ideation, including a failed suicide attempt. Mother showed
law enforcement videos of conversations with Father within the past week admitting he
wanted to harm himself. One video depicted Father showing Mother a bullet while
telling her that “the primer to the gun did not go off because he’s ‘not good with guns.’ ”
In the other video, while the children were present with Father and Mother, Father
discussed with Mother his history of suicidal ideation. Mother was concerned that Father
seemed “fixated on having both children alone [with him] with no supervision.”
In initial law enforcement contact with Father, apparently by telephone, Father
“denied all the allegations,” but presented as “very agitated.” Law enforcement did not
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attempt to initiate a mental health hold remotely, as Father said he did not have intrusive
thoughts at the time. Nonetheless, the responding social worker’s impression from
discussing the matter with the police was that Father was unstable and untruthful. She
learned he had a history of making 911 calls with unfounded accusations against Mother
for domestic violence and for “stealing his money,” and an officer noted Father’s mood
swings in calls to the department. Father told the police that he had access to firearms.
The social worker contacted Mother where she resided with the children and the
children’s maternal grandfather since moving out of Father’s home a couple of months
earlier. Mother denied engaging in domestic violence with Father, but said he would
“kick in doors and throw things at the wall such as toys, cups, and ‘anything that he had
in his hand.’ ”
Mother showed the social worker a video from two days earlier in which Father
said he had a “mental breakdown,” he admitted signs of his “poor mental health” over the
last six months, he blamed Mother for wanting to hurt himself, and he labeled Mother a
failure for not calling 911 the night he made an “attempt,” which he characterized as a
“cry for help” that should have “red flagged that night” because he was a danger to
himself. Father blamed the decline in his mental health on Mother finding out about his
infidelities. He expressed that he was glad he “survived” attempting to kill himself. He
said he was now in therapy, apparently implying improvement, but when Mother noted a
recent instance of suicidal ideation, Father lashed out that, over the last six months,
3
including “up to the previous weekend,” “someone should have done something”
regarding his poor mental health.
Mother showed the social worker another video from the week before in which
Father expressed suicidal ideation, a point he drove home by showing Mother a bullet
that had misfired. In response to Mother asking if he had attempted to kill himself,
Father confirmed that he had. He also said ambiguously, “I don’t think you’re going to
see anything like that changing because I’m going on my anti-psychotic medication.”
Mother denied that Father had ever threatened to harm her or the children. When asked
about substance use that might contribute to suicidal ideation, Mother mentioned Father’s
marijuana use.
A peace officer and a social worker contacted Father at his home, where Father
denied any suicidal intent. Father said he had a friend from Colorado take his two
firearms—a rifle and a handgun—late the previous month. Father claimed variously that
he smoked about “five joints [of marijuana] per two weeks” or “about one joint every two
days.” He disclosed autism and attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder diagnoses
(ADHD), for which he took medication, and he also received individual counseling
services. Shown Mother’s videos, Father talked over them while also playing a video
game on his phone.
Father asserted the faulty gun incident actually occurred three years previously
with an unnamed “ex” romantic partner, and he attributed the “mental breakdown” from
some months earlier that he mentioned in the other video to stress Mother caused him.
4
He insisted he had not concretely thought “of a way to hurt himself,” but instead “simply
just wanted to hurt himself.” He also claimed his suicidal ideation never involved use of
his weapons. Father blamed Mother and his therapist for not seeing “red flags”
indicating his suicidal thoughts.
Father’s therapist subsequently contacted the social worker at Father’s request.
The therapist reported that Father was not stable, “seemed like he had different
personalities,” and recommended that he receive a psychiatric evaluation. She had seen
Mother’s video recordings, about which Father complained Mother “tricked him into
talking about the ‘old stuff.’ ” The therapist did not believe Father’s explanation; instead,
she noted he had “a way [in which] whatever he tells himself is the ‘truth.’ ” The
therapist had previously brought to Father’s attention concerns that he exhibited multiple
personalities, as if he were “two different people.” Regarding the children, Father
vacillated in therapy between giving up custody, to never seeing them again, and then
changing his mind and showing a cooperative demeanor.
