Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

In re K.G. CA5

Filed 10/19/26 In re K.G. CA5
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 10/19/26 In re K.G. CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re K.G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law.

THE PEOPLE, F089728

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. Nos. JW-137534-00,
JW-137534-01, JW-137534-02,
v. JW-137534-03, JW-137534-04,
JW-137534-05, JW-137534-06)
K.G.,

Defendant and Appellant. OPINION

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Marcus Cuper,
Judge.
William Howard Safford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher J. Rench and
Brook A. Bennigson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
Appellant K.G. appeals from an order pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code
section 7071 transferring various homicide and firearms charges levied against him from
juvenile court to criminal court. Primarily, K.G. claims his right to a speedy trial was
violated by the fact that approximately three years passed before his transfer hearing was
held. He further asserts the trial court erred by failing to make specific findings of good
cause prior to granting the various continuances he requested. Assuming without
deciding that constitutional speedy trial protections attach to a motion to transfer pursuant
to section 707, we find K.G. has waived any such claim. The vast majority of the
continuances in this case were sought by K.G., whose initial counsel substituted out after
over a year into the case. Substituted counsel then required significant time to get up to
speed on the case. Additional continuances were also sought by K.G. to allow him to
obtain an expert: the first expert was slow in responding to certain preliminary requests
from K.G.’s counsel, leading K.G. to seek a new expert; the second expert appointed by
the trial court refused the appointment; and K.G. finally located his own expert who
ultimately required substantial time to complete the review and author a report.
Throughout all of this, the court sought and obtained waivers of time from application
against K.G.’s speedy trial rights in virtually every continuance. The few continuances
where a specific time waiver was not requested and obtained were instances in which
K.G. impliedly waived time by agreeing to a certain date or requesting a further
continuance. These clear waivers, both express and implied, were made on the record in
open court and must be given effect; to hold anything else would be to upend the concept
of waiver entirely.

1 Further statutory citations are to the Welfare and Institutions Code, unless otherwise
specified.

2.
We find similarly unconvincing K.G.’s arguments about his personal absence from
several brief court hearings, as his counsel affirmatively waived the requirement of his
presence for those hearings. We also conclude K.G. forfeited certain claims he now
seeks to raise about a lack of resources, because he did not raise any such claims in the
trial court. Lastly, K.G.’s argument that these waivers resulted from the ineffectiveness
of his counsel (IAC) finds no support in the record. We affirm the order.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The parties do not substantially dispute the factual background of this case. On
January 2, 2020, the victim and her boyfriend, who were both 19 years old, were at a park
in Delano discussing their relationship when a gray car pulled up. Two people quickly
got out of the vehicle approximately 15 feet away from them and asked the couple where
they were from. The victim’s boyfriend yelled, “‘I don’t bang,’” but saw the individuals
drawing weapons, including at least two handguns. The victim’s boyfriend tried to cover
the victim with his body as the individuals began shooting. The victim’s boyfriend stated
he saw the assailants shooting at his girlfriend. After multiple shots were fired, the
assailants left in their vehicle.
The victim’s boyfriend had been shot in the back of the legs. The victim was shot
in the legs and back, and died at the scene. The victim, who attended Fresno State, was
wearing Fresno State clothing, which was predominantly red. The victim’s boyfriend
was unable to provide a useful description of the assailants to police.
A confidential informant first led the police to K.G. and two others. The
informant stated K.G. told him about K.G.’s involvement in the shooting, and explained
they had seen the victim, who was wearing red, and thought she might be going to meet a
rival gang member at the park. They followed her and waited, and, when the victim’s
boyfriend arrived, pulled up and started shooting. K.G. acknowledged being the shooter;
the other individuals served as driver and lookout, according to the informant. All three
of them had bragged about the shooting and discussed it with the informant on multiple