When the social worker texted Father to request that he participate in drug testing,
he answered that he could not do so that day due to work. Father then insisted that all
further communications be through email only, or else he would hire an attorney. Then
he texted the social worker: “I am allowed to be rude to you because you are an asshole
so go fuck yourself.” The social worker noted in his report that the exchange
corroborated earlier reports of Father’s drastic changes in mood and behavior.
5
Meanwhile, Mother obtained in family court a temporary restraining order against
Father, pending further proceedings in that court. On the same day, Father tested positive
for what the social worker noted were high levels of marijuana metabolites and Delta-9
THCC. The following week, Father texted the social worker a photograph of an official
looking “DV-800/JV-270” court form suggesting that he had just surrendered his rifle and
handgun to a licensed gun dealer, but the form did not include a case number or filing
stamp. Father previously had claimed he already gave his rifle and handgun to his
Colorado friend. Father also sent the social worker a “Certificate of Completion” for a
16-hour anger management class, but he would not answer, without an attorney present,
what prompted him to take the class.
The children’s paternal aunt spoke to the social worker about Father’s mental
health and mood swings. The mood swings were “significant” and longstanding,
observed “in the past” also by Father’s two teenage children from a prior relationship.
The aunt was not aware of any safety concerns for the older children in the past. She
believed Father’s mental health was currently exacerbated by “unresolved trauma
stemming from the paternal grandmother’s passing.” Father had shared with the aunt a
mental health evaluation he completed online, which he believed “went ‘great.’ ” The
aunt, however, had pointed out to him that he had not been forthcoming for the
evaluation. His omissions included minimizing his daily marijuana use as once every
two weeks and other “lies,” according to the aunt.
6
The aunt thought Father used his autism diagnosis to justify erratic behavior and to
manipulate Mother “to feel bad for him [to] get her to stay in the relationship.” The aunt
described Mother as timid and subject to intimidation by Father. The aunt believed
Father’s “goal was to have the children in his custody since [ ] [M]other would not
remain with him.” Father had recently filed for divorce in early July 2025.
The evaluation, said to be based on an outpatient “virtual visit” stated that Father
“Consistently reported no current suicidal ideations.” Summary information in the
evaluation included that Father “is a 34-year-old male, self-employed with seven children
from two marriages, currently in a stable relationship and under psychiatric care.” The
evaluation concluded with an “Assessment of risk factors” deemed to “suggest[] a low
current suicide risk. No red flags were identified.”
DPSS social workers filed a dependency petition in mid-August 2025, seeking
juvenile court protection for Minors under section 300, subdivision (b). The allegations
included that Mother failed to benefit from services in a prior child welfare referral and
that Father’s marijuana use and unresolved mental health history jeopardized Minors’
health, safety, and well-being, including because of suicidal ideation evidenced in the
recent video recording.
At the ensuing detention hearing (§ 319), the juvenile court found a prima facie
showing supported the petition allegations and detained Minors from parental custody.
The court vested custody with DPSS, but ordered that Minors remain in Mother’s care.
The court authorized two one-hour supervised visits weekly for Father with Minors. The
7
court also authorized reunification services for Father, including funding for a
psychiatrist, psychologist, or other clinical experts, as well as counseling, parenting
education, drug and alcohol testing, and substance abuse treatment. After hearing
testimony from Mother, Father, the maternal grandfather, and a maternal uncle, the court
issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) requiring Father to surrender any weapons
and to stay away from Mother and Minors, except for visitation with Minors, pending a
further hearing.
DPSS subsequently documented a prior domestic violence incident between
Mother and Father that had occurred back in May 2025. According to Mother, Father
became upset with her for asking a question, yelled insults and chased her, and kicked
open the bathroom door that Mother and C.T. hid behind.
A new social worker interviewed Mother and Father separately about their
perceptions of the family’s needs. Mother believed time was needed for Father to
participate in therapy, given his recent statements about suicide “and want[ing] to have
the kids alone while talking about suicide.”
Father informed the social worker he would “not be participating” in supervised
visitation. Nor would he submit to drug testing, viewing the requirement as “an
admission of guilt.” He saw the testing requirement, including before visits, as “the
Department . . . trying to accuse him of a crime.” Father declined to participate in any
reunification services ordered by the court; he refused to sign or return any of the release
8
of information forms for any services he obtained. Father declined any cooperation with
DPSS apart from an interview.
In the interview, Father expressed disappointment that “common sense was not
utilized” to resolve DPSS’s and the juvenile court’s safety concerns. He claimed his
recorded statements regarding self-harm were “made in emotion and taken out of
context.” He blamed the prior social worker for “only . . . search[ing] for what he wanted
to find,” despite Father providing the worker with his therapist’s and his pastor’s contact
information. Father did not acknowledge that the prior social worker told him his
therapist had contacted the worker with her concerns, including that he receive a
psychiatric evaluation.
Father summarized the family’s needs as follows: “What we need is a Judge to go
to the mom and say he wants to see his kids, he does not want to take them. You
[apparently referencing Mother] need to facilitate visits and not be vindictive.”
According to Father, Mother “needed a reminder that he made the kids as much as she
did, and so she needed to allow visitation.”
Mother cooperated with family maintenance services. Father stated she was “the
best mom for his children”; he did not propose alternate caregivers or placement; he
reiterated his assertion that “he was not asking for custody, just visitation.”
DPSS amended its petition in early September 2025 to strike the allegation
regarding Mother’s child welfare history as a basis for dependency jurisdiction. DPSS
recommended that the court assume dependency jurisdiction based on the petition
9
allegations and then close the dependency court proceedings with exit orders to family
court, vesting custody with Mother and authorizing supervised visitation for Father. At
Father’s request, the juvenile court set the pending jurisdictional hearing as contested.
The court left in place the TRO against Father pending the hearing date, with its
exception for visitation.
The social worker checked with Father about visiting Minors before the hearing,
since Father had not seen them in close to three months. C.T. was almost two years old
and was set to dress as Tinkerbell for Halloween. K.T., nearing six months old, would be
Peter Pan. Father declined. He said he was “not able to commit to [visitation] terms . . .
as they are currently ordered” by the court. He explained that he would “not allow the
state to violate my 4th amendment rights.” Father demanded that DPSS “come forward
with better terms to ensure that [he] has reasonable visits.”
Father also said he could not afford visits, including paying for gas and a visitation
monitor. The social worker told him the costs could be defrayed, including no cost for
DPSS to monitor visits; however, Father again declined, refusing the prerequisite saliva
test before each visit. Instead of visits, Father focused on “continuing with the private
sector services” he retained in lieu of court-supervised ones. He refused again to return
releases the social worker sent him, though she reminded him that the purpose was to
verify services with his providers.
Father and Mother appeared at the contested jurisdictional hearing. DPSS
continued to recommend that the juvenile court assume jurisdiction over Minors based on
10
the amended petition’s allegations, and then, in lieu of dependency court supervision,
issue exit orders to family court with custody to Mother and visitation for Father. The
court admitted DPSS’s reports without objection.
Minors’ counsel submitted on DPSS’s recommendation. Minors’ counsel
concurred with DPSS that “the Court can definitely find the allegation b-2 [regarding
jurisdiction based on Father’s mental health, including suicidal ideation] as true today.”
In submitting, counsel left for the court to determine whether “allegation b-3” regarding
Father’s marijuana use also supported jurisdiction.
Arguing against jurisdiction, Father asserted he had addressed in his private
services any concerns about his mental health and, therefore, “there’s not any current risk
of harm to the[] children.” Father did not testify or call any witnesses. He submitted for
the court’s consideration certificates he received for completing his private services.