3.
occasions. K.G. told the informant on several occasions that he had shot the female
victim.
In early 2022, Delano detectives planned what they referred to as an “Operation”
after K.G. was arrested on other charges. K.G. was placed in an audio-recorded cell
along with one or more undercover agents. A detective then met with K.G. and presented
him with evidence, including several fake documents, which the detective claimed
implicated K.G. in the homicide of the young woman. The detective then left, after
which K.G. implicated himself in the homicide to the undercover agents, explaining that
while both he and another individual had the guns, he was sure he was the one who had
shot the victim. K.G. also identified the suspect vehicle as his mother’s car. After these
discussions with the undercover agents, the detective interviewed K.G., during which he
admitted to the shooting. K.G. claimed the victim’s boyfriend had pulled a gun out, and
K.G. had fired in self-defense. However, police reports indicate this account is not
supported by video surveillance obtained from nearby buildings.
The driver of the assailants’ car was interviewed by police. The driver told police
the homicide was K.G.’s idea. K.G. had shown up to the driver’s house and told the
driver he wanted to “‘put in work.’” After they pulled up to the park, K.G. told the driver
to stop, at which point K.G. got out and started shooting; the shooting continued until the
driver claimed he noticed a girl there, and told K.G. to stop shooting and get back in the
car. K.G. refused to stop at first, but soon got back in the car and they drove away. The
driver told K.G. it was “not cool” that he had shot the victim, and that the target should
have been her boyfriend.
After the driver and the third assailant were interviewed by police, they were
placed in a holding room together with an audio-recording device running. The pair
continued to make incriminating statements about K.G.’s involvement in the shooting.

4.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A juvenile wardship petition pursuant to section 602 was filed on March 9, 2022,
alleging five counts against K.G.: first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a), 189,
subd. (a); count 1); attempted first degree murder (id., §§ 664/187, subd. (a), 189,
subd. (a); count 2); two counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (id., § 245,
subd. (b); counts 3, 4); and possession of a stolen vehicle (id., § 496d, subd. (a);
count 5.). Additionally, the petition alleged the murder occurred while K.G. was an
active participant in a criminal street gang, thus making the murder count death penalty
eligible pursuant to Penal Code section 190.2, subdivision (a)(22). The petition further
alleged enhancements based on K.G.’s use of a firearm (id., § 12022.53, subd. (d),
counts 1, 2; id., § 12022.5, subd. (a), counts 3, 4; id., § 12022.7, subd. (a), counts 3, 4)
and gang affiliation (id., § 186.22, subd. (b)(1), counts 1–4; id., § 186.22, subd. (d),
count 5). A motion to transfer the case to criminal court pursuant to sections 602 and 707
was filed the same day. At the time the petition was filed, K.G. was already serving a
sentence in the Kern County Jail, and had also been sentenced to a term in state prison.
K.G. has thus been detained since the initiation of this matter.
What followed next was a long series of continuances, requests for extensions, and
status conferences. The record shows that K.G. requested a continuance or extension on
the following dates for the parenthetically indicated reasons, almost all of which were
granted: March 10, 2022 (counsel had not received copy of transfer motion); April 20,
2022 (investigation and discovery pending); June 7, 2022 (investigation and discovery
pending); August 3, 2022 (investigation and discovery review pending); September 20,
2022 (investigation and discovery review pending); November 7, 2022 (investigation and
discovery review pending); January 9, 2023 (investigation and discovery review
pending); February 21, 2023 (investigation and discovery review pending); June 13, 2023

5.
(no reason given); July 19, 2023 (attorney leaving practice)2; July 25, 2023 (new defense
attorney substituting into case); September 11, 2023 (new attorney reviewing discovery);
October 20, 2023 (new attorney reviewing discovery); February 14, 2024 (defense
motion to seek additional funds for expert); March 27, 2024 (substitute counsel requested
further time for orders for expert review); April 15, 2024 (defense motion for additional
expert funds pending); June 4, 2024 (defense request to substitute different expert);
July 16, 2024 (further time for expert review); August 27, 2024 (second expert refused
appointment, and further time needed to secure new expert); October 8, 2024 (third
expert located; motion for expert funding and evaluation pending); November 20, 2024
(status hearing trailed due to defense counsel illness); December 10, 2024 (motion for
expert funds pending); January 28, 2025 (probation report and defense expert
investigation pending)3; and March 12, 2025 (further time needed for briefing). The
record shows the People requested and were granted a continuance or extension only
twice: April 19, 2023 (filing a motion to seal certain discovery and jury trial)4 and
December 4, 2023 (prosecutor activated by the “California State Guard”)5.
Counsel expressly waived time from being counted against K.G.’s right to a
speedy trial on the vast majority of these occasions, typically at the direct questioning of
the trial court, and implicitly waived time on the rest of these by agreeing to an extension
or consenting to a specific date. Beginning in April 2024, the People began objecting to