These included, counsel for Father said, a 16-hour anger management class, a 12-hour
parenting class, a four-hour domestic violence class, and a four-hour conflict resolution
class.1 Father also disputed jurisdiction based on his marijuana use but, “being
proactive” according to counsel, he had completed an eight-hour marijuana education
course.
Father also included in his packet of exhibits a text message from Mother and a
letter from Father’s privately-retained individual counseling therapist. Counsel for Father
1 Apart from the anger management certificate, Father’s documentation is not in
the record on appeal. The court admitted the materials over DPSS’s objection, but it
appears Father did not designate the exhibits as part of the record on appeal, if they were
retained by the juvenile court, nor did he otherwise lodge them on appeal.
11
represented that the text message from Mother to Father showed that she did not move
out of the home she shared with Father “due to concerns about father’s mental health or
about any sort of fear of father,” but rather because of a “difficult therapy session.” No
details were given regarding the therapy session.
Counsel for Father also represented that the proffered letter from Father’s therapist
“indicat[ed] that father has been consistently attending weekly visits” for the last several
months, in which they “did address his depression, accompanied by his suicidal
thoughts.” According to counsel, the therapist’s “professional opinion [was] that he has
mentally stabilized, that he has learned the coping mechanisms that he needs to control
his emotional triggers,” and she additionally noted his “high level of commitment to
continuing with his treatment.” The therapist’s understanding, according to Father’s
counsel, was that Father’s unspecified “difficulties” addressed in therapy were due to
“being deprived of communication with his children,” presumably by Mother, at least in
Father’s view.2
Before ruling on the petition, the juvenile court inquired whether Father “ever
[authorized] any kind of release of information as to the various programs he completed
on his own which would allow the Department to interview and reach out to the providers
and get their information?” Father had not done so. DPSS objected to admission of
Father’s exhibits, including the certificates, because the court and the agency had “no
2 As with Father’s classroom certificates, neither the text message from Mother to
Father nor Father’s therapist’s letter is in the record on appeal.
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way of knowing anything about these [documents], other than there’s a piece of paper
handed to us, and that’s it.” The court admitted the exhibits, but expressly gave them
“minimal weight.”
The court found the dependency petition allegations true, “with the caveat” that
the court amended the allegation regarding Father’s marijuana use to state “ ‘that the
father has a history of using’ [the drug] . . . , replac[ing] the word ‘abusing’ with ‘using.’ ”
As interlineated, the court sustained the petition based on risk posed to Minors by
Father’s “unresolved mental health issues” as stated in the petition, including his
“suicidal ideations,” and separately based on his marijuana use as well.
The court explained its ruling regarding Father’s mental health: “The real concern
is that dad engaged in behavior that causes everyone significant concern for his safety
and the safety of individuals who are around him, and I don’t necessarily have
information in front of me that compels this Court to believe that those issues have been
completely resolved.”
The court also concluded that removing Minors from Father’s physical custody
under section 361, subdivision (c), was necessary, by clear and convincing evidence, for
lack of trustworthy “recent information” that Father had resolved his issues. His
providers had “not been interviewed by the Department,” he “refused to participate in the
services provided by the Department, refused to test for the Department and [he] did miss
a significant amount of visitation.”
13
The court adopted DPSS’s recommendation to, in lieu of ongoing dependency
supervision and proceedings, “close the matter with sole physical and sole legal custody
to mother.” The court ordered visitation once a week for Father, an hour at a time and
supervised, but subject to being expanded upon approval by the family court. The court
also made the TRO permanent, again with its exception for visitation and subject to
modification or rescission by the family court.
In concluding remarks, the court “remind[ed] the parties that these orders are not
necessarily permanent.” The court explained: “There’s nothing preventing dad from
returning to family law court as he continues in his therapeutic programs and can
demonstrate to that court that he might be appropriately given types of visitation or
increased time with the children or the custodial arrangements [may] be changed.” The
court entered its jurisdictional findings, the disposition order removing Minors from
Father’s custody under section 361, its order closing the dependency proceedings, and
ensuing exit orders to family court vesting custody with Mother. Father now appeals.
DISCUSSION
Father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court’s
jurisdictional findings and the court’s order removing Minors from his custody before
issuing exit orders to family court. We first address one of Father’s jurisdictional
challenges, namely his contention that his suicidal ideation was solely in the past, thereby
posing no current risk for Minors in his care. Next, we find it unnecessary to address
Father’s challenge to a second independent basis for jurisdiction, i.e., his marijuana use.
14
Then we turn to his contention the evidence did not support removal of Minors from his
custody.
A. Jurisdiction: Governing Law and Analysis
The purpose of juvenile court jurisdiction is “to provide maximum safety and
protection for children wo are currently being physically, sexually, or emotionally abused,
being neglected, or being exploited, and to ensure the safety, protection, and physical and
emotional well-being of children who are at risk of that harm.” (§ 300.2.) Section 300,
subdivision (b)(1)(D), authorizes juvenile court jurisdiction when a parent cannot
adequately care for a child due to mental illness or substance abuse. Specifically,
dependency court protection is proper if the “child has suffered, or there is a substantial
risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of . . . [t]he
inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s
or guardian’s mental illness . . . or substance abuse.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(D).)
Proof by the low threshold of a preponderance of the evidence warrants
jurisdiction. (§ 355, subd. (a); Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 248.)
Nevertheless, harm may not be presumed from the mere fact of a parent’s mental health
challenges. (In re A.L. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 1044, 1050; see In re Joaquin C. (2017)
15 Cal.App.5th 537, 563 [“mental illness is not itself a justification for exercising
dependency jurisdiction over a child”].) There must be a risk of harm traceable to the
parent’s mental condition. (Joaquin C., at p. 561 [parent’s condition or conduct must
cause risk of harm].) Similarly, jurisdiction for substance abuse requires drug or alcohol
15
use that “makes a parent or guardian unable to provide regular care for a child and . . .
this inability has caused the child to suffer serious physical harm or illness or creates a
substantial risk of such harm or illness.” (In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 558.)
The juvenile court does not have to predict or foresee the exact harm a child may
suffer if a parent fails to treat his or her mental health condition or substance abuse. A
substantial risk of harm suffices. (In re Travis C. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1226-
1227 (Travis C.).) The court “need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to
assume jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to protect the child.” (In re R.V. (2012)
208 Cal.App.4th 837, 843 (R.V.).) The risk of harm must be ongoing as of the
jurisdiction hearing. (In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 601-602.) “The court
may consider past events in deciding whether a child presently needs the court’s
protection. [Citations.] A parent’s ‘ “[p]ast conduct may be probative of current
conditions” if there is reason to believe that the conduct will continue.’ [Citations.]”
(Id. at p. 602; accord, e.g., In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133.) [“A parent’s past
conduct is a good predictor of future behavior.”].)
We review the juvenile court’s decision to assume jurisdiction under the
substantial evidence standard. “ ‘Substantial evidence is evidence that is “reasonable,
credible, and of solid value”; such that a reasonable trier of fact could make such
findings.’ ” (In re L.W. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 840, 848 (L.W.).) “The appellant has the
burden of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the
findings or order.” (R.V., supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 843.) Our review is deferential.
16
“We do not evaluate the credibility of witnesses, attempt to resolve conflicts in the
evidence or determine the weight of the evidence. Instead, we draw all reasonable
inferences in support of the findings, view the record favorably to the juvenile court’s
order and affirm the order even if there is other evidence supporting a contrary finding.”
(Ibid.)
Father argues that his acknowledged mental health issues, including past instances
of suicidal ideation, did not create a risk of serious physical harm or illness for Minors at
the time of the jurisdictional hearing. (See L.W., supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 1018.) We
are not persuaded.