2 The People also indicated they needed further time to file a discovery motion to seal
certain documents.
3 The court did set a briefing schedule at this hearing, over K.G.’s objection.
4 K.G.’s counsel also noted they were still in the process of obtaining and reviewing
discovery as of that point.
5 K.G.’s counsel indicated at this hearing the parties were exploring a plea deal via adult
court that K.G. “might be interested in taking,” and that K.G. might ultimately be “waiving
transfer .…”

6.
all further continuances and requesting that the matter be set for a transfer hearing as
soon as possible.
At the vast majority of these hearings, K.G. was present, and he was absent only
from six hearings: November 7, 2022 (no reason given; waiver given by counsel),
December 4, 2023 (refused transport; waiver given by counsel), August 27, 2024 (no
reason given; waiver given by counsel), January 28, 2025 (no reason given; waiver given
by counsel), February 18, 2025 (no reason given; waiver given by counsel), and
March 12, 2025 (no reason given; waiver given by counsel). As noted, at each of these
hearings, a waiver of personal appearance was given by counsel.
The transfer hearing in this case was held on April 1, 2025. The trial court
accepted the probation officer’s report as evidence, along with the briefs of counsel and
exhibits attached thereto, and also took judicial notice of other pending cases against
K.G. No testimony was presented at the transfer hearing.
The trial court issued its ruling on April 15, 2025, and concluded the People had
demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that K.G. was not amenable to
rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Because K.G. does not
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in relation to this finding on appeal, we recount
the court’s conclusions only briefly.6 The court found K.G. exhibited significant criminal
sophistication, noting: K.G. and his cohorts drove to another town for the specific

6 Before transferring a case from juvenile to adult court, the court must find the People
have demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the minor “is not amenable to
rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3).) While
making this finding, the statute directs the court to consider five factors: (1) “The degree of
criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor”; (2) “Whether the minor can be rehabilitated
prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction”; (3) “The minor’s previous delinquent
history”; (4) the “Success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor”;
and (5) “The circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to have been
committed by the minor.” (Id., subd. (a)(3)(A)–(E).) None of these factors is more important
than the others, and all must be considered in relation to the ultimate issue of whether the minor
is amenable to rehabilitation. (In re Miguel R. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 152, 167.)

7.
purpose of shooting a rival gang member; waited until they found the victim and then
waited further for her boyfriend to arrive; shot the victims and fled the scene; and lied to
officers about the shooting being in self-defense. All of this tended to show K.G. did not
act impulsively, but rather premeditated the killing and attempted to evade responsibility
for it, demonstrating he was aware of the consequences and severity of the crime. The
court concluded there would not be sufficient time to rehabilitate K.G., as the court
would have approximately three years three months while he remained under juvenile
jurisdiction. It noted K.G. had failed to rehabilitate despite numerous prior opportunities
to do so. The court observed K.G. was “very intelligent” and had “the capacity to grow
and change,” but that it did not appear “likely to happen in such a short period of time,”
in part because his “actions have not demonstrated a motivation to change.” The court
recited K.G.’s lengthy juvenile history, and concluded it favored transfer to adult court.
Concerning the fourth factor, the court found this also favored transfer; while it noted
K.G. had some success in prior juvenile placements, it noted even K.G. admitted that all
that rehabilitation “went out the window when he was released from custody” and he
began to commit new crimes. Lastly, the seriousness of the crime militated in favor of
transfer, per the court, because K.G. specifically went out with the intention of shooting
someone, was the actual shooter, and fired approximately a dozen shots with the intention
of killing his targets. He then bragged about the killing to others, showing no remorse.
The court commented, “Weighing all five factors, this particular case was not a very
close one,” and found the People had demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that
K.G. was not amenable to rehabilitation.
A notice of appeal was timely filed.
DISCUSSION
K.G. does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his transfer
nor does he claim that the trial court erred in some way in finding clear and convincing
evidence of his lack of amenability to rehabilitation. Rather, K.G. argues that he was

8.
deprived of his federal and state constitutional speedy trial rights by the delays in
bringing the matter to a transfer hearing, and that the court erred by granting his requests
for continuance without requiring that he show good cause. K.G. also complains that
these continuances violated statutory law both because they were not written motions and
because the court did not make specific findings of good cause for each requested
continuance. These delays prejudiced K.G., since the time remaining on the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction is an express factor the court must consider in making its amenability
assessment. (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(B).)
Next, K.G. argues he had a right to be personally present for all juvenile court
proceedings, which he was denied, due to his absence from approximately six of the
status hearings. Per K.G., his counsel lacked authority to waive his appearance, and the
trial court lacked authority to accept a waiver of appearance.
K.G. also argues he had a right to access resources necessary to litigate the
question of his amenability to rehabilitation—namely the appointment of an expert to
conduct an evaluation—but claims he was denied that right due to the delays in this case.
It appears K.G.’s argument hinges on the fact that the court did not itself supply him the
expert, but rather ultimately required his counsel to obtain an independent expert for
which it provided funding, after the first two experts retained by the court were
unavailable for the appointment. Further, K.G. asserts that his counsel was provided with
insufficient resources because, after his first counsel substituted out of the case, his
successor counsel noted she had other cases that had higher priority.
According to K.G., having shown error, he need not show prejudice, since there is
not a requirement to show prejudice on interlocutory review. However, K.G. asserts he
still can show prejudice, because even his own expert did not believe that there was
sufficient time to rehabilitate him after all the procedural delays that had occurred. If
evaluated promptly, there was a better chance the expert would have concluded there was
sufficient time to rehabilitate him, which may have led to a better outcome, per K.G.

9.
Lastly, K.G. argues we should set aside any forfeiture occasioned by the fact that
he asked for these continuances, because it is fundamentally unfair to allow him to suffer
the harm of a delay in these circumstances. Alternatively, K.G. argues the court should
find he was given IAC by his counsel requesting and receiving the numerous
continuances that made up the vast majority of the delay in this case.
I. K.G. Has Both Forfeited and Waived Any Claims of Error Based on Speedy
Trial Rights, Personal Appearance, or a Lack of Resources
This appeal is largely resolved by the doctrines of waiver and forfeiture. Waiver
is “‘the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’” (Lynch v.
California Coastal Com. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 470, 475 (Lynch).) “Waiver requires an
existing right, the waiving party’s knowledge of that right, and the party’s ‘actual
intention to relinquish the right.’” (Ibid.) Waiver is always predicated upon a party’s
intentions, which may be manifested either expressly or by implication, i.e., either by
words or by conduct “that is ‘“so inconsistent with an intent to enforce the right as to
induce a reasonable belief that such right has been relinquished.”’” (Ibid.)
Forfeiture, by contrast, emerges when a party fails to preserve a claim by raising a
timely objection. (Lynch, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 476; In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287,
1293, fn. 2.) We have long held that a party may not raise an issue on appeal where they
have failed to challenge that issue in the trial court and, thus, never afforded the trial
court an opportunity to remedy the error. (In re G.B. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 464, 469; In
re Brian K. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 39, 42; In re Josue S. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 168,
170–171.) This doctrine “‘is intended to prevent a party from standing by silently until
the conclusion of the proceedings.’” (In re C.M. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 376, 385.)
While the application of the forfeiture rule is not automatic, and forfeiture may be
excused at the discretion of the appellate court, our Supreme Court has cautioned that
“the appellate court’s discretion to excuse forfeiture should be exercised rarely and only
in cases presenting an important legal issue.” (In re S.B., supra, at p. 1293; see In re