Simply put, it was for the juvenile court to determine Father’s credibility. The
court could reasonably determine that Father’s history of falsely claiming his suicidal
ideation was in the past, in conjunction with his unwillingness to undergo credible
psychiatric testing or have his counseling and coursework claims tested by the court or
DPSS, meant the risk of harm to Minors if left in his care remained ongoing.
Father does not dispute that mental distress that pushes a parent to the brink of
suicide presents a grave risk of harm to a child in the parent’s care. Father had claimed
that Mother’s videos referred to incidents in the past, but in virtually the same breath he
admitted that his “red flag” cries for help warranting 911 emergency intervention
continued up to the weekend before Mother sought dependency protection. The court
could reasonably conclude that Father’s dangerous state of mind did not abruptly cease
when Mother requested help. Father claimed he never had concrete plans to harm
17
himself and disclaimed intent to use his firearms for self-harm, but this was belied by his
own actions and statements. He showed Mother in admitting current suicidal thoughts
the bullet that misfired in one of his attempts. Father put the court in the position of
having to decide whether he was lying when he insisted he needed help or when he said
he didn’t. Mother, the agency, and the court could all be reasonably concerned for
Father’s safety and the safety of Minors in his care when Father said not to expect his
fragile mental state to improve with psychotropic medication. Of further concern, there
was no evidence Father obtained this or other medication to address his recently admitted
suicidal ideation. Father’s own privately retained therapist also said he was
untrustworthy, manipulative, and needed psychiatric testing and help. The contrary, self-
serving online assessment Father furnished was transparently worthless.
We must also view the rest of the evidence regarding Father’s subsequent
treatment—or the lack thereof—in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's
findings, and we cannot reweigh the evidence. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773
(I.J.).) Representations by Father’s counsel at the jurisdictional hearing did not constitute
evidence his mental health had improved. (See, e.g., In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396,
413, fn. 11 [“unsworn statements of counsel are not evidence”].) Father provided at the
jurisdictional hearing what he said was his therapist’s updated, favorable assessment of
his mental health, but he would not allow the court or DPSS to ask him, his therapist, or
any of his providers any questions to corroborate his improvement claims. It was the
court’s prerogative, which we may not second guess, to discount Father’s evidence.
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Moreover, Father omits the evidence from the record on appeal, and we therefore must
presume the trial court’s examination of the evidence supported the court’s ruling,
especially given that Father precluded even a DPSS telephone call to confirm any of the
evidence, let alone cross-examination. (See Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.2d
557, 564 [lower court’s ruling presumed correct; appellant bears burden to affirmatively
establish error]; see, e.g., Stasz v. Eisenberg (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1039
[obligation rests on appellant “to present a complete record for appellate review”].)
In the absence of credible evidence that Father’s mental state had improved and
suicide was no longer a risk, the juvenile court could reasonably act with due protective
caution to assume jurisdiction over Minors. Travis C., supra, 13 Cal.App.5th 1219 is
instructive. There, the mother’s mental health issues included not only delusions and
paranoia, which she minimized, but also threats to take her own life. The mother was not
medication compliant and refused regular, consistent psychiatric care, bouncing among
providers. (Id. at p. 1222.) The mother had significant time alone with the children and
threatened to leave the home of maternal relatives, who sometimes intervened to protect
the children. (Ibid.) The juvenile court in Travis C. rejected the mother’s argument that
any potential harm to the children from her poor mental health was merely speculative,
and the appellate court upheld the ruling. (Id. at pp. 1225-1226.)