10.
Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887–888, fn. 7 [noting appellate courts typically only
excuse forfeiture “when a forfeited claim involves an important issue of constitutional
law or a substantial right” or, occasionally, when the appellant lacked a “meaningful
opportunity to object at trial”].)
Assuming that speedy trial rights attach to this proceeding,7 it is beyond clear K.G.
waived his rights to a speedy trial in this case. This is why the trial court repeatedly
sought and obtained express waivers of time from being counted against K.G.’s speedy
trial rights, which occurred on 21 separate occasions. Typically, the court specifically
questioned counsel as to whether time was waived, and elicited affirmative confirmation;
on a few of the occasions, counsel preemptively volunteered that K.G. would waive time.
This is, by its very definition, an express waiver of the right to a speedy trial. To find
anything else would be to eviscerate the doctrine of waiver and upend the law of criminal
procedure in this state. The remaining continuances all occurred either at K.G.’s request,
or with K.G.’s consent to a specific date, which is sufficient to find an implied waiver of
K.G.’s speedy trial rights. Affirmative requests for a continuance, all of which were over
the People’s objection after April 2024, are fundamentally incompatible with a desire for
a speedy trial.8 We will not analyze the merits of a claim that has been so obviously and
repeatedly waived.
We are not persuaded by K.G.’s argument that his counsel was not permitted to

7 Speedy trial rights have been found to attach to the jurisdictional hearing, which must be
held in juvenile proceedings. (In re Chuong D. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1309.) Since a
request to transfer jurisdiction must be held prior to the jurisdictional hearing (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 5.766(d)), we assume without deciding that speedy trial rights also attach by
implication to a transfer motion.
8 To the extent K.G. claims the trial court violated statutory law by failing to require the
motion be written and by not making a specific finding of good cause, we conclude K.G.
implicitly waived the first argument by making only oral requests for continuances—an action
incompatible with a desire to have all motions be in writing—and forfeited both arguments, as he
raised neither below.

11.
waive time on his behalf. K.G.’s citations to Townsend v. Superior Court (1975) 15
Cal.3d 774 and People v. Turner (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1214 (Turner) do not convince us
otherwise. Townsend states an attorney may not waive a criminal defendant’s right to a
speedy trial “over his client’s objections.” (Townsend, supra, at p. 781.)9 However,
counsel points to nothing in the record showing K.G. objected to any of these
continuances. K.G. was present for the vast majority of these hearings and never raised
any complaints. Townsend does not stand for the broad proposition K.G. now asserts.
We find similarly on K.G.’s claims of error based on the fact that he was not
present at six of these hearings. California statute does provide K.G. with a general right
to be present at all court hearings pertaining to him. (§§ 679, 224.71, subd. (p).)
However, the right to be physically present at a hearing can be waived. Courts have
specifically noted a minor may waive the right to be physically present if they make “a
knowing and intelligent waiver, considering the minor’s age and other relevant
circumstances, including intelligence, education, experience, and ability to comprehend
the meaning and effect of his or her acts.” (In re Sidney M. (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 39,
48.) “Stated another way, Welfare and Institutions Code section 679 simply requires that
the state not do anything that would preclude the minor from being present and that if the
minor is voluntarily absent, thereafter he or she cannot complain of the situation thus
created .…” (Id. at pp. 48–49.) This is similar to criminal proceedings, in which the
defendant can likewise waive a physical or remote appearance. (Pen. Code, § 977,
subd. (b)(1).)

9 Turner merely reiterates this component of Townsend, and states generally that an
attorney may not waive a client’s speedy trial rights—among numerous others—over the
client’s objection. (Turner, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1220–1221.) The actual issue
analyzed in Turner was whether a refusal to file a suppression motion is a constitutional
choice akin to the right to confront witnesses or demand a speedy trial, or in the realm of
counsel’s authority to control trial strategy, similar to selection of witnesses or requests
for continuances. (Id. at pp. 1221–1222.) It therefore sheds little light on the case at bar.

12.
Of the approximately 30 hearings held in this case prior to the appealed order,
K.G. was only absent from six, all of which were exceedingly brief. Each time K.G. was
not present, the court made note of this on the record and solicited a waiver as to K.G.’s
right of personal appearance from counsel, which K.G.’s counsel affirmatively gave. By
the point at which K.G. was absent from the hearings, he was experienced in the criminal
justice system, having been involved in the juvenile justice system for many years and
having further criminal charges against him for which he had already been sentenced.
Further, he was present at numerous other hearings, at which he could have raised his
objection to any proceedings occurring without his physical presence, but did not. We
therefore conclude the court reasonably accepted these waivers from his attorney as
valid.10 Having waived his right to be physically present, K.G. may not now complain of
it on appeal.
Lastly, we find K.G. has forfeited any argument that he lacked sufficient resources
to mount a defense to the transfer motion, as this issue was never raised in the court
below. While we do retain the discretion to set aside this forfeiture, we decline to
exercise it in this instance, as this is not one of the rare cases presenting an especially
important legal issue that warrants resolution. (In re S.B., supra, 32 Cal. 4th at p. 1293.)
Further, even if we were to reach this issue, the record does not support a finding
of error. The authority cited by K.G. holds that the right to a speedy trial “may be denied
simply by the failure of the state to provide enough courtrooms or judges to enable [the]
defendant to come to trial within the statutory period.” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26
Cal.3d 557, 571.) However, as discussed above, K.G. affirmatively waived any speedy

10 K.G.’s argument that such waivers must be personally made and could not be made on
his behalf by his attorney is not persuasive. K.G. cites no authority to this effect. Generally
speaking, the relationship between attorney and client is predicated on agency principles, which
permit the attorney to act on behalf of the client within the scope of their authority, either actual
or apparent. (Blanton v. Womancare, Inc. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 396, 403.) The ability to waive
K.G.’s personal appearance at a brief procedural hearing is clearly within both the actual and
apparent scope of an attorney’s authority.

13.
trial arguments, expressly and repeatedly. We will not discard these waivers without
exceedingly good reason that is well supported by legal authority and the record, neither
of which are present here.
Indeed, while the record here reflects that the attorneys, the court, and the experts
were busy, there is nothing particularly unique about this situation. Nothing indicates the
press of business was so severe K.G.’s case functionally could not proceed. Rather, it
appears numerous personal choices, largely made by K.G. and those on his team, caused
the lengthy delay in this case. K.G.’s initial counsel resigned from the indigent defense
program, necessitating new counsel who substituted into the case in July 2023.
Substituted counsel received numerous extensions to allow for discovery review and time
to file motions seeking additional funds for experts. Ultimately, K.G.’s counsel elected
to move on from the first expert provided by the court in June 2024 after the expert did
not respond as promptly as counsel wished with supporting documentation needed for a
motion for additional expert funds. The second expert refused the appointment by the
court in August 2024, at which point the court advised defense counsel they would need
to obtain their own expert, for which the court would pay. Counsel located a third expert,
and filed a motion for expert funding in October 2024, but did not apparently realize a
transfer report had not been completed by probation until January 2025. At that point,
the court set the hearing over the objection of K.G.’s counsel, as the People had been
objecting to any further continuances in the matter since April 2024 and asking that a
briefing schedule for the transfer hearing be set.
At no point did K.G., his counsel, or any of his experts state that they could not get
the necessary work done in a timely manner due to a lack of resources, or state they
wished to move forward but could not because resource delays were causing difficulties.
Indeed, K.G. does not point to any particular continuances that were unreasonable within
the context of this case. Murder prosecutions often contain significant amounts of
discovery, and the process was delayed when K.G.’s first attorney left practice, which