We do so similarly here, where Father sought to have Minors alone in his care
despite what the juvenile court could conclude was a recent suicide attempt, in
conjunction with evidence indicating Father’s poor mental health remained a risk. This
19
included Father’s lengthy, unresolved history of suicidal ideation and noncredible
statements minimizing past and current risk of engaging in self-harm, Father’s dismissive
assessment that psychotropic medication would not change his mindset, his implicit
refusal to begin or comply with a medication regimen, his subversion of recommended
professional psychiatric care by substituting a noncredible virtual evaluation, and the
absence of any credible evidence showing improvement in his mental health. The
juvenile court did not err in sustaining jurisdiction on mental health grounds in these
circumstances.
Father also disputes the additional basis on which the juvenile court found
jurisdiction: namely, his marijuana use. However, given our conclusion that substantial
evidence supports one of the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings, we need not address
the sufficiency of the evidence to support this alternative finding. (In re I.J., supra,
56 Cal.4th at p. 773.) “As a general rule, a single jurisdictional finding supported by
substantial evidence is sufficient to support jurisdiction and render moot a challenge to
the other findings.” (In re M.W. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1452; see In re M.R.
(2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 886, 896 [“ ‘[T]he juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction . . . will
be upheld if substantial evidence supports any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction
enumerated in the petition.’ ”].)
Review of alternate jurisdictional grounds is moot when “no effective relief could
be granted.” (In re Madison S. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 308, 329.) That is the case here
given that “jurisdiction would be established regardless of the appellate court’s
20
conclusions with respect to any such [alternate, challenged] jurisdictional grounds.”
(Ibid.) We note also that it would be a waste of judicial resources to consider whether to
uphold the juvenile court’s jurisdiction ruling on an alternate, additional ground when the
family law court must review all the circumstances as they may have developed further, if
Father seeks custody or increased visitation in those proceedings. We therefore decline to
review Father’s superfluous, secondary jurisdictional challenge.
B. Removal: Governing Law and Analysis
Once the juvenile court finds a child to be within its jurisdiction, the court must
conduct a dispositional hearing to determine whether removal of the child from the
parent’s custody is necessary. (§ 361, subd. (c); In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159,
169 (N.M.).) “A removal order is proper if based on proof of parental inability to provide
proper care for the child and proof of a potential detriment to the child if he or she
remains with the parent. [Citation.] ‘The parent need not be dangerous and the minor
need not have been actually harmed before removal is appropriate. The focus of the
statute is on averting harm to the child.’ [Citation.]” (N.M. at pp. 169-170.) There must
be “clear and convincing evidence that removal is the only way to protect the child.” (Id.
at p. 170.) The court may consider a parent’s past conduct, present circumstances, and
response to the conditions giving rise to the dependency proceedings. (In re Cole C.
(2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 900, 917.)
Whether conditions in the home present a risk of harm to the child is a factual
issue, and we apply the substantial evidence test on review. (N.M., supra,
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197 Cal.App.4th at p. 170.) Under that standard, the appellate court “ ‘must view the
record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give due deference to
how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in
the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.’ ” (In re V.L. (2020)
54 Cal.App.5th 147, 155.)
As a preliminary matter, DPSS contends Father waived his appellate challenge to
the juvenile court’s custody removal order because, once jurisdiction was established,
Father “submit[ted]” to the dependency closing with exit orders to family court. DPSS
points to Father’s counsel’s statement at the hearing that, “[i]f the Court is finding the
[jurisdictional] allegations true today, we would submit on the case closing. I would be
asking for supervised visitation for father a minimum of two hours per week . . . .” We
agree that Father forfeited his appellate challenge to the removal of Minors from his
custody. Even assuming arguendo that Father did not forfeit his challenge, substantial
evidence supports removal.
A party’s decision to “submit” in dependency proceedings can have different
meanings—with different consequences. “[A] parent who submits on the reports in
evidence does not forfeit the right to appeal the juvenile court’s orders.” (T.V., supra,
217 Cal.App.4th at p. 136, italics added.) When a party “submits” in the sense of
declining to present further evidence or argument, so that the trier of fact may proceed to
rendering its decision “ ‘on a particular record,’ ” no forfeiture occurs. (Ibid.) Upon
submission in this manner, “the court must nevertheless weigh evidence, make
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appropriate evidentiary findings and apply relevant law to determine whether the case has
been proved.” (Ibid.) Thus, “the parent acquiesces as to the state of the evidence yet
preserves the right to challenge it as insufficient to support a particular legal conclusion.”