14.
effectively doubled the time needed to review discovery. However, this review was an
unavoidable and important part of representing K.G. There were also indications that
K.G. was exploring negotiating a plea deal at various points. Ultimately, the delay in
adjudicating the transfer motion allowed K.G.’s counsel to review discovery, obtain an
expert witness to oppose transfer, and attempt to negotiate a plea deal, all of which were
certainly reasonable and prudent measures. (Cf. In re O.F. (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 133,
164 [noting that, since the underlying question in § 707 is “a minor’s amenability to
rehabilitation, expert testimony ‘will likely be necessary,’ and the testimony of experts
that the minor can be treated ‘“is entitled to great weight in the court’s ultimate
determination”’”].) We would find no constitutional violation due to a lack of resources,
even were we to reach this issue.
II. K.G. Fails to Show Constitutional IAC
The Sixth Amendment entitles all defendants to effective assistance of counsel.
(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 686 (Strickland).) A claim of
constitutional IAC requires two showings:
“First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance
was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing
that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”
(Strickland, supra, at p. 687.)
A similar showing is required to demonstrate constitutional IAC under article I,
section 15, of the California Constitution. (People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171,
215.) The appellant bears the burden of establishing trial counsel was constitutionally
inadequate. (People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 436.)
This is a high bar for an appellant to meet. (Harrington v. Richter (2011) 562 U.S.
86, 105.) Establishing deficient performance requires evidence that “counsel’s

15.
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” (Strickland, supra,
466 U.S. at p. 688.) Trial counsel’s performance must be reviewed by this court in a
“highly deferential” manner. (Id. at p. 689.) “Because of the difficulties inherent in
making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant
must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action
‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” (Ibid.) Further, the burden is “difficult to
carry on direct appeal,” and we will “‘“reverse convictions [on direct appeal] on the
ground of inadequate counsel only if the record on appeal affirmatively discloses that
counsel had no rational tactical purpose for [his or her] act or omission.”’” (People v.
Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 437.) Because such a claim requires the record to contain
affirmative evidence that counsel had no rational tactical reason for proceeding in the
manner they did, such claims are typically more conducive to resolution in a separate
action for a writ of habeas corpus. (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266–
267.)
Here, K.G. points to nothing in the record affirmatively showing his counsel’s
performance fell outside the wide range of permissible latitude granted under Strickland.
The record simply does not contain affirmative evidence that there were no rational
tactical reasons for requesting these continuances; instead, each of the requested
continuances was justified by a stated reason, typically to allow for review of discovery
or the securing of an expert witness and funds to pay them. K.G. notes his second
attorney advised the court she had received multiple cases at the same time and had been
instructed to give other cases more priority. K.G. argues this indicates she completely
abandoned her representation of him. This grossly overstates the matter: the mere fact of
delays coupled with an offhanded statement to the court about taking on multiple cases
falls far short of affirmatively demonstrating K.G.’s attorney failed to meaningfully
represent her client or his interests. Indeed, the record shows K.G.’s counsel ultimately

16.
produced a report from a retained expert and used this report to file a brief opposing
transfer.
Moreover, even if we assumed K.G.’s attorney was constitutionally ineffective in
failing to bring the matter to a transfer hearing sooner, there is no indication of prejudice
here, which is an essential component of a Strickland challenge. (Strickland, supra, 466
U.S. at p. 687.) In order to meet this standard, K.G. must “‘show “a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.”’” (In re Seumanu (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 599, 623.) We
are far from convinced the trial court’s ruling would have been any different even if the
analysis of the second factor was changed to allow more time for rehabilitation. The fact
remains that the egregious violence and planning involved in this alleged crime would
almost certainly have outweighed even several additional years of rehabilitation
opportunity, suggesting that a more timely hearing would almost certainly have had no
impact on the court’s transfer decision. We base this in part on the court’s comments that
“this particular case was not a very close one” before concluding that each factor weighed
in favor of transfer. In particular, the court concluded K.G. did not act impulsively, but
rather showed sophistication and intentionality in the crime. The court also noted that,
even though K.G. had the capacity to grow and change, it did not appear likely to happen
since there was no indication he had any motivation to change. We do not believe there
is a reasonable probability that holding the transfer hearing sooner would have resulted in
the transfer motion being denied.

17.
DISPOSITION
For the reasons given above, the transfer order is affirmed.

MEEHAN, J.
WE CONCUR:

HILL, P. J.

HARRELL, J.

18.

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