(Ibid.)
“Only when a parent submits on a social worker’s recommendation does he or she
forfeit the right to contest the juvenile court’s decision if it coincides with that
recommendation.” (T.V., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 136.) Submission in this sense “in
essence . . . endorses the court’s issuance of the recommended findings and orders.”
(Steve J. v. Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 798, 813.)
Here, the social worker’s report for the jurisdictional hearing recommended exit
orders to family court instead of dependency court supervision, with custody of Minors to
Mother and “reasonable” visitation for Father. At the hearing, Mother argued for
visitation just once a month based on Father failing to verify any of his services, his
refusal to visit Minors, and the fact that Father “still blames mother for not having the
visits” authorized by the court. Father, through counsel, “submit[ted] on the case
closing” if the court sustained jurisdiction, and asked “for supervised visitation . . . a
minimum of two hours per week,” in contrast to Mother “asking for once a month.”
Father did not mention custody.
Father’s statement through counsel, “[S]ubmit on the case closing,” can be read to
mean that he concurred in an outcome, i.e., exit orders, but that he did not endorse or
acquiesce in any particular determination of custody in those orders. In that case, his
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submission would be similar to submitting on a social worker’s report, rather than on a
particular custody recommendation. Undercutting this conclusion, however, is the fact
that in submitting the matter Father only argued for visitation (weekly), not for custody.
His request solely for visitation implies he conceded custody to Mother. He also
conceded that visitation would be supervised, which is inconsistent with challenging
removal of his physical custody rights.
Additionally, we note that in Father’s social worker interview for the jurisdictional
hearing, he only sought visitation and disclaimed any interest in custody. He expressly
stated “he was not asking for custody, just visitation.” Reiterating the point, he said he
“wants to see his kids, . . . not . . . take them.” In this vein, we also note that Father in his
appeal checkmarked the box indicating his challenge was to the juvenile court’s
“section 300 jurisdictional findings,” and he left unchecked the box contesting “Removal
of custody from parent or guardian.” For all of these reasons, we conclude Father
forfeited the appellate challenge he now attempts to raise against the court’s custody
removal order.
Nonetheless, even assuming for the sake of argument that Father did not forfeit his
challenge, substantial evidence supports removal—largely for the same reasons. The
purpose of section 361, subdivision (c), is to protect a parent or guardian’s “physical
custody” interest while ensuring there is no “substantial danger to the physical health,
safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were
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returned home.” (Id., subd. (c)(1).) There must be no reasonable alternatives to protect
the child, apart from removal. (Ibid.; N.M., supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 170.)
Removal was proper here where the evidence supported the conclusion Father
recently attempted suicide and his initial push for having Minors alone in his physical
custody justifiably raised alarm bells. A parent’s suicidal ideation poses a clear, obvious
risk to children in their custody (see Travis C., supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1225-1226),
particularly here where Minors could not care for themselves if Father harmed himself.
Father’s chosen method in previously attempting to shoot himself highlighted devastating
potential direct harm to Minors in Father’s custody, whether from a stray bullet or
witnessing violent self-harm. Father’s lengthy history of suicidal ideation raised the
stakes that there was no easy fix, and Father’s refusal to seek psychiatric evaluation and
treatment from a credible professional, to participate in verified services, and even to visit
Minors were all cause for concern. There were no alternatives to removal from Father’s
custody where he identified no one to help him and where, indeed, he did not want
Minors in his custody. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s order.
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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings, removal order, and exit orders with
sole custody to Mother are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
LEE
J.
We concur:
McKINSTER
Acting P. J.
RAPHAEL
J.
